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5Preface
This issue of the Netherlands Institute for Law and Governance Series is the result 
of an Administrative Law Research Seminar held on June 11th 2014, in 
Groningen, under the theme: “On lawmaking and public trust”.
We are grateful to the speakers and participants who have generously accepted to 
take part in this seminar and make their essays available to a wider audience by 
contributing to this publication.  
In addition to the debt we owe our contributors, we wish to express our gratitude 
to the Department for Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Public 
Administration of the University of Groningen Law Faculty, the Research 
Program Public Trust and Public Law and the Groningen Centre for Law and 
Governance for financing this project. Finally, we would like to thank 
Mrs Renée Pruneau and the Publisher, Eleven International Publishing, for their 
competent and efficient work as well as the members of the peer review 
committee for their meticulous work, which has resulted in numerous constructive 
comments for the authors. 
May 2016,  
Suzanne Comtois 
Kars de Graaf 
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Contemporary Lawmaking and Public Trust: 
Challenges, Threats and Opportunities 
Suzanne Comtois*
This book, as well as the research seminar that preceded it, explores ways in which 
lawmaking is changing under various pressures and examines the impact of such 
changes on the law itself, on the lawmaking processes, and on the role of decision-
makers (judges, public administrators and stakeholders). It also questions the 
legitimacy and impact, on the public’s trust and confidence, of the new 
governance tools that have emerged from this transformation.   
1. The transformation of lawmaking  
Over the last decades, the evolution of public law has been marked by a trend 
towards the diversification of the sources and forms of law, processes and 
governance tools. In our ever more globalized world, various factors (such as the 
increasing importance of European law, international law and fundamental rights, 
as well as the greater prevalence of social and economic concerns) have tended to 
justify the need to harmonize legal norms and practices and, thus, to open the 
borders of legal normativity. The increased interaction between legal systems and 
other sources of normativity has led to the coexistence of a diversity of normative 
authorities (ranging from civil society and the industry itself, to European and 
international organizations). It has also resulted in the emergence, within domestic 
law, of a broad range of norms grounded in different sources of legitimacy and 
with varying degrees of normative force, not merely constrained to the narrow 
formal definition of “legal norm”.   
Within the judicial branch, the creation of judges’ international networks, together 
with their common interests and the development of a European or international 
judicial culture, has led to the increasing use of foreign legal material (binding as 
well as non-binding) by the highest courts when interpreting vague statutes or 
dealing with difficult cases.1 Canadian courts, for example, have used foreign 
*  Professeur titulaire (Full Professor) at the Faculté de droit, Université de Sherbrooke 
and visiting Professor at the University of Groningen Law School, Netherlands (2010-
2014). The author wishes to thank Chantal Racette, currently completing her master’s 
degree in notarial law at the Faculté de droit, Université de Sherbrooke, for her 
collaboration.  
1  On this question, see namely:  Elaine MAK, Judicial Decision-Making in a Globalised 
World: A Comparative Analysis of the Changing Practices of Western Highest Courts,
Oxford, Hart Publishing,  2013;  Sam MULLER and Sydney RICHARDS (eds), Highest 
Courts and Globalisation, The Hague, Hague Academic Press, 2010; Antoine HOL et 
al. “Special Issue on Highest Courts and Transnational Interaction”, (2012) 8-2 Utrecht
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legal material in cases dealing with a wide range of topics, including 
environmental protection,2 international trade obligations, constitutional issues 
related to war crimes and crimes against humanity, extradition to countries where 
the death penalty may be imposed, and deportation of refugees to areas where 
they risk torture.3 The growing influence of these external sources (international, 
European or other foreign legal material) is a subject of debate among scholars
and among judges themselves. At the center of this debate is the tension between 
diverging views on the role and limits of the national courts with respect to 
upholding the rule of law and promoting core democratic values. More 
specifically, as pointed out by the authors LeBel and Chao, there is a “tension 
between the democratic principle underlying the internal legal order and the 
search for conformity or consistency with a developing and uncertain external 
legal order”.4
Likewise, at the administrative level, especially in states with liberal market-
oriented economies, the quest for superior performance and the development of a 
new culture has transformed the legal landscape.5 Laws and direct regulations are 
Law Review 1; Basil MARKESINIS and Jörg FEDTKE, Judicial Recourse to Foreign Law: 
A New Source of Inspiration?, New York, Routledge-Cavendish, 2006; 
Michel  BASTARACHE, “The Globalisation of the Law and the Work of the Supreme 
Court of Canada” in Sam MULLER and Sydney RICHARDS (eds), Highest Courts and 
Globalisation,  The Hague, Hague Academic Press,  2010,  p. 41-54.   Among the other 
authors cited on the subject in Elaine Mak’s book, see namely:  Vicki JACKSON,
Constitutional Engagement in a Tran/snational Era, Oxford,  Oxford University Press, 
2009;  Aida  TORRES  PÉREZ, Conflicts of Rights in the European Union:  A theory of 
Supranational  Adjudication,  Oxford,  Oxford  University  Press,   2009;  Mitchel  
DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, Judicial Deliberations: A Comparative Analysis of Judicial 
Transparency and Legitimacy, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004; and Michal 
BOBEK, Comparative Reasoning in European Supreme Courts: A Study in Foreign 
Persuasive Authority, Doctoral thesis, European University Institute, 2011.  
2 See namely: 114957 Canada Ltée (Spraytech, Société d'arrosage) v. Hudson (Ville),
2001 SCC 40, in which the Supreme Court of Canada discusses the interpretative role 
of the international law precautionary principle.  
3  Louis LeBel and Gloria CHAO, “The Rise of International Law in Canadian 
Constitutional Litigation: Fugue or Fusion? Recent Developments and Challenges in 
Internalizing International Law”, (2002) 16 Supreme Court Law Review (2d) 23.  
4  L. LeBel and G. CHAO, cited in note 3, p. 24. On this question, see also: S. MULLER and 
S. RICHARDS, cited in note 1; E. MAK, cited in note 1. 
5  On this theme see namely: (69) P. Issalys, Répartir les normes. Le choix entre les formes 
d’action étatique, Québec, Société de l’assurance automobile du Québec 2002, à la 
p. 90 (La réglementation par objectifs); Ch.-A. Morand, Le droit néo-moderne des 
politiques publiques, Paris, LGDJ, 1999, à la p.77 (nature des objectifs);  L. M. Salamon 
(dir.), The Tools of Government : A guide to the New Governance, Oxford University 
Press, 2002;  P. F. Eliadis, M. M. Hill et M. P. Howlett (dir.) Designing Government : 
from  instruments to Governance, Montréal, McGill / Queen’s University Press, 2005; 
W.A. Bogart, « The Tools of the Administrative State and the Regulatory Mix » dans 
C. M. Flood et L. Sossin (dir.), Administrative Law in Context, 1re éd., Toronto, Emond 
Montgomery Publications, 2008, 25;  P. Lascoumes et P. Le Galès (dir.), Gouverner
par les instruments, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po. 2005; Ch. Halpern, P. Lascoumes, 
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still important but now form only part of the picture. To improve efficiency and 
adapt state action and practices to ever-changing contexts, public administrations 
have sought alternatives to traditional command-and-control regulation. New 
forms and methods of regulation and practices that promote greater flexibility, 
responsibility and technical expertise, rather than control, have emerged. These 
include smart regulation, principles-based regulation, self-regulation, negotiated 
norms, soft law, procedural safeguards and various other forms of participative 
democracy. Last but not least, the transformation of lawmaking cannot be 
properly assessed without a clear account of the  soft law phenomenon, that is the 
production, by the public administration itself, of an abundance of administrative 
norms, (often called “soft law”) not binding per se, but often interpreted as such 
for the sake of coherence.   
In contrast to the binding character of traditional regulation, these new public 
governance tools put greater emphasis on social dialogue and objectives such as 
flexibility, fairness, transparency, participation, accountability, justification, 
consensus, collaboration, effectiveness, consistency, legitimacy and social 
acceptability. For instance, in many sectors, such as public transportation, 
financial markets, agriculture and some industrial branches, various forms of co- 
or self-regulation and soft law have replaced or supplanted general state rules. In 
other sectors, such as energy, natural resources and watershed management, 
participatory decision-making processes have been introduced to give 
stakeholders (First Nations, citizens, industry actors, public interest groups, etc.) 
a stronger voice at the various stages of the lawmaking process, from the 
elaboration of the norms to their application in individual cases. In other settings, 
like pollution control, a combination of policy tools including market incentives 
(pollution permits, carbon exchange and voluntary measures6), complement 
regulatory frameworks.  
At first glance, this evolution may appear beneficial for the field of administrative 
law, in that it reflects a spirit of adaptation and a greater concern for efficiency 
and values such as cooperation and communication in the development of new 
policy instruments. However, the increasing use of new types of norms flowing 
from various normative systems or attached to other sources of legitimacy raises 
serious questions as to their place with respect to national legal systems. Their 
growing influence not only blurs the boundary between law and non-law, but also 
P. Le Galès (dir.), L’Instrumentation de l’action publique, Paris, Presses de Sciences 
Po. 2014; S. Breyer, Regulation and its Reform, Cambridge (Mass), Harvard University 
Press, 1982; S. Breyer, “Analyzing Regulatory Failure : Mismatches, Less Restrictive 
Alternatives, and Reform”, (1979) 92 Harvard Law Review, 547; D. Mockle, 
« Gouverner sans le droit? Mutation des normes et nouveaux modes de régulation », 
(2002) 43 Cahiers de Droit 143 : D. Mockle, « L’évincement du droit par l’invention 
de son double : les mécanismes néo-réglementaires en droit public », (2003 44 Cahiers 
de Droit 297. 
6  Such as the industry monitoring initiative suggested by the Governor of the Bank of 
England at the 2015 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Paris. 
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creates new challenges when it comes to their integration into domestic law and 
the means of ensuring their legitimacy through proper democratic checks and 
balances. Soft law, for instance, is usually considered as being outside of the 
recognized categories of positive law, unlike traditional laws and regulations that 
are binding and enforceable against third parties. Yet, the use of soft law is broadly 
acknowledged7 and, under certain conditions, even legitimized and encouraged 
by courts8 as a flexible means of controlling the use of discretionary powers and 
curtailing arbitrariness in administrative decision-making. As a result, despite its 
lack of binding force or legal status, soft law often has important impacts on the 
individuals, the businesses or even the member states (EU) to which it applies. 
2. The transformation of lawmaking and public trust
The evolution of lawmaking and of the conception of law referred to above also 
raises questions about the impact of such a transformation on public trust and 
confidence in the law itself and in its processes, institutions and stakeholders.  
It is well established that trust matters in lawmaking. For instance, the “decisions 
of legal authorities mean little if the members of the public do not follow them”.9
Research has shown that compliance with laws and regulations rises when the 
level of trust and confidence is high.10 In less democratic societies, it may not be 
impossible to govern without trust or legitimacy11 but, in the absence of voluntary 
compliance, governments must resort to coercion and “expend enormous 
resources to create a credible system of surveillance through which to monitor 
public behavior, reward desired behavior, and punish rule violators”.12 On the 
other hand, voluntary compliance, obtained through trust or legitimacy, not only 
reflects our core democratic values, it “makes governing easier and more 
effective,” less costly,13 and it frees up state resources.14 In other words, voluntary 
7  For an exhaustive study of the soft law phenomenon’s terms of acceptance, see:
CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, FRANCE, Étude annuelle 2013 du Conseil d’État. Le droit souple,
coll. « Études et documents, Conseil d’État », La Documentation française, 2013. 
8 See namely, Friends of the Oldman River Society v. Canada (Ministre des Transports),
[1992] 1 SCR 3.  
9  Tom R. TYLER, “Trust and law abidingness: A proactive model of social regulation”, 
(2001) 81 Boston University Law Review 361, 363. 
10  Margaret LEVI, Audrey SACKS and Tom TYLER, “Conceptualizing Legitimacy, 
Measuring Legitimating Beliefs”, (2009) 53 American Behavioral Scientist 354, 356-
357; Myung JIN, “Citizen Participation, Trust, and Literacy on Government 
Legitimacy: The Case of Environmental Governance”, (2013) 5 Journal of Social 
Change 11, 14-15; T. R. TYLER, “Trust and law abidingness: A proactive model of 
social regulation”, cited in note 9, 366. 
11  M. LEVI, A. SACKS and T. TYLER, cited in note 9, 354-355. 
12 Id.; M. JIN, cited in note 10, 14. 
13  M. LEVI, A. SACKS and T. TYLER, cited in note 9, 354-355. 
14  T. R. TYLER, “Trust and law abidingness: A proactive model of social regulation”, cited 
in note 9, 386. 
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compliance with laws and regulations is crucial to both democracy and the 
efficient functioning of the legal system.15 In addition, research studies have 
shown that increased mutual understanding and trust foster cooperation.16 As 
such, trust and confidence facilitate social interaction, whether in the private 
sphere or in dealings with the state (through government agencies or other public 
authorities). On the contrary, a decrease in trust and confidence tends to 
negatively impact such relations. 
Insofar as public trust and lawmaking are interconnected, ensuring public trust in 
lawmaking seems even more important today. In our globalized world, 
characterized by rapidly evolving technologies, highly complex scientific and 
technological developments, intricate financial systems, and so on, it is often an 
enormous challenge for even the most sophisticated experts to fully understand 
the stakes and make rational decisions. To the general population, most of it is 
simply incomprehensible. In some instances, it is difficult even for government 
authorities, judges and administrative decision-makers to fully grasp the 
underlying issues. In that context, individuals and decision-makers often have no 
other choice but to trust the experts to act in the public’s interest and not in their 
own self-interest. However, the magnitude of the scandals that have occurred over 
the last decades - be it in the industrial sector (such as the recent Volkswagen 
“diesel dupe” scandal) or in the financial sector (for example, the Lehman 
Brothers scandal of 2008, the unethical ABACUS deal of the Golden Sachs 
investment bank and the syphoning off of large corporations’ profits into off-
shores bank accounts), as well as the numerous allegations of corruption, political 
traffic of influence, conflicts of interest, fraud and bribery voiced across the world
- have weakened the public’s trust in both governments and experts, and called 
into question the motives behind their actions. Nonetheless, as governance is 
unlikely to become any simpler, it is essential to restore or enhance public trust 
and confidence in lawmaking, as well as in the processes and institutions by which 
laws, regulations and norms are applied. This observation, in turn, has 
implications for modern lawmaking, which needs to repair trust. Is it the case?  Is 
public trust enhanced or undermined by contemporary lawmaking? Are the new 
governance tools trust-generating? For instance, does the increased reliance on 
self-regulation, negotiated norms, soft law, non-jurisdictional modes of conflict 
resolution and various procedural safeguards bolster public trust and confidence 
in the legal system, its processes and its institutions? Or else, is public trust and 
confidence being further undermined by such a diversification of sources and 
forms of lawmaking? If so, in what ways?  
Some nineteen authors have shared their thoughts on these issues and discussed 
the threats and challenges that perhaps call for adjustments in the contemporary 
lawmaking processes. Their essays analyze changes in lawmaking and their 
15  M. JIN, cited in note 10, 14. 
16 See, for instance: Tom R. TYLER, Why People Cooperate: The Role of Social 
Motivations, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 42-43. 
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impacts on public trust and confidence from various perspectives  (such as ethics, 
rights, legitimacy, democratic responsiveness, checks and balances, legitimate 
expectations, public interest, capture, technical competence, legal certainty, costs 
and efficiency) and within a variety of issues and contexts, including: the 
Europeanization and internationalisation of administrative law (Jans & Outhuijse;
Mendelts); the emergence of alternative modes of regulation and their trust-
generating qualities (Westerman; Bröring & Cherednychenko; Winter & 
Haarhuis); policy change and public trust (Lubach); the developing trends in 
access to justice in Dutch administrative law and practice, in the light of 
Jerry Mashaw’s theory of administrative justice (De Graaf & Marseille); the
erosion of the welfare state, through a shift from rights to conditional entitlements 
(Schwitters & Vonk ) and, from the point of view of the combination of statutory 
and private initiatives in domains such as social security (Tollenaar ). The book 
also analyses the tension between juridification and socialization in social control 
(De Ridder); the psychology of trust within public organizations and the use of 
mediation as a way of repairing trust (Beaudin); legal uncertainties and mistrust 
in the tacit authorization system under GALA (Hoogstra ); the effectiveness of 
citizen “participatory initiatives” under ECI (Zeegers) and other types of statutory 
consultations such as the ones conducted under the Waste electrical and electronic 
equipment Act, WEEE (Más). Finally, to conclude this book, a synthesis chapter 
will shed light on and draw attention to the key points developed in these essays 
(Hertogh).  
We thank all the contributors for this opportunity to reflect on lawmaking and 
public trust and we are confident that the present book has much to offer to those 
interested in these issues.  
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“Front-Door” versus “Back-Door” 
Lawmaking. 
 
A Case Study Concerning German Responses 
to the Challenges of the Aarhus Convention 
Jan H. Jans* and Annalies Outhuijse**
1. Introduction1
In most countries, the relationship between international and national law was 
never simple nor straightforward. In order to comply with international 
obligations, two main instruments have been applied at the national level. First of 
all, there is the royal road via the “front door”. If national law is not in sync with 
international obligations, the legislature assumes its responsibilities and takes 
action. National law will then be amended accordingly to comply with 
international law. However, there is also another way of dealing with national 
incompatibilities. We could call this the “back-door” way of lawmaking.2 With 
this method, the main actor is not the legislator but the court. The court performs 
lawmaking by interpreting national law in such a way that it is consistent with 
international obligations. In some countries, for instance the Netherlands, 
Germany and the United Kingdom, the courts have a duty to interpret in such a 
manner as a matter of national constitutional law.3 Furthermore, the Court of 
Justice of the EU requires, as a matter of EU law, that national courts interpret 
                                                            
*  Professor of Public Law and Vice-Dean (research) at the Faculty of Law, University of 
Groningen. 
**  PhD researcher on the functioning of dispute-resolution procedures of the Dutch 
competition authority at the University of Groningen. LL.M. in Dutch Law 
specialisation Constitutional and Administrative law (summa cum laude) and the LL.M. 
Research Master (cum laude).  
1  This text builds upon previous publications of the first author, in particular the 
publications mentioned in footnotes 2, 3 and 5. The text of this contribution was 
finished on 1 October 2015.  
2  Cf. on the concept of “back-door’ lawmaking: J.H. Jans, “Harmonisation of National 
Procedural Law Via the Back Door? Preliminary Comments on the ECJ's Judgment in 
Janecek in a Comparative Context, in: Bulterman, Hancher, McDonnell and Sevenster 
(eds), Views of European Law from the Mountain, (Liber Amicorum P.J. Slot), p. 267-
275. 
3  Cf. J.H. Jans, S. Prechal, R.J.G.M. Widdershoven (eds.), Europeanisation of Public 
Law (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2015), chapter 3. 





national law “as far as possible” in the light of EU law; the doctrine of consistent 
interpretation.4 
 
This contribution will discuss both methods of lawmaking by presenting a concise 
case study concerning German responses, from both the legislator and the courts, 
towards German obligations under Article 9(2) and (3) of the Aarhus Convention.  
 
2.  The front-door method 
The front-door method of lawmaking is lawmaking by the legislator and normal 
legislative procedures. The case of access to justice of environmental 
organisations in German administrative procedural law and the implementation 
of Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention in the German legal order can serve as 
an example of this front-door method.  
 
The Aarhus Convention is a so-called “mixed agreement” which means that both 
the European Union and the Member States are party to the Treaty.5 The official 
name of the Aarhus Convention is the Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental 
Matters.6 The official name reflects the three pillars of the Convention, namely 
(1) access to information, (2) public participation and (3) access to justice. In this 
chapter, we will focus on access to justice, the third pillar of the Convention, 
which is laid down in Article 9 of the Convention. The aim of the Convention is 
to provide wide access to justice, and this pillar provides effective enforcement of 
the two other pillars. Paragraphs 1 to 3 of Article 9 Aarhus Convention provide 
different possibilities for access to justice. The first paragraph only relates to 
disputes concerning the right to environmental information. The second paragraph 
stipulates access to justice with respect to the public participation pillar of 
Article 6 Aarhus Convention. The third paragraph provides an additional right 
with regard to the first and second paragraph, which will be discussed below in 
the context of the back-door method. The second paragraph is of particular 
importance for the description of the front-door method.  
 
                                                            
4  I.a.  Case  C-106/89  Marleasing  ECLI:EU:C:1990:395;  Joined  Cases  C-397/01  to 
C-403/01 Pfeiffer ECLI:EU:C:2004:584. Cf. also the literature referred to in footnote 
3, with further references in that chapter. 
5  Cf. J.H. Jans, “Who is the referee? Access to Justice in a Globalised Legal Order”. 
Review of European Administrative Law, 4(1), 2011, p. 87-99. 
6  There is abundant literature on this treaty. See, i.a., M. Pallemaerts (ed.), The Aarhus 
Convention at Ten; Interactions and Tensions between Conventional International Law 
and EU Environmental Law (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2011). 







Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention provides: 
 
2. Each Party shall, within the framework of its national legislation, 
ensure that members of the public concerned: 
(a) having a sufficient interest or, alternatively, 
(b) maintaining impairment of a right, where the administrative 
procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondition, have 
access to a review procedure before a court of law and/or another 
independent and impartial body established by law, to challenge the 
substantive and procedural legality of any decision, act or omission 
subject to the provisions of Article 6 and, where so provided for 
under national law and without prejudice to paragraph 3 below, of 
other relevant provisions of this Convention. 
 
What constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right shall 
be determined in accordance with the requirements of national law 
and consistently with the objective of giving the public concerned 
wide access to justice within the scope of this Convention. To this 
end, the interest of any non-governmental organisation meeting the 
requirements referred to in Article 2(5) shall be deemed sufficient 
for the purpose of subparagraph (a) above. Such organisations shall 
also be deemed to have rights capable of being impaired for the 
purpose of subparagraph (b) above. 
 
The provisions of this paragraph 2 shall not exclude the possibility 
of a preliminary review procedure before an administrative 
authority and shall not affect the requirement of exhaustion of 
administrative review procedures prior to recourse to judicial 
review procedures, where such a requirement exists under national 
law. 
 
The second paragraph of Article 9 stipulates the access to a review procedure for 
members of the public concerned with challenging the substantive or procedural 
legality of decisions, acts or omissions subject to the public participation 
provisions of Article 6 of the Convention. Pursuant to Article 9(2), the parties of 
the Convention have the choice to implement one of two admissibility criteria: 
either sufficient interest or the violation of a right. France has, for example, chosen 
the first option whereas Germany has chosen the second option. Environmental 
organizations within the meaning of Article 2, paragraph 5 Aarhus Convention 
are deemed to have a sufficient interest or to have a right that can be violated 
according to Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention. The European Union has adopted 
the provision of paragraph 2 with nearly identical wording in the EU Directive 
2003/35 (Public Participation Directive) through the amendment of Directive 
85/337 (Environmental Impact Assessment Directive (EIA Directive)) by the 
addition of Article 10a EIA Directive.7 These directives have been transposed by 
the Member States.  
                                                            
7  Directive 2003/35/EC, OJ 2003 L 156/1.  





In German literature, there has been significant controversy over whether §42(2) 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung (hereinafter: VwGO (administrative procedural 
law)) is compatible with these international and European provisions.8 The 
provision reads in English: 
 
Except where otherwise provided by law, such an action is 
admissible only if the claimant asserts that his rights have been 
impaired by the administrative measure or by the refusal or failure 
to act.9 
 
The VwGO contains a very strict admissibility criterion and the consequence 
thereof is a limited right of appeal. The German criterion is a stricter criterion 
than, for example, the criterion used in the Netherlands. The German legislature 
has chosen for the “violation of a right”-criterion, where sufficient interest grants 
no standing. The appellant is required under §42(2) VwGO to demonstrate that his 
subjective rights have been violated by a decision. An appellant only has a 
subjective right when the violated norm intends to protect the appellant’s 
individual interests. Therefore, the violation must be a breach of a so-called 
Schutznorm. The decision on whose rights a legal provision protects lies with the 
legislator and is therefore a purely legal decision. As a result, damage suffered by 
an individual does not result in access to a court if the law does not aim to protect 
the injured party. Consequently, the interpretation of legal provisions is of crucial 
importance. Due to this system, there is, in principle, no appeal possible for the 
protection of general interests, such as the environment. These general interests 
cannot be protected by environmental organizations either, since they cannot have 
subjective rights. As mentioned, the German literature raised the question whether 
§42(2) VwGO was compatible with Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention and 
Article 10a of the EIA Directive.  
 
The legislator decided to keep on the safe side and adopted a new act for the 
transposition of the EIA Directive, namely the Umweltrechtbehelfsgesetz 
(hereinafter: UmwRG).10 According to Paragraph 2(1)(1) of the UmwRG a 
“recognised”11 domestic or foreign association may, without being required to 
                                                            
8  Cf. A. Epiney, K. Sollberger, Zugang zu Gerichten und gerichtliche Kontrolle im 
Umweltrecht (Berlin 2002), p. 85; A. Epiney, “Verwaltungsgerichtlicher Rechtsschutz 
in Umweltangelegenheiten in Europa”, EurUP 2006, p. 242, at pp. 243 et seq., who 
compares the legal systems of different EU Member States with regard to access to 
justice; Cf. also Nicolas de Sadeleer, Gerhard Roller; Dross, Miriam (eds), Access to 
Justice in Environmental Matters and the Role of NGOs; Empirical Findings and Legal 
Appraisal (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2005). 
9  And in the original German text: “Soweit gesetzlich nichts anderes bestimmt ist, ist die 
Klage nur zulässig, wenn der Kläger geltend macht, durch den Verwaltungsakt oder 
seine Ablehnung oder Unterlassung in seinen Rechten verletzt zu sein.” 
10  Gesetz Ober ergänzende Vorschriften zu Rechtsbehelfen in Umweltangelegenheiten 
nach der EG-Richtlinie 2003/35/EG (Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz) of 7 December 
2006, BGBI. I 2006, p. 2816, 14 December. 
11  See § 3 UmwRG. 







maintain an impairment of its own rights, bring an action to challenge a decision, 
provided that the association asserts that the decision contravenes legislative 
provisions “which seek to protect the environment, which confer individual rights 
and which may be relevant to the decision”.12 
 
The problem, however, in this new provision was that although environmental 
organisations were granted access to the administrative courts, they still had to 
show that the decisions they want to challenge in a judicial review violate rules 
“which confer individual rights”. The problem with this condition is that, once 
again according to German legal doctrine, many provisions in environmental 
legislation, in particular on nature protection and air quality, do not confer 
“individual rights” but are enacted to protect the public at large. In short the result 
of this is that environmental organisations had access to the court, but there were 
hardly any provisions they could rely on to challenge decisions in a judicial 
review. This triggered Advocate General Sharpston to remark that the German 
system of judicial review looked “like a Ferrari with its doors locked shut, an 
intensive system of review is of little practical help if the system itself is totally 
inaccessible for certain categories of action.”13 
 
Not very surprisingly was that this “individual rights” condition was challenged 
in court with the argument that it was not in line with the Aarhus Convention and 
the Aarhus implementing directive at EU level. The Court of Justice of the 
European Union decided on this in the Trianel case.14 In this case, the German 
company Trianel was granted permits to build a coal fired thermal power plant 
near five Natura 2000 sites, even though the environmental impact assessment of 
the project did not show that it was unlikely to have a significant effect on the 
special areas of conservation located nearby. Therefore, it was argued that the 
permits were granted in violation with German nature protection law and 
Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive. The environmental organization BUND 
wanted access to court to challenge the decision authorising this project. 
 
The national court dealing with the case (Oberverwaltungsgericht Nordrhein-
Westfalen) argued that most of the provisions BUND relied upon primarily 
concerned the general public and not the protection of individual rights and that 
according to German administrative procedural law they had to be declared 
inadmissible in their appeal. However, the Oberverwaltungsgericht wanted to be 
sure that the restrictions on access to justice in German were compatible with EU 
law and asked the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling.15 The Court of Justice 
ruled as follows:  
                                                            
12  In German: “dem Umweltschutz dienen, Rechte Einzelner begründen und für die 
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13  ECLI:EU:C:2010:773, point 77. 
14         Case C-115/09, Trianel, ECLI:EU:C:2011:289. 
15  OVG NRW, Beschluß vom 05.03.2009, 8 D 58/08.AK. Cf. i.a. A. Schwerdtfeger, 
“ ‘Schutznormtheorieތ and Aarhus Convention - Consequences for the German Law”, 





If, as is clear from that provision (Article 10a EIA Directive 
(addition authors)), those organizations must be able to rely on the 
same rights as individuals, it would be contrary to the objective of 
giving the public concerned wide access to justice and at odds with 
the principle of effectiveness if such organizations were not also 
allowed to rely on the impairment of rules of EU environment law 
solely on the ground that those rules protect the public interest. As 
the dispute in the main proceedings shows, that very largely 
deprives those organizations of the possibility of verifying 
compliance with the rules of that branch of law, which, for the most 
part, address the public interest and not merely the protection of the 
interests of individuals as such.16 
 
The Court concluded that Article 10a of the EIA Directive precludes legislation 
that deprives the access to court from environmental organizations on the ground 
that the violated environmental provision only protects the interests of the general 
public and not the interests of individuals.  
 
Although in the aftermath of Trianel German courts recognised the access of 
NGOs without requiring the infringement of an individual right,17 it was quite 
clear that the German legislator had to become active again and introduced new 
legislation whereby the requirement that an environmental standard should 
protect individual rights was deleted from the UmwRG. The new provision 
entered into force on 29 January 2013 and reads as follows:18  
 
§ 2 Rechtsbehelfe von Vereinigungen 
(1) Eine nach § 3 anerkannte inländische oder ausländische 
Vereinigung kann, ohne eine Verletzung in eigenen Rechten 
geltend machen zu müssen, Rechtsbehelfe nach Maßgabe der 
Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung gegen eine Entscheidung nach § 1 
Absatz 1 Satz 1 oder deren Unterlassen einlegen, wenn die 
Vereinigung 
1. geltend macht, dass eine Entscheidung nach § 1 Absatz 1 Satz 1 
oder deren Unterlassen Rechtsvorschriften, die dem Umweltschutz 
dienen und für die Entscheidung von Bedeutung sein können, 
widerspricht, […]. 
                                                            
JEEPL 2007, p. 270-277. See also the overview from S. Schlacke, “Die Novelle des 
Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetzes – EuGH ante portas?”, ZUR 2013-4, p. 195. 
16  Case C-115/09, Trianel, ECLI:EU:C:2011:289, para. 46. 
17  See Oberlandesgericht Münster 1 December 2011, Az: 8 D 58/08.AK.juris, and 
Oberlandesgericht Mannheim 20 July 2011 10 S 2102/09. Cf. also M. Eliantonio and 
Ch.W. Backes, “Access to Courts for Environmental NGOs at the European and 
national level: Improvements and room for improvement since Maastricht”, in: 
M. de Visser & A.P. van der Mei (eds.), The Treaty on European Union 1993-2013: 
Reflections from Maastricht (Cambridge: Intersentia 2013), p. 557-580; F. Grashof, 
“Judicial Coherence in Public Environmental Law”, to be published in Review of 
European Administrative Law 2015/2. 
18  BGBl. 2013 I, 95.  







The problematic condition “Rechte Einzelner begründen”19 in the old text of the 
Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz was deleted and as a consequence, environmental 
organisations in Germany can now appeal against decisions where an 
environmental impact assessment should have been prepared (correctly). 
However, as the new text added some new conditions, in particular in §4a 
UmwRG, it is not quite clear whether the current text of the UmwRG is in line 
with the Aarhus Convention and the implementing EU legislation.20 Whatever the 
case may be, it is clear from the judgment of the Court of Justice in Case C-137/14, 
that the German legislator is bound to change the Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz 
once again, as various provisions of it were declared incompatible with EU law.21 
 
The example of access to justice of environmental organisations in German law 
provides a fine example of what we call ‘front-door lawmaking”. In order to align 
German administrative procedural law with its international and EU obligations 
the standard provision of §42(2) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung was supplemented 
by the German legislator with new rules in the Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz. 
However, these new rules were, according to the Court of Justice of the EU, not 
good enough, and therefore the German legislator acted again and amended the 
Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz. However, these changes were also inadequate 
according to the Court of Justice and therefore the German legislator has to 
become active once again and change the law accordingly. We cannot assume that 
this will be the end of the saga either! This case is therefore a good illustration of 
judicial dialogue in a complex multi-facetted shared legal order. The current text 
is the result of a dialogue between a national administrative court 
(Oberverwaltungsgericht), the EU Court of Justice and the German legislature, 
with input from legal doctrine in Germany and throughout the EU and beyond. 
3.  The back-door method 
 
Let us now compare the example of the Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz and 
alignment with international and EU law via the national legislation (front-door 
lawmaking) with the following example of back-door lawmaking. It concerned, 
                                                            
19  In English: “which confer individual rights”. 
20  See inter alia D. Schmitt, “Das neue Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz und seine 
Vereinbarkeit mit dem Unionsrecht”, ZEuS 2013, pp. 359-384 and F. Grashof, National 
Procedural Autonomy Revisited. Consequences of differences in national admin-
istrative litigation rules for the enforcement of environmental European Union law – 
The case of the EIA Directive. Dissertation Maastricht University 2015, p. 158. It seems 
that one of the problems of the new provision is that the intensity of judicial review is 
somewhat less intense than the default standard of review. And because the Umwelt-
Rechtsbehelfsgesetz is exclusively meant to implement EU Directive 2003/35, one 
could argue that this is incompatible with the principle of equivalence from the 
Rewe/Comet-case law of the Court of Justice. See on this principle J.H. Jans, S. Prechal, 
R.J.G.M. Widdershoven (eds.), Europeanisation of Public Law (Groningen: Europa 
Law Publishing 2015), chapter 2. 
21  Case C-137/14 Commission v. Germany, ECLI:EU:C:2015:683. 





once again, alignment of the German law on access to justice with the Aarhus 
Convention. In this case Article 9(3) of the Convention which states: 
 
In addition and without prejudice to the review procedures referred 
to in paragraphs 1 and 2 above, each Party shall ensure that, where 
they meet the criteria, if any, laid down in its national law, members 
of the public have access to administrative or judicial procedures to 
challenge acts and omissions by private persons and public 
authorities which contravene provisions of its national law relating 
to the environment. 
 
Although attempts have been made by the European Commission to implement 
the third paragraph into a EU directive and a draft was published, the directive 
never became reality because of strong resistance from some Member States.22 
Unlike Article 9(2) of the Aarhus Convention, Article 9(3) never resulted in any 
changes in German administrative procedural law. The special provisions of the 
German Umwelt-Rechtsbehelfsgesetz only deal with access to justice regarding 
decisions falling within the scope of Article 9(2) Aarhus Convention. That implies 
that access to justice for environmental organisations with respect to decisions 
falling within the scope of Article 9(3) of the Aarhus Convention are still 
governed by the “default” provision of §42(2) Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung, 
discussed earlier in this chapter. And as we have stated above, this means that 
environmental organisations are de facto precluded to challenge acts and 
omissions which contravene environmental law. 
 
However, in a remarkable judgment, the so-called Slovak Bears case, the Court 
of Justice of the European Union ruled that, even in the absence of any 
implementing EU measures regarding Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention and 
irrespective of the fact that this provision is not directly effective in the Union’s 
legal order, the Member States of the EU are required to interpret their national 
provisions on administrative law in such a manner that it is consistent with the 
obligations resulting from Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention: 
 
(..)It is, however, for the referring court to interpret, to the fullest 
extent possible, the procedural rules relating to the conditions to be 
met in order to bring administrative or judicial proceedings in 
accordance with the objectives of Article 9(3) of that convention 
and the objective of effective judicial protection of the rights 
conferred by EU law, in order to enable an environmental protection 
organization, such as the zoskupenie, to challenge before a court a 
decision taken following administrative proceedings liable to be 
contrary to EU environmental law.23 
 
                                                            
22  Cf. COM(2003) 624 final. 
23  Case C-240/09, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, ECLI:EU:C:2011:125 (Slovak Bears). 







According to this judgment the EU principle of judicial effective protection is 
“coloured” by Article 9(3) Aarhus. As a matter of Union law, the national courts 
of the EU Member States are required to interpret their national access to justice 
law in order to be “Aarhus consistent”. 24  The German Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
took up this challenge in a remarkable judgment in 2013. In this case a German 
environmental organisation requested that the responsible authority would change 
its air quality plan in order to improve the air quality in the Rhein/Main-area. As 
no  action  was  taken,  judicial  procedures  followed.  It  was  quite  clear  that 
under  the  default  provision  of  §42(2)  VwGO  the  NGO  should have  been 
declared “inadmissible” in court. The legal provisions regarding German air 
quality are not meant to confer an individual right for NGOs.  The first court 
Verwaltungsgericht, however  opened  up  §42(2)  Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung  
and  dmitted the NGO standing  in  court.  That  judgment  was  upheld  by  the  
highest German administrative court the Bundesverwaltungsgericht. The 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht relied very heavily on the judgment of the Court of 
Justice in Slovak Bears. The Bundesverwaltungsgericht ruled that the case law of 
the Court of Justice with regard to the Aarhus Convention (i.e. Slovak Bears case) 
requires that environmental organizations are granted access to the courts in order 
to guarantee the implementation of European environmental law. In accordance 
with this, §42(2) VwGO in combination with Article 47(1) of the German Anti-
Pollution Law (Bundesimmissionsschutzgesetz; BImSchG)) can be interpreted in 
such a manner that environmental organisations are granted a right, enforceable 
in court, to require compliance with the requirements of air pollution control 
legislation, adopted to comply with an EU directive. Via this method of “Aarhus-
consistent interpretation” of German administrative procedural law, the 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht greatly expanded access to justice of environmental 
organizations under the default provision of §42(2) VwGO.  
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
 
In this chapter two methods to comply with obligations from the Aarhus 
Convention to broaden access to justice for environmental organizations were 
shown. With respect to Article 9(2) of the Convention the traditional “front-
door” method was used. The German legislator assumed its responsibilities and 
changed German procedural law – in a dialogue with the EU Court of Justice – 
in order to comply with that provision. With respect to Article 9(3) of the 
Convention no legislative action was taken. Not by the EU, and not by the 
German legislator. Instead, it was the courts that took action. Triggered by a 
judgment of the EU Court of Justice, the highest German administrative court 
decided to interpret national administrative procedural law in such a manner that 
it is consistent with Article 9(3) Aarhus Convention. Although not identical, the 
result from this ‘back-door” way of lawmaking is quite similar to the ‘front-
door” method. 
                                                            
24  BVerwG 7 C 21.12, ECLI:DE:BVerwG:2013:050913U7C21.12.0. 





From a democratic and legitimacy point of view, and hence from a public trust 
perspective, the route via the ‘front-door” must be preferred for obvious reasons. 
Courts do not have the same democratic legitimacy as the legislature. Moreover, 
as the German constitution so aptly states, Art 20(3) Grundgesetz: Die 
Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt 
und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden. The judiciary is 
bound by the law, whilst the legislature, within the boundaries of the constitution, 
can change the law. 
 
Indeed, courts always have to interpret the law, that is their job. And in order to 
bring the national legal order in sync with the countries international obligations, 
courts are required to be active, innovative and, if necessary, break new ground. 
However, a court is not a legislature and in order to avoid blame for having acted 







Who Decides What Is Significant?  
The Case of Nitrogen Deposition on Dutch 
and German Natura 2000 Sites 
Peter Mendelts*
1.  Introduction 
Public trust in legal institutions such as courts and legislatures is dependent upon 
many factors. For the good functioning of a legal system it is essential that 
people have a good level of trust in its functioning. This holds true for national 
legal systems as well as for international legal systems such as the law of the 
European Union. This is even more interesting where there is an interaction 
between the national legal systems and the European system. Although trust is 
in itself an extra-legal concept, for the functioning of the legal systems one 
should be careful to preserve the trust of the public.  
Looking at legal norms with the concept of trust in the back of our mind, open 
norms are particularly interesting. An open norm set by a legislator needs further 
interpretation of that norm. This holds true for open norms in private law, that 
are interpreted by private parties and, in case of conflict, by courts that decide 
cases between those private parties. For open norms in administrative law, the 
role of government bodies that apply the law and pre-interpret the norms, come 
into play. It is the government body that first interprets an open norm. A private 
party may challenge that before a court, and the court gives a more prevalent 
interpretation of the open norm. This whole process may become more diffused 
when the norms are interpreted at different jurisdictional levels, where different 
government bodies and courts at different levels function.  
Open norms in European Directives can lead to national legislations and 
government practices that differ from Member State to Member State. A 
common complaint about these divergences is that they distort the level playing 
field between the Member States. In this article I will do a case study on the way 
The Netherlands and Germany deal with nitrogen deposition on natural 
protected areas that are part of the European Natura 2000 network, the so-called 
Natura 2000 sites, and how they judge the significance of the effects. The case 
study is based on the fact that there are some vague terms to be found in Art. 6 
of the European Habitats Directive (Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992). 
Art. 6 of the Directive requires that “any plan or project not directly connected 
with or necessary to the management of [a Natura 2000 site] but likely to have a 
*  Ph.D. Legal advisor and part-time lecturer in administrative law at the University of 
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significant effect thereon, either individually or in combination with other plans 
or projects, shall be subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the 
site in view of the site's conservation objectives.” The focus will be on the terms 
“likely to have a significant effect”, as these are particularly vague. I will 
demonstrate that two adjacent national systems, The Netherlands and Germany, 
have two largely divergent approaches to the question of when a nitrogen 
deposition may have a significant effect on protected habitats. 
First I will give a brief description of the interaction between national courts and 
legislators and the ECJ. Paragraph 3 will hold a short description of the 
obligations under the Habitats directive. In paragraph 4.1 I will describe how the 
Dutch authorities have in vain tried to escape some of the obligations under the 
Habitats Directive by labelling measures to create a new habitat to compensate 
for the loss of quality of the same habitat elsewhere, as a mitigating measure 
rather than a compensatory measure, in the so-called Briels-case. In 4.2 the 
Dutch practice of “external netting” will be described, followed by a description 
of the new Programmatic Approach to Nitrogen in 4.3 and a comparison to the 
German method in paragraph 5. In paragraph 6 the risk of divergent 
interpretations of what is a significant effect and of what is a significant amount 
of nitrogen, will be briefly considered.  
2.  The interaction between national courts and legislators and the ECJ 
European Directives are legal measures enacted by the institutions of the 
European Union in specific areas. According to Art. 288 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), those Directives are binding, as to 
the result to be achieved, but the choice of form and methods are left to the 
national authorities. The Directives typically contain rules that have to be 
translated into national law in the form of Acts of Parliament by the national 
legislators.  
When applying these Acts of Parliament, the national courts must stay within 
the boundaries set by European law, including the Directives. So, when the 
national courts decide cases, they must apply European law. In cases where 
important questions concerning the interpretation of a Directive comes up before 
a national court, the court may decide to ask preliminary questions to the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ).1 The national court will use the answers given 
by the European Court to decide the case. When the national law is hard to 
reconcile with or even contrary to the Directive, the court may either re-interpret 
the national law so that it is no longer contrary to the Directive, or even decide 
to leave the national law without application.  
1 See for a description of the procedure R. Barents, EU Procedural Law and Effective 
Legal Protection, in: Common Market Law Review 2014, p. 1437-1462. 
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The interpretation of the Directive by the ECJ will in some cases incite the 
legislator to new legislation, to change the national implementation of the 
Directive. This may be an attempt to bring the national law closer to the 
Directive. But, as legislation is policy-driven, it may also be an attempt to reach 
other policy goals in a way that is reconcilable with the Directive. Then new 
cases may appear before the court, and new questions of conformity of the 
national law and European law may arise and new questions may be asked to the 
ECJ. There is therefore a circle of interpretation of a Directive (Act of 
Parliament – national courts – ECJ – Act of Parliament – etc.).  
This process is even more interesting where the Directive contains vague terms 
that constitute open norms, which may be interpreted in variable ways. The 
question then may be asked what role the ECJ sees for itself, as it is the 
counterpart of the national courts on the one hand, but also the delimiter of the 
legislator’s leeway on the other hand. Does the ECJ take full jurisdiction and 
pinpoint the exact meaning of the vague terms, and thus take a role as a 
legislator to the national legislations? Or does the ECJ take a more judicial, 
court-like approach, and leave room for the national authorities to manoeuver? 
And how do legislators and courts respond to the position the ECJ takes? Do 
legislators acquiesce in the ECJ’s interpretation of the Directive, or do they 
actively fight it by issuing new legislation? And how do the national courts 
position themselves in between the national legislator and the ECJ?  
Open norms in European Directives are first and foremost interpreted by 
national government bodies and by national courts with the assistance of the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ). If, however, the outcomes of the interpretation 
are unfavourable in the eyes of the national authorities, the national legislator or 
national government bodies may act to come up with a new interpretation of the 
open Directive norms. Thus, there is an ongoing debate between the courts and 
the national legislators and government bodies. The legislators, on whom the 
duty to implement the Directives rests in the first place, are first in line to give 
their interpretations of the open norms of the Directive and of the obligations 
that the Directive imposes on the Member State. The national legislators may in 
a certain way respond to the case law to bend the development of the law in a 
direction they perceive as desirable.2 However, they cannot escape the judicial 
interpretation of the Directive and certainly not that of the ECJ.3 If the political 
desire would be to go against the line of jurisprudence, it would be up to the 
European organs (Council and Parliament) to change the wording of the 
2 See G. Davies, Legislative Control of the European Court of Justice, in: Common 
Market Law Review 2014, p. 1579-1608.  
3 See R. Bieber and F. Maiani, Enhancing Centralized Enforcement of EU Law: 
Pandora’s Toolbox?, in: Common Market Law Review 2014, p. 1051-1092. 
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Directive or even come up with a new Directive altogether.4 All these actors 
may either boost the public trust in the legal system as well as undermine that 
trust. Divergent interpretations of open norms may undermine the people’s trust 
in the system.  
3.  The obligations under the Habitats Directive 
Within the European Union there is a network of nature reserves known under 
the name Natura 2000. The core of the network had been established under the 
1979 Birds Directive5 already, but the 1992 Habitats Directive6 instituted the 
Natura 2000 network as such.7 Since then, the 28 EU Member States have 
assigned over 27,000 sites as Natura 2000 sites. As to the protection and 
management of these sites, Article 6 of the Habitats Directive is relevant. The 
Member States must in short establish the necessary conservation measures, and 
preferably management plans for the sites (Art. 6 (1)), and they must prevent the 
disturbance of habitats and the disturbance of species (Art. 6 (2)). The 
culmination point in the protection of the sites, is Art. 6 (3), which reads as 
follows:  
Any plan or project not directly connected with or necessary to the 
management of the site but likely to have a significant effect thereon, 
either individually or in combination with other plans or projects, shall be 
subject to appropriate assessment of its implications for the site in view of 
the site's conservation objectives. In the light of the conclusions of the 
assessment of the implications for the site and subject to the provisions of 
paragraph 4, the competent national authorities shall agree to the plan or 
project only after having ascertained that it will not adversely affect the 
integrity of the site concerned and, if appropriate, after having obtained 
the opinion of the general public. 
Art. 6 (3) obliges the Member States to make appropriate assessments of the 
impact of plans and projects, if they are likely to have a significant effect on the 
site. The next step is that permission for the plan or the project may only be 
given when the integrity of the site is not adversely affected. Art. 6 (4), finally, 
defines when a derogation is possible, namely when there is no alternative for 
the adverse plan or project and there are imperative reasons of overriding public 
4 See further A. Alemanno and O. Stefan, Openness at the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: Toppling a Taboo, in: Common Market Law Review 2014, p. 97-
140. 
5  Council Directive 2009/147/EC of 30 November 2009 on the conservation of wild 
birds (codified version). The original version is Council Directive 79/409/EEC of 
2 April 1979 on the conservation of wild birds. 
6  Council Directive 92/43/EEC of 21 May 1992 on the conservation of natural habitats 
and of wild fauna and flora. 
7 See for the process D. Evans, Building the European Union’s Natura 2000 network, 
in: Nature Conservation 1:11-26 (2012). 
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interest, and the Member State shall take compensatory measures to ensure the 
protection of the overall coherence of the Natura 2000 network.  
Art. 6 (3) is to be implemented in national law by the EU Member States. This 
means that its legislation must provide for an appropriate assessment for all 
activities that are likely to have a significant effect on a Natura 2000 site. For the 
Netherlands, this has been done in Art. 19d of the Natuurbeschermingswet 1998,
in Germany by Art. 34 (1) of the Bundesnaturschutzgesetz (and in the legislation 
of the different Länder). These provisions have as a consequence that some 
economic activities will not be allowed because of their adverse effects on the 
protected natural values. The Dutch and German legislators and government 
bodies have been looking for ways to reconcile the wish to protect the natural 
values in Natura 2000 sites on the one hand, and economic development on the 
other.  
4.  Nitrogen deposition: the Dutch method 
In the Netherlands, nitrogen levels are relatively high compared to most other 
European nations. Whereas nitrogen is essential to crop growth, an excess of 
nitrogen is a risk to the environment and especially to certain vulnerable habitat 
types for which Natura 2000 sites are designated.8 Therefore, projects such as 
farm expansions or infrastructural developments that lead to an increase of 
nitrogen deposition, cannot be licensed easily. As this puts brakes on economic 
development, the Netherlands has tried to deal with Art. 6 (3) of the Habitats 
Directive in ways to evade overly stringent consequences. First, I will illustrate 
that the Netherlands has tried in vain to find leeway for licensing by labelling 
measures that are really compensatory measures as mitigation measures (Section 
4.1). Then, I will show that the Netherlands has licensed some developments by 
using decreases in nitrogen deposition to license new increases. Until 
1 July 2015 this was done by “external netting” (Section 4.2) and since 1 July 
2015 by the Programmatic Approach to Nitrogen (PAN) (Section 4.3).  
8 See M. Pau Vall and C. Vidal, Nitrogen in agriculture, http://ec.europa.eu/ 
agriculture/envir/report/en/nitro_en/report.htm. 
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4.1  Mitigation or compensation: the Dutch motorway A2 
An illustrative case is the widening of the Dutch motorway A2 in the south of 
the Netherlands, between the cities of Den Bosch and Eindhoven. The A2 was 
and is a well-known congestion point and the Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure 
and the Environment had decided on the widening for economic reasons. The 
project comprised the construction of four additional motorway lanes resulting 
in a motorway with four lanes in each direction instead of two. It provides for a 
good insight in how the Dutch government has been struggling the last few 
years with nitrogen deposition on Natura 2000 areas. This case led to a judgment 
by the European Court of Justice of 15 May 2014, the so-called Briels-case.9
From the point of view of nature protection law, the problem with this project 
was that the motorway is adjacent to a Natura 2000-site called Vlijmens Ven, 
Moerputten & Bossche Broek and the presence of the protected habitat type 
Molinea meadows in the part of the Natura 2000-site right next to the motorway 
which would suffer from an increase in nitrogen deposits. Molinea meadows are 
sensitive to nitrogen, and the broader motorway would attract more traffic and 
therefore the nitrogen deposits on the Natura 2000-site would increase. But there 
was a solution found for that: A new area of Molinea meadows was to be 
developed in a more distant part of the Natura 2000-site, so that the total area 
and quality of the habitat type would not be diminished and actually enlarged.  
The competent Dutch authority argued that the development of a new area of 
molinea meadows was not a compensatory measure for the disappearance of 
natural values elsewhere, but that it could be considered as a mitigation measure. 
The difference is, that if it is considered compensation, Art. 6 (4) requires that 
there are no alternatives for the widening of the motorway, and that there is a 
compelling reason of public interest to carry out the project. If it is judged a 
mitigation measure, the line of reasoning is that there are no significant effects 
and therefore the project may be carried out without further demands.  
The Court denounced the Dutch line of reasoning:  
39 Consequently, it follows from the foregoing considerations that Article 
6(3) of the Habitats Directive must be interpreted as meaning that a plan 
or project not directly connected with or necessary to the management of 
a site of Community importance, which has negative implications for a 
type of natural habitat present thereon and which provides for the creation 
of an area of equal or greater size of the same natural habitat type within 
the same site, has an effect on the integrity of that site. Such measures can 
be categorised as “compensatory measures” within the meaning of Article 
6(4) only if the conditions laid down therein are satisfied. 
9  ECJ 15 May 2014, C-521/12. 
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4.2  The Dutch practice of “external netting” until 1 July 2015  
Nitrogen deposition on Natura 2000 sites does not only cause a problem for road 
builders, but also for farmers that wish to increase their cattle stock and for 
factory builders. As many of the Dutch Natura 2000 sites have been identified as 
sensitive to nitrogen, even very small increases in nitrogen deposition are 
deemed to have a significant effect. Whereas some infrastructural works and 
some factories and power plants may pass the ACC-test of Art. 6 (4) Habitats 
Directive, for farmers who want to increase their stock, this can hardly be the 
case. What compelling reason of public interest can be found for a private 
agricultural business expansion?  
Therefore, the licensing under the Dutch Nature Protection Act esp. in the 
agricultural sector has become increasingly difficult. The only real possibility 
for licensing a stock increase was for a farmer to buy out another business and to 
use those “deposition rights” to increase his own cattle stock. This is called 
“external netting” and allowed by the Council of State if there is a clear 
connection between the one’s business stopping and the other’s increase in 
cattle. Such a connection may be established by a contract between the two 
farmers.10 The idea is therefore that a farmer who wishes to extend his business, 
may use the fact that one of his neighbouring farms stops his business buy 
buying that neighbour’s “deposition rights”, and thus the project as a whole 
(which consists of an extending business on the one hand and a diminishing or 
stopping business on the other) does not have a significant negative effect.  
4.3  The Programmatic Approach to Nitrogen since 1 July 2015 
The possibility of “external netting” is over since 1 July 2015, the day the new 
Act of Parliament on the Programmatic Approach to Nitrogen (PAN) has come 
into effect.11 The Dutch legislator has been looking for ways to give more space 
to more economic development despite Natura 2000. It has considered that, on 
the whole, nitrogen deposition is decreasing over time, be it in a slow pace. This 
is a result of the development of more environmental-friendly techniques to 
make cars and factories less polluting. This decrease, so it is considered, may 
partly be used to grant licenses for new economic development. Thus, nitrogen 
deposition on nitrogen sensitive Natura 2000 areas is still falling but at a lower 
rate than without the extra licensing.  
The PAN has a threefold objective, namely to reduce the levels of nitrogen 
deposition on the whole, to impose restoration measures on nitrogen sensitive 
Natura 2000 sites, and to give some leeway for licensing to allow some more 
economic development. Also from the perspective of nature protection, there are 
10  E.g. Council of State, 16 March 2011, ECLI: NL:RVS:2011:BP7785. 
11 See the proceedings of the States-General nr. 33 669.  
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certainly good things about the PAN. One of the most important measures seem 
to be changes to the water management in and near Natura 2000 sites, as this 
may increase the ability of the present habitats to deal with the nitrogen 
deposition. Nevertheless, the PAN would not be in place if it weren’t for the 
perceived need of more space for economic development.   
How does the PAN work?12 Underlying the whole system is a computer 
programme called Aerius in which a whole range of Natura 2000 sites are 
included. In the programme an extensive number of nitrogen emitters are 
included, and it can calculate the effects a change – like the construction of a 
road or an increase in livestock – will have on the nitrogen deposition on the 
different Natura 2000 sites. As there is an expected decline in background levels 
of nitrogen deposition, the computer programme registers “development space” 
available for economic development. It’s the different government agencies that 
hand out that “development space” by licensing projects, if they need more than 
1.00 mole/ha/year of development space. In Aerius, development space is 
reserved for developments between 0.05 and 1.00 mole/ha/year that no longer 
need a license but for which it is sufficient if they are reported. When the 
development space threatens to run out, the 1.00 mole/ha/year level is lowered 
to 0.05 mole/ha/year, so all developments with effects over 0.05 mole/ha/year 
must be reported. All effects under the 0.05 mole/ha/year threshold are 
considered not to be significant.  
As to how the development space will be divided, the Secretary of State of 
Economic Affairs has the first say. She has identified priority projects, which are 
the first eligible for development space. After the priority projects, the provinces 
may prioritize projects and give policy rules (soft law) as to how the space will 
be divided. The national PAN programme including the priority projects has 
been under consultation and the final version is soon to be published.  
Among lawyers, there are serious doubts as to the compatibility of PAS with 
Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive.13 The main problem is that Article 6 (3) 
demands an appropriate assessment on the level of the project. If the project has 
negative effects that may adversely affect the integrity of the site, permission is 
only granted under the ACC-test, which can only be done if the project has no 
alternatives and there are imperative reasons of overriding public interest to 
execute it. In the case of development space for allowing extra nitrogen 
deposition handed out under the PAN, this development space is calculated by 
the Aerius computer programme. That development space comes from 
developments exterior to the project and is not a result of an interior mitigation 
12  Much Dutch-language information on the PAN can be found on http://pas.natura 
2000.nl/. 
13 See e.g. A.A. Freriks, Juridisch gekissebis over mitigatie en compensatie: wankelt het 
fundament van de Programmatische Aanpak Stikstof?, in: T.W. Franssen a.o. (eds.), 
Op het grensvlak, The Hague: Instituut voor Bouwrecht 2014. 
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measure. It is therefore very doubtful that the Courts will allow for the handing-
out of development space to be seen as mitigation measures. This will mean that 
most projects will not be eligible for development space out of the PAN. And 
for those who do qualify under Article 6 (4) and may get development space, we 
do not need the PAN to come to this conclusion. So, in sum, the problem with 
the PAN, being system-oriented, is that it does not fit well in the frame of 
thought of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, which is project-oriented. 
The Dutch government, however, maintains that the PAN is compatible with 
Article 6 of the Habitats Directive and is confident that it will stand the test 
before the courts.14 We will see what the Dutch Council of State or maybe even 
the European Court of Justice will find as to the compatibility of the PAN with 
Article 6.  
5.  Nitrogen deposition: the German method 
Looking at the Dutch case-law, one is struck by the low significance levels that 
are used. It makes one wonder what other European countries use as a threshold 
of significance. Therefore, I will look at Germany, the Netherlands’ big 
neighbour. Large parts of Germany have background levels of nitrogen that are 
comparable to those of the Netherlands.  
From the case-law of the Bundesverwaltungsgericht, the highest federal 
administrative Court, it turns out that nitrogen deposition first of all is not 
considered to have a significant effect if it does not reach a threshold of 100 g 
N/ha/year. Please note that this is a different unit than used in the Netherlands, 
but 100 g N/ha/year is about 7.14 mole/ha/year. The 7.14 mole threshold is 
much higher than either the 1.00 or the 0.05 mol/ha/year threshold used in the 
Netherlands. Furthermore, if the deposition exceeds the 7.14 mole but is less 
than 3% of the calculated critical load15 and the maximum critical load has not 
yet been reached, it is also deemed to be not significant.16 Thus, levels of 
nitrogen deposition that are judged not significant and therefore allowed in 
Germany, are not allowed in the Netherlands.  
Why are there such huge differences between Germany and the Netherlands as 
to when an increase in nitrogen deposition becomes significant in the meaning 
14 See the Explanatory Memorandum to the Act of Parliament, in the Proceedings of the 
Second Chamber of the States-General, 2012-2013, 33 669, nr. 3, p. 2.  
15  The critical load being the maximum of nitrogen deposition the habitat type in 
question can handle. 
16  Bundesverwaltungsgericht, judgment of 23 April 2014, 9 A 25.12, to be found on 
www.bverwg.de/entscheidungen and published in Natur und Recht (2014) 36:706-
718. This method is described in S. Balla a.o., Eutrophierende Stickstoffeinträge als 
aktuelles Problem der FFH-Verträglichkeitsprüfung, in: Natur und Recht 2010, 
p. 616-625. 
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of Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive? After all, it is in the core the same 
open norm that has to be applied, be it in two different EU Member States. The 
Dutch approach seems to be that any measurable or calculable effect is 
significant, esp. for habitat types where the current deposition already is above 
the critical load the habitat type can take. In Germany there seems to be a 
different reading of the word “significant”, where margins of statistical 
uncertainty play a role.17
It’s not for me to answer which significance level should be taken: the Dutch, 
the German or even another one. In the end, the ECJ is the final authority to 
decide which levels of significance will be acceptable and which levels are not. 
However, the difference is striking. As a counterbalance it should be added, that 
if a Natura 2000 site suffers under overly high nitrogen deposition levels, the 
Member State is under the obligation to take measures under Article 6 (2) of the 
Habitats Directive, so if Germany is more lenient in its licensing it may have to 
take more positive government measures to restore the integrity of the site in 
another way.18 The Dutch PAN does provide for such positive measures also.  
Natura 2000 is a European network, and cross-border effects are to be taken into 
account also. When the Dutch provincial government granted a power plant near 
the German border, it decided that the nitrogen deposition on the Dutch Natura 
2000 sites should be judged to Dutch standards, whereas for the effects on the 
German Natura 2000 sites, judged by the same Dutch authority, the German 
standard may be used.19 The idea is that it must be assumed that the German 
method is in accordance with Art. 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive:  
22.5. With regard to the method which is based on the report of the Kieler 
Institut für Landschaftsökologie, the Administrative Jurisdiction Division 
of the Council of State considers as follows. Given the obligations under 
Article 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive, the competent German authorities 
also may only authorise an activity when they are certain that the activity 
does not adversely affect the integrity of the site concerned, based on the 
best scientific knowledge and taking into account the specific 
characteristics of the German Natura 2000 sites. The methodology is 
applied in practice in licensing procedures in Niedersachsen. The use of 
the method is common in Germany. Also in view of Article 4 (3) of the 
Treaty of the European Union, the defendants may therefore in principle 
assume that the method used in the IBL report on nitrogen deposition for 
the assessment of the effects of the increase in nitrogen deposition on 
17 See L. Boerema, Het stikstofdoolhof: Wat als de PAS omvalt?, in Journaal Flora en 
fauna (2014) 1:3-16. 
18  Although it must be noted that nitrogen deposition does not stop at borders, so it lays 
the same burden on the neighbouring Member States as well.  
19 See paragraphs 22 – 22.14 of the decision of the Council of State, 16 April 2014, 
ECLI:NL:RVS:2014:1312. 
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German Natura 2000 areas is in accordance with Article 6 (3) of the 
Habitats Directive.20
Whereas it is understandable that the Council of State upholds the German 
method as being in accordance with European obligations, and that it allows the 
Dutch authorities to use the German method when considering the cross-border 
effects on the German Natura 2000 sites, it raises questions as well. If it is 
correct that the German threshold of significance of 100 g/ha/year (converted to 
Dutch units: 7.14 mol/ha/year) is in fact in accordance with Art. 6 of the 
Habitats Directive, which we do not know, it makes one wonder if the Dutch 
threshold of 0.05 mol/ha/year now and of 1.00 mol/ha/year in the near future, 
may be unnecessarily low. This, especially in the view of the fact that the 
Netherlands has now introduced a new system called PAN of handing out 
development space by the use of a computer programme of which, as explained, 
it is doubtful if it is maintainable under the Habitats Directive. In the end, it is up 
to the ECJ to give its final verdict, but we will have to wait for a case to be 
submitted to the Court.  
6.  Conclusion 
The divergence of the interpretations of what is “a significant effect” between 
the Netherlands and Germany when it comes to nitrogen deposition is striking. 
The significance threshold of 7.14 mole/ha/year is approximately 140 times 
higher than the 0.05 threshold used in the Netherlands. When the relevant 
public, such as farmers and other economic actors, know about these differences 
(which they do, certainly in the border regions of the two countries), they 
complain that the level playing field between the two countries is distorted. In 
the eyes of Dutch farmers and their associations, the Dutch authorities are too 
strict in view of the more lenient German neighbour. This makes them lose trust 
in their own authorities.  
There is a second, more internal reason why the way the Netherlands deals with 
nitrogen deposition on Natura 2000 sites is relevant in view of public trust. The 
introduction of the PAN with the promise that there will be development space 
for economic activities including farming boosts expectations, not only among 
farmers but also among other economic actors. If the Aerius computer 
programme used in the PAN does not provide enough development space to 
satisfy the demands, or if the PAN turns out not to be in accordance with Art. 6 
of the Habitats Directive, the attitude of farmers and other economic actors may 
possibly change to frustration, and trust in government bodies and in the courts 
may diminish. This may have repercussions on the trust people have in the 
European institutions also. The fact that Germany uses higher thresholds makes 
the Netherlands - rightfully or not - look unnecessarily strict when it comes to 
20  My translation, PM. 
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nitrogen deposition on Natura 2000 sites. This creates the risk that the support 
for nature protection and for the Nature 2000 network, as well as the support for 
the European Union as such, may diminish. Only the future will tell if this risk 
turns out to be real.  
In my view, what is needed to enhance public trust in the way nitrogen 
deposition on Natura 2000 is judged, is to come to more agreement between the 
European Member States than we currently have on what level of nitrogen 
deposition may constitute a significant effect on protected habitats as meant in 
Art. 6 (3) of the Habitats Directive. Small differences between Member States of 
the European Union may exist, but where large unexplainable differences 
emerge, such as illustrated above, public trust may be compromised. This means 
that the ECJ will on some day have to decide which level of significance is 
acceptable and which is not. In the meantime, we will have to live with the 
divergences and the strain it puts on public trust, in the absence of an ECJ 
judgment that leads us the way.  
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It is quite common to advocate alternative forms of democratic participation and 
control as a means to foster and enhance public trust in the performance of public 
institutions. Museums, hospitals, schools and universities are frequently required 
to make themselves accountable to the public by regularly reporting on the results 
they achieved, and to show what has been done with taxpayer money. Next to 
this, it is hoped that the distance between regulators and the regulated can be 
bridged by allowing for more direct forms of democracy, and to devise better and 
more direct forms of self-regulation. It is hoped that people will feel more 
committed to rules if the rule-makers are from within their own field, and 
endowed with the required local knowledge. 
In this article I will analyse these new forms of accountability and participation 
under the heading of goal regulation, and inquire into the extent to which indeed 
public trust can be said to be enhanced by this alternative style of regulation. I 
will first sketch a rough outline of the special features of goal regulation and 
analyse its dynamic in terms of the familiar Principal Agent model. A central 
problem in P-A relations is to what extent the Agent can be trusted.1 It is therefore 
of vital importance to adequately identify the Principal and the Agent in a system 
of goal regulation. After that, I will address the question of whether or not these 
new forms of participation and control can be interpreted as more democratic than 
classical representative democracy. It will be argued that their democratic merits 
are very limited and therefore cannot inspire the kind of public trust that is called 
for. 
                                                 
*  This is an adapted version of my article “Doelregelgeving en democratie” in: Recht in 
geding, ed. by Groenhuijsen et al., Boom Jur., 2014, pp. 125-134. 
**  Professor in Philosophy of Law at the University of Groningen and member of staff at 
the Academy for Legislation in The Hague. 
1  I will therefore confine myself to an analysis of trust in a P-A relationship and not deal 
with the various concepts of trust and their shades of meaning as such. 
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1.  Goal regulation 
Since the 1990s of the previous century, a new style of legislation has emerged 
that has been analysed under the heading of “principles-based regulation”2 but 
which I prefer to call “goal regulation”.3 In a system of goal regulation, the 
legislator no longer issues detailed legislation that prescribes how citizens should 
act and what they should do or refrain from doing. In a system of goal regulation 
laws are made that merely indicate the goals to be achieved and/or the interests 
that should be protected. It is not prescribed how a goal should be achieved; the 
law merely imposes an abstract duty of care and commissions other parties to 
concretise that duty in more detailed rule-making. 
Usually such a goal-law is not addressed to individual citizens but directed to a 
host of institutions, such as inspectorates, professionals, public institutions or 
professional associations. These actors are all in one way or another involved with 
the central goal or interest mentioned in the central abstract duty of care. Together 
they form a so-called regulatory regime.4 This set of institutions is commissioned 
to take the necessary measures in order to achieve the imposed goal. Rulemaking 
is just one such measure. 
This does not mean that rulemaking is entirely delegated to the regulatory regime. 
The central legislator remains responsible for the degree to which aims are 
realized and require the regime to regularly report on what has been achieved and 
which steps have been taken in order to reach the goal. Goal-laws, therefore, 
typically consist of three elements. 
1. The proper goal-prescription: Aim A is desirable and needs to be furthered or 
reached. 
2. A duty to implement: In order to achieve aim A, measures should be taken and 
rules drafted.  
3. A duty to report: Report about the progress that is made towards aim A. 
                                                 
2  Julia Black, Decentring Regulation: Understanding the role of regulation and self-
regulation in a post-regulatory world, in: Current Legal Problems (2001) 54, pp. 103-
147 en Forms and Paradoxes of Principles Based Regulation, LSE Law, Society and 
Economy Working Papers 13/2008, London School of Economics and Political 
Science, Law Department,  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1267722. 
3 See P.C. Westerman “Governing by Goals: Governance as a Legal Style”, in: 
Legisprudence: International Journal for the Study of Legislation, Hart Publishing, 
2007, pp. 51-72, The Emergence of New Types of Norms, in: Luc J. Wintgens (ed.) 
Legislation in Context: Essays in Legisprudence, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2007, pp. 117-
133. 
4 See Christopher Hood et al., The Government of Risk: Understanding Risk Regulation 
Regimes, Oxford U.P., 2001. 





A good example of such an Act is the Wildlife and Natural Environment,5 which 
states that 
1.   It is the duty of every public body, in exercising any functions, to 
further the conservation of biodiversity so far as is consistent with the 
proper exercise of those functions. [….] In this section “public body” 
meansۛ
(a)  a Northern Ireland department; 
(b)  a district council; 
(c)  a statutory undertaker within the meaning of the Planning (Northern 
Ireland) Order 1991 (NI 11); 
(d)  any other body established or constituted under a statutory provision.
(2) The Department must designate one or more strategies for the 
conservation of biodiversity (whether prepared by the Department or by 
one or more other persons).  
(3)  The Department mustۛ
(a)  not later than 5 years after the coming into operation of subsection 
(1), 
 and 
(b)  at least once in every period of 5 years thereafter, publish a report 
regarding the implementation of any strategy designated under that 
subsection.  
It is clear that the Act is addressed to a set of “public bodies”, and contains all 
three elements. In (1) an abstract duty of care is imposed to a large set of norm-
addressees (“any other body…”). In (2) it is left unclear which strategy should be 
followed. The main thrust of the Act is its third element (3): the duty to report 
which strategies have been designated and followed. Only as regards this third 
element can non-compliance be sanctioned.  
2.  Outsourcing 
Goal-legislation was initiated in Sweden as early as the sixties6 and originated as 
a response to the complexities of regulating a welfare state. But it was only in the 
nineties, when the problems and pitfalls of the European harmonization process 
became clear, that the virtues of goal-legislation were advertised as a panacea 
against overregulation.7 Goal-legislation was represented as a solution to two 
pressing problems: the need for flexible and tailor-made laws and the 
                                                 
5  Northern Ireland 2014.  I owe this example to Ronan Cormacain. See http://www. 
legislation.gov.uk/nia/2011/15/pdfs/nia_20110015_en.pdf, last acces-sed Nov 4, 2014.  
Paragraph numbers have been changed in order to conform to my threefold division. 
6  I learnt this from my – half-Swedish – PhD student Annewietske Enequist who also 
alerted me to the early literature concerning the pros and cons of goal regulation, which 
is unfortunately only accessible in Swedish. 
7 See European governance: a white paper, Brussels, 2001, Commission of the European 
Communities.  
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impossibility of imposing uniform and detailed rules from one central point on 
various diverse institutional settings and legal cultures. Moreover, it seemed to be 
the ideal strategy to implement the principle of subsidiarity that had been adopted 
in the Treaty of Maastricht as one of the pillars of European unification. This 
principle requires that powers or tasks should rest with the lower-level sub-units 
of a certain political order “unless allocating them to a higher-level central unit 
would ensure higher comparative efficiency or effectiveness in achieving [the 
policies]”.8
Various arguments have been adduced in favour of the principle and the 
corresponding alternative forms of legislation, mainly based on expectations 
rather than empirical data. One of these expectations is that the central units will 
be relieved from their heavy regulatory tasks; another is that the lower echelons, 
since they are more directly involved with the issues at hand, will have more 
detailed knowledge than the central unit which is regulating matters from a 
distance. And finally it is hoped that these lower echelons will be more committed 
to compliance if they had been more directly involved in the making of these rules.  
Outsourcing regulation is therefore the keyword. In order to conceptualise the 
relationship between those who outsource and those to whom it is outsourced we 
may make use of the old and well-known distinction between Principals and 
Agents. The Principal commissions the Agent to carry out a certain task in order 
to pursue an aim, desired by the Principal. The P-A distinction used to be applied 
mainly to the relation between electorate and parliament or between stakeholders 
and board of a corporate firm. But gradually the P-A terminology has been applied 
to all kinds of outsourcing relations and has brought about an abundant supply of 
literature on P-A relations.9
The central problem of this relationship is exactly one of the reasons why 
outsourcing is usually decided upon: The Principal outsources certain tasks if they 
have neither the knowledge nor the resources to perform the tasks themselves. 
This inevitably implies a certain information-asymmetry: The Agent knows more 
                                                 
8  Føllesdal, Andreas, Survey Article: Subsidiarity, in: The Journal of Political 
Philosophy, Vol. 6, nr. 2, 1998, pp. 190-218. 
9  Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll, Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures 
as Instruments of Political Control in: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 
Vol. 3, No. 2 (Autumn, 1987), pp. 243-277 Oxford University Press,; Moe, T., Political 
Control and the Power of the Agent, Journal of Law Economics & Organization 2006 
vol:22 iss:1 pg:1 -29; Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and Political Control 
of Administrative Agencies in: Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 8, 
No. 1, Conference on the Economics and Politics of Administrative Law and 
Procedures (Mar., 1992), pp. 93-110, Oxford University Press; Michael E. Levine and 
Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda: 
Toward a Synthesis Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, Vol. 6, Special Issue: 
[Papers from the Organization of Political Institutions Conference, April 1990] (1990), 
pp. 167-198 Oxford University Press. 





than the Principal. The recurrent question is therefore; how can the Principal be 
sure that the Agent does not utilize their knowledge for their own advantage 
instead of using it to achieve the goals of the Principal? A dilemma that is often 
compared to that of the tourist (Principal) arriving at an unknown airport and has 
no other option than just rely on the cab driver (Agent) to bring them as soon and 
as efficiently as possible to the hotel rather than taking costly detours or, worse 
still, bringing them directly to a slum in order to leave them there and then having 
their clothes and possessions robbed. The typical P-A dilemma is therefore about 
trust. 
3.  The proliferation of rules and actors 
Goal-legislation should not be seen as a drafting technique that is only used at 
central government levels. The formulation of a goal-act usually entails a process 
in which all the parties involved (the entire regulatory regime) issue goal-laws in 
their turn. In this process the threefold structure of the goal-rules is continuously 
reproduced: goals are formulated and imposed on agents who are thereby 
commissioned to achieve those goals and are required to report on what has been 
done. Sometimes, the duties to draft rules are effectively carried out. Then, the 
agent effectively develops standards for what should be done or omitted. In most 
cases, however, we see that the Agent responds by formulating a list of more
concrete goals and targets, which are then imposed in turn to another Agent. The 
process of rule-making should therefore be conceptualised as mainly a process of 
concretisation.  
During this process the abstract goals (clean environment, reliable health care, 
good working conditions) are concretised in two ways. In the first place, the 
abstract goal is concretised by enlisting its component parts. E.g. “reliable health 
care” is analysed in more concrete goals such as “adequate training facilities”, 
“hygiene”, etc. The second way in which abstract goals are concretised is by 
indicating the degree to which these goals (or component parts of these goals) 
should be realised. This form of concretisation is achieved by means of 
benchmarking, often accompanied by the explication of best practices.10 The input 
of (non-legal) experts is essential in order to regulate matters at this concrete level. 
We should note that at the most concrete level it can be difficult to distinguish 
goal-rules from the ordinary action-prescribing-rule. “Take measures in order that 
the window is closed” is a goal-rule but hardly different from an act-rule such as 
“close the window”. Nevertheless, there is a marked difference between the 
prescription to use tiles “that can be easily cleaned” and a prescription that “tiles 
of such and such material” should be used. The former type of regulation can be 
categorized as a result-prescribing rule that is derived from more abstract goal-
                                                 
10  The whole process is described by Enequist, who compares Swedish and Dutch 
concretisation practices of goal-legislation on Elderly Care: see Anne-Wietske 
Enequist,  A.L.E., From abstract goals to concrete rules: Regulating nursing home care 
in Sweden and the Netherlands, PhD thesis, (Ridderprint, Ridderkerk, 2015). 
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rules. Such a goal-rule may leave some freedom on the part of the norm-addressee 
to determine the best means to achieve the result (and to experiment with different 
tiles). Also, since the rule is about the result rather than about the act, it is 
indifferent as to who should effectively bring about the intended result. Goal-
legislation, even in its most concrete form, is therefore “naturally” accompanied 
by strict liability. 
This process of concretisation and continuous outsourcing brings about an 
enormous proliferation of rules, standards, performance-indicators and 
benchmarks. They not only arise from the necessity to concretise the abstract 
goals, but also from the duty to report. It is not enough to report that one took an 
effort. The Agent should report by indicating concrete, controllable, measurable 
results as proof that she indeed furthered the imposed aim. The proliferation of 
rules corresponds to an equally intense process of proliferation of actors.
Intermediate levels of employees are created who are constantly busy in 
developing benchmarks, gathering data, reporting and auditing. Goal-rules 
therefore set a dynamic in motion in which more rules call for more actors who in 
turn produce more rules.  
4.  In the shadow of the law 
It is not my intention here to just reiterate the usual complaints about over-
regulation. More important is the observation that all these rules and standards are 
predominantly made, applied and enforced outside the formal legal system with 
its in-built checks and balances. The only thin thread that links the 
(goal)regulatory rules and standards to the formal legal system is the – highly 
uninformative – original goal-act, issued by the central government. The further 
process of concretisation takes place in the shadow of the law. As such, it borrows 
its coercive force and efficacy from a large part from official law but is not 
accompanied with the usual formal warrants.  
An example might serve to illustrate this point. In the Netherlands the legislator 
issued a legally valid and broad clause saying that companies using harbour 
facilities must take appropriate safety measures in order to prevent accidents in 
loading and unloading dangerous substances. Since this law does not stipulate 
precisely what counts as appropriate safety-measures, the scope for discretion on 
the part of the norm-addressees is fairly wide. Formally they had the choice to use 
gangways, ladders, or what else seemed fitting the situation. However, the 
Inspectorate drew up more precise standards, specifying – to an absurd degree of 
detail – the sizes and location of escape routes. It is important to note that these 
rules lacked legal status and were not formally binding. Moreover, the prescribed 
precautionary measures were generally perceived to be unnecessary since there 
were many more and less expensive ways to safeguard safety. Yet, the companies 
together spent 400 million euros in order to comply with these non-binding rules. 





These rules were perceived to be legally binding, and it was believed that by not 
complying one risked incurring sanctions or in any case disreputable litigation.11
It should be clear that goal regulation is not a marginal affair. The majority of 
public institutions are regulated in this way. The average citizen is therefore much 
more often and much more intensely affected by these regulatory rules than by 
the official rules that unequivocally belong to the legal system. The average 
citizen may be occasionally in touch with private law when they buy a house, 
when they marry, set up a business or when they draw up a testament, and they 
may rarely if not never in their whole life be in touch with criminal law. But living 
in modern society, the average citizen is almost always affected by goal 
regulation.  
If our average citizen teaches in a primary school, they have to fill in daily the 
forms required by the inspection about the progress made by their pupils. As 
director of such a school they have to fill in many more forms and to engage in an 
ongoing dialogue with inspection as well as a number of governmental or semi-
governmental boards and intermediate institutions or committees.  If our citizen 
happens to care for the sick or elderly, their professional work is surrounded, if 
not dictated, by rules telling them at which times they should wake up the patients, 
how they should supply them with their daily meals or how diagnoses should be 
established. Again, they should report daily on what has been going on. And if 
our citizen works as a plumber and has their own small plumbing company, they 
have to be kept informed about the kind of certificates that should be obtained in 
order to be recognised as a reliable plumber. 
Since these all-pervasive rules are only partially connected to the formal legal 
system they not only fail to meet for a large part the requirements of the Rule of 
Law, but also seem to suffer from a democratic deficit. The standards, benchmarks 
and performance indicators are developed and changed by institutions and by 
actors who do not engage in a public debate and are largely hidden from view of 
those who are affected by these rules.  
Yet, goal regulation has been advocated not as a threat to democratic decision-
making but as a means to enhance democratic participation and control. The 
proponents of goal regulation usually adduce two arguments in favour of this 
view. The first argument runs that goal regulation calls for participation of “civil 
society”. Goal regulation is not a top-down affair and invites those who are most 
intensely affected by regulation to really participate in rule-making; it develops a 
level of democratic deliberation and decision-making which cannot be attained by 
traditional representative democracy.12
                                                 
11  Zie W. Timmer, Bestemming bereikt! Een praktijkonderzoek naar de toepassing van 
doelregelgeving, diss. EUR. 2011. 
12  R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton 
U.P., Princeton, 1993; E.R. Engelen en M. Sie Dhian Ho (red.), De staat van de 
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The second argument runs that since goal regulation is always accompanied by a 
duty to report on what has been achieved, transparency is its main virtue. The duty 
to report to supervisory bodies also implies accountability to the public at large. 
Performances of hospitals and schools are publicised on the Internet and made 
accessible to all stakeholders involved, which in turn would enhance forms of 
democratic control.  
In the next section I will examine the claim that the democratic quality of rule-
making is improved; in section 6 I will deal with the accountability claim.  
5.  Democratic rule-making? 
It is true that rule-making by field parties is one of the main features of goal 
regulation. But should we understand this rule-making as self-regulation? As I 
argued elsewhere,13 self-regulation within a goal-regulative context is neither 
spontaneous nor voluntary. The social field regulates itself because the goal-act 
obliges the field to do so. Usually, self-regulation takes place because government 
officials threaten to regulate matters in a classical top-down manner if the parties 
do not develop the rules themselves (so-called “conditional self-regulation”).14
The Principal not only imposes the obligation to make rules, but also determines 
who should do so. This seems at odds with the observation that goal-rules often 
leave the norm-addressees unspecified, but we should keep in mind that although 
such an act is formally addressed to a host of institutions, the government has a 
big say in composing the groups that are influential in shaping the rules of the 
field.  
The Dutch Act on the Quality of Care Providers offers a striking illustration of 
this policy. Several years after the Act had been adopted, the field had barely taken 
steps to draft the various Quality Management Systems that were required by the 
Act. This prompted the Ministry of Health to establish a so-called Steering Group: 
a group in which insurance companies, care-providers, inspectorate and 
professional associations were represented.15 The Steering Group initiated further 
regulation.  
                                                 
democratie. Democratie voorbij de staat, Amsterdam U.P. 2004. pp. 173-196.; 
Charles F. Sabel, Beyond principal-agent governance: experimentalist organizations, 
learning and accountability. 
13  P.C. Westerman, Who is regulating the self? Selfregulation as outsourced rulemaking, 
in: Selfregulation, thematic issue of Legisprudence: International Journal for the Study 
of Legislation, Vol. 4, no 3 2010, pp. 225-241. 
14  Eijlander, Philip, en Wim Voermans, Wetgevingsleer, Tjeenk Willink, Deventer, 1999. 
15 See Enequist, op.cit., Ch 3. 





We can therefore safely assume that the way the “self” is constituted is largely 
determined by the civil servants of the Ministry.16 The Ministry usually does not 
invite individual professionals; people are only involved as representatives of 
associations, institutions and boards. It is the intermediate level of managers rather 
than the individual nurses and teachers who are regulating the “self”.  
But even if the Principal would succeed in inviting all relevant partners, this kind 
of participation remains organised along the sectoral lines that are drawn by the 
policy-goals around which a regulatory regime is organised. Those who deliberate 
do not deliberate as citizens but as producers or consumers of the goods and 
services indicated by the central aim. The closest one can get to citizenship is by 
being a stakeholder organised in an interest group, but also there, the room for 
deliberation is determined by the central aim. A member of the environmental 
movement is not entitled to deliberate about higher education. 
The sectoral organisation is also responsible for the kind of deliberation that is 
permitted in the context of goal regulation. There is only room for debate about 
what the aim consists in, and how the various ingredient parts of that aim or sub-
aims should be concretised in targets or performance-indicators. There is no room 
for weighing and prioritising the relation between the various aims. As every 
discussant is so to speak locked up in their own sectoral regulatory regime, there 
is no room for a debate concerning the balance between e.g. employment and 
environmental issues.  
This is more than just an academic issue. The director of a hospital is confronted 
with various lists of criteria and demands, stemming from different regulatory 
regimes, such as health care, labour conditions, or environmental measures. It is 
to the individual director to weigh and balance the various requirements; a public 
forum for discussion is systematically lacking. 
6.  Democratic control? 
The second argument adduced by those who expect goal regulation to enhance 
democracy is that the duty to report adds to transparency and therefore 
accountability to the public at large. Here, the democratic potential is not sought 
in making the rules but in accounting for what effectively was achieved. I will 
abstain here from an elaborate analysis of different forms of accountability17 and 
draw attention to just a few features of accountability within a regime of goal 
regulation.  
                                                 
16  M.R. Ramlal, Naar een glazen wetgevingshuis. Belangeninbreng, transparantie en de 
wetgevingsjurist in ambtelijk Den Haag, Boom juridische uitgevers, 2011. 
17  Mark Bovens, Analysing and Assessing Public Accountability. A Conceptual 
Framework. European Governance Papers (EUROGOV) No C-06-01, http://www. 
commex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-06-01.pdf. 
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In the first place it should be noted that in a system of goal regulation the 
institution should not account for what went wrong but for what is positively 
achieved. The institution should report to what extent the objectives are realized. 
In itself this is a very difficult task. It presupposes consensus on what counts as a 
good performance.  
In the second place: how is it possible to prove and demonstrate that a good quality 
of education/healthcare/art was achieved? Only by presenting indicators which 
are measurable, demonstrable and controllable. The relation of these indicators to 
the underlying aim, however, is often artificial and at best an indirect one (think 
of the number of articles in peer-reviewed journals as an indication of “academic 
excellence”). Often, performance-indicators are not even indirectly linked, as is 
the case with the policy documents, mission-statements, protocols and 
certificates, together forming a “portfolio” that act as a substitute for real 
achievements. Remarkably enough, these documents owe their value not to their 
content but to their existence. The protocol can be copied from other institutions. 
What counts is that it is there.  
These more or less artificial criteria determine in turn the way how the aim is 
perceived by the broader public, i.e. the stakeholders such as clients, patients or 
visitors. The mere information that in a certain hospital the amount of cardiac 
surgeries performed falls below the benchmark that was determined by the 
Inspectorate will be interpreted by the larger public as an expression of the 
importance of this criterion. I don’t suggest here that the criteria of Inspectorates 
lack relevance, but it is important to realise that to a large extent the judgment of 
the public will be shaped and informed by the very criteria that are drawn up by 
the same institutions that are evaluated at a later stage. Since the public does not 
have its own set of criteria, the transparency that is achieved here should not be 
overrated. The criteria that are determined by field parties are transformed into 
operational criteria by managers and then presented to the larger public as the
criteria by means of which performances should be evaluated. 
We should also be careful not to overestimate the role of the public, for the simple 
reason that in these contexts the public is not the Principal to whom the institutions 
are accountable. The public is a third party, a stakeholder. Not the one who 
commissioned the agent to carry out a certain task and not the one who attaches 
consequences to mal-performance.  
7.  The people: Principal or Agent?
This raises the question of whether or not it is possible for the public (or the 
“people” to use that old but nowadays obsolete expression) to act as a Principal at 
all. This is not a very farfetched question. As I noted above, the P-A model was 
traditionally applied to the relationship between the electorate and representative 
parliament. The electorate is then conceived as the Principal. They commission 





the parliament to speak in their name. According to this classical view, the task 
that is entrusted to the Agent seems to consist of a broad mandate to represent the 
interests of the people.18 If the Agent fails to live up to expectations, the electorate 
(Principal) can hold the Agent accountable for their failure to represent their 
interests adequately and decide not to vote for him again. 
There is no such leverage in the two advocated possibilities to democratic 
participation in a goal-regulative context. Neither of these possibilities allow the 
public to act as a real Principal. In the first option (rulemaking by the field parties 
involved), the field parties act as Agent and not as Principal. Those who develop 
the standards and who draft the rules do this because they are required to do so 
and in pursuance of the Principal’s policy aims. They make the rules not by virtue 
of their being citizens – citizens have disappeared from view in the goal-
legislative landscape – but by virtue of their expertise as consumers or producers 
of the services and goods that are centred around the imposed aim. They are the 
cab drivers and not the clients. It is therefore not only artificial but also misleading 
to interpret the activities of such cab-drivers as forms of democratic participation. 
The second option fares no better. It may be true that the public has access to the 
information concerning the performances of public institutions, but they are 
– again – not the true Principal. They are, at best, bystanders. The real Principals 
are those who allocate the resources, the subsidies as well as the licenses and 
accreditation necessary to continue what the agent is doing. They may decide to 
allocate resources on the basis of considerations such as the amount of visitors 
attracted, but in such cases the public is just a performance indicator, not a 
Principal.  
One might object to that if the government acts as Principal, imposes its aims and 
gives subsidies, it thereby acts in name of the people, and that the people are in 
the final instance the last and true principal. Formally speaking, this is correct. 
But this means that democratic legitimacy then depends on the mechanisms of 
classical representative democracy. And we have seen that this formal form of 
democracy is only linked to the bulk of regulation by means of the very thin thread 
of the original abstract goal-act. This means that alternative arrangements such as 
new forms of self-regulation and of accountability do not add anything which 
makes this style of regulation more democratic. On the contrary; in the first option 
the citizen is obliged to commit themselves to the purpose around which their 
work is organised, and in the second option they function at best as a performance-
                                                 
18   It should be noted that in more recent versions, the mandate is understood more 
narrowly as the provision of certain (public) goods and services. See
Randall G. Holcombe and James D. Gwartney, Political Parties and the Legislative 
Principal-Agent Relationship, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 
(JITE) / Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Vol. 145, No. 4 (December 
1989), pp. 669-675.  
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indicator. Only in representative formal democracy, despite its many 
shortcomings, the citizen is the true and only Principal. 
8.  Conclusion: organised distrust reversed
On the basis of my arguments so far we cannot arrive at conclusive evidence 
concerning the trust-generating qualities of goal regulation. We can only conclude 
that appeals to its democratic nature are mainly rhetorical. Self-regulation is 
structured and commissioned by the government, which sets the parameters for 
debate along sectoral lines. Accountability mechanisms fare no better. The public 
mainly plays the role of the bystander. Public assessment of results is shaped by 
means of criteria drawn up by institutions themselves and if from time to time 
newspapers reveal “real” performances, usually hidden from view by positive 
reports that are mainly based on the presence of protocols and quality 
management systems, this does little to inspire or enhance confidence. 
In view of the Principal-Agent relations within a goal-regulative context, we 
might advance the claim that relations are reversed if we compare them to the 
classical ideal of the electorate as Principal and parliament as Agent. In the 
classical view the role of the citizen is marked by a system of checks and balances; 
i.e. of organised distrust of governmental power. In a system of goal-legislation, 
matters are reversed. The citizen qua citizen has disappeared from view. If people 
are consulted and commissioned to carry out regulatory and supervisory tasks it 
is by virtue of their being a member of institutions: of being producers and 
consumers of “deliverables”: goods and services. In other words, in their capacity 
of Agents. And as agents they have to show and to prove that they can be trusted. 
Again there is organised distrust, not of governmental power, however, but of the 
performances of all those who are engaged in the production of goods and 
services, including rulemaking. Bearing in mind that people generally tend to 
reciprocate expectations and to respond in just the same way as they are treated, 
there is reason to believe that, as a result of this distrust in the public, public trust 
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1.  Introduction 
The financial crisis of 2008 and misbehaviour, such as the large-scale selling of 
exorbitant insurance policies, also known as woekerpolis, and the Libor interest 
rate manipulation scandal involving a major retail bank Rabobank, resulted in an 
enormous decrease of public trust in the Dutch financial services industry. While 
the post-crisis era has witnessed a move away from the principles-based public 
regulation towards more prescriptive and centralised public regulation, both at the 
EU and Member State level,1 the principles-based regulation has not entirely lost 
its significance in the aftermath of the crisis. In this contribution, we examine the 
role of principles-based regulation in restoring public trust in financial institutions 
and their services in the post-crisis world: is principles-based regulation the right 
way to overcome the crisis of trust in the financial markets? 
First of all, we have to acknowledge that this trust crisis is a very stubborn 
problem. It is difficult to gain trust, and it is easy to lose it. After one negative 
experience ten positive experiences are needed to regain trust. In case of complex 
products, services and markets, even more efforts are to be made to restore it. 
Human beings are sense-makers, constantly trying to understand social situations. 
Even when there is no trust crisis, it is normal to keep one’s distance from the 
financial markets because of a great deal of complexity involved therein. People 
become alienated when misconduct appears to permeate the whole financial 
sector. When a single bank, insurer or financial intermediary is cheating on a 
consumer, the latter can go to a rival company. When misbehaviour seems to be 
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inherent to the financial branch as such, people cannot escape from the 
inconvenient situation. Their estrangement from financial services thus acquires 
a structural character.  
The consumer alienation from financial institutions and services, however, is 
highly disturbing. On the one hand, financial services, such as payment, credit, 
investment, and insurance, have become an essential part of the everyday life of 
Dutch citizens. Such services allow citizens to meet their essential needs, such as 
having a home or sufficient income after retirement, and to fully participate in 
society. In mobilizing savings and allocating investment, financial services are 
also highly important for the (EU) economy. On the other hand, consumer 
confidence in financial markets is essential for their proper functioning. The 
financial markets simply cannot function without public trust.   
Our examination of principles-based regulation in the post-crisis world as a 
possible solution for resolving the trust problem starts with the analysis of the 
rationale for this type of regulation, as well as the problems involved therein 
(section 2). Subsequently, we discuss the traditional approach to rule-making as 
opposed to the modern approach thereto. In this context, attention is also paid to 
the relationship between the legislator, regulator, judiciary and financial services 
industry in shaping the content of open norms (section 3). These issues are further 
elaborated upon by using three examples of open norms in the Dutch Financial 
Supervision Act (Wet financieel toezicht (Wft)), which are of great importance in 
practice (section 4). We focus on the duty to supply accurate, clear and not 
misleading information (Article 4:19 Wft), the duty of responsible lending 
(Article 4:34 Wft), and the general duty of care (Article 4:24a Wft). The 
perplexity concerning the duty to supply accurate, clear and not misleading 
information illustrates the problem of ambiguity concerning the status of public 
soft law produced with a view to clarifying the meaning of open norms. The 
analysis of the duty of responsible lending in turn reveals a tension between public 
and private soft law in shaping the content of open norms. Finally, the general 
duty of care deserves special attention in the present context given its mega-open 
character combined with the special enforcement technique attached thereto. Our 
contribution ends with some conclusions on principles-based regulation and 
public trust in the post-crisis era (section 5). 
2.  Principles-based regulation: the rationale and problems 
Principles-based regulation pre-dates the financial crisis of 2008 and its relevance 
is not limited to the financial services sector. Since the eighties, it has been 
recognised that a large number of sharp and precise rules with a command and 
control character has a negative side. In its report on the Future of the Rule of 
Law, the Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (Wetenschappelijke 
Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid (WRR), for example, has argued that this type of 
regulation undermines the responsibility of citizens and their organisations in 
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modern society and does not address the problem of the rapidly changing frontier 
of knowledge.2 Goal regulation, or principles-based regulation, such as general 
duties of care, coupled with the corresponding forms of accountability, is 
presented as a plausible solution. Such regulation is regarded as more flexible and 
sustainable.  
Another reason in favour of principles-based regulation stems from the well-
known compliance theory developed by Malcolm Sparrow. Sparrow advocates a 
creative responsive attitude, contributing to avoidance of illegal as well as legal 
but undesirable behaviour.3 A strict legal view is seen as too restrictive. The 
influences of economical and psychological factors become more important. As a 
consequence, the traditional focus on legality is put into perspective. The legality 
principle is qualified as relative. 
Indeed, at first glance, open norms as the expression of principles-based 
regulation seem to be in conflict with the principles of legality and legal certainty. 
However, the government and parliament, as well as legal science, accept open 
norms. Most strikingly, even courts accept the use of such norms and do not 
consider them to be against the law, in particular the requirements of 
foreseeability and accessibility. The case law acknowledges the fact that open 
norms are inevitable because the legislator is simply not able to provide for 
detailed rules for all possible situations that may arise. Therefore, detailed rules 
may imperil legal certainty rather than contribute thereto. 4  Already in the 
seventies the need for open norms had also been recognized by the European 
Court of Human Rights (ECrtHR).5 In its later case-law, the ECrtHR has argued 
as follows:6
However clearly drafted a legal provision may be, in any system of law, 
including criminal law, there is an inevitable element of judicial 
interpretation. There will always be a need for elucidation of doubtful 
points and for adaptation to changing circumstances. Indeed, in the United 
Kingdom, as in the other Convention States, the progressive development 
of the criminal law through judicial lawmaking is a well entrenched and 
necessary part of legal tradition. Article 7 (art. 7) of the Convention cannot 
be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal 
liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the 
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resultant development is consistent with the essence of the offence and 
could reasonably be foreseen. 
The ECrtHR thus emphasises the inevitability of a step-by-step development of 
law. The legislator is not the only and final law-maker. It often uses open-ended 
norms for the reasons given above, followed by their “gradual clarification (…) 
from case to case.” 
How is this reality of lawmaking to be seen from the public trust perspective? Can 
it not only be accepted from a legal point of view but also from a public trust point 
of view? On the one hand, it speaks for itself that open norms do not contribute to 
public trust where people want to know precisely in advance which norms they 
have to comply with. On the other hand, public trust is not fostered by legislation 
dominated by detailed rules that fails to cover all relevant situations and, hence, 
to realize its regulatory objectives. When such “certainty-by-details” legislation 
constantly lags behind new developments in the financial services sector, the 
credibility of the regulator is at stake. Financial law is a complex and dynamic 
field where detailed norms simply cannot capture all instances of financial 
institutions’ behaviour, their product innovations and organisational changes, or 
altering external circumstances. It is probably not going too far to argue that 
financial law is a domain where principles-based legislation is adequate par 
excellence.  
At the same time, the resort to open norms is not a guarantee for public trust. At 
least the following five problems involved therein can be mentioned. First of all, 
an open norm is not immediately filled in by concrete elements as result of their 
interpretation by courts, financial regulators and/or the financial industry itself. It 
normally takes some time before an acceptable level of legal certainty is reached. 
Besides, it cannot be excluded that some open norms permanently remain vague. 
Secondly, rendering open norms concrete in itself does not guarantee that their 
addressees are satisfactorily acquainted with relevant court judgements or soft 
law, particularly if the latter is produced by financial supervisory authorities. 
Thirdly, as a consequence of the Sparrow attitude, open norms might be used by 
financial watchdogs for punishing conduct which is legal but, in their view, 
undesirable. In case of granting a license or enforcing the law, however, this is 
strictly speaking against the legality principle. According to the lex certa
principle, a breach of law can only be established when the addressee of a norm 
knows in advance what the norm requires of him. In the fourth place, the resort to 
open norms gives rise to many complex and sensitive issues concerning the 
relationship and/or division of labour between the legislator, the financial 
regulator, the judiciary, and the financial services industry. Which actor should 
have the upper hand when it comes to shaping the content of open norms? Is it 
not true that in the case of law enforcement that this is always a court? Last but 
not least, the concretisation of open norms through the case law by the judiciary, 
as well as public and private soft law produced respectively by financial regulators 
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and the financial industry, may result in a very complex set of norms. This would 
force financial institutions to set up expensive compliance departments with the 
increase in costs of financial services and products for clients as a result. 
3.  Lex certa and open norms: a traditional approach vs. a modern 
approach 
The powers of administrative authorities under a certain law generally have a 
condition (X) – power (Y) structure: an administrative authority is allowed to use 
its power (Y) to take a decision about, for example, granting a permit or 
sanctioning an infringement of legislation, but only if the legal condition (X) has 
been met. Consider the following examples.  
In case the insurer does not meet the standards of integrity (X), the financial 
authority can (Y) withdraw its license.  
If the prospectus is not clear for the client (X), the financial regulator can 
(Y) fine the bank up to a maximum of € 5.000.000.  
In these examples, the “standards of integrity” and “not clear for the client” are 
open norms. The application of such norms is subject to the public authority’s 
discretion (beoordelingsruimte of-vrijheid). That the financial supervisory 
authority can withdraw a license or impose a fine, is a matter of discretion too, 
and even in two respects: the authority has discretion regarding the question 
whether it wants to use its power to do so (Y1, of beleidsvrijheid) and, in case of 
a positive answer, how to use it (the temporary or permanent withdrawal of a 
licence? which fine? (Y2, hoe-beleidsvrijheid)). 
All these elements – X, Y1 and Y2 – can be qualified as a matter of discretion.
Suppose that the element X is clear and it is beyond any doubt that the open norm 
has been violated. Then, at least in the Netherlands, with respect to the Y 
elements, a distinction must be made between remedial and punitive sanctions. 
As far as the remedial aspect is concerned, in case of a breach of the legal standard, 
Dutch law recognizes the principle that the financial regulator must enforce the 
compliance with it (Y1). The implementation of this duty (Y2) is a matter of the 
financial regulator’s discretion, subject to limited judicial review. When the 
regulator also has a power to impose a punitive sanction, such as an administrative 
fine, the decision of whether or not to use it (the Y1-element), usually lies within 
its discretion too. When the decision is made to impose a fine, the question to be 
addressed next is which fine. In all Western European countries, the decisions of 
administrative authorities concerning the amount of a fine can be fully reviewed 
by courts. So the question of whether or not to impose a fine is a matter of judicial 
deference, while the amount of a fine is subject to a fully-fledged judicial review. 
In fact, this is remarkable, considering that the first aspect is more drastic than the 
second.   




In the following, we will focus on the preliminary question of whether there is a 
breach of an open norm: The X-aspect. The legality principle implies that norms 
must be clear and foreseeable. Sanctioning a violation of a vague norm is therefore 
not allowed when a reasonable person cannot know in advance when he breaches 
it. In the European continental jurisdictions, in particular, the Netherlands, 
Germany, and France, a distinction is made between open legal norms and policy 
discretion. Open legal norms are subject to one exclusive interpretation which can 
be fully reviewed by a court. In contrast, policy discretion implies the possibility 
of several diverging interpretations which must be reviewed by the court with 
deference. 
The problem is evident. A bank or an insurance company should act in accordance 
with the standards of integrity. But what do these standards imply? When does a 
financial institution breach the law? Who has the final say in determining this? A 
financial regulator or an administrative court? Can someone breach the law 
without knowing the precise meaning of the norm? If the answer is yes, can the 
breach imply strict liability, particularly in case of a criminal charge?  
The traditional doctrine says that sanctions can only be imposed when a norm is 
clear in advance. It also says that the question of whether the norm has been 
breached is not a policy matter but a legal matter which is subject to a fully-
fledged judicial review. In contrast, the modern approach towards rule-making is 
more tolerant of open norms and more complicated at the same time. The starting 
point is the actual need for principles-based regulation. Precise and detailed norms 
are not seen as an ideal of the rule of law anymore. This approach implies a greater 
responsibility of citizens and their organizations in ensuring compliance with 
open norms. But how far does this responsibility extend? And what is the role of 
the judiciary in this new context? 
In the case law of the Dutch courts, foreseeability and accessibility appear to be 
the main criteria. The lex certa principle requires that norms must be as clear as 
reasonably possible. Absolute clarity is thus not required. Manifest un-
reasonableness results in the annulment of an administrative decision. The 
reasoning behind the adoption of such a high standard of review is as follows. 
Different interpretations of an open norm are acceptable as long as they are not 
manifestly unreasonable. An administrative decision will only be quashed when 
no reasonable person would have made the same choice as the regulator.7 In this 
way, courts avoid the need for providing their own interpretation of the open norm 
involved. 
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In the case of a manifestly unreasonable behaviour, every reasonable person, 
including financial institutions, is supposed to know that they are doing the wrong, 
illegal thing. When it is not entirely clear beforehand whether a certain conduct is 
compatible with an open norm, the responsibility of the addressees comes up. This 
is a rather severe responsibility because, as professional institutions, the 
addressees like banks and insurance companies are presumed to know the meaning 
of open norms. If they cannot establish it, they are obliged to ask the regulator 
whether their intended behaviour is in accordance with the norm or not. Thus, in 
the case involving ABP – one of the largest pension funds in the world operating 
in the Netherlands – the Industrial Organisation Appeal Court (College van 
Beroep voor het Bedrijfsleven (CBB)) ruled as follows:8
One may expect from a big and experienced market participant like ABP 
that it makes inquiries about the goal and range of [the open norms 
involved]. As far as, according to ABP, things were not clear, ABP could 
have contacted the regulator DNB [the Dutch Central Bank]. However, 
ABP did not do that. 
So in case of uncertainty about the meaning of an open norm, the professional’s 
responsibility implies a duty to inquire into the meaning of such a norm, which 
can be done by simply asking the regulator about it.9
While it is easy to agree on this starting point, the modern approach towards the 
lex certa principle under Dutch law is not entirely uncontroversial. At least the 
following four shortcomings involved therein deserve special mention in this 
context: 
In the first place, the Dutch financial regulators – the Dutch Central Bank (De
Nederlandse Bank (DNB)) and the Dutch Financial Markets Authority (Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten (AFM)) – are not obliged to provide clear answers concerning 
the interpretation of vague standards, and the Dutch courts are very reluctant to 
qualify declarations to this effect as legal acts. In particular, Dutch law generally 
does not recognize an action for a declaration similar, for example, to the German 
“Feststellungsklage”. Within this framework, the financial supervisory authorities 
are normally not pressed to give clear, individual, and precise answers which can 
be qualified as legally binding commitments or even legal acts. One notable 
exception thereto is the newly introduced general duty of care under section 4:24a 
Wft which is discussed in more detail below.  
The second shortcoming is that regulators are not legally obliged to provide and 
publish interpreting guidance with respect to open-ended provisions. Of course, 
on many issues such guidance is available on their websites, in particular in the 
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Questions & Answers sections. Nevertheless, this information often remains 
vague as well. 
The interplay between public soft law produced by regulators and private soft law 
developed by the financial services industry itself (such as banking codes) is the 
third area of concern. When professionalism of those to whom an open norm is 
addressed is highly valued, the standards made by the professional branch 
associations within the framework of open norms should be taken seriously by the 
regulators when interpreting and applying such norms. The duty of care and the 
justification principle compel the regulators to provide an explanation when their 
policy or decision diverges from private soft law. One may get the impression, 
however, that the Dutch courts give too much leeway in this context to the 
financial regulators. We will elaborate upon this issue in the next section. 
Last but not least, when assessing the financial institutions’ responsibility for 
knowing the content of open norms, the case law of the Dutch courts does not 
distinguish between different categories of the norm addressees. It is arguable, 
however, that big financial institutions like banks are expected to have more 
(responsibility for having) knowledge about open norms than small players in the 
financial markets. 
Despite the existence of these problems, it can be concluded that compliance with 
open norms can be enforced in the Dutch legal system. Being seen as a rather 
flexible principle, lex certa does not pose significant obstacles thereto. Another 
important finding is that the public authorities’ discretion is not an oversimplified 
black-and-white thing. It involves a sliding scale ranging from very limited to 
very broad discretion. Besides, in the course of time, the degree of discretion can 
decrease as a result of new case law, new (public or private) soft law and, more 
generally, an increase in experience and knowledge. In the end, legality and lex 
certa, foreseeability and accessibility are, in essence, a matter of good
communication guided by the idea of the responsibility of all stakeholders 
involved in ensuring compliance with open norms. 
4.  Open norms in post-crisis financial regulation and their concretisation 
4.1  General remarks 
In this section, three examples of open norms in the Dutch financial supervision 
legislation will be discussed. How are they specified? In particular, what role in 
their concretisation is played by public and private soft law? As a preliminary 
remark, it should be noted that the Dutch AFM distinguishes between three types 
of its soft law, namely policy rules, guidelines, and interpretations. Policy rules 
are self-binding non-legislative rules of the AFM. With its own guidelines, the 
AFM aims to inform a specific group of persons about a particular topic. The 
guidelines can contain recommendations for financial service providers. The last 
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category – interpretations – gives insight into how, in the AFM’s view, an open 
norm must be interpreted. According to the AFM, such interpretations are not 
binding and do not give any rights to the addressees of the open norm concerned. 
In addition, guidelines and recommendations can be issued by the European 
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs) concerning the matters within the scope of EU 
law. In this way, the ESAs can contribute to the development of consistent, 
efficient, and effective supervisory practices with a view to ensuring a common, 
uniform, and consistent application of European law. 
4.2  The duty to supply accurate, clear and not misleading information 
(Article 4:19 Wft) 
The first example concerns Article 4:19 Wft which reads as follows:10
1.  A financial enterprise shall ensure that the information provided by it 
or on its behalf with regard to a financial product, financial service or 
ancillary service, including advertisement, is not detrimental to the 
information to be supplied or made available pursuant to this part.  
2.  The information supplied by an investment firm to clients shall be 
accurate, clear and not misleading. The preceding sentence shall apply 
mutatis mutandis to information to this part by a financial enterprise that is 
not an investment firm. (…) 
The meaning of “accurate, clear and not misleading” information is further 
specified by the AFM in its policy rules. 11  When assessing whether the 
information is “accurate”, for example, the AFM looks into whether the 
information is correct in substance; whether the consumer receives what he is told; 
and whether there are no contradictions in the information, either in one 
information document or between different information mediums. In addition, the 
policy rules of the AFM contain some examples of incorrect information. For 
instance, the information about a certain financial product on the financial 
institution’s website is considered to be incorrect if it is not in conformity with 
the contract terms relating to the product.  
Most strikingly, the AFM notes that in practice it always makes a specific 
assessment of each case and explicitly states: 
We emphasise that the qualification of information as inaccurate, unclear 
or misleading makes no difference for answering the question whether 
Article 4:19 (2) Wft has been violated.12
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How can Article 4:19(2) Wft be understood in the light of this statement by the 
AFM? One possible interpretation is that qualifying certain information as 
inaccurate, unclear or misleading based on the AFM’s policy rules does not 
preclude the AFM from finding in the specific circumstances of a case that 
Article 4:19(2) Wft has not been violated. This interpretation is in line with the 
doctrine of policy rules which does not preclude diverging decisions in favour of 
the addressee in a specific case. 
Another plausible interpretation is that a violation of Article 4:19(2) Wft can be 
established even though, according to the relevant policy rule, the information 
provided is accurate, clear, and not misleading. This interpretation appears 
problematic in light of the principle of legitimate expectations. This principle 
implies that a diverging individual decision to the detriment of the addressee is 
forbidden. However, this problem can be overcome because the AFM’s policy 
rule in question explicitly warns of the possibility of such a negative decision. 
This warning can be considered to eliminate the addressee’s expectation that 
decisions to its detriment are excluded altogether. 
Finally, one can also interpret the AFM’s statement and, hence, Article 4:19(2) 
Wft, in the vein of the Sparrow’s approach to regulation and enforcement. In this 
interpretation, it is possible to qualify information as inaccurate on the basis of 
the policy rule, but this would not amount to a violation of Article 4:19(2) Wft. 
This in turn would mean that no administrative sanctions could be imposed for 
acting contrary to the AFM’s policy rule. However, the compliance with the 
policy rule could be ensured in more informal ways, in particular through 
communication between the regulator and the regulated.  
At present, however, neither the legislator nor the AFM has made it clear in which 
sense Article 4:19(2) Wft should be understood. In fact, by publishing the above-
mentioned policy rule the AFM has only exacerbated the legal uncertainty 
regarding the meaning of this provision. This is unfortunate, as financial 
regulators can be expected to play a key role in clarifying the content of open-
ended norms.         
   
4.3  The duty of responsible lending (Article 4:34 Wft)  
The second example of an open norm worth mentioning in the present context is 
Article 4:34 Wft which reads as follows: 
1. Before concluding a credit contract, an offeror of credit shall, in the 
consumer’s interest, obtain information on the latter’s financial position 
and assess, in order to prevent overextension of credit to the consumer, 
whether concluding the contract would be justified. 
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2. The offeror shall not enter into a credit contract with the consumer where 
this would not be justified with a view to overextension of credit to the 
consumer. (...)13
This open-ended provision imposes a general duty on creditors to act as 
“responsible lenders”, so as to prevent consumer over-indebtedness; for this 
purpose, however, it only obliges creditors to assess whether the consumer is 
creditworthy before the conclusion of the credit agreement and to refuse granting 
credit if this is not the case. The meaning of this open statutory norm as far as the 
assessment of the consumer’s creditworthiness in simple consumer credit 
transactions is concerned is mainly fleshed out in the codes of conduct of the three 
branch organizations: the Code of Conduct of the Netherlands Association of 
Consumer Finance Companies (Vereniging van Financieringsondernemingen in 
Nederland (VFN)), the Consumer Credit Code of the Dutch Banking Association 
(Gedragscode Consumptief Crediet van de Nederlandse Vereniging van Banken
(NVB)), and the Code of Conduct of the Dutch Home Shopping Organisation 
(Gedragscode van de Nederlandse Thuiswinkelorganisatie (NTO)). All three 
codes of conduct share the same starting point for assessing whether the consumer 
is creditworthy and the provision of credit is thus justified: upon incurring 
interest- and repayment-related obligations under the credit agreement, the 
consumer must still have sufficient means to provide for his or her basic needs 
and to bear his or her recurring expenses.14 If this is not the case, providing credit 
would be considered irresponsible. What is more, the Dutch AFM regards the 
provisions of the codes of conduct as minimum norms for responsible lending.15
If a particular lender is not bound by one of the codes of conduct, it may use other 
norms provided that the latter offer the same or higher level of consumer 
protection. Consequently, the disregard of the provisions of the codes of conduct 
by the financial institution when providing credit to consumers may result in the 
violation of the statutory rules on responsible lending, regardless of whether the 
institution is formally bound by a particular code of conduct or not. In such a case, 
the Dutch financial supervisory authority may impose administrative sanctions. 
In this way, private soft law produced within the statutory framework can be 
supported by the public enforcement mechanisms provided by the state.   
Yet, as the examples from the area of consumer mortgage credit show, public and 
private soft law may also be in tension with each other. In particular, public 
enforcement may also significantly undermine the practical importance of private 
soft law. This is demonstrated by the AFM’s decision of 24 September 201016 in 
which this financial watchdog imposed an administrative penalty in the amount 
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of € 120.000 on one of the major retail banks operating in the Netherlands – 
Rabobank – for the breach of Article 115 of the Business Conduct Supervision 
(Financial Enterprises) Decree 2006 (Besluit Gedragstoezicht financiële 
ondernemingen Wft (BGfo)). This provision, which specifies the general public 
law duty of creditors to act as “responsible lenders”, obliges creditors to establish 
and apply criteria for assessing the consumer creditworthiness with a view to 
preventing consumer over-indebtedness. The meaning of this open-ended norm 
was further specified in the Mortgage Financing Code of Conduct (Gedragscode 
Hypothecaire Financieringen (GHF)) drawn up by the Dutch Banking 
Association. In some cases, this Code of Conduct allowed lenders to deviate from 
the strict criteria for consumer lending laid down therein, provided they 
sufficiently motivated their decision given the specific situation of the consumer. 
Based on the respective provisions of the Code of Conduct and the statistical data, 
Rabobank formulated its internal rules for consumer lending. Under these rules, 
highly educated consumers under the age of 35 who were expected to get the 
salary increase could be granted a higher amount of credit than was normally 
allowed. However, in the view of the financial markets authority, this provision 
was contrary to Article 115 BGfo as specified in the authority’s own report
concerning the quality of advice and transparency in mortgage lending. 17
According to this report, the Rabobank was not allowed to deviate from the 
normal consumer lending rules based on statistical data; such a deviation was only 
permitted based on the data relevant for the specific situation of an individual 
consumer (such as the employer’s statement of salary increases). In this way, the 
Dutch financial supervisory authority deeply interfered with the bank’s internal 
policy concerning the prevention of over-indebtedness designed to implement the 
co-regulatory arrangement. This outcome was reached in the course of public 
enforcement whereby the administrative agency not only looked into whether the 
bank complied with the Mortgage Financing Code of Conduct drawn by the 
industry but also into whether it acted in accordance with the agency’s own 
guidance.    
                     
This case provides a good illustration of the vulnerability of private soft law 
within the framework of public regulation as interpreted and applied by financial 
supervisory authorities. What is striking about it is that the open norm which was 
elaborated in the code of conduct produced by the industry under the vigilant eye 
of the financial supervisory authority was also specified by this authority itself in 
its formally non-binding guidance. In its enforcement action, therefore, the 
financial regulator followed its own interpretation of the code of conduct rather 
than the interpretation given to it by the bank. Obviously, such an approach may 
undermine the practical significance of private soft law within the statutory 
framework, leading to its substitution by public soft law produced by 
administrative agencies. What is more, it does not make it clear how public soft 
law and private soft law relate to each other, impairing legal certainty.  
                                                            
17  AFM, Kwaliteit advies en transparantie bij hypotheken, 1 November 2007. 
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In our view, in order to ease the tension between public and private soft law and 
to contribute to legal certainty in financial law, the AFM could learn from the 
experience of the Health Care Inspectorate of the Netherlands (Inspectie 
Gezondheidszorg (IGZ)). The latter exercises supervision over the national health 
care system with a view to promoting safe and high-quality health care. In the 
same way as the AFM, this regulator also has to supervise compliance with open 
norms. For example, under Article 40 of the Individual Health Care Professional 
Act (Wet op de beroepen in de individuele gezondheidszorg (Wet BIG)) and 
Article 2 of the Healthcare Institutions (Quality) Act (Kwaliteitswet 
zorginstellingen (KWZ)), a health care provider should provide “responsible” 
care. It is notable that, in relation to this general duty, the IGZ has set out a special 
enforcement framework in which it explains its approach to private soft law. The 
essence of this approach has been aptly summarized by the Council of State (Raad 
van State) as follows: 
(...) For the purpose of exercising its enforcement power, the IGZ has 
established an IGZ enforcement framework. It states that the legislator has 
left room for health care providers to specify generally formulated 
legislative norms based on their expertise and practice. The health care 
providers do this by translating their scientific knowledge in criteria for 
professional conduct of business and formulating these criteria as a 
professional standard relating to the norms associated with the field. 
Subsequently, the IGZ bases its enforcement as far as possible on these 
field norms. Therefore, it declares the field norm as an IGZ-enforcement 
norm. In its policy, the IGZ envisages that it considers the field norms as 
weighty advice. The health care provider should generally follow the field 
norms, but may deviate therefrom in the interest of the patient by providing 
a verifiable explanation. If there are no field norms or the existing field 
norms are, in the IGZ’s view, insufficiently clear or insufficiently 
measurable, or otherwise unacceptable and inadequate for its enforcement, 
it may, if necessary for ensuring responsible care, decide to formulate 
independent specific IGZ-enforcement norms, informing the outside world 
when and how it will exercise its enforcement power in individual cases. 
Here, too, the health care providers may deviate therefrom by providing a 
verifiable explanation if this is in the interest of the patient. (...)18
Thus, the IGZ shows deference to private soft law produced by the health care 
providers. At the same time, it reserves itself the right to deviate therefrom. In 
particular, if the IGZ is of the opinion that the existing private soft law does not 
adequately fill in the respective open norm, it may produce its own soft law. In 
such a case, however, it is expected to make it clear in advance which set of rules 
it is going to enforce. Such a solution not only ensures respect for the knowledge 
and expertise within a particular branch, but also contributes to legal certainty as 
far as the relationship between public and private soft law is concerned.        
 
                                                            
18  Council of State, 14 January 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:58, para. 3.1 (our translation). 




It is also notable in this context that in the aftermath of the financial crisis, the role 
of private soft law in specifying Article 4:34 Wft in the area of consumer 
mortgage credit has been considerably weakened by the rise of public regulation. 
The Dutch government largely replaced the provisions on responsible consumer 
mortgage lending laid down in the Mortgage Financing Code of Conduct with 
much more prescriptive and protective provisions of the delegated act.19 Private 
soft law in this area enacted within the statutory framework was considered to 
have failed to provide for a sufficient level of consumer protection against over-
indebtedness in the post-crisis era.  
 
Not only private but also public regulation, however, faces difficulties in terms of 
designing an optimal regulatory regime. In particular, overprotective public 
regulation may not perform well in markets characterised by consumer 
heterogeneity.20 A related concern is that highly paternalistic public regulation 
may backfire against the consumers and thus prove ineffective in practice. 
Restrictive rules on responsible lending, for example, may prevent consumers 
from gaining credit from licensed creditors and force them into the arms of shady 
lenders who charge much higher interest rates.21 In fact, private soft law produced 
within the statutory framework may be better equipped to strike the right balance 
between freedom and protection, particularly if both financial institutions and 
consumer associations are involved in the process of rule-making. Therefore, the 
substitution of soft law in the financial services field by hard-core public 
regulation and/or public soft law produced by financial watchdogs is not without 
risk. 
4.4  The general duty of care (Article 4:24a Wft) 
The third example of an open norm which deserves special mention in the present 
context is the newly introduced Article 4:24a Wft which reads as follows: 
1. A financial service provider gives careful consideration to the legitimate 
interests of the consumer or beneficiary. 
2. A financial service provider who provides advice acts in the interest of 
the consumer or beneficiary. 
3. The AFM applies Article 1:75 [Wft] in relation to the first and second 
section only in case of manifest abuses that can damage trust in the financial 
service provider or the financial markets. (...)22
                                                            
19  Temporary Mortgage Credit Regulations of 12 December 2012 as amended on 
30 October 2013 (Tijdelijke regeling hypothecair krediet). For instance, as of 
1 January 2013 the maximum mortgage credit amount is being gradually reduced to 
100 % of the property value by 2018.  
20 Cf eg R.A. Epstein, “The Neoclassical Economics of Consumer Contracts”, Minnesota 
Law Review 92 (2008) 803, 810. 
21 See eg Epstein (2008) 831. 
22  Our translation. 
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By including this general duty of care on the part of financial service providers in 
the financial supervision legislation, the Dutch legislator aims to improve 
consumer protection in financial markets and thus to restore public trust in 
financial institutions and the services provided by them. The rationale for the 
adoption of this mega-open norm is threefold.23 First of all, according to the 
legislator, the general duty of care should ensure that, when providing financial 
serves to consumers, financial institutions always ascertain that their acts or 
omissions do not impair the “legitimate interests” of the consumer. These are “the 
interests which are directly or indirectly affected by the provision of financial 
services and which the financial institution can be reasonably expected to 
consider”.24 Such interests should be given due regard in view of information 
asymmetry between financial institutions and consumers. Furthermore, the 
second paragraph of Article 4:24a Wft makes it clear that the responsibility of 
financial institutions goes even further in cases of financial advice. The providers 
of financial advice must not only take the consumer’s interests into account but 
act in the consumer’s interests. Secondly, by explicitly anchoring the general duty 
of care in the primary legislation, the Dutch legislator hopes to contribute to the 
cultural change in the financial sector towards taking consumer interests 
seriously. Thirdly, the newly adopted general duty of care is supposed to play the 
role of a safety net under the existing specific consumer protection provisions in 
the financial supervision legislation. This would allow the AFM to intervene in 
the financial markets “in case of manifest abuses that can damage trust in the 
financial service provider or the financial markets” and that have not been 
captured by the more specific rules. Here also lies the limitation of the AFM’s 
powers based on Article 4:24a Wft. They can only be used in extreme cases and 
in the absence of a specific legal ground that would allow the AFM to take action. 
The AFM thus cannot resort to this open norm in order to derogate from the more 
specific rules contained in the financial supervision legislation, and it should 
exercise self-restraint when applying it.  
Perhaps the most striking aspect of Article 4:24a Wft is how the Dutch legislator 
sees the interplay between the enforcement of this open norm and its 
concretisation. According to the legislator, given its open nature, the general duty 
of care will be specified in individual cases. In this way, the legislator emphasises 
the indeterminate character of this provision as a safety net which can be enforced 
as such without any obligation on the part of the government or the AFM to fill it 
in beforehand. However, there is one important constraint on the enforcement of 
the general duty of care. An administrative order for periodic penalty payment 
(last onder dwangsom) and an administrative fine (bestuurlijke boete) can only be 
imposed if the AFM has first issued a binding designation (aanwijzing) and the 
financial institution has failed to comply with it. A binding designation requires 
the institution to adhere to a particular line of conduct within a reasonable term 
                                                            
23 See Memorie van Toelichting Wijzigingswet financiële markten 2014, Kamerstukken II 
2012/13, 33 632, nr. 3, pp. 27-28. 
24 Id., p. 27. 




specified therein. In the legislator’s view, when determining what conduct is 
expected from a financial institution on the basis of its administrative law on the 
general duty of care embodied in Article 4:24a Wft, regard should be paid to the 
private law duties of care as developed in the case law of the Dutch civil courts. 
Accordingly, as a primary enforcement tool with regard to Article 4:24a Wft, a 
designation could play an important role in the concretisation of the general duty 
of care in light of the corresponding obligations in private law. This enforcement 
solution has thus the potential to enhance legal certainty without undermining the 
open nature of this norm. Yet, at present, it remains to be seen to what extent this 
potential will be realized. 
5.  Concluding remarks 
Given a high degree of complexity and innovation involved in the financial 
services industry, financial supervision legislation cannot achieve its regulatory 
objectives without open norms. According to the case law of the ECrtHR and the 
Dutch courts, such norms can be compatible with the principles of legality, lex 
certa, and transparency. Furthermore, the public authorities’ discretion is not an 
either/or matter: it involves a sliding scale from very limited to very broad 
discretion. In the course of time, the degree of discretion can decrease as a result 
of new case law or new (public or private) soft law.  
Despite the discretion being a relative and dynamic concept, however, the 
requirements of foreseeability and accessibility are applicable to open norms, too. 
With respect to these requirements, our analysis of the open norms in the Dutch 
financial supervision legislation has revealed an uneasy relationship between 
principles-based regulation and public trust in financial institutions and services 
in the post-crisis era. Principles-based regulation places a significant degree of 
responsibility for compliance therewith on financial institutions and in this way 
allows such institutions to engage with its goals and spirit. The open norms 
enshrined in this type of regulation have the potential to prompt a cultural 
reorientation within the financial sector towards the interests and needs of 
consumers of financial services and, hence, to promote public trust in the financial 
markets. In fact, principles-based regulation is a necessary prerequisite for 
restoring such trust given the limitations of prescriptive command and control 
regulation in capturing the complexity of financial services and markets.  
The main question addressed in this contribution is whether principles-based 
regulation is the right way to overcome the crisis of trust in the financial markets. 
Considering all the above mentioned, the acceptance of principles-based 
regulation in the Dutch legal order is to be welcomed. At the same time, resort to 
principles-based regulation entails many challenges which may undermine its 
effectiveness and, hence, public trust in the financial markets. These challenges 
in the Netherlands include but are not limited to the absence of any significant 
pressure on the financial watchdogs to clarify the meaning of open norms, much 
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lack of clarity concerning the status of public soft law already produced to this 
end, and a tension between public and private soft law in shaping the content of 
open norms. Without addressing these challenges, principles-based regulation 
may prove to be too obscure to guide the financial services industry towards a 
cultural change.  
What is the best way out of this dilemma? In our view, the way forward lies in 
improving co-operation between the regulator and the regulated in ensuring 
compliance with open norms and transparency of rule-making. Effective 
communication between the financial watchdogs and financial institutions in the 
course of interpretation and application of open norms is a key factor in this 
context. In our opinion, the guidance provided by the AFM with respect to the 
duty to supply accurate, clear, and not misleading information under Article 
4:19(2) Wft does not provide an example of good practice in this context. Nor is 
such an example provided by the AFM’s decision of 24 September 2010 imposing 
an administrative penalty on Rabobank for the violation of the responsible lending 
rules. In both cases, no effective communication between the regulator and the 
regulated actually took place.  
Innovative solutions are needed to ensure such communication, and thus the 
effectiveness, of the post-crisis financial regulation in restoring public trust in the 
financial markets. Despite many obstacles, the Dutch legal system appears 
receptive towards experimentation with such solutions. On a policy level, the 
financial regulators could avoid producing additional ambiguity concerning the 
meaning of open norms. In addition, they should make it clear to what extent they 
follow private soft law and provide good reasons for deviating therefrom. The 
approach adopted by the Health Care Inspectorate could serve as an example of 
good practice in this respect. On an individual level, the effective communication 
could be ensured by using a binding designation as a primary enforcement tool 
with regard to open norms. The adoption of such a solution in relation to the 
general duty of care embodied in Article 4:24a Wft is a step in the right direction.  
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Public Trust and the Preparation of Regulation: 
The Case of ex ante Studies in the Netherlands 
Heinrich B. Winter* and Carolien M. Klein Haarhuis**
1. Introduction
In the legislative process, empirical and analytical instruments of information 
provision play an increasingly important role. Legislation was originally a 
vertically structured process of policy development, primarily involving 
interaction within and between government ministries and, later on in the process, 
a dance between the Cabinet and Parliament. Society’s role in that context was 
relatively limited. That changed rapidly in recent decades. Forms of feedback and 
dialogue have been embedded at both ends of the procedure. At the beginning, 
social consultation takes place with a clearly defined target group, supplemented 
by internet consultation with an open target group. After the fact, we see a surge 
in ex post evaluation since the 1980s. By now, it has become customary for the 
effects of regulations to be evaluated after legislation has been established. In 
general, the relevant regulation includes an evaluation clause that prescribes 
evaluation within three or five years after the law’s entry into force, and then 
mandates repeated evaluation from then on, generally every five years. The 
content and/or implementation of the regulations are relatively frequently 
amended on the basis of ex post evaluations.1 On the other hand: according to 
Michiels utilization of evaluations of the General administrative law act in the 
Netherlands seems to be limited.2 A surge in ex ante research has been observed 
in the legislative process in the past decade. Before the definitive draft instrument 
of a regulation enters the procedure, the proposed arrangement or possible 
alternatives have often already been subjected to extensive testing and analysis. 
This article focuses on that trend towards information-driven legislation. It will 
address various forms of ex ante analysis, the use thereof and their consequences 
                                                            
*  Professor of Public Administration at the department of Constitutional law, 
Administrative law and Public Administration of the Law Faculty of the University of 
Groningen. 
**  Researcher at the Research Centre of the department of Security and Justice (WODC). 
1 See: H.B. Winter, Evaluatie in het wetgevingsforum. Een onderzoek naar de relatie 
tussen evaluatie en de kwaliteit van wetgeving, Kluwer, Deventer: 1996. 
2  F.C.M.A. Michiels, Het evalueren van de Awb: een voortdurend proces, in: 
T. Barkhuysen e.a. (red.), Bestuursrecht harmoniseren: 15 jaar Awb, Boom Juridische 
uitgevers, The Hague: 2010, p. 41-55. Daalder is even more critical, when he judges 
utilization to be disappointing: E.J. Daalder, Voldoende kwaliteit van het 
bestuursproces: enkele opmerkingen naar aanleiding van het verslag van de Commissie 
Evaluatie Awb II, NTB 2002/6, p. 153-159 and E.J. Daalder, De derde evaluatie van de 
Awb: komt het einde in zicht?, NTB 2007/5, p. 141-146. 
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for the legislative process, as well as the confidence that society can have in these 
forms. 
2. Legislation in the past 
The various functions of legislation are referred to as guarantee and instrument.3
The law as a guarantee addresses the values of the rule of law. Such principles as 
legal certainty, equality of rights and democracy become relevant.4 The 
underlying concept behind legislation is that these principles are served by 
embedding legal rules in legislation. We are referring to the legality requirement 
that means that not only the citizenry, but also the governing administration are 
bound by the law. During the course of the previous century, the emphasis in 
legislation shifted from the guarantee to the instrument in terms of function. As 
the government took on clearer ambitions to achieve and regulate changes in 
society, the need for instruments that made it possible for the public 
administration to do so grew proportionately. Legislation was no longer primarily 
about codification, but also took on significance as an agent of modification.5 That 
changed function of legislation is closely related to what we call the development 
of government from watchman state to welfare state.6
If legislation primarily serves a codifying function and aims to offer guarantees, 
legislating can remain a relatively internal matter. The concept of the legislative 
lawyer as a “plodder in the forecastle” references this as well.7 This image is an 
exaggerated example, of course, but codifying legislation was generally 
established without intensive interaction with society, and without extensive 
consultation with implementing authorities and enforcement agencies. The 
decades following the Second World War showed many rapid changes in 
precisely that area. 
3. Legislating in the welfare state 
Legislation that has different, more modifying ambitions cannot automatically 
rely on societal support and are more likely to elicit questions regarding 
implementation and enforcement. Critical questions about realising those 
                                                            
3  P. de Haan, Th.G. Drupsteen and R. Fernhout, Bestuursrecht in de sociale rechtsstaat,
Kluwer, Deventer: 1978. 
4 See regarding these principles: M. Scheltema, J.W.M. Engels e.a. (eds), De rechtsstaat 
herdacht, Kluwer, Alphen aan den Rijn: 1989, p. 11-25. 
5  It was Koopmans who first described this pair of concepts in this way: T. Koopmans, 
“De rol van de wetgever”, in: Honderd jaar rechtsleven, Kluwer, Zwolle: 1970.  
6  It may be too early to determine whether the recent shift to an “activation state” will 
once again have consequences for the function that legislation serves.  
7  Former legislative lawyer W.J. van Eijkern used the term zwoegers or plodders, see:
“De macht van de zwoegers in het vooronder. Rechtsvorming door juristen via het werk 
van de afdelingen wetgeving”, in: De jurist-ambtenaar (Kan-bundel), W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, Zwolle: 1977, p. 42-43. 
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ambitions – which are, after all, neither undisputed nor automatically successful 
– can be expected. Against that backdrop, it is easy to understand the 
intensification of analysis and empirical substantiation in the legislative process. 
At the beginning of the process, this has led to the emergence of countless forms 
of societal dialogue and stakeholder consultation. Implementation and 
enforcement organisations contribute in the form of implementation and 
enforcement checks. In recent years, internet consultation on proposed legislation 
has become a permanent fixture in the legislative preparation process. Anyone has 
the opportunity to respond to draft versions of bills via www. 
internetconsultatie.nl. Since 2009, several hundred proposed laws and orders in 
council (algemeen maatregel van bestuur, AMvB) have been subjected to public 
consultation using this method. Ex post evaluation studies have taken off. Since 
the early 1980s, when the first forays into legislative evaluation were made with 
the University Administration Reform Act, the Freedom of Information Act and 
the Noise Pollution Act, ex post legislative evaluation has more or less become a 
standard part of the legislative process. Although no policies have been developed 
for research on evaluating laws, it is standard practice for the introduction of new 
legislation to be accompanied by ex post evaluation studies. Many laws and 
regulations include an evaluation clause drafted according to the model of 
designation 164 of the “designations for regulations”. Ex post legislative 
evaluation attracts scientific attention, including studies on the organisational 
context, the methodological structure, the results, and the use of these findings in 
the evaluations.8
Ex post evaluation yields very useful results in terms of the added value of the 
findings in making minor course corrections in the legal system. At the same time, 
ex post evaluation clearly has some disadvantages as well. It is no exception to 
see ex post evaluation studies used to reach a compromise or – conversely – to 
reopen a discussion of fundamental principles. Moreover, ex post evaluation 
research is an expensive undertaking. Conducting empirical research and 
collecting and analysing fact-based information on the implementation and effects 
of a regulation take time and require considerable budgetary commitments. This 
is an important consideration, especially in systematic design of evaluation 
research. Finally, ex post legislative evaluation is frequently also dysfunctional. 
Evaluation research rarely leads to dramatic change.9 The consequences are 
generally confined to introducing limited amendments to the laws and regulations, 
the chosen organisational arrangements, and/or the method of implementation, 
and these changes are often technical in nature. Directional dependence may offer 
a possible explanation for this pattern. It is far from easy to abandon a regulatory 
                                                            
8 See e.g.: H.B. Winter, M. Scheltema & M. Herweijer, Evaluatie van wetgeving: 
terugblik en perspectief, Kluwer, Deventer: 1990; Winter, 1996; C.M. Klein Haarhuis 
& E. Niemeijer, Wet en werkelijkheid. Bevindingen uit evaluaties van wetten, BJu, The 
Hague: 2008. 
9  Winter, 1996. 
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direction and embark on a new course. It would seem that evaluation cannot 
provide sufficient substantiation for the system-wide changes needed to make that 
happen. In some sense, that is understandable: evaluations generally only address 
the existing solutions; they do not usually extend to exploring possible 
alternatives. Intensification of research during the preparatory process for 
legislation (and policy) is therefore unsurprising in this context. The various forms 
of research and analysis in the legislative process will be addressed below. 
4. Research and analysis of proposed laws and regulations 
The process of preparing legislation naturally includes coordination between and 
within government ministries. Goals, methods and resources are coordinated 
throughout that process, often involving a process of exchange. Ministries 
frequently hold divergent views on policy problems and the solutions at hand. 
Those divergent views are also held by stakeholders and other parties who play a 
growing role in the legislative process. We also refer to legal, economic, 
sociological, scientific and political rationality when it involves the diverse 
interests and considerations of the various parties involved in legislation. 
Veerman states that political rationality often trumps the other rationalities in 
legislation.10 Klein Haarhuis holds that scientific insights could help make choices 
in such a way as to achieve the goals of the law.11
Engaging many different parties in the preparation process suits the context of the 
“polder model” used in the Netherlands, but it goes beyond that when 
implementation and enforcement authorities are involved in the preparation 
process. Stakeholder engagement takes place not only from the top down, but at 
the grassroots level as well – only we call it “lobbying”. Internet consultation is a 
relatively new phenomenon that was mentioned above. All these forms of 
engagement during the legislative procedure are relatively non-systematic and 
quality-oriented. Along the way, there has been a growing need for a more 
systematic focus on the process of preparing legislation. For that reason, various 
tests have been introduced over the past ten to fifteen years.12 Sometimes it 
involves obligations dictated by law, and on some occasions also the requirement 
to engage external expertise or support. Statistics Netherlands is required to be 
called in to assess business impact; the National Institute for Public Health and 
                                                            
10  Gert-Jan Veerman & Robin Mulder, Wetgeving met beleid. Bouwstenen voor een 
bruikbare wetgevingstheorie, BJu: The Hague, 2010, p. 15 and following. 
11  C.M. Klein Haarhuis, “Over nut en noodzaak van ex-anteanalyses bij de 
totstandbrenging van wetgeving”, in: RegelMaat 2010/2, p. 65-79. 
12  In a 2015 report OECD mentions the Netherlands as one of the early starters in Europe 
in the 1990s in developing better regulation and with a strong focus on reducing 
administrative burdens. The report also hints at the Integraal Afwegingskader (IAK) as 
a way to bring together guidance and instructions for impact assessments tools. 
Nevertheless, according to the report, the Netherlands is acting below OECD-average 
on the field of ex ante as well as ex post evaluation. OECD, Regulatory Policy Outlook,
2015. 
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the Environment (RIVM) has to assess environmental impact; the Council for the 
Judiciary or the Expertise Centre for the Administration of Justice and Law 
Enforcement must be brought in on matters involving the impact on the judiciary, 
or to test whether a proposed measure can feasibly be enforced or implemented. 
As of 1 March 2003, pursuant to a decision by the Council of Ministers, a new 
structure for assessing the impact of proposed regulations became mandatory.13 It 
consists of two phases. The initial phase involves substantiation of the selected 
instrument(s). Then the initiating ministry assesses whether the proposed law or 
order in council (or amendment to the legislation) is desirable and necessary to 
achieve the policy intention. The consequences it will have for the business sector 
and the environment will be addressed at that point, as well as whether it can 
feasibly be implemented and enforced. This takes place in the form of a quick 
scan. This step may be skipped if there is no room for an alternative choice of 
instruments, if no substantial consequences are expected for the business sector, 
the environment, or feasibility of implementation and enforcement, if it is clear in 
advance that no substantial societal costs or benefits are associated with the 
regulation, or if it involves regulations entailing EU implementation. Sub-
stantiation of the choice of instrument also remains necessary in those cases. Once 
the instrument has been selected and the choice has been substantiated, phase 2 
starts. Various checks are conducted at that point. These may include a cost-
benefit analysis, or a check of compliance with the draft regulation on business 
impact, an environmental impact check, or a check on feasibility of 
implementation and enforcement. 
As of 2011, the Integral Consideration Framework for policy and regulation 
[Integraal Afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving (IAK)] in preparing for and 
providing accountability on laws and regulations.14 120 checks, among which the 
aforementioned cost-benefit analysis, the environmental impact check and the 
check of the feasibility of implementation and enforcement, have been combined 
and reduced to 16 mandatory elements that have to answer the following 7 
questions about the policy to be prepared or the regulation to be drafted: 1) What 
is the cause or reason? 2) Who is involved? 3) What is the problem? 4) What is 
the purpose? 5) What justifies government intervention? 6) What is the best 
instrument for the purpose? and 7) What are the consequences? Relevant aspects 
include the effectiveness of the proposed intervention and the consequences it will 
have for citizens, businesses, the government and the environment.15
                                                            
13  Information described here comes from “Effectbeoordeling Voorgenomen Regel-
geving” [Impact Assessment for Proposed Regulations], a 2003 publication by the 
Meldpunt Voorgenomen Regelgeving, an alliance of various ministries, which guides 
and supervises the process of mapping the impact of draft regulations. 
14  Parliamentary Papers 2010-11, 29 515, no. 330. 
15  At first, there was the Regulation on Performance Data and Evaluation Research for the 
National Government in 2001 and 2006. This RPE required ministries to include the 
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The question with all these activities, of course, is whether they can help answer 
questions about achieving the set goals, at what cost point that will be the case, 
and the unintended effects. No systematic research had been done on that issue at 
that point, let alone an inventory of the nature and scope of the ex ante studies in 
the Dutch government ministries. In order to answer those questions, the Research 
and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Security and Justice (WODC) 
conducted studies in 2013 and 2014 on the various checks and analyses that could 
be identified in the legislative preparation process, summarised as “ex ante 
studies”, based on a review of these studies from 2005-2011.16 The key findings 
from that study are outlined here. These studies were conducted during the 
preparation process for policies and for regulations. The findings reported below 
therefore extend beyond the strict scope of this chapter, i.e. the preparation of 
regulation. 
5. Ex ante studies: nature and number17
The study focused on published studies, so only a small percentage of the ex ante 
studies and analyses were included; many of these studies are for internal use 
only. The study conducted by the Research and Documentation Centre focuses on 
two questions: how can ex ante studies be categorised based on reason, approach 
and commissioning party, and what do ex post evaluations teach us about the 
predictive value of ex ante studies? The latter question addresses the connection 
between ex ante and ex post research, closing the circle and making it possible to 
create actual added value. The ex ante studies involve published reports from 
studies on the consequences of one or more policy or regulatory options in 
national policy, legislation and regulations, commissioned by a government 
ministry or a ministerial research institute. To reiterate: the study does not 
exclusively look at laws and regulations, although that is the primary focus of this 
chapter; ex ante policy evaluation was also included in the study by the Research 
and Documentation Centre. 306 studies matching this description were founded 
in the period between 2005 – 2011. The studies can be grouped based on a number 
of characteristics. The following sections look at the cause or reason, the 
commissioning and implementing parties, the phase of policy preparation in 
which the studies took place, the number of alternatives that were studied, the 
nature of the subject of study, and the types of ex ante studies. 
                                                            
consideration of ex ante evaluation in policy preparations. The 2008 Regulation on 
National Budget Requirements later abandoned that requirement. 
16  C.M. Klein Haarhuis assisted by S.A.C. Keulemans, Ex ante onderzoek in meta-
perspectief. Aard, aantallen en gebruik van ex ante studies door de rijksoverheid, The 
Hague: Research and Documentation Centre of the Ministry of Security and Justice 
(WODC), Onderzoek en Beleid no. 311, 2014. 
17  The original report and a publication about the report were used to write this chapter: 
C.M. Klein Haarhuis & M. Smit, “Ex-antestudies op de kaart. Onderzoek naar 
beleidsvoornemens (2005-2011): aard, aantallen en wat ex-postevaluaties erover 
zeggen”, in: RegelMaat 2014/4, p. 229-245. 
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The cause 
Over half of the studies (51%) are intended primarily to support policy formation 
or decision-making processes. In 12% of the cases, a question, pledge or motion 
in the House of Representatives was the primary cause. Nearly one in seven 
studies (15%) is intended to calculate the possible consequences of a proposed 
plan. In 9%, the study is designed to support implementation. 7% involved a 
different cause or reason, such as a statutory obligation; the remaining 6% were 
based on a combination of different reasons.  
Commissioning and implementing parties 
Most analyses were commissioned by the former Ministry of Transport, Public 
Works and Water Management (now the Ministry of Infrastructure and the 
Environment: 44), followed by the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport (38). 
The Ministry of Finance commissioned the lowest number of studies (4), but that 
ministry frequently co-commissioned studies in cases involving interministerial 
research. Nearly half of the analyses were conducted by private research or 
consultancy firms (45%); slightly more than a quarter (26%) were conducted by 
academic institutes, planning bureaus or other government-run scientific research 
institutes. Implementing organisations are responsible for 7%, while 14% of the 
studies are conducted by various types of research parties, generally an ad hoc 
partnership between private agencies and researchers. Only a very few (4%) were 
conducted by a ministerial body. Another 4% were assigned to a council or 
advisory committee. 
Phase
Ex ante research is frequently criticised for being involved late in the policy 
process, and thus having limited impact on the policy formation process.18 The 
Research and Documentation Centre study shows that nearly 85% of the studies 
were conducted at an early point in the process, when there were still one or more 
intentions that still needed to be decided on. Still, that does mean that 15% were 
conducted after the decision had already been taken. In those cases, the study was 
intended to run the calculations for the selected alternative or to continue 
developing it. Obviously, the earlier in the preparation process that the analysis is 
conducted, the more influence the results will have on considering the 
alternatives. 
                                                            
18  J. Hertin, K. Jacob, U. Pesch & C. Pacchi, The production and use of knowledge in 
regulatory impact assessment: an empirical analysis, Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 
Forschungsstelle für Umweltpolitik. FFU report, 01-2009, for the EU regulatory 
framework E. Beukers, L. Bertolini & M. te Brömmelstroet, “Percepties op het MKBA 
proces”, in: Tijdschrift Vervoerswetenschap, 2012/2, 68-79. 
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Numbers of alternatives studied 
The number of alternatives studied – following from the above – grows larger 
when the analysis is conducted in an earlier phase of the preparations: 3.7 
compared to 1.8 in the second phase. On average, 3.4 alternatives were examined 
in the 306 covered here. Studying multiple options is customary in the cost-benefit 
analyses. In a few cases, a study looked at several alternatives after the policy or 
regulation was adopted; in these cases, the study involved modes of 
implementation or a baseline option to compare with the selected variant. It is 
striking to note that the studies conducted by private agencies looked at relatively 
many options, on average. The same held true for the studies commissioned by 
the former Ministry of Transport, Public Works and Water Management. 
Manifestations 
As stated, the study covers both regulations and policies. In many cases, it 
involves coherent, interconnected regulations or policies: a programme. Examples 
include the fifteen studies conducted in the framework of the kilometre pricing; 
various studies were also conducted on agreements involving environmental 
policy, as well as system-wide reforms (e.g. in health care). The examples show 
that they generally involve studies on policy. In 75 cases, it concerns ex ante 
research on regulations. 
Types of studies 
Eight different types of ex ante studies can be identified. These categories are 
subjective and do not follow clearly delineated boundaries or adhere to mutually 
exclusive criteria. There is also a significant degree of overlap between the 
categories: over a quarter of the 306 ex ante studies cannot be classified as a single 
type, but as a combination of types. The types of studies that occur most 
frequently are the cost-benefit analysis and the exploratory ex ante study. A cost-
benefit analysis compares one or more alternatives to a baseline option, looking 
at a range of costs and benefits, which are expressed in financial terms wherever 
possible. Generally, the result is a positive or negative balance within a certain 
bandwidth. A societal cost-benefit analysis looks at costs and benefits in terms of 
the economy and society. The number of studies looking at societal costs and 
benefits increased between 2005 and 2011. This type of studies primarily occurred 
in the former Ministries of Transport, Public Works and Water Management and 
of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment; the scope of application has 
expanded to the social domain (the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport), but 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom 
Affairs also use societal cost-benefit analysis more frequently. Exploratory 
studies refers to studies that explore policy options and are preliminary in nature 
or serve as a quick scan. These studies are often conducted in the earliest stages 
of planning. The question here would be whether the proposed instrument will 
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achieve the intended purpose, or whether an alternative would be preferable. 21% 
of the studies were cost-benefit analyses or societal cost-benefit analyses, if the 
combination studies are included; 19% were exploratory ex ante studies. 
Figure 1: Types of published ex ante analyses in the Netherlands (2005-2011) 
Of the total, 14% involves specific types of consequence-driven studies, e.g. 
looking at environmental impact, legal consequences, or consequences of the 
administrative burden on organisations in the public or private sector. In 
combination with other types of studies, this type occurs in 21% of cases. The 
potential effectiveness is the primary focus in 13% of the studies: the ex ante 
evaluations. An example is the analysis looking at whether the shift in nature 
policy by the former Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Fisheries could achieve 
the intended ecological impact. In combination with other types of studies, the 
percentage rises to 14%. The consequences for implementation or feasibility of 
implementation were addressed in 11% of the analyses, e.g. in an organisational 
and financial context. The implementing organisations are generally involved in 
implementation themselves. Implementation analyses are frequently combined 
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frequent types are the planning evaluation, the risk analysis and the cost 
effectiveness analysis. 
Ex ante evaluations are relatively more likely to be prompted by a political cause, 
such as a Parliamentary question or motion. Studies on the legal or environmental 
consequences and analyses of implementation and enforcement are more likely to 
be the result of a mandatory requirement. Implementation and risk analysis, 
ex ante evaluations and planning evaluations are seen more frequently in the 
context of proposed legislation and policy programmes than for other forms of 
policy. 
6. Ex ante and ex post 
An important question in this overview of the “state of the art” in ex ante studies 
is whether the predictions made by the studies actually come true. Very little is 
known about the relationship between ex ante and ex post research. The 2015 
OESO-report discussed earlier refers to this as “closing the regulatory governance 
cycle”. Does the cycle really gets closed in the Netherlands? Klein Haarhuis states 
that 47 of the 306 ex ante analyses (which represents 15%) were followed by an 
ex post study. This not only includes ex post effectiveness studies, but also process 
evaluations, mid-term reviews and implementation studies. It is striking to note 
that twice as many ex post evaluations were found when a plan or proposal had 
already been outlined to some extent during the ex ante analysis and could be 
calculated or assessed, or when it had already been adopted. Apparently, clearly 
defined plans have a greater chance of being embedded in policies or regulations. 
There is no correlation between the type of ex ante study and any later ex post 
evaluation. So why are so few ex post evaluations found? In 22 cases, the 
proposed policy or regulation did not move forward, so there was obviously very 
little reason for ex post evaluation. A comparable situation occurs in the 14 cases 
where the policy or regulation has not yet been established. In 13 cases, the ex 
post evaluation has been commissioned or launched, but the results have not yet 
been published. In a study from 2009 Berveling outlines four reasons why ex post 
studies were not committed: 1) a typical regulator is more interested in the present 
and the future and not in past performance, 2) the regulator does not want to annoy 
his positive evaluation of the regulation with negative information about its 
performance, 3) organizational impediments can hinder ex post evaluations for 
instance by means of lack of money, time, capacity etc and 4) methodological 
problems can block isolation of the effects of a regulation. Overviewing the very 
limited amount of ex post studies following ex ante analyses, it seems the 
regulatory cycle does not get closed as a result of several of these reasons. 
7. Conclusion and discussion 
The study leads to a number of conclusions. First, the number of studies that were 
found about the “future” of a policy or regulation was higher than expected. 
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Moreover, the number of ex ante studies is rising sharply. These studies are not 
distributed evenly across the ministries; ex ante studies are primarily conducted 
on a regular basis by the Ministries of Infrastructure and the Environment, Health, 
Welfare and Sport, Security and Justice, and Economic Affairs. The societal cost-
benefit analysis is the most frequently occurring type of study, followed by the 
exploratory studies. It is striking to note the weak connection with ex post 
evaluation studies. 
The study shows that it is quite possible to conduct ex ante analyses of the 
consequences of policies or regulations that are still in development. The diverse 
range of studies makes it clear that there are sufficient points of references in 
many different fields. The trend fits into a European context, in which regulatory 
impact assessments are increasingly mandatory. 
The relationship between how legislation is prepared and the theme of “public 
trust, public law” would seem self-evident. From a positive outlook, an open and 
informed debate about the proposed alternatives increases quality and thus boosts 
public trust in the option ultimately selected. Cynics may protest that studies are 
often commissioned at a point when the debate can hardly be influenced. 
Similarly, ex ante studies are alleged to be nothing more than “ticking boxes”, or 
mere window dressing. In that context, it may not be advisable to mandate ex ante 
analyses, as Meuwese advocates.19 On the other hand, the research data shows 
that the vast majority of the ex ante studies are conducted in a relatively early 
phase – and in any case early enough for multiple alternatives to be considered. 
That would seem to indicate a serious approach, rather than tactical moves or 
political motives. This chapter does not address how the studies were used. The 
study did look at that aspect in five cases. In all those cases, indications of 
utilization were found: access to information by interest groups in the sector at 
large; positions taken by civic organisations (in four of five cases); and a response 
by Cabinet members in all five cases (in the Explanatory Notes or in response to 
Parliamentary questions). Further development took place in three of the five 
cases. All in all, these are not results that would support a cynical response. 
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Policy Change and Public Trust  
The Case of the Atomausstieg in Germany: Who Has to Pay? 
 





The voices claiming that the traditional ways of energy production should be 
abandoned in favor of more ecological methods recently became louder in the 
Dutch parliament: electricity generated from hard coal should be phased out 
within 10 to 20 years. This spells the demise of the three coal plants that were 
recently opened.1 
 
This example illustrates that striving for a more ecological policy, which is a legal 
obligation according to recent court verdicts,2 can imply major changes in 
situations created by governmental decisions that were deemed appropriate not 
long ago. 
 
This orientation shift poses a problem that is well known in public politics. In 
cases where public authorities cooperate with private organizations in the so-
called common interest, to what extent can the public authority unilaterally 
change its policy? There is no easy answer, but it seems likely that the private 
partners would claim that the public authority had put its trustworthiness at stake 
and would at least ask for damages as compensation. 
 
Neighboring Germany’s decision to close down its nuclear power plants in the 
aftermath of the Japanese disaster of Fukushima illustrates this reality. This 
decision has become known as the “Atomausstieg”.3 The Swedish company 
Vattenfall, which exploited two of the plants that are to be closed (Brünsbüttel 
and Krümmel), sued the Federal State of Germany for a sum of 4.7 billion Euro 
in an international arbitration procedure and filed, along with other companies, a 
lawsuit against the Federal State of Germany before the Constitutional Court in 
Karlsruhe. 
 
                                                            
*  Dr., Professor of Construction Law at the University of Groningen. 
1  Http://fd.nl/economie-politiek/1128913/tweede-kamer-stemt-voor-sluiting-
kolencentrales. 
2  District Court The Hague 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196 (English 
translation). 
3  Exit from nuclear energy. In the following, the German terminology will be used. 





The case is interesting for various reasons: 
 
It can give an insight into what could happen should the Dutch government decide 
to put forward its own “Energiewende”. 4 Some German lower court rulings have 
already held that the immediate closing down of the oldest plants in Germany is 
unlawful.  
 
In the Netherlands, there is a comparable question that has led to diverging 
opinions in jurisprudence. The recent Act to put an end to the commercial 
elevation of minks is being challenged in court because it allegedly does not 
provide for adequate damage compensation for the businesses which have to close 
down.5  
 
It shows the importance of supranational dispute resolution in these matters. 
Vattenfall did not only sue Germany before a national court, but also before the 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an institution 
connected with the World Bank in Washington. The role of such institutions has 
recently been discussed in the context of TTIP and CETA, free trade associations 
at various stages of negotiation between the EU and, respectively, the USA and 
Canada.6 
 
It therefore seems appropriate, in the context of the theme “Lawmaking and public 
trust”, to discuss the following questions: 
 
a. To what extent does a decision of policy change imply a breach of public trust 
and is there a ground for damage compensation? 
 
b. What role should European and international institutions play with respect to 
dispute resolution in this context? 
 
This paper does not purport to offer a full comparative analysis of German and 
Dutch laws regarding the issues it brings forth. It is mainly a description of the 
                                                            
4  The German word “Energiewende” refers to a policy change away from traditional 
forms of energy (coal, gas, nuclear energy) to more ecological and renewable forms 
such as wind and solar energy. 
5  Wet Verbod pelsdierhouderij Staatsblad (Law Gazette). 2013, 11, abrogated by the 
District Court The Hague (ECLI:NL:RDHA:2014:6161) as not in compliance with Art 
1 First Protocol ECHR. In appeal reversed by the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) The 
Hague ECLI:NL:GHDHA 2015:3025; A decision in higher appeal before the Supreme 
Court (Hoge Raad) is pending. It is noted here that in Germany, the role of the ECHR 
as a ground for review is less important because of the existence of constitutional 
review. 
6  ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip and www.international.gc.ca/ceta; brought 
under a wider attention of the Dutch public (and politicians) by a.o. 2 broadcasts on 
March 15 and October 4 2015 of the TV program Zondag met Lubach (ZML) accessible 
via www.uitzendinggemist.nl. 
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German case of the Atomausstieg. This case can give an insight into some legal 
issues that arise when decisions regarding energy policy are changed, sometimes 
due to necessity. In this respect, the case is, in my opinion, interesting for the 
Netherlands as well for other (European) countries. Although national legal 
systems might differ, the issues of compensation for damages and the role of 
international arbitration are likely to come up anywhere. Where Dutch law is 
discussed, it is foremost done to enhance the understanding of the German legal 
system of government liability and compensation for damages. The conclusions 
in section 4 have to be read in that perspective. 
 
Before studying the German case, a short reflection on the concept of the breach 
of public trust and the possible grounds for damage compensation in general is 
required. This is not only necessary to be able to answer the first question but it is 
also useful since there is, in this respect, a distinction between Dutch and German 
law. 
 
2.  Breach of public trust: the basis for damage compensation?
The concept of public trust supposes a public authority that acts in relation to its 
(private)7 partners in a trustworthy way. At the same time, defending the public 
interest- the primary task of the public authority-implies the necessity of 
flexibility and the possibility of policy change. The tension between 
trustworthiness, implying certainty and stability, and flexibility, as well as 
adaption to new societal developments, is a never ending story of judicial 
disputes. 
 
Going back to the basics, we have to take into account that administrative8 law 
has two main functions: a. to protect the citizens (including private legal persons) 
against malfunctions of a powerful and often monopolist public authority and b. 
to provide the public authority with legal instruments to regulate societal relations. 
This dual character of administrative law already reflects the underlying tension. 
“Trusting” the decisions of public authorities cannot be equated with expecting 
that the right accorded to or the legal status created for a citizen will never change. 
In this way, public trust is inherently limited. That inherent limitation can be 
interpreted in two ways. It can mean that there are limits which, when they are not 
respected, imply a breach of public trust, or it can mean that public trust implies 
room for manoeuver and that, within certain limits, a change does not mean a 
breach of public trust. 
                                                            
7  Another topic is to what extent breach of public trust also plays a role in public-public 
relations. Although there are reasons to believe that this is the case, I will not pursue 
that question further since the subject of this paper is a dispute between a public 
authority and private companies. 
8  Here, administrative law includes private law used by public authorities for public 
purposes and hence influenced by administrative law. 





In the first type of reasoning, the following question arises: to what extent does 
the legally binding decision of a public authority create rightful legal expectations 
and limit the freedom of deciding otherwise? Crossing these limits is consequently 
illegal and implies the obligation to fulfill the expectations and/or to pay 
compensation for damages. This obligation is based on an unlawful act. 
 
In the second type of reasoning, the question is: to what extent is a policy change 
possible without a breach of public trust? That change is not unlawful as such but 
can imply an obligation to compensate for damages caused by that change. This 
obligation is not based on an unlawful act but on the violation of the principles of 
equality and proportionality. The obligation to compensate for damages is, strictly 
speaking, not based on a breach of public trust but rather on a change within the 
limits of public trust. 
 
I am inclined to support the second opinion. Changing public policy does not, in 
most cases, imply a breach of public trust. A change in policies is sometimes 
necessary due to changing societal circumstances. Also, changing some political 
decisions taken by a former government of a different political color is 
characteristic of a democracy. The question of damage compensation has to be 
judged in that perspective. 
 
In Dutch law, the partner of a public authority is entitled to full damage 
compensation for an unlawful act. On the other hand, in cases of liability without 
an unlawful act, the extent of his own risk is taken into consideration. This 
“normal societal risk” has to be taken into account and be deducted from the 
calculated numbers of damage compensation at stake.  
 
The development of Dutch law9 shows that liability, and hence a public 
authority’s obligation to compensate for damages, could originally only be based 
on an unlawful act. The idea of liability and damage compensation in the absence 
of an unlawful act is more recent.  
 
In German law, this development took place in reverse.10 The development of the 
theory of public liability starts with the obligation to pay damage compensation 
in cases where there is no question of unlawfulness as such because the damage 
causing act is in the common interest, but where is ruled that damage 
compensation is appropriate because it cannot rest with the individual. As will be 
elaborated in section 3.4, the concept of expropriation, and specifically the social 
                                                            
9  See, among many others: H.D. van Wijk, W. Konijnenbelt, R.M. van Male, 
Hoofdstukken van Bestuursrecht 16e ed. Chapter 21, p. 769ff. Wolters Kluwer 2014. 
10  See D.A. Lubach, Overheidsaansprakelijkheid op grond van enteignungsgleicher en 
aufopferungsgleicher Eingriff; een worsteling op de grens van rechtmatigheid en 
onrechtmatigheid in Duitsland in T. Nijmeijer et al. (eds), Co & co, Liber Amicorum 
Co van Zundert, Kienhuis Hoving, Kluwer 2013, p. 113. 
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aspect of the property rights as codified in the Constitution,11 plays an important 
role. We will see that the question of damage compensation in a case like the 
Atomausstieg and the fundamental question concerning the extent to which the 
necessary amendment of the law has to provide for (a possibility for) damage 
compensation is treated in this context. 
 
3. The German case of the Atomausstieg
 
Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act 
 
On March 11th 2011, a big tsunami caused substantial damages and a radioactive 
leak in several nuclear power plants in Fukushima (Japan). On March 14th 2011, 
the German government decided to impose a so-called moratorium on nuclear 
energy. On the basis of art 19 par. 3 of the Atomic Energy Act, which empowers 
the government to close down nuclear power plants temporarily for security 
reasons, it ordered the immediate closure of the 8 oldest nuclear power plants for 
a period of 3 months. On July 31st 2011, the Atomic Energy Act was amended. It 
confirmed the immediate closure of the 8 old nuclear plants.12 The relevant permit 
to exploit the plants would be withdrawn on Aug 6th 2011(!). All the other nuclear 
plants would be gradually closed down by 2022. It is striking to notice that this 
very short amendment only dealt with the financial consequences of the technical 
procedure of the closure of the plants and the disposal of the nuclear waste. The 
other possible financial consequences of this important policy change were not 
discussed, except in the comments of the Bundesrat (the Senate), which remarked 
– at the very end of its paper – on the legal responsibility of the Federal 
government, implying possible damage compensation because the financial 
budgets of the Länder might be surpassed.13 The government did not discuss or 
react to this remark and nowhere in the discussions in the Bundestag has this 
aspect been brought up. When financial aspects were discussed, they concerned 
the large profits of the four companies that were exploiting the nuclear power 
plants. Meanwhile, the political parties on the left advocated a complete closure 
on shorter notice.14 
 
Unlawful moratorium 
Meanwhile, it was clear that the four companies (RWE, EnBW, Eon and 
Vattenfall) did not agree with this sudden change and considered filing lawsuits. 
RWE first filed a lawsuit against the land Hessen regarding the order to close 
down the so-called Biblis plant for the duration of the moratorium. VGH 
                                                            
11  Art 14 II GG: Property entails obligations. Its use shall also serve the public good.  
12  Dreizehntes Gesetz zur Änderung des Atomgesetzes Bundesgetzblatt 31 Juli 2011 
Teil 1 nr 43. 
13  Bundestag Drucksache 17/6246. 
14  Id. 





(Verwaltungsgerichtshof) Hessen15 held that the order was illegal for two reasons: 
a procedural mistake - no fair hearing (“keine ordentliche Anhörung”) - and a 
substantial fault - art 19 Atomic Energy Act does not give the authority to close 
down nuclear plants when there is no imminent danger.16 Appeal to the BVwG 
(Bundesverwaltungsgericht) is not allowed by the VGH. This decision is 
confirmed by the BVwG (7B18.13).17 This means that the unlawfulness of the 
moratorium is final. 
 
Although the highest administrative court had decided that the moratorium was 
unlawful, there was no certainty yet on damage compensation. The question of 
damage compensation had to be decided by the civil courts. RWE and Eon filed 
lawsuits against NordRheinland –Westfalen and Niedersachsen which were to be 
decided by the Landgerichte (civil courts) in Bonn and Hannover. These cases 
concerned the temporary closure of the oldest plants and were unsuccessful on 
grounds which have little to do with the policy change as such and are therefore 
less interesting in the context of this paper. 
 
Verfassungsklage 
The more interesting question is whether or not the law, i.e. the Atomic Energy 
Act, can be amended without proper compensation for damages. The decision to 
amend the act implied, as we have seen, the definitive closure of all the nuclear 
power plants in the short or long term. This issue was dealt with by the 
Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe.  
 
                                                            
15  VGH Hessen 27-02-2013 Az 6C825/11T, accessible via: http://www.lareda. 
hessenrecht.hessen.de/lexsoft/default/hessenrecht_lareda.html? Kassel - 27.02. 2013 - 
A (3) The supervisory authority may order that a situation be discontinued which is 
contrary to the provisions hereof or of the statutory ordinances issued hereunder, or to 
the terms and conditions of the notice granting the licence or general approval, or to 
any subsequently imposed obligation, or which may constitute a hazard to life, health 
or property because of the effects of ionising radiation. In particular, the supervisory 
authority may order that 1. certain protective measures shall be taken, 2. radioactive 
material shall be stored or kept in custody at a place designated by it, 3. the handling of 
radioactive material, the erection and Z: VGH 6 C 824/11.T VGH Kassel - 27.02.2013 
- AZ: VGH 6 C 824/11.T. 
16  Die Anordnung sei zudem materiell rechtswidrig, da die Voraussetzungen der 
Ermächtigungsgrundlage - § 19 Abs. 3 Satz 1 i.V.m. Satz 2 AtG - nicht vorlägen, der 
Beklagte das notwendige Ermessen nicht sachgerecht ausgeübt und eine nicht mehr 
verhältnismäßige rechtsfolge gesetzt habe. The first part of Art 19 (3) reads: The 
supervisory authority may order that a situation be discontinued which is contrary to 
the provisions hereof or of the statutory ordinances issued hereunder, or to the terms 
and conditions of the notice granting the license or general approval, or to any 
subsequently imposed obligation, or which may constitute a hazard to life, health or 
property because of the effects of ionising radiation. 
17  Accessible via: https://dejure.org/dienste/vernetzung/rechtsprechung?Text=7%20B% 
2018/13. 
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In 2013 Eon, RWE and Vattenfall filed a Verfassungsklage. They sued the Federal 
Government before the Constitutional Court on the basis that the 13th Amendment 
of the Atomic Energy Act allegedly constituted a violation of property rights and 
limitation of freedom of commerce, and was therefore unconstitutional unless 
there was compensation for damages.18 The claim was based on a violation of 
article 14(I) GG jo. art 14 (III)GG.: 
 
I. Property and the right of inheritance shall be guaranteed. Their 
contents and limits shall be defined by the law  
II. (…) 
 
III. Expropriation shall only be permissible for the public good. It may 
only be ordered by or pursuant to a law that determines the nature 
and extent of compensation. Such compensation shall be determined 
by establishing an equitable balance between the public interest of 
those affected. In case of dispute concerning the amount of 
compensation, recourse may be had to the ordinary courts. 
 
Interesting in the context of this paper is the way the Constitution formulates the 
determination of compensation. Unlike in the Netherlands í where damage 
compensation in the case of expropriation always has to be granted in full19 – in 
Germany there has to be an “equitable balance”. That means that one is not always 
entitled to full compensation. That can be explained by the German concept of 
“Sozialbindung des Eigentums”,20 according to which property rights function in 
a societal context. An inherent societal risk can lead to partial, rather than full, 
compensation for damages. 
 
As stated earlier under 2, we will discuss here the headlines of the history of the 
German expropriation law.21 After WWII, the BGH (Bundesgerichtshof) 
developed a material concept of expropriation known as “Enteignungsgleicher 
Eingriff”. If the consequences of restricting the use of a property were such that 
the limitation was disproportional to a certain extent, compensation for damages 
could be a constitutional obligation.  
 
At the same time, the BGH developed the theory of the Sonderopfer,22 which 
resembles to a great extent the Dutch system of “compensation of disad-
                                                            
18  The suit not only raised the question of damage compensation but also that of the 
reasoning behind the sudden change of policy. That raises the fundamental question to 
what extent the constitutional control can interfere in highly politically influenced 
decisions like these. In the context of this paper, this question –though very interesting- 
is not discussed. The focus will be on the issue of damage compensation. 
19  See art. 40 Expropriation Act (Onteigeningswet). 
20  Art. 14 II GG as already mentioned (supra note 11). 
21  See D.A.Lubach (supra note 10). 
22  In English: Special sacrifice. 





vantages”.23,24 According to this theory, there has to be a situation that creates a 
special and abnormal burden. It is self-evident that the 13.Amendment did not 
imply an expropriation in the formal sense. The property itself remained the 
plaintiffs’. Nevertheless, in this system the suit could have been based on art 14 
GG (III). But the system has changed. In 1981, in the famous 
Nassauskiesungsbeschluss, the Constitutional Court25 ruled that this expansion of 
the concept of expropriation was unconstitutional, mainly because it would mean 
that the court would decide on the amount of damage compensation and not the 
legislator as required by art.14 GG.26 The Court stated that a distinction has to be 
made between the formal expropriation under art 14 GG and the determination of 
the content and limits of the property right. Expropriation always means the 
complete or partial withdrawal of the property.  
 
Consequently, it seemed that the more recent jurisprudence left no room to ground 
a claim on art 14 III GG, at least not with the argument that the 13th Amendment 
is an expropriation and hence that there is a legal- even constitutional – obligation 
to pay compensation for damages under art 14 III GG. That had an important 
consequence. Although the authority to determine the content and limits of 
property rights is based on the Constitution (14 (I) S2 GG) there is no 
constitutional guarantee for damage compensation. 
 
Moreover it created an additional problem. In the aforementioned (in note 23) 
case the Constitutional Court ruled that when an act creates a disproportional 
burden, the first step is to try to rectify the unlawful act. The unlawfulness, i.e. the 
disproportionality, cannot be “bought off” by damage compensation. That would 
contradict what is called “the primary legal protection”.  
 
Rectification in the above-mentioned sense may be possible in cases such as the 
protection of monuments or nature conservation. In the case of the closure of 
nuclear power plants, it is not feasible. The plant cannot be closed down partially 
and the measures cannot be taken in a less intense or less damaging way. If there 
is any disproportionality, the payment of damages seems to be the only way to 
compensate.27 The Constitutional Court had ruled that, to be able to deal with 
                                                            
23  In Dutch: nadeelcompensatie. Recent legislation provides for a general basis for this 
type of damage compensation. See: Wet nadeelcompensatie en schadevergoeding bij 
onrechtmatige besluiten, Stbl. (Law Gazette) 2013, 50. (This part however has not yet 
entered into force; see Stb. 2013,162). 
24  BGH 19-061952 BGHZ 6,270,279: “Bei der Enteignung handelt es sich um einen 
gesetzlich zulässingen zwangsweisen staatlichen Eingriff in das Eigentum ,sei es in der   
Gestalt der Entziehung oder der Belastung, der die betroffenen Einzelnen oder Gruppen 
im Vergleich zu anderen ungleich besonders trifft und sie zu einem besonderen,den 
übrigen nicht zugemuteten Opfer für die Allgemeinheit zwingt.” 
25  BVerfGE 58 300. 
26  See above par. 1… “shall be defined by law” and 3…pursuant to a law that determines 
the nature and extent of compensation”. 
27  In the German terminology: Ausgleichspfichtige Inhalt-und Schrankenbestimmungen. 
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cases like these, the act had to contain a procedure in which, together with a 
decision on the content and limitation of the property right, a decision had to be 
taken on the right to damage compensation.28 
 
Therefore, the question that had to be decided by the Constitutional Court seemed 
indeed to be whether or not the 13.Amendment was unconstitutional, violating art 
14 (II) GG, since it did not contain such a provision. RWE aimed exactly at this 
question in the first part of its suit:  
 
In der Verfassungsbeschwerde von RWE wird erstens beantragt, 
festzustellen, dass Art. 1 Nr. 1 lit. a) bis c) des Dreizehnten Gesetzes zur 
Änderung des Atomgesetzes mit Art. 14 GG insofern unvereinbar ist, als 
sie keine Entschädigungs- und Ausgleichsregelung für den Eingriff in die 
Berechtigung zum Leistungsbetrieb vorsehen.29,30  
 
Damage compensation? 
Let us assume that the 13th Amendment should be completed by a provision for 
damage compensation. In this case, the administrative courts would be competent 
to judge on issues arising from questions about damage compensations in the 
context of Art 14 par I S2.31 Since the Constitutional Court has not spoken yet, 
there are evidently no judgements of the administrative courts on this issue. The 
history of the policymaking regarding the use of atomic energy in Germany in the 
last decades seems important in this respect. Three events have a landmark-like 
character. In 2000, consensus was reached on atomic energy policy in the 
21st century. This consensus aimed at a gradual diminution of the role of atomic 
energy and an Ausstieg in the long run.32 In December 2010, however, the 
government decided to prolong the lifetime of the nuclear power plants by an 
average of 12 years compared with the Agreement of 2000, thus changing the 
agreements concluded in 2000.The Atomic Energy Act, in which the agreements 
had been implemented, had to be changed accordingly.33 This decision was 
                                                            
28  BVerfG 2-3-1999 1BvL7/9, NJW 1999, 2877. 
29  To be found in the reaction of Greenpeace on the complaints of Eon, RWE and 
Vattenfall p. 84 https://www.greenpeace.de/sites/www.greenpeace.de/files/publica 
tions/20130805gp_stellungnahme_verfassungsbeschwerde_evus.pdf. 
30  English translation: The constitutional complaint of RWE is firstly seeking a 
declaration that Article 1 no. 1 lit. a) to c ) of the Thirteenth Act amending the Atomic 
Energy Act is in so far inconsistent with art. 14 GG, as they do not provide for 
compensation and a compensation scheme for damages occurring from the intervention 
in the operation of the business. 
31  Par. 40 (II) S1 VwGO (Verwaltungsgerichtsordnung). 
32  The lifetime of a nuclear power plant was limited to 32 years (Entwurf eines Gesetzes 
zur geordneten Beendigung der Kernenergienutzung zur gewerblichen Erzeugung von 
Elektrizität) and would imply the closure of the last plant in 2022 (http://dipbt. 
bundestag.de/dip21/btd/14/068/1406890.pdf). 
33  11th Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act (http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/ 
17/030/1703051.pdf). 





motivated by the necessary role of nuclear energy during the transition period 
until the full implementation of ecological renewable energy. In July 2011 
– 7 months later! í the 13th Amendment was adopted. This abrupt change and the 
reasoning behind it was challenged in the lawsuit before the Constitutional Court34 
and it goes without saying that the suddenness of the decision will play an 
important role when it comes to damage compensation. It is impossible and not 
necessary, in the context of this paper, to predict if the high claims of the industry 
will be honored, but there are some clues that can give an indication as to the 
result.  
 
First, it is important to note that there is no protection of expected profits under 
art. 14 GG.35 Moreover, the described policy changes show that the nuclear energy 
policy in Germany- as almost anywhere else in Western Europe- has been the 
subject of continuous discussion in the last decades. The parliamentary documents 
show that the political opinion on this issue was heavily dependent on the 
“political color” of the government in power. In 2000, the Agreement on the use 
of Atomic Energy36 was concluded with a left-wing government37 and, as soon as 
that color changed38 in 2005, the lobby of the nuclear industry tried to get rid of 
it.39 This lobbying resulted in the 2010 decision to alter the Agreement of 2000 
and rely on atomic energy for a considerably longer period of time. That means 
that, at least until 2010, there was uncertainty as to whether the use of nuclear 
energy in Germany would come to an end in 2022 such as provided for in the 
agreement concluded in 2000. As 2022 is also the year wherein the last nuclear 
plant has to end its activity under the 13th Amendment, this could be an important 
factor in the discussion on damage compensation. 
 
Breach of contract? 
Apart from the question on the extent to which claims for damage compensation 
based on a legal provision in the Atomic Energy Act can be put forward, the issue 
of damage compensation can be raised in a different way. In the framework of the 
decisions of 2000 and 2010, contracts, or at least agreements, were concluded.40 
In 2010 RWE, Eon, EnBW and Vattenfall had explicitly stated that a contract 
would be necessary in order to make sure that a subsequent government (with 
                                                            
34  See supra notes 18 and 29.  
35  See BVerfGE 74,129 (148). 
36  The so-called Atomkonsens. 
37  Rot-Grün: SPD-Grünen. 
38  Schwarz-Gelb: CDU/CSU-FDP. 
39  In contradiction with the statement mentioned in note 42 infra. 
40  Atomkonsensvereinbarung of June 11 2000 (http://www.bmu.de/atomenergie/doc/ 
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another political color) would not change their policy.41 This implies that the 
question of damage compensation could also be examined in the context of a 
breach of contract and a lack of public trust.42 
 
In that respect, we have to examine whether those politically motivated 
agreements can qualify as legally binding contracts. If so, they would, according 
to German law, be administrative contracts (Verwaltungsverträge).43 Juris-
prudence and literature though seems to be of an almost unanimous opinion that 
the Agreement of 2000 cannot qualify as a binding contract but has to be seen as 
a gentlemen agreement,44 firstly because the government did not intent to 
conclude a contract45 and secondly because the government cannot bind the 
legislator and prevent him from subsequently changing the law.46 Also, the 
Constitutional Court has ruled that the Agreement of 2000 is not a legally binding 
decision or anything equivalent. Regarding the specific article at stake, it judged 
that its content was not more than a political statement “an denen kein vernünftig 
und verantwortlich Handelnder ein “Tau festbinden” würde”( translation: “that 
cannot be regarded as binding by any reasonably and responsibly acting 
person”).47  
 
Thus, a claim for damage compensation directly based on breach of contract will 
probably fail.  
 
The non-binding character of the Agreement of 2000 also means that a certain 
phrase in its introduction that is particularly interesting the context of this paper 
cannot be more than “wishful thinking”. In the introduction, the parties express 
their assumption that the agreement will not lead to claims for damage 
compensation.48 This is important because the fear of damage compensation 
                                                            
41  It is noteworthy that the 13th Amendment was put forward by the same government! 
42  Interesting in this respect is the remark of the chairman of Eon at the signing of the 
Atomkonsensvereinbarung 11-06-2000 (cited in the paper mentioned in note 27 p. 84) 
that emphasizes the importance of trust: “Politische Kompromisse sind auch eine Frage 
des Vertrauens. (...) Die Vereinbarung ist ein erster Schritt. Entscheidend ist, dass beide 
Seiten sich auch in Zukunft an ihren Inhalt und Geist gebunden fühlen. Wir sind dazu 
bereit.” 
43  As codified in par. 55 Administrative Procedure Act (Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz). 
44  See: Prof.Dr Joachim Wieland, Rechtsprobleme der Strommengenübertragung gemäss 
par. 7 Abs.1b bis 1d AtGesetz Reihe Umweltpolitik Bundesministerium für Umwelt, 
Naturschutz und Reaktorsicherkeit BMU 2007.  
45  Supra note 32 p. 17. 
46  Id. 
47  BVerfG 19-2-2002, 2BVG 2/00 BVerfGE 104,249,266,288. 
48  Supra note 32 p. 16: “Bundesregierung und Versorgungsunternehmen gehen davon aus 
dass diese Vereinbarung und ihre Umsetzung nicht zu Entschädingungsanspruchen 
zwischen den Beteiligten führt. Wieland ((note 44) p. 17) remarks that the companies 
will need more to defend a waiver of the sort among the shareholders. 





claims was the reason for which the government chose “the informal way” of 
lawmaking, i.e. amending the Atomic Energy Act. 
 
Hence, arguing that the principal decision of the Ausstieg already dates back to 
the year 2000, that the Agreement of 2000 contains a waiver of damage 
compensation and that the decision to extend the lifetime of the nuclear power 
plants in 2010 was nothing more than a short interlude will not hold either.  
 
As to the agreement that has been concluded concerning the decision to extend 
the lifetime of the power plants in 2010, we have to acknowledge that it deals with 
a specific aspect of that decision. As a result of the extension, the companies 
would make their considerable profits for a longer period than was foreseen in 
2000. By the institution of a special fund, the companies would contribute to the 
financing of the change to more ecological energy resources in the long run. Apart 
from this fund and apart from this agreement, a special tax (Kern-
brennstoffsteuer)49 would be introduced. The terminology of the document- the 
word “Vertrag” is used- gave the impression that this agreement was meant to be 
binding. Whether or not that was the case50 is less important in the context of this 
paper. It is clear that this “Vertrag” did not imply an obligation to extend the 
lifetime of the power plants as such. It simply contained a financial obligation to 
be put in place if and when the Atomic Energy Act was changed accordingly. The 
13th Amendment brought a withdrawal of the aforementioned fund with it.51 
International arbitration 
In this respect, two questions arise. First, the possible danger of the importance of 
these systems of supranational dispute resolution for the democratic character of 
decision-making on a national level is at stake and the second question is if the 
major role played by these institutions with respect to the litigation of important 
decisions of EU member states is in accordance with EU law. The European 
Commission has joined the Vattenfall case as “amicus curiae” to put forward its 
opinion that questions like these are to be decided within the system of the 
national and European judiciary. Both issues will be discussed hereafter. 
 
It took a while before Vattenfall joined the other plaintiffs in the lawsuit before 
the Constitutional Court. This might have to do with the fact that Vattenfall is 
(indirectly) fully owned by the state of Sweden and, hence, can be seen as a 
(foreign) legal person according to public law or at least as a private company 
                                                            
49  In the preamble of the document, the companies made it clear that they would sue that 
plan in court.  
50  In literature, doubts are expressed; see a.o. Hanka von Aswege, Christian Waldhoff, 
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held by a public authority . Therefore, it could be argued52 that Vattenfall is not 
entitled to protection under the German Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
has ruled that legal persons according to public law, including private legal 
persons held by a public authority, do not have the right to file a lawsuit on the 
ground of violation of a constitutional right before a German court.53 However, 
Vattenfall could, as a foreign company, go another way. It has the right to sue the 
Federal state of Germany before the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes in Washington (ICSID).54 The basis for this request for 
supranational arbitration is the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).55 The relevant 
standards in this case could be:56 1. The provisions for protection against 
expropriation without compensation. 2. The obligation of fair and equitable 
treatment and the non-impairment through unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures. 3. The duty to observe any obligations vis-à-vis an investor or 
investment (umbrella clause) 
 
It is important to note that the protection afforded under the aforementioned 
provisions goes further than what we have seen under German law. Art.13 ECT 
states that investments may not be nationalized or expropriated or subjected to an
action equivalent to nationalization or expropriation (curs. author). That means 
that, under the ECT, Vattenfall can argue that there is an indirect expropriation, 
                                                            
52  As does Greenpeace (supra note 29 p. 82). Differently: Nathaly Bernasconi-
Osterwalder & Rhea Tamara Hoffman in The German Nuclear Phase-Out Put to the 
Test in International Investment Arbitration? Background to the new dispute Vattenfall 
v.Germany(II)to be found in the IISD (International Institute for Sustainable 
Development) brief series (www.iisd.org/investment). They hold that the German 
branch of Vattenfall that operates the power plants of Brunsbüttel and Krümmel is 
based as a GmbH in Hamburg and is therefore a domestic private legal person. This is 
disputable as at the same time Vattenfall can only file a complaint with the ISCID as a 
foreign company. 
53  Beschluss vom 08.02.2006, 2 BvR 575/05 NJW 2006,2907: Als juristische Person des 
öffentlichen Rechts kann sich die Beschwerdeführerin nicht auf Art. 19 Abs. 4 GG 
berufen (vgl. BVerfGE 39, 302 <316> ). Der Rechtsschutzstandard, wie ihn Art. 19 
Abs. 4 GG für das Verhältnis der Grundrechtsträger zum Staat vorhält, gilt mit Blick 
auf die im Bereich der öffentlichen Aufgaben grundsätzlich fehlende 
Grundrechtsfähigkeit nicht für juristische Personen des öffentlichen Rechts (vgl. 
Maunz/Dürig/Herzog, GG, Art. 19 Abs. 4 Rn. 42). Für eine Differenzierung zwischen 
inländischen und ausländischen juristischen Personen des öffentlichen Rechts ergeben 
sich keine Anhaltspunkte. Danach sind ausländische wie inländische juristische 
Personen des öffentlichen Rechts auf die Geltendmachung einzelner Prozess-
grundrechte wie Art. 101 Abs. 1 Satz 2 und Art. 103 Abs. 1 GG beschränkt. 
54  icsid.worldbank.org/apps/ICSIDWEB/process/Pages/Arbitration.aspx. 
55  The ECT was concluded in 1994 and entered into force in 1998. It is a multinational 
treaty that controls the transnational environment for trade, transfer and protection of 
investment in the energy sector; art. 26 provides for a dispute settlement mechanism 
between an investor and a contracting partner. 
56  See Bernasco-Osterwalder and Hoffman (supra note 52) p. 2. 





an argument that, as we have seen, would not hold in a case before the German 
Constitutional Court.57 
 
Article 10 ECT requires that each contracting partner encourage and create stable, 
equitable and transparent conditions for investors of other contracting partners. 
This is, according to Bernasco –Osterwalder and Hoffman, the most effective and 
most frequently sought remedy by foreign investors. They suppose that Vattenfall 
will likely argue that it has not been treated fairly and equitably as it had legitimate 
cause to believe that the legal extension of 2010 would remain in force. In this 
context, Vattenfall will likely refer to its “legitimate expectations”, an element 
that tends to constitute a major factor for arbitral tribunals in assessing a violation 
of the principle of fair and equitable treatment.58 
 
To what extent these “legitimate expectations” will be honored remains to be seen. 
The factors already mentioned in section 3.5 should play a role. 
 
The umbrella clause in art 10(1) ECT implies that the country where the 
investments are made is in general required to observe all obligations that it has 
entered into with an investor. Vattenfall could thus argue that the decision of 2010 
to extend the lifetime of the power plants was an obligation to which Germany 
had committed itself and that the 13.Amendment would constitute an 
infringement of the ECT. 
 
The result of the arbitration will probably be available later this year.59 To which 
extent the claim of 4.7 billion euro will be honored is still uncertain. 60 
 
The possibility of settling investment disputes in an international context has 
raised questions concerning the extent to which it could be harmful to the 
enforcement of domestic regulation.61 A full discussion of the pros and cons of 
                                                            
57  Idem, Bernaso-Osterwalder and Hoffman (supra note 52); they observe that the 
protection against indirect expropriation is particularly important in the context of 
international investment protection law because it often differs significantly from 
domestic approaches, which tend to be more mindful of public welfare perspectives 
(p. 2). 
58  Id. p. 3. 
59  http://www.mittelbayerische.de/wirtschaft-nachrichten/klagewelle-wegen-atomauss 
tieg-rollt-21840-art1320650.html. 
60  Id. 
61  Especially in the context of the negotiation on the conclusion of the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the European Union and the USA and the 
already concluded but not yet ratified Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) between the EU and Canada. The idea of an Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
(ISDS) is much more widespread and is incorporated in a multitude of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties. It is also much older (ICSID was started in 1966). See 
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2015/jun/10/obscure-legal-system-lets-corporta 
tions-sue-states-ttip-icsid. 
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this issue is beyond the scope of this paper, but the history of the relation between 
Vattenfall and the Federal State of Germany is nevertheless an interesting 
example of what could happen if this way of dispute settlement were used more 
frequently, for Vattenfall is a repeat player. An earlier dispute involving Vattenfall 
was resolved by the ISCID in 2011. It filed a complaint against the state of 
Germany on the issue of the construction of a coal-fired power plant in 
Hamburg/Moorburg, stating that a permit imposing water quality standards made 
the project “unviable” and asking for damages of 1.4 billion euro. The result was 
that the standards were lowered.62 It is interesting to know that, in March 2015, 
the EU commission has filed a complaint against Germany in this case because 
they allegedly violated the Habitat Directive in issuing the relevant permits for 
the Hamburg/Moorburg plant.63 That raises the question of the extent to which the 
outcome of an international dispute settlement can supersede EU law. In this 
respect, the European Court of Justice has ruled that “where an international 
agreement provides for its own system of courts, including a court with 
jurisdiction to settle dispute between the Contracting partners to an agreement, 
(…) the decisions of that Court will be binding on Community institutions, 
including the Court of Justice (…). An international agreement providing for such 
a system of courts is in principle compatible with EU law”.64 But the ECJ has also 
decided that Arbitral Tribunals do not actually constitute “ordinary courts” in the 
sense of article 267 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (TFEU) 
and that the decisions of those Tribunals should not be executed within member 
states without proper examination of their consistency with EU law.65 Doing so, 
the ECJ opens the door for the lawsuit against Germany. 
 
Finally, in July 2015, the European Commission joined the procedure of 
Vattenfall before the ICSID as amicus curiae.66 The EU commission claims that 
the procedure is illegal and violates art. 3 TFEU. The Lisbon Treaty has 
considerably changed the landscape of investment treaty law. Investment treaty 
law is now, to a large extent, formally within the exclusive competence of the 
                                                            
62  See Bernasconi-Osterwalder and Hoffman (supra note 52) p. 2. 
63  http://www.germanenergyblog.de/?p=18291) en http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_ 
IP-15-4669_en.htm. 
64  CJEU 14 December 1992,Opinion I/91-European Economic Area I, ECR 1001,I-6079 
para. 39, as cited in Amélie Noilhac Intra-EU arbitration under the Energy Charter 
Treaty, The European Union competence in Foreign Direct investment; fundamental 
change for intra-EU energy arbitration (http://ajis-strasbourg.weebly.com/uploads/ 
4/0/6/6/40666569/m%C3%A9moire_de_stage_a._noilhac.pdf). 
65  Eco Swiss v. Benetton, ECJ, 1 June 1999, Case C-129/97, ECR 1-3055, para. 34, cited 
by Noihac in note 24 (supra note 64). 
66  See more on this issue: Carlos Gonzalez-Bueno and Laura Lozano, More than a friend 
of the court. The evolving role of the European commission in Investor State 
Arbitration; http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/01/26/more-than-a-friend-of-the-
court-the-evolving-role-of-the-european-commission-in-investor-state-arbitration/. 





European Union (cf. Articles 3.1(e) and 2.1 TFEU).67 This could imply that 
conflicts in this field should be resolved within a European context, because EU 
law has priority over the ECT since it now (i.e. after the Lisbon Treaty) governs 
the same competence regarding investments.68 It can also be argued, however, 
that the parties in the ECT have agreed on the precedence to be given to particular 
obligations to ensure the most favorable treatment of and dispute resolution 
between investors. The ECT standards override those provided by EU law and 
art. 16 ECT69 implies that EU law is complemented by the ECT but does not 
supersede it.70 
 
We will have to wait until at least the fall of 2016 to know what the outcome of 
this dispute will be. 
 
4. Conclusion 
The case of the Atomausstieg discussed here has raised an intensive judicial 
discussion that is far from over. At least two important judgements have yet to be 
rendered. The Constitutional Court has to decide on the constitutionality of the 
13th Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act and the ISCID has to give a decision 
on Vattenfall’s claim for a huge compensation for damages. It is probable that 
more claims will be filed before national German courts in the future. 
Nevertheless, the study of this case allows us to reflect on the two questions raised 
in section 1.4: 
 
                                                            
67  Dr Jan Kleinheisterkamp, The Next 10 Year ECT Investment Arbitration: A Vision for 
the Future – From a European law perspective Report for the SCC / ECT / ICSID 
Conference on “10 Years of Energy Charter Treaty Arbitration” 9-10 June 2011 
(http://sccinstitute.com/media/61991/jan_kleinheisterkamp_report-ect-eu-law.pdf). 
68  See C. Söderlund, The future of the Energy charter Treaty in the Context of the Lisbon 
Treaty, in G. Coop (ed) Energy Dispute Resolution; Investment Protection, Transit and 
the Energy Charter Treaty, Jurisnet LLC, 2011, at 104 cited in note 43 by Noilhac 
(supra note 64). 
69  See Noilhac (supra note 64) .Art 16 ECT provides that “where two or more Contracting 
Parties have entered into a prior international agreement, or enter into a subsequent 
international agreement, whose terms in either case concern [investment protected by 
the ECT]: 1. Nothing in Part III or V of this Treaty shall be construed to derogate from 
any provision of such terms of the other agreement or from any right to dispute 
resolution with respect thereto under that agreement; 2. Nothing in such terms of the 
other agreement shall be construed to derogate from any provision of Part III or V of 
this Treaty or from any right to dispute resolution with respect thereto under this Treaty, 
where any such provision is more favorable to the investor or investment”. 
70  See Noilhac (supra note 64) p.8, after having analyzed art 16 ECT as a conflict clause 
that discards the application of the general conflict rule of the Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, more specifically art 30 that consists the principle of lex posteriori, 
according to which the later law supersedes the earlier. 
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1. To what extent does a decision of policy change imply a breach of public trust 
and is there a ground for damage compensation? 
 
When it comes to changing public policy, public trust is inherently limited. 
Changing public policy does not, in most cases, imply a breach of public trust. 
However, that does not mean that there is never a ground for damage 
compensation. The development of the constitutional control in Germany shows 
that, in cases solely concerned with the determination and limitation of property 
rights, there is no constitutional right to damage compensation since there is no 
formal expropriation. However, legal measures that imply a special burden can 
only be constitutional when the legislator has first tried as much as possible to 
minimize that burden and, secondly, provided a procedure for obtaining damage 
compensation. In my opinion, the lack of attention to this aspect in the 
13th Amendment of the Atomic Energy Act makes it probable that the 
Constitutional Court will conclude to its unconstitutionality. 
 
The general opinion in literature and jurisprudence is that the Agreement of 2000 
does not qualify as a binding contract, which leads to the idea that, in practice, the 
role of binding contracts to determine long-term policy decisions, such as those 
at stake here, is limited, especially when the subject entails legislative 
amendments. Damage claims based on breach of contract in those cases seem to 
be hardly successful. 
 
The decision to abandon atomic energy in 2011 implied a sudden change in 
comparison with the decision to extend the lifetime of the nuclear power plants in 
2010. However, in the end it entails the phasing out of nuclear energy in the same 
time frame as was foreseen in 2000. This, combined with the fact that there had 
been intensive discussion in the German society for decades and the fact that 
exploiting a nuclear power plant has raised huge profits for a long period of time, 
will influence the civil courts’ decisions with respect to the amount of damage 
compensation to be paid out. 
 
2. In such cases, what is the role of European and international institutions in 
dispute resolution? 
Foreign investors – among other exploiters of nuclear power plants- can use the 
ISCID arbitration procedure to challenge the decisions of host countries with 
allegedly negative consequences for their investments, while this procedure is not 
available to domestic investors. 
 
In the case of Germany, the ICSID arbitration procedure can lead to decisions that 
are more favorable for investors than those that could be obtained from a national 
court. 
 





The case of Vattenfall vs Germany in the case Hamburg/Moorburg coal fired 
power plant shows that a settlement in the ICSID procedure can lead to tensions 
between European and national regulations. 
 
It is yet to be decided whether or not the amendment of the Treaty on the Function 
of the European Union by the Lisbon Treaty means that intra-EU investment 
disputes cannot be brought any longer before international (i.e. non-European) 
arbitration courts. I would not bet on a EU victory here. 
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On Administrative Adjudication, 
Administrative Justice and Public Trust. 
Analyzing Developments on Access to Justice in 
Dutch Administrative Law and Its Application in Practice 
 





In efforts to improve the good administration of justice in the context of 
administrative law disputes in the Netherlands, the Dutch legislator regularly 
amends the procedures that the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) has 
prescribed since 1994 for settling disputes concerning single case decision-
making by public authorities. For the same reasons, public authorities and 
administrative courts sometimes change the manner in which these procedures are 
applied in practice. A basic assumption in this chapter is that administrative 
adjudication, administrative justice, and public trust are interconnected. 
Administrative procedural law and its application in practice can contribute to the 
acceptance of public law decision-making, the court’s judicial review of those 
decisions and therefore public law in general. 
 
Legal protection against administrative law decisions (single case decision-
making) is available to interested parties in the Netherlands. First, an interested 
party may object to a decision by lodging a formal objection with that public 
authority. Lodging an objection leads to an objection procedure that is regulated 
by provisions found in Chapters 6 and 7 of the Dutch GALA. This procedure 
allows the public body to re-evaluate its decision in light of the applicable norms 
and all the relevant public and private interests involved. Secondly, this party may 
– if the objection procedure didn’t successfully address the objections – lodge an 
appeal with the administrative court. In administrative court procedures, 
Chapters 6 and 8 of GALA provide the necessary procedural provisions to allow 
for a full judicial review of the administrative law decision by a specialized 
administrative law court. 
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Improving the adjudication of administrative law disputes is a concern for both 
public authorities in objection procedures and administrative courts in appeal 
procedures, as well as for the legislator. Public authorities, when re-evaluating a 
decision in the objection procedure, administrative courts, when reviewing the 
legality of an administrative law decision, and the legislator, when amending the 
procedural provisions for the objection procedure and the administrative court 
procedure, all strive to find a balance between the need for efficient procedures 
and professional treatment that will lead to legally sound decision-making and/or 
judgments. 
 
In this paper, we intend to analyze the changes and developments in practice and 
law during the last 20 years in the light of Mashaw’s theory of administrative 
justice. This theory, which can be used to analyze the changes in the objection 
procedure and which can be inspirational in analyzing changes in the procedure 
before the administrative law courts, distinguishes between three ideal types of 
decision-making. Decision-making by public authorities in the objection 
procedure and the preparation of judgments by administrative law courts can be 
assessed by using these three models. The main questions we want to answer are 
rather simple. Could analyzing the changes in law and practice using Mashaw’s 
analytical framework provide relevant insight? Will such an assessment provide 
clarification with respect to the developments that aim to improve the 
administration of justice in Dutch general administrative law? Can a general trend 
be observed? Since Mashaw’s theory of administrative justice is concerned with 
governmental bodies delivering justice in a bureaucratic context, this theory 
seems especially relevant for the assessment of the objection procedure’s 
developments. That assessment will be complemented by a recent Dutch model 
that has been introduced in order to assess governance in the judiciary. This model 
seems relevant for assessing the developments in the administrative court 
procedure. In Sections 3 and 4, we apply this framework to several developments 
in both the objection procedure and the administrative court procedure. The 
analysis allows us to answer the questions above and draw conclusions on 
possible trends in the efforts made in both practice and law to improve the good 
administration of justice in administrative law disputes (section 5). 
 
2. Analytical framework to assess developments 
The theory of administrative justice 
 
The manner in which legal rules are implemented in practice has always been a 
topic of research and discussion. Many agree that the administration of justice 
should be the aim of any legal system. This is also true in administrative law where 
governmental bodies strive to deliver justice in a bureaucratic context. In his 1983 
work Bureaucratic Justice, Mashaw2 has given a definition of justice in the 
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context of an administrative system. According to his work, it means “those 
qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for the acceptability of its 
decisions”. Based on an empirical study of the administrative decision-making 
concerning the American Disability Insurance Scheme, he expanded on this 
definition by identifying and assessing three different models of administrative 
justice. He named these Bureaucratic Rationality, Professional Treatment, and 
Moral Judgment. According to Mashaw, these models are competitive, but not 
mutually exclusive, within any administration.3  
 
According to the Bureaucratic Rationality Model, the administrative justice 
system should be developed in a way that enables it to process as many cases as 
possible at the least possible cost. It should therefore be both accurate and cost-
effective, accuracy being defined here as the ability to distinguish between right 
and wrong. Focusing on facts and knowledge, bureaucratic rationality provides 
for decision-making that is rationalized to keep costs in mind. It therefore ignores 
arguments of value, preference or ethics. This bureaucratic view is legitimized by 
its conservation of state budgets and realization of politically (democratically) set 
goals. While bureaucratic rationality is focused on the effective and efficient 
implementation of the rules, the goal of the Professional Treatment Model of 
administrative justice is to serve the client. The legal professional should not just 
blindly follow the system, but should also make sure that the client is provided 
with the resources or help that is needed. The Professional Treatment Model also 
lets the professional himself make the appropriate decisions, thus relies less on 
rationalized systems. However, this means that, besides efficiency, hierarchical 
control is also somewhat lost. The professional is given freedom, which can lead 
to decisions that are difficult to check and review. This is acceptable because of 
the service the professional can deliver. The Moral Judgment Model revolves 
around the ideas of fairness and fair allocation of benefits and burdens. In 
considering the purpose of adjudicatory situations, it is accepted that one of its 
main aims lies in the resolution of disputes. Decision-making is a defining value 
according to the Moral Judgment Model. This means that there should be an even 
opportunity for all parties to prove their claims. Also, it promotes results that are 
agreed upon by all parties. The legal professional should seek the ultimate 
outcome using common moral principles within the context painted by the 
different parties. 
 
According to Mashaw, these three models of administrative justice can be 
distinguished by their legitimating values, their primary goals, their structure or 
organization and by their different cognitive techniques (Figure 1). 
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Independent Contextual  
Interpretation 
 
Since 1983, many scholars have offered criticism of Mashaw’s three models of 
administrative justice. Sainsbury4 has criticized Mashaw’s interpretation of 
administrative justice. According to Sainsbury, the efficiency of Bureaucratic 
Rationality has nothing to do with justice and should therefore not be included as 
a legitimating goal. Besides that, the features related to “structure or organization” 
and “cognitive techniques” should not be considered components of 
administrative justice. Sainsbury argued that only two qualities should be shown 
during a decision-making process: accuracy and fairness (fairness in this case 
entails promptness, impartiality, participation and accountability). One other 
critic is Adler, who attempted to improve Mashaw’s work. An overview of 
Adler’s ideas on administrative justice is given in his 2010 work Administrative 
Justice in Context.5 He identifies three more models and makes some adjustments 
to Mashaw’s original three models. He adds the managerial, consumerist and 
market models and renames the existing three models as the bureaucratic, 
professional and legal models. 
 
Although Adler’s criticism is convincing and certainly brings new value and 
nuance to the existing theory of administrative justice, we are of the opinion that 
Adler’s view on administrative justice – for the purpose of this paper – is 
unnecessarily complicated. In the sections below, we will therefore primarily 
focus on Mashaw’s three decision-making models and use them as the analytical 
framework for assessing the developments in the objection procedure and the 
administrative court procedure. A limitation of all theories of administrative 
justice is that they concern justice as delivered by organizations that belong to the 
executive. However, a recent report on the future governance of the judiciary 
seems to suggest that theories concerning the justice of an administrative system 
can also be relevant for organizations that are within the judiciary, like 
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administrative courts. Remember that justice in the context of an administrative 
system refers to those qualities of a decision process that provide arguments for 
the acceptability of the decisions. 
 
The governance model of the Dutch judiciary 
 
In the beginning of 2014, the Dutch School for Public Governance (DSPG)6 
released a report that offered a framework for reflection on the current and future 
forms of governance within the Dutch judiciary branch. One of the main goals of 
the research was to assist the Dutch judiciary to start an appropriate, well-
structured and thought-out discussion on the current governance model in order 
to improve the manner in which the judiciary governs itself. For the purposes of 
the report, the researchers interviewed many different stakeholders that play 
relevant roles within the Dutch judiciary, such as judges and their managers.  
 
The report concluded that, in the last 25 years, a development in the Dutch 
judiciary has resulted in the rise of a new, modern public management style of 
governing, co-existing in parallel with the traditional, professional way of 
governing. This development caused a visible tension between the world of 
“governance” or “management” and the legal “professionals” who “just want to 
do their job”, according to the report. Two opposite views of the governance 
structure of the Dutch judiciary are reinforcing this struggle. According to one 
viewpoint, the judiciary simply consists of a group of professionals who should 
be left alone as much as possible; this viewpoint embraces a highly decentralized 
form of governance. From the other point of view, the judiciary is a national 
system that should function as one single organization. This viewpoint advocates 
not only the introduction of central policies on many issues, but also the 
uniformity and transparency of these policies. In the report, the researchers distill, 
from their research and interviews, three different viewpoints on the governance 
of the Dutch judiciary. The term “judgment” is used as a metaphor for the 
judiciary in the figure that is used in the report to explain the three viewpoints 
(Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Three viewpoints on governance in the judiciary 
 
 
The first viewpoint (the genius judgment) is that the legal magnificence should be 
at the core of the judiciary’s organization. The second (the efficient judgment) 
stands for the opinion that the judiciary should function as a business and be 
managed in the sense that the best results are reached at the lowest possible cost. 
The third viewpoint is that of the relevant judgment (for society): the goal is to 
resolve the parties’ dispute and make sure that the conflict is settled. The report 
goes on to state that, in the Netherlands, the “genius judgment” is no longer the 
most important or dominant view. Many perceive the “efficient judgment” to be 
the dominant view nowadays. This can be attributed to the rise, in recent years, of 
the managerial style of governance in the judiciary. 
 
These three views are rather similar in nature to the three models of administrative 
justice that were established by Mashaw in his 1983 research, but they are not the 
same. The “relevant judgment” reiterates the importance of the service the 
judiciary provides for society: dispute resolution within a legal framework. 
Therefore, it resembles the Professional Treatment Model, which puts emphasis 
on providing a service to clients (e.g. parties to a conflict). However, there are 
aspects of the “relevant judgment” that are similar to Mashaw’s Moral Judgment 
Model. The “efficient judgment” resembles the Bureaucratic Rationality Model 
since it focuses on accuracy and effectiveness, and stands for a managerial style 
of governance. But the “efficient judgment” also reminds us of Mashaw’s 
Professional Treatment Model. Finally, one could argue that the “genius 
judgment” and the Moral Judgment have a similar background since both put 
emphasis on allowing either civil servants or judges to function independently in 
their work to resolve conflicts in a certain context. The “genius judgment” does, 
however, have some resemblance to the Bureaucratic Rationality Model as well. 
Our conclusion is that there are indeed both important similarities as well as 
relevant differences between the models used to analyze the forms of governance 
















In the next two sections (3 and 4) we will use both Mashaw’s theory of 
administrative justice and the viewpoints on governance in the Dutch judiciary to 
analyze several important developments in both law and practice in the context of 
the Dutch objection procedure as well as the administrative court procedures. 
 
3. Analyzing developments: the objection procedure 
 
The objective of the legislator 
The objective of the legislator in 1994, when it was decided to introduce a 
mandatory objection procedure in chapter 7 GALA, was that it should be a 
gateway for the administrative court procedure. When an interested party cannot 
agree with an administrative law decision rendered by an administrative authority, 
lodging an appeal with a specialized administrative law court must be allowed. 
However, court proceedings are expensive and take a long time. They should 
therefore be avoided in cases where they are not necessary. The GALA therefore 
provides that interested parties can appeal to the court only if they have first 
lodged an objection and participated in an objection procedure. The main goal of 
the procedure was to increase the chances that the public authority and the 
interested party reach a solution to their conflict and that, as a result, the court is 
not appealed to in order to settle their dispute.7 
 
When designing the objection procedure, the legislator had several goals in mind. 
The first of these was flexibility. The legislation gave the public authority the 
freedom it needed to implement the objection procedure at its discretion. A second 
goal had to do with the legislator’s fear that the public authority would not take 
the objections to its administrative law decision seriously. He sought to prevent 
cases where an interested party would not be granted a fair procedure.8 Several 
measures were taken to reach this goal. Amongst other measures, a formal hearing 
was made mandatory. Another relevant measure was providing that the objections 
would not be assessed by any civil servant that had been involved in the 
preparation of the disputed decision, so that the re-evaluation of the decision 
would be unprejudiced (or by the public authority itself). Furthermore, article 7:13 
GALA confers on the administrative body the competence to establish an advisory 
committee with external members that could conduct the hearing. A third goal 
was to make sure that the public authority would not assume too quickly that the 
objections were resolved to the satisfaction of the objector. It was stipulated that 
the public authority can only assume that an objection is withdrawn when it is 
done in writing. 
 
                                                            
7  Parliamentary Papers II 1988/89, 21 221, No. 3, pp. 115-116. 
8  M. Scheltema, “Inleiding”, in: A.T. Marseille & L. van der Velden (eds.), Vertrouwen 
verdient. Verdiend vertrouwen. Visies op geschilbeslechting dor de overheid, The 
Hague: Sdu Uitgevers 2013. 





The provisions in Chapter 7 GALA on the objection procedure ensure that the 
public authority will take a serious look at the concerns of the interested parties. 
In addition, the legislator stressed the need for an objection procedure with a 
rather informal character; the legislator intended the objection procedure to be an 
informal procedure. As soon as an administrative law court is involved in the 
dispute, there is a risk that the dispute will be subject to unnecessary juridification. 
To avoid this, the interested party and the public authority should try to use the 
objection procedure to resolve their dispute. The reconsideration of the disputed 
decision should not only concern the legality of the decision but also its 
effectiveness and the question of whether or not the outcome is reasonable. 
 
In light of the above, we conclude that the aim of the legislator was – in terms of 
the models of Mashaw – to realize administrative justice by Professional 
Treatment. 
 
Developments in practice 
 
When the objection procedure was introduced, public authorities had broad 
discretion to choose how they wanted to fulfill their obligation to hear an 
interested party during the objection procedure. Large independent public 
authorities, such as the tax authorities and the Employee Insurances Implementing 
Agency, chose to entrust this task to their own civil servants, usually those with a 
legal education. However, almost all municipal public authorities established 
external advisory committees consisting of three independent members 
(art. 7:13 GALA). One reason for doing this was that those municipal public 
authorities wanted to show that they adhered to an unprejudiced assessment of the 
objections. There was also a pragmatic reason: establishing an external advisory 
committee is an inexpensive way to handle many objections. Members of most 
municipal external advisory committees were lawyers. As a consequence, the 
objection procedure acquired in practice a rather formal character. After all, when 
three lawyers are asked to form a committee to provide advice on whether an 
objection to an administrative law decision is well founded, there is a fair chance 
that they will take the three-judge section of the administrative law court as an 
example.9 As a result, many of the hearings of municipal advisory committees 
were very similar to those of the three-judge sections of the administrative courts. 
Parties to the dispute (the objector and the administrative body) plead their case 
before the committee. They frequently expressed their views orally on the basis 
of written pleadings, as is the case with formal court hearings. Other consequences 
of the dominating presence of lawyers that were independent from the public 
authority were that the committee’s written advice focused mainly on the legality 
of the objected decision and that there was hardly any attention to other aspects 
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of a reconsideration of the decision: effectiveness and reasonableness.10 The 
question of whether it would have been possible for the public authority to pay 
more attention to the interests of the objector usually didn’t have much impact 
since the advisory committee mostly concluded – in a judge-like fashion – that 
the outcome of the weighing of the interests involved was not in such a way 
unreasonable that no reasonable public authority could have reached that 
conclusion. 
 
It was also found that – unlike the legislator had assumed – objectors frequently 
made use of lawyers to assist them in the objection procedure.11 This meant a 
reinforcement of the formal nature of the procedure. The frequent presence of 
lawyers in the objection procedure raised the question of whether it should be 
considered reasonable to order the public authority to bear the costs of the legal 
assistance when the procedure resulted in the amendment of the disputed decision 
due to a mistake made by the public authority. The GALA did provide for such a 
provision with respect to the procedure before the administrative law court (article 
8:75 GALA), but not with respect to objection procedures. In 2002, article 7:15 
GALA introduced a similar scheme for the objection procedure.  
 
A formal aspect of the procedure that was criticized by public authorities, was the 
way in which the obligation to hear the objector is regulated by the provisions in 
Chapter 7 GALA. Public authorities of course consider it reasonable that the 
objector is given the opportunity to explain his objections during a hearing. 
However, contestants frequently do not show up when the public authority 
organizes a hearing to provide them with this opportunity. For public authorities 
it would be easier if they had the power to inform the objector that he would only 
be granted a hearing if he explicitly informed them of his wish to be heard. If he 
did not respond within a specific time-period, the public authority would assume 
that the objector was not interested in a hearing. The risk thus shifts from the 
government (that organizes a hearing for which the objector does not show up) to 
the objector (who loses his right to a hearing if he fails to let the public authority 
know that he wants to be heard). The wish of the public authorities was granted 
in 2013. Since then, article 7:3 GALA stipulates that a hearing is not necessary 
when the objector has not declared, within a reasonable period set by the public 
authority, that he wants to be heard. 
 
The choices made by public authorities concerning the practical aspects of the 
objection procedure and the amendments made by the legislator with respect to 
the objection procedure show that, during the first decade after the imple-
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mentation of the GALA, Bureaucratic Rationality was the dominant model 
guiding the efforts to try and bring about the good administration of justice. 
 
The objection procedure: mandatory or optional? 
Prior to the introduction of the objection procedure in 1994, there were 
discussions about whether this procedure should be mandatory or optional. The 
legislator opted for a mandatory procedure. The debate on “mandatory or 
optional” did not fade away when the GALA came into force. A frequently 
mentioned disadvantage of the obligatory objection procedure was that, in some 
disputes, the public authority and the interested parties have already exchanged 
all their arguments in the period before the contested decision and will not be 
diverted away from their positions. In such a situation, the objection procedure is 
nothing less than a ritual dance with a predictable outcome and only results in a 
loss of time and energy. There was rather much support for introducing the 
possibility of skipping the objection procedure in such situations.12 In 2004, article 
7:1a was added to the GALA. It provides that if someone disagrees with a decision 
and wants to go directly to the administrative law court, he can raise an objection 
and ask the public authority to agree to skip the objection procedure. If both the 
public authority and the court agree, the objection procedure can be bypassed. 
 
When objectors became legally allowed to bypass the objection procedure, it was 
expected that they would make extensive use of this possibility. That has not been 
the case. A request to skip the objection procedure is made in less than 1% of the 
objection cases. Contrary to expectations, the interested parties did not often feel 
the need to go directly to court and bypass the objection procedure.13 
 
The informal pro-active approach model 
 
The past decade has seen a shift in the way public authorities handle objections. 
While the Bureaucratic Rationality Model initially seemed dominant, there has 
been a shift during the last decade to a combination of the Professional Treatment 
and Moral Judgment models. This has everything to do with the emergence of 
mediation and insights from social psychology concerning procedural justice. In 
a sense, there is a movement “back to the source.” The way in which a growing 
number of public authorities are implementing the objection procedure in practice 
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is called the Informal Pro-active Approach Model and resembles the initial ideas 
and intention the legislator had when introducing the objection procedure.14 
 
What is this other way of treating objections? It is a pro-active, personal and 
solution-driven approach that consists of two interventions. First, when receiving 
an objection, a civil servant ensures quick and direct personal contact with the 
person that lodged the objection, usually by way of a telephone call. The civil 
servant tries to assess the reason for the objection and consults with the objector 
regarding how his objection may be best addressed. Sometimes, the telephone call 
is not just the first contact with the objector, but also the last. That may be the case 
if it turns out that the objection is based on a misunderstanding (for example, the 
objector has misunderstood the content of the decision). Usually, the conversation 
with the objector is followed by a meeting at the office of the public authority. 
The objector, an official who has been involved in the preparation of the disputed 
decision and an “independent” civil servant talk about how the problem which 
gave rise to the objection can best be solved. This procedure takes place in the 
shadow of the official procedure laid down in Chapter 7 GALA. Ideally, as a result 
of the informal approach, the objection is withdrawn. The reason may be that the 
public authority agrees to modify its decision. Another reason for withdrawing 
the objection may be that the objector concludes that the decision that he 
originally disagreed with is correct. A third possible outcome may be that, 
although it is not possible to change the disputed decision, the public authority 
can assist the objector in finding a solution for his problem. 
 
The Informal Pro-active Approach Model, which is used by a growing number of 
public authorities, places the citizen’s problem at the center of attention. The 
model ideally leads to the solution of his problem, but ensures, at least, that the 
objector is convinced that the public authority has taken a serious look at his case, 
resulting in his acceptance of the outcome. In this way of dealing with objections, 
we mainly recognize elements of the Professional Treatment Model (the public 
authority focuses on providing a service to the objector) as well as elements of the 
Moral Judgment Model (the public authority values an outcome that the objector 
considers fair). 
 
4. Analyzing developments: administrative court procedure 
 
The objective of the legislator 
 
When the legislator codified general administrative law in the GALA in 1994, he 
had several goals in mind with the introduction of new provisions for 
administrative court procedures in Chapter 8 of the GALA. One of the key ideas 
of the Dutch legislator was that the provisions on administrative court procedures 
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should have as their primary goal the protection of the rights and interests of the 
individual claimant and should not pursue compliance with all public law 
regulations in general. In other words, the legislator wanted procedural rules to be 
an appropriate framework to allow the courts to settle cases relating to an 
individual’s rights and obligations in a binding, effective, and efficient way. As a 
consequence administrative courts are, to a large extent, bound by the grounds for 
judicial review put forward by the claimant and are also restricted in their review 
by the scope of the request (non ultra petita). Judicial review of a public 
authority’s decision should furthermore be easily accessible, although appeal 
periods are short (six weeks). As a consequence, the Dutch GALA does not 
require an interested party to have legal representation in court procedures and it 
arranges for a rather low court fee. 
 
One of the distinctive features of general administrative procedural law relevant 
for our analysis and deemed important by the legislator in 1994, is the fact that an 
administrative court will always actively search for the relevant and objective 
truth. When considering questions of fact and evidence, the administrative courts 
are active and are not bound by what parties have put forward. The courts are 
granted broad discretion when applying investigatory powers to establish the 
relevant facts to rule on the dispute. It provides them with an instrument to 
compensate for the inequality that is deemed to exist between the public authority 
and the civilian interested party that lodged the appeal against its decision. 
Together with these discretionary powers, the courts were given freedom to divide 
the burden of proof between the parties and to assess the probative value of the 
evidence put forward.15 Trusting courts with such broad discretion was based on 
the assumption that courts know best and that, therefore, there was no need for 
any substantive provision on evidence, the burden of proof or the probative value 
of the evidence. 
 
A final element that is characteristic of judicial review in the Netherlands and 
interesting for our assessment is the fact that appeals are always concerned with 
the outcome of single case decision-making. Since public authorities are usually 
granted discretionary powers, many cases before the administrative courts would 
result in the annulment of a decision by the court only to conclude that the public 
authority is required to try and make a new decision that can once again be the 
object of an appeal by the same interested party. Many scholars have argued, in 
the past, that this potentially continuing ritual of annulment and decision-making 
is not very efficient and/or effective. Therefore, in 1994, the courts were conferred 
the power to decide that the legal consequences of an annulled decision will be 
allowed to stand (article 8:72(3)(a) GALA). The courts can also determine that 
their rulings will replace the annulled decision (article 8:72(3)(b) GALA). In both 
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cases, the court can only use these powers when it is sure of the decision that 
should be taken by the public authority.16 
 
In light of the above, we can easily conclude that the legislator has introduced 
provisions pertaining to administrative court procedure without any manifest 
elements of – in terms of the models of Mashaw – Bureaucratic Rationality. The 
model that seems to dominate in the brief recapitulation of the Dutch legislator’s 
objectives in 1994 is Moral Judgment. The fact that emphasis was put on 
effectively and efficiently resolving disputes by Dutch administrative courts 
shows that elements of Professional Treatment were considered as well. 
 
Developments in practice 
 
After Chapter 8 of the GALA had been introduced in 1994, the administrative law 
courts were considered to be active courts with a keen interest in judging cases 
based on the objective truth. The general opinion was that the large discretion 
conferred upon the courts would lead them to actively apply their investigatory 
powers. Although some administrative courts remained (more) active then others, 
over time the courts became less inclined to use their investigatory powers. One 
explanation for this growing passive attitude could be that the interpretation of the 
new provisions on administrative procedural law is still evolving and that the 
passive attitude would better fit the developing ideas on the structure and the goals 
of judicial review. Another argument was that the courts’ organization is a 
bureaucracy as any other and that agreements between individual judges, judges 
and their staff, and judges and their management might affect their choice of using 
an investigatory power.17 One of the issues that relates to the lack of active attitude 
by the administrative courts is the fact that all courts applied the so-called court-
hearing-centered organizational scheme for handling cases. The aim of this 
organizational scheme was to process many cases at low cost. In most cases this 
meant that a case would be “on the desk of a judge” only several weeks before a 
court hearing was held and that a judgment would be pronounced within several 
weeks after the hearing. In many cases, a judge might feel that there was not 
enough time for the court to use its investigatory powers; any formal investigative 
power would take time and would prolong an already lengthy procedure. 
Although the GALA provided a framework for tailor-made case-management by 
offering discretionary powers to the court, the court-hearing-centered 
organizational scheme was perceived in practice by both courts and claimants as 
a binding roadmap for all cases. 
 
                                                            
16  See K.J. de Graaf & A.T. Marseille, “Final dispute resolution by Dutch Administrative 
Courts: Slippery Slope and Efficient Remedy”, in: Suzanne Comtois & Kars de Graaf 
(eds.), On Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Independence, The Hague: Eleven International 
Publishing 2013, p. 205-217. 
17  See A.J.G.M. van Montfort et al, “The sooner the better”, International Journal of the 
Sociology of Law, 2005 (33), p. 35-51. 





A decade after implementing the new provisions in the GALA, it was clear that 
the notion of the administrative court as an active court could no longer be 
considered correct. The courts would frequently rule – much to the surprise of the 
claimant – that the claimant didn't bring forward sufficient evidence to support 
his argument. Courts themselves were in most cases no longer actively using their 
investigatory powers, which brought scholars to conclude that administrative 
courts no longer comply with the normative ideal of the legislator at the time of 
the codification of administrative procedural law.18 Also, an evaluative study 
commissioned by the Dutch Government devoted to questions related to assessing 
the facts of the case in administrative procedural law came to the same 
conclusions. 
 
Looking at these developments it is clear that practice has shown that 
administrative courts should no longer be seen as active courts.19 In particular, the 
court-hearing-centered organizational scheme to handle cases has led in practice 
to the rise of elements of the Bureaucratic Rationality Model in the way courts 
handle their cases. It seems that the model of the Efficient Judgment 
(Management) has had some influence in these developments. 
 
The administrative court procedure: efficient and effective dispute resolution? 
 
The Netherlands is no exception to the rule that, in most cases of judicial review, 
the court’s decision to annul the contested decision does not end the conflict 
between the parties. The public authority is usually required to make a new 
decision, which can then be the subject of a new appeal.20 This is highly 
ineffective and inefficient. Although Chapter 8 of the GALA already focused, in 
1994, on the possibility of granting the courts competence for final dispute 
resolution, the legislator found sufficient reasons, after 15 years of dispute 
resolution on the basis of GALA, to try to stimulate effective and efficient dispute 
resolution by administrative courts in order to provide a better service to the 
claimants and to protect their rights and interests.21 The Dutch legislator is keen 
on the idea that administrative courts have an important role to play in finding 
                                                            
18  L.J.A. Damen, “Public administration: ‘at your service!’”, in: K.J. de Graaf et al., 
Quality of Decision-Making in Public Law, Groningen: Europa Law Publishing 2007, 
p. 151-167. 
19  T. Barkhuysen, L.J.A. Damen e.a., Feitenvaststelling in beroep (Derde evaluatie van 
de Awb - 2006), The Hague: BJu 2007, with a summary in English on p. 341-344. 
20  This is sometimes called the “yo-yo” effect, see Philip Langbroek, Milan Remac and 
Paulien Willemsen, “The Dutch System of Dispute Resolution in Administrative Law”, 
in: Dacian C. Dragos & Bogdana Neamtu (eds.), Alternative Dispute Resolution in 
European Administrative Law, Springer 2014, section 4.5.2. 
21  We will not discuss here the amended art. 6:22 GALA (substantive and formal 
illegalities can be passed, should these not affect interested persons) and new 
art. 8:69a GALA (claimants can invoke only those rules that are specifically intended 
to protect their interests). 





ways to stimulate efficient and effective final dispute resolution by the courts. The 
legislator has made several relevant amendments to the GALA.  
 
An administrative court’s possibilities to end a conflict by means of a judgment 
in judicial review procedures are limited due to the separation of powers. This 
separation would be jeopardized if the courts decided the correct way of 
exercising a discretionary power that was conferred to the public authority.22 In 
2010, the GALA was amended by introducing a new instrument for the courts to 
better serve their clients, by providing final dispute resolution without 
jeopardizing the separation of powers, and to improve the efficiency and 
effectiveness of administrative adjudication in the Netherlands. This instrument 
is called an administrative loop (bestuurlijke lus) and it provides the courts with 
the power to allow the public authority the opportunity to repair the shortcomings 
or unlawful elements found by the court in the contested decision. A new article, 
8:51a GALA, allows the court to rule, in an interim judgment, that it has found 
unlawful elements in the contested decision and that it will annul the decision in 
its final judgment. However, the court will give the public authority time to try 
and repair these unlawful elements and, in that way, still have the possibility of a 
final judgment to end the conflict. 
 
In the meantime, the case law of the highest administrative law courts in the 
Netherlands had changed the way the courts assess the possibilities of effectively 
and efficiently ending the conflict by applying the instruments provided for in 
article 8:72(3), in an effort to help claimants protect their rights and interests. In 
an effort to codify these new developments, the Dutch legislator introduced a new 
relevant provision on January 1st 2013. Article 8:41a GALA stipulates that 
administrative courts will resolve the parties’ dispute when possible. Although 
this provision is more or less symbolic, it does encourage the administrative courts 
to focus on efficient, effective and final dispute resolution in order to provide a 
service to society. To complement the provision, the legislator also amended 
article 8:72 GALA in order to be in line with the new emphasis on final dispute 
resolution by administrative courts. 
 
The emphasis the Dutch legislator has put on efficient and effective dispute 
resolution implies a shift from a perspective where the Moral Judgment Model 
was dominant to a perspective where elements of both the Bureaucratic 
Rationality and Professional Treatment models are also deemed highly relevant. 
One could argue that the Efficient Judgment and the Relevant Judgment models 
predominate with respect to these developments.  
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The new case management procedure 
 
The past decade has seen a change in the way administrative law courts handle 
cases. As explained in this section, the passive attitude adopted by courts when 
establishing the facts of a case has met with some criticism. Also, the courts had 
to change the way they treat their cases due to the emphasis that has been put on 
efficient and effective administrative adjudication. This has led the courts away 
from their dominant management scheme that was focused on the court hearing. 
Without relevant legislative amendments, the administrative law divisions of the 
Dutch district courts, and also, to some extent, the highest administrative courts, 
have been handling their cases in accordance with a New Case Management 
Procedure (NCMP) since 2012. This new scheme entails that cases are scheduled 
to be heard as soon as possible. The hearing is meant to allow for a discussion 
between the judge and the parties in order to deal with the dispute in a way that 
does justice to the parties’ interests. Judges have a more active role at the hearing. 
Dealing with a case in an efficient and effective manner, allowing for 
customization and striving towards final dispute resolution are key elements of 
this – rather informal – hearing.23 
 
The New Case Management Procedure seems to offer relevant elements for some 
of the developments we have discussed in this section. First, it could be argued 
that the NCMP has been introduced in response to criticism that administrative 
courts have not been very keen on applying their investigatory powers ex officio. 
The NCMP has not been introduced for the purpose of reverting to the legislator’s 
initial objective and making administrative courts active once again. With court 
hearings scheduled as soon as possible and discussions between the judge and the 
parties on the procedure, claimants should not be surprised any longer by the 
court’s conclusions concerning the establishment of the facts. 
 
Second, the NCMP is focused on providing each case with the attention and 
conflict resolution technique that it deserves. In that respect, the NCMP for the 
administrative court procedure resembles the Informal Pro-active Approach 
Model for the objection procedure. The dispute between the parties is at the center 
of attention and this ideally leads to an amicable conflict resolution or to a court 
procedure that parties can agree upon. Judges do their best to implement theories 
from social psychology when applying procedure fairly from the users’ 
perspective, in the sense that the parties feel that they have been heard and have 
been taken seriously.24 
                                                            
23  A.T. Marseille, B.W.N. de Waard & P. Laskewitz, “De Nieuwe zaaksbehandeling in 
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Experiment in the Netherlands”, International Public Administration Review, XII 
(2í3), p. 47-61. 
24  A. Verburg & B. Schueler, “Procedural Justice in Dutch Administrative Court 
Proceedings”, Utrecht Law Review 2014 10(4), p. 56-72. 





After the adoption of Chapter 8 of the GALA, developments in legislation and 
practice have focused, on one hand, on efficiency and effectiveness, which could 
be interpreted as relating to Mashaw’s Bureaucratic Rationality Model. On the 
other hand, one could easily argue that the most recent practical development puts 
an emphasis on the Professional Treatment Model. With respect to the models 
used in the future to assess the forms of governance in the judiciary, one could 
say that emphasis, in the case of the recent developments, has been put on both 




In this chapter we have analyzed some of the developments in Dutch 
administrative adjudication over the past 20 years, in both the General 
Administrative Law Act (GALA) that was introduced in 1994 and its application 
in practice. Improving the adjudication of administrative law disputes is 
interconnected with the idea of public trust and, therefore, a concern for both 
public authorities in objection procedures and administrative courts in appeal 
procedures. Of course, it is also a relevant concern for the legislator. All strive 
towards legally sound decision-making and/or judgments. In their efforts, all try 
to find a balance between the need for efficient procedures, professional treatment 
and an outcome that is in accordance with public law and is perceived as fair. 
 
The analytical framework used to perform the analysis was chosen from the 
theory of administrative justice, specifically Mashaw’s theory of administrative 
justice. Although this theory was developed on the basis of research within the 
bureaucratic context of a government agency, the assumption upon which this 
chapter is built is that Mashaw’s model can be used to interpret the developments 
in administrative adjudication in the Netherlands. Some support for this 
assumption can be found in a recent study on the future forms of governance in 
the Dutch judiciary. We have endeavored to characterize the developments in 
decision-making by public authorities and administrative law courts in the context 
of both objection and appeal procedures by indicating the extent to which it 
corresponds with the ideal types decision-making that are distinguished by 
Mashaw: the Bureaucratic Rationality Model, the Professional Treatment Model, 
and the Moral Judgment Model.  
 
Using Mashaw’s analytical framework to interpret the developments that aim to 
improve the administration of justice in Dutch administrative law has led us to the 
following conclusions.  
 
With the introduction of the objection procedure in the GALA in 1994, the 
legislator was aiming to implement a decision-making procedure that would 
primarily focus on Mashaw’s Moral Judgment Model. The implementation of the 
provisions concerned with the objection procedure and the amendments brought 
to the procedure by the legislator first showed a trend towards decision-making in 





accordance with the Bureaucratic Rationality Model. However, in the past decade, 
a strong trend towards the Professional Treatment and Moral Judgment models 
can be seen in practice. This trend is mainly due to public authorities embracing 
the so-called Informal Pro-active Approach Model as an appropriate scheme to 
handle objections. Focusing on procedural justice and professional treatment, this 
Informal Pro-active Approach Model seems relevant to improve the admin-
istrative adjudication in the Netherlands and therefore public trust. 
 
When chapter 8 of the GALA on administrative procedural law was introduced in 
1994, the legislator envisaged a procedure for decision-making (pronouncing 
judgment) that – as was the case with the objection procedure – would be based 
primarily on Mashaw’s Moral Judgment Model. In the first decade, the 
implementation of the provisions which granted the courts discretion with respect 
to the establishment of the facts fell prey to the Bureaucratic Rationality Model. 
After years of applying the court-hearing-centered scheme of managing cases, the 
courts seemed to have become restrained and rather passive where the 
establishment of the facts was concerned. Also, much attention was drawn to 
wishes of final dispute resolution as both a service to the client (Professional 
Treatment) and as a measure to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
(Bureaucratic Rationality). However, in the past years, the courts have changed 
the way they manage their cases. The introduction of the New Case Management 
Procedure (NCMP) can be seen – as was the case with the Informal Pro-active 
Approach Model (IPAM) in the objection procedure – as a clear trend towards 
decision-making on the basis of both the Professional Treatment and the Moral 
Judgment models.  
 
In conclusion, we have found that both the IPAM and the NCMP are primarily 
focused on decision-making according to the Professional Treatment Model and 
the Moral Judgment Model. Practical implementation of provisions on 
administrative adjudication in the Netherlands seems to show a trend towards 
these two models. Differing form the Bureaucratic Rationality Model, we feel that 
these two models are the most likely to bring about and promote public trust in 




Participation Societies or Repressive Welfare 
States?  
 





In virtually the whole of Western society, a shift is taking place in the rationale of 
the welfare state. After the war this rationale was based on the principle of 
universal entitlement and the idea that social welfare would reduce inequality and 
foster solidarity. The focus was more on social rights than on duties. Since the 
nineteen nineties nearly all western states have introduced restrictive conditions. 
Only those willing to adjust themselves to the paid labour market have access to 
social security benefits and the individual (and civil society at large) is expected 
to take up more responsibilities in providing care and support for the needy. In 
the King of the Netherlands’ speech of 2014 this shift was famously referred to as 
the dawn of a “participation society”. Such a society is seen as a remedy for the 
Omni-present welfare state with its generous benefits and welfare dependency.   
 
There is also another way of looking at the changes that are taking place in our 
welfare systems. The changes produce a constant stream of paternalistic 
interventions and new detailed entitlement conditions which are paired with an 
increasingly harsh regime of sanctions to combat fraud and abuse. These are the 
dark undertones of new welfare policies. They attract the attention of critical 
commentators who refer to these policies in less positive terms: as a process of 
“creeping conditionality”,1  “the rise of a repressive welfare state”2 or as a way of 
“punishing the poor”.3 
 
It is tempting to perceive the participation society and the repressive welfare states 
as opposites. But these are concepts of a different order which are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Participation does not have to be voluntary. It can be 
mandatory under the threat of sanctions in the same way as, for example, 
education meant to enhance autonomy, is made obligatory for all minors. 
                                                            
*  Dr., Associate Professor (sociology of law) and connected to the Paul Scholten Centre 
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2  Gijsbert Vonk, “Repressive Welfare States: the Spiral of Obligations and Sanctions in 
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Conversely, a permissive welfare state does not have to be a recipe for more social 
inclusion, as it may lead to benefit dependency and a continuation of poverty. The 
pair: participation – repression rather signify opposite normative viewpoints, 
along categorical lines, of structural transformations within the welfare state.  
 
The purpose of our contribution is to discuss some prominent sociological and 
philosophical interpretations of the transformations that are taking place in the 
welfare state. The question we raise is: how would the recent trends in welfare 
reform be explained by leading scholars in the field of social science and 
philosophy and how do these explanations contribute to our understanding of 
contemporary discussions about participation and repression? 
 
Below, in Section 2 we will describe the object of this contribution by giving a 
brief overview of the relevant trends in social welfare reform.  Then, in Sections 
3 we critically discuss some prominent interpretations available in social theory 
and philosophy. In order to streamline the discussion, we have differentiated 
between the emancipationist school, with authors who concentrate on the 
improvement of the individual and the society (Giddens, and Habermas) and the 
disciplinary school, with authors who reflect upon the role of the state as 
determinant for controlling individual behaviour (Foucault, and Wacquant). 
However arbitrary and artificial this distinction may be, it helps us better 
understand the two faces of contemporary welfare reform of participation and 
repression. In Section 4 we will finish with a short deliberative conclusion and 
some considerations concerning the implications of the theoretical exercises for 
actual welfare policies. We conclude that whatever the differences between the 
grand scholars Foucault, Wacquant, Giddens and Habermas, all show a 
commitment to equality, and are resisting a moral technology in which individuals 
are pressed into disciplinary (economic-utilitarian) frameworks. As long as the 
welfare state is presented simply in terms of participation, activation and 
individual responsibility; headings which in fact are merely covering up systemic 
deficiencies, failing collective responsibilities and the material divide between the 
rich and the poor, all theories provide ammunition to reject these tendencies. We 
argue that, in order to use this ammunition, academics must translate the 
implications of social theories into terms of more concrete political devices, 
which, as a matter of fact, is exactly what some contemporary scholars are 
attempting to do.  
 
2. The birth of the participation society and the rise of the repressive 
welfare state 
  
Active welfare state 
The majority of Western welfare states have embraced the “active welfare state” 
as a normative objective, following the critical reception to unconditional 
entitlement to welfare which is, rightly or wrongly, often referred to as a typical 





characteristic of the post-war welfare paradigm. The ethos of these active welfare 
states is one in which an “active” individual must “take charge” of their own 
responsibilities and “participate” in work and in societal relations. Such ideology 
has now gained widespread support in social security systems across Europe and 
other Western states.  
 
In the book Reshaping Welfare States and Activation Regimes in Europe, Serrano 
Pascual4 identifies three trends which are fundamental features of the activation 
policies in eight European countries. In the first place, it is an individualised 
approach. In the author’s view, rather than creating appropriate political 
conditions for the fair distribution of wealth, the aim is to change individual 
behaviour, motivation and attitudes. These policies favour the increased 
individualisation of interventions (tailored, client centred services) and the greater 
involvement of the beneficiary. The second trend is the promotion of economic 
citizenship, which requires workers to be more or less unconditionally available 
to meet the demands of the market, but also expects them to show that they are 
available and willing to work. Work is increasingly seen as a civil duty and as 
such a perquisite of citizenship. The third trend is the “contractualisation” of the 
relation between the individual and the state, as a metaphor for a social regulation 
mechanism, which focusses on “reciprocity” and “deservingness”. 
Legal constituents of the active welfare state 
These three trends resonate in the legal and institutional changes which are visible 
in the social security systems. Firstly, the individualised approach is facilitated by 
discretionary powers which in many countries have become more widespread, 
often situated at the local level.5  The active welfare state is a “local, discretionary 
welfare state”.  
 
Secondly, the notion of economic citizenship translates itself into the introduction 
of a wide array of reintegration services made available to those out of work, 
varying from trainee schemes, employment subsidies and mandatory work 
programmes to job coaches and various forms of guidance and mediation. It is 
also visible in the surge in work obligations formulated by the legislature, 
cumulating in an obligation to accept unpaid work as a form of work rehabilitation 
or as a token of deservingness.6  
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Thirdly, the notion of contractualism is visible in the increased articulation of 
legal duties imposed on beneficiaries, often deeply interfering with personal 
choices and behaviour. Some countries actually use a “contract” as a vehicle to 
express these duties, but very often the legal status of such documents as true 
contracts under civil law is highly questionable.7 What follows when beneficiaries 
do not adhere to the legal duties imposed on them are benefit cuts and sanctions 
imposed under administrative or criminal law.8 
The birth of the participation society 
The active welfare state is neither a homogeneous notion, nor a static one. The 
latest financial and economic crisis has forced governments to make new choices 
and rethink the philosophy underlying welfare policies. In this process some of 
the constituents of the active welfare states develop their own flavour beyond the 
scope of the mere ideal of a better reintegration into the labour market. Thus, for 
example, in the UK and in the Netherlands governments actively promote the idea 
that citizens should engage more actively in meaningful horizontal relations in 
order to strengthen the fibre of the society which is then better capable to provide 
care and support. This ideology not only serves as a marketing tool for various 
budget cuts in welfare services as part of an austerity package in an ageing society, 
or as a legal argument not to provide individual care services (although it cannot 
be denied that is has this function). 9 It also promotes civil society as an alternative 
to the welfare state as whole. What is interesting is that notions such as the big 
society (UK) or the participation society (Netherlands) have left the bedrock of 
economic citizenship and have entered the domain of social citizenship. However, 
this social citizenship is not resulting from a bottom up movement of societal 
organisations, but rather one which is advocated in a top down manner as a 
government ideal.10   
The rise of the repressive welfare state  
The flipside of the coin of the participation society is the diminishing patience 
with persons who do not live up the highly voiced ideal of social and economic 
citizenship. These are the long term unemployed, the drop outs, the addicts, the 
recalcitrant youths, the petty offenders, stranded single mothers, the homeless and 
the tramps – in short, everybody who has taken a wrong turn in life or for whom 
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the bus did not stop. They bear the brunt of the increasingly harsh policies in 
response to inactivity or their “wrong behaviour”. These are policies which 
translate into an explosion of co-operation and information duties, a system of 
increasingly harsh sanctions and the growth of the bureaucratic machinery to 
engage in the implementation of these measures with wide powers to inspect, 
control and discipline the behaviour of individual citizens, stretching from the 
highest central strategic level to the most local administrative level.  
 
Repressive policies and practices have been reported in Australia, the US and in 
Europe (at least in Germany, France, the UK and the Scandinavian countries).11 
It is important to point out that this trend can only partly be seen as a consequence 
of the active welfare state. The arrows of the repressive welfare state are not only 
directed against economic inactivity but also point at those suspected of fraud and 
abusers of benefit rights and target disorderly and antisocial behaviour in a more 
general sense of the word. These policies are not necessarily based on empirical 
evidence or rational considerations. For example, the harsh Dutch Social Security 
Fraud Act of 2013 was a response to political pressure, not at all to increasing 
levels of fraud and abuse. In fact, the figures show that these have not increased 
at all.12 Also, the call for higher fines is made on the assumption of wrongful 
behaviour which, in practice, cannot always be upheld. Not all recipients who do 
not adhere to the rules are intentional fraudsters. There is a difference between 
intentionally and unintentionally violating obligations and the extent of error may 
far outreach the extent of fraud.13 Suspected fraud is not the same as the real extent 
of fraud.14 Some people just get confused by the rules or experience events in their 
lives that make them unfit to do what is expected of them.  
 
The repressive welfare state comes with collateral damage. The excessive 
obligations, harsh sanctions and far reaching local discretionary powers constitute 
a cocktail which some people who are unwilling or unable to adjust, can no longer 
swallow. This is something which has not yet been structurally researched, but 
there is increasing piecemeal evidence that such correlation exists.15  If the system 
loses faith in the citizens, the citizens may lose faith in the system, thus giving 
rise to a new underclass which does not rely on the formal safety net, but on 
subsidiary services such as night shelters, temporary aid, local allowances and 
services in kind, food banks and help from family and friends. The quality of this 
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sub minimal safety net is weak: legally badly articulated, exclusive and subject to 
erosion.16 Thus, the repressive welfare state may well be just one more factor 
underlying the growing incidence of extreme poverty and homelessness in 
Europe. This is then in itself part of a negative spiral as, reportedly, states respond 
to extreme poverty and homelessness in an equally repressive manner, 
introducing public order measures against sleeping rough and begging and 
banning the poor from the public domain.17  
 
3. Sociological and philosophical Interpretations of welfare policies  
 
Labels such as repression and participation figure prominently in sociological 
and philosophical accounts of transformations of the welfare state. What the 
analyses of Habermas, Giddens, Foucault and Wacquant share is that repression 
and participation are incorporated in a wider explanatory framework which 
includes structural transformations within various social domains. What divides 
their accounts is whether these transformations tend to have exclusively a 
disciplinary character or might also be seen as offering opportunities to citizens 
for emancipation. 
 
3.1    The disciplinary accounts of Foucault and Wacquant 
 
The combination of individual responsibility and paternalism which characterizes 
recent tendencies within the welfare state can be conceived in terms of discipline 
and power. This is the explanatory rationale which is characteristic for how 
Foucault, and those inspired by his thoughts, conceive the recent transformations 
of the welfare state. He summarizes these features in terms of biopolitics and 
governmentality.18 In this perspective, individual responsibility and autonomy are 
not seen as fortifying the liberty of individual citizens versus the state or other 
citizens, but as components of a new regulatory policy of risk management: A 
new supervisory strategy which regards free competition, free will and individual 
responsibility as socially beneficial factors, which contribute, for instance, to 
collective wealth.  
 
In the 17th and 18th centuries governmental authorities used severe physical 
sentences to articulate their power. From the nineteenth century power-relations 
are modelled according to the Panopticum-model, which means that the thoughts 
and conduct of people are moulded in hierarchical structures, which allow 
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governments to abstain from direct physical pressure. In those structures people 
are observed without themselves knowing when they are observed and by whom 
they are observed. They are submitted to a detailed set of standards of appropriate 
behaviour which they internalize. Doing well at school, at work or to be a 
deserving recipient of social assistance implies that you have to discipline yourself 
and comply with the standards prevailing in the distinct domain (normalisation). 
Autonomy, individual responsibility and subjectivity are the outcomes of these 
regulatory and disciplinary techniques which work through people rather than 
working on them. Foucault highlights the internalisation of the disciplinary effects 
of governing and administrative agencies as governmentality.19
 
The neo-liberal transformations of the welfare state of the most recent decades, 
are analysed in the later publications of Foucault. He sees the neo-liberal 
programme for the withdrawal of the state as a technique of government. What 
seems to be a transmission of power to markets and private actors is in fact a 
matter of indirect regulation. Neo-liberal models of government allow themselves 
to reduce intervention, not because they are less willing to control society, but 
because they can rely on self-control mechanisms.20 They develop indirect 
techniques for leading and controlling individuals, substituting individual 
responsibility for collective responsibility. Individuals are held responsible for 
social risks such as illness, unemployment, poverty, etc. Neo-liberalism expects 
that a responsible and moral individual will behave according to an economic-
utilitarian rationale. Responsibility in this context does not mean more than that 
individuals are expected to opt voluntarily for that behaviour that is beneficial to 
society.  
 
What may be questioned is whether Foucault’s analysis may help to explain the 
most recent repressive tendencies within the welfare state. It is difficult to discern 
in the introduction of a harsh regime of sanctions to combat minor abuses of 
recipients, the refined and mild disciplinary regime which is identified by 
Foucault. In that respect the observations of Wacquant, who explicitly addresses 
the more punitive character of current policies, may be more adequate. He 
explains the social transformations in terms of coping with legitimacy deficits of 
neo-liberal policies.21 Privatisation, deregulation, the withdrawal of the state from 
issues of fair redistribution and the massive accumulation of welfare at the top-
echelons of society have produced urgent problems of legitimacy. Governments 
try to remedy this through a combination of penal policies (incorporation of 
deviants in expanding incarceration institutions) and repressive welfare/work 
policies. It especially targets (black) minorities, those living in the marginalized 
poor neighbourhoods and single women with children. Large segments of the 
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21  Wacquant o.c. 2009.  
 





population are controlled and addressed in terms of lacking responsibility, to hide 
the structural shortcomings of neo-liberal policies.  
 
In the theoretical framework of Wacquant, the revitalization of responsibility is 
not just a sophisticated technique of social control, being opportune, as Foucault 
maintains, when the government may rely on the internalization of social norms 
instead of applying direct and repressive control.  According to Wacquant the 
penal welfare state plays a major role in covering up new hierarchies and the 
defects of neo-liberal politics.  
 
Although the analyses of Foucault and Wacquant diverge on several issues, they 
also express similar sensitivities. The revival of responsibility has to be explained 
in terms of the integration problems current societies are facing. In their analyses 
individual responsibility is not an area beyond the control of the governments, but 
rather a moral technology: an instrument of regulation and integration. We will 
turn now to the analyses of Giddens and Habermas in which there is still room for 
richer conceptions of responsibility. In their perception, transformations of the 
welfare state are not unequivocally strengthening the grip of governmental 
agencies on individual conduct. These may entail the promise of reflexivity and 
emancipation.   
 
3.2  The emancipist accounts of Giddens and Habermas  
 
In the discussions concerning the welfare state Anthony Giddens’ approach stands 
for the “Third Way”.22 It is an attempt to follow the path of neo-liberalism in the 
direction of deregulation and privatization, without losing the concern for 
equality. He still attributes a role to the state to correct the inequalities created by 
the unrestrained logic of the market, but at the same time he postulates that the 
classical welfare state has to be reshaped because it is not able to cope with 
problems of contemporary rapidly changing societies. The rise of new global 
markets, the permanent application of advanced technology, and the spreading of 
scientific knowledge across society, requires a flexibility which cannot be 
provided by the classical welfare state. It can no longer be the exclusive task of 
governments to protect citizens and guarantee them sufficient financial resources. 
People have to be activated to be flexible, to find jobs, to follow life-long training. 
 
In the classical welfare state, social justice was identified with ever higher levels 
of public spending, with more focus on social rights than responsibilities. But the 
adverse effect was that it created new dependency (on social benefits and those 
distributing these) and passivity. What social support should accomplish, 
according to Giddens, is social inclusion, and that has to be done either by 
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reducing the excluding effects of the market, or the excluding effects of the 
unconditional benefits and social support of the classical welfare state.23  
 
The destiny of contemporary citizens, according to Giddens, is that they are 
reflexive. Most of the problems and dangers in modern societies are risks 
fabricated by human beings, and not the outcome of fate.  We lean on scientific 
knowledge to monitor these problems and establish and transform social 
institutions to remedy these problems. This leads to an awareness that we do not 
merely shape our natural and social environment, but that our conduct is at the 
same time the product of our (fabricated) environment.  This circular relation 
between causes and effects can also be discerned within the domain of the welfare 
state.  
 
To a far greater extent than when the classical welfare state was established, we 
have become aware that risks are manufactured risks created by those institutions 
which were established to cope with the traditional risks of unemployment and 
industrial accidents. The establishment of institutions to remedy risks and 
compensate victims has created adverse effects. The risk of unemployment, for 
instance, will increase when guaranteed social benefits foster passivity, as moral 
hazards are the inevitable side-effect of insurance. We have to accommodate 
institutions and incorporate individual responsibility to remedy these adverse 
effects. This is reflected in Giddens’ postulate that there are “no rights, without 
responsibilities”.24 
 
Giddens sees the revival of individual responsibility also as the consequence of 
the increasing significance of science in daily life. Science has eroded 
traditionally embedded customs. It requires individual actors to consider 
permanently alternative courses of conduct, which have to be evaluated in terms 
of prevailing scientific expertise. They have to anticipate the risks and plan their 
life as responsible subjects.25 Today, responsible parents are expected to send their 
children to appropriate schools, which they have to select on the basis of objective 
assessments. Employees have to adapt their life style to reduce the chance of 
getting RSI, and a reduction in insurance premiums becomes available when the 
insured people adapt their life styles to statistically informed standards. Thus 
increasing knowledge of risks leads to an expansion of the moralisation of 
individual conduct. Behaviour that fails to incorporate risk-avoiding practices 
starts to be viewed as irresponsible. 
 
There are certainly traces of an economic utilitarian rationale in the programme 
of the Third Way. But it cannot be maintained that Giddens has no broader 
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aspirations; these may for instance be derived from how he conceives inclusion: 
“inclusion refers in its broadest sense to citizenship to the civil and political rights 
and obligations that all members of a society should have, not just formally, but 
as a reality of their lives. It also refers to opportunities and to involvement in 
public space”.26 In other words, inclusion and responsibility are not merely 
devices to increase economic welfare, but also refer to broader meanings of 
citizenship.  
 
Thus, for Giddens the revival of individual responsibility is an inevitable 
consequence of social and cultural transformation, which combines the need to 
reduce the adverse effects of dependency with the requirement to build new social 
bonds in a rapidly changing society. His endeavour certainly is to increase 
collective welfare by activating people, but his ambitions are broader and include 
empowerment and the strengthening of social bonds which may be the basis for a 
more robust autonomy.  
  
The dual perspective on recent transformations of the welfare state can also be 
recognized in Habermas’ approach. The principal aim of his critical social theory 
is to analyse social tendencies which reduce and which may enhance autonomy 
and democratic citizenship. In Habermas’ account the classical welfare state 
provided the necessary building blocks for autonomy and democratic citizenship 
by guaranteeing minimal financial resources and social rights. But once fully 
established in the eighties of last century it tended to frustrate these empowering 
effects by its bureaucratic administration which transformed citizens into 
dependent clients.  
 
Habermas’ ideas about the deficiencies of the classical welfare state have to be 
conceived against the background of his analysis of modernisation. He sees this 
as an imbalanced process in which instrumental rationality has become too 
prominent and is crowding out normative orientations. Habermas considers the 
growing intervention of instrumental rationality in our daily lives to be a 
consequence of the development of corporate capitalism, the welfare state and 
mass consumption. These trends submit widening areas of life to a generalising 
logic of strategical considerations, efficiency and control.27 Although the 
integration of society can to some extent be based on strategical forms of action 
(e.g. success on the market), societies are stable over the long run only if the social 
order is perceived as legitimate and in accordance with what is true, right and 
good. The social order must be rooted in consensual norms, which rely on the 
force of the better argument.28  
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Habermas regards the provisions of the welfare state as a necessary intervention 
to provide compensation for market failures to those in weaker market positions. 
These interventions have a dual impact: On the one hand they contribute to 
communicative action because they create the material conditions for equal 
participation. On the other hand, the legal regulations of the welfare state also 
have a tendency to impair communicative action. Its institutionalisation is based 
on the differentiation of complex systemic interdependencies and the 
predominance of an instrumental rationale, which subordinate individuals to the 
needs of the welfare state and promote strategic orientations. An illustration of 
this is that the bureaucratic and anonymous operation of the arrangements 
providing social support easily provoke strategic orientations of their clients.29 
 
To remedy the deficiencies of liberal and welfare state conceptions of law, 
Habermas suggests a third “proceduralist” model of law, which is fundamentally 
grounded on communicative rationality. This model evaluates the interventions 
of the welfare state in terms of enhancing citizens’ autonomy and political 
participation.30 Law has to provide the material preconditions for equal 
opportunities to realize freedom and autonomy. At the same time, welfare 
entitlements may not create dependencies and strategic orientations which 
undermine communicative orientations. This model is based on the proceduralist 
assumptions of the democratic process and of a public whose citizens actively 
participate in political argumentative deliberation and determine the standards 
according to which equals are treated equally and those who are unequal 
unequally. Characteristic for this paradigm of law is that it protects autonomy not 
only against interventions by the state, but also against economic and 
administrative powers. State intervention is allowed insofar as it contributes to the 
creation of a public of citizens who participate in political communication.31 
 
In sum, both the shortcomings of liberal and the welfare state paradigms are 
avoided in a model which articulates the communicative power of citizens, 
contributing to more legitimacy of the welfare state because citizens can perceive 
themselves as the authors of the law.32 Habermas perceives the welfare state in an 
emancipatory framework. The idea of a reflexive welfare state is based on the 
assumption that individual actors are not merely determined by the systemic 
matrix of governmental needs and requirements. The welfare state has to facilitate 
active citizenship and participation in political communication. 
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What Habermas shares with Giddens is that they both embrace a reconstruction 
of the welfare state which will enhance autonomy, individual responsibility and 
activate citizens. These emancipatory ambitions are based on a richer account of 
responsibility than Foucault’s and Wacquant’ accounts. They see the introduction 
of individual responsibility within the welfare state merely as a device to 
discipline individuals to bring their conduct and thoughts in line with collective 
aims.  
 
4.  Conclusion  
 
Grand sociological and philosophical theories offer challenging interpretations of 
changes within the welfare state. By placing these changes in the context of wider 
structural social transformation, they sharpen the attention to underlying political 
assumptions and rationales. To that extent, these analyses may be helpful for 
developing the contours of a welfare state architecture which is more in line with 
social ideals. However, those who are looking for concrete and practical 
indications of how to remedy its shortcomings might be disappointed. What is 
required when the welfare state has to contribute to emancipation and civic 
citizenship? However, it is not the aim of the aforementioned theorists to provide 
building blocks which may meet with the needs of those engaged in actual policy 
issues. This accounts especially for Foucault and Wacquant: they provide critical 
descriptive analyses of social transformations rather than developing guidelines 
for the reformation of the welfare state.33 The theoretical starting points of 
Giddens and Habermas are in this respect more promising: they are not satisfied 
with analysing social transformations merely from an objective descriptive stance. 
Both social theorists maintain that human agency, the intersubjective 
interpretations of actors, and their normative evaluations have to be included in 
social theory. Habermas criticises Foucault because he exclusively relies on 
observing systemic relations. Giddens’ engagement with practical political issues 
can be recognised in his commitment to formulating the outlines for a 
transformation of the welfare state, in the programme of the Third Way.   
 
Nonetheless, Habermas’ and Giddens’ ideas for a transformation of the welfare 
state are quite sketchy. Furthermore, one may criticize them for not appreciating 
the risks of a negative, coercive approach to activating policies and empowerment, 
thus turning a blind eye to the rise of the repressive welfare state. It is therefore 
important that social scientists attempt to translate the implications of grand social 
theories into concrete political devices which are devoid of such negative 
implications. It is not within the scope of this article to discuss those attempts. Let 
us just hint at some of these. 
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Eleveld has analysed the Life Cycle Arrangement in terms of Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality.34 She relies on his concept of self-care, a concept which 
figures in his later works and which indicates how, according to Foucault, 
individuals could avoid or resist the disciplinary mechanisms.35 Applied to 
concrete social policies it requires respect for the diversity of lifestyles and that 
individuals not be pressed into disciplinary categories such as those defined by an 
instrumentalist economic rationale.   
 
Bartholomew builds on Habermas’ ideas in his plea for dialogical social rights.36 
According to him, it requires the incorporation of dialogue and democratic 
participation in the administration of social benefits and social assistance. Social 
policies and regulations should be guided by procedural norms that allow all 
concerned to participate equally in decision making.  
 
Also in line with the enhancement of democratic citizenship and active 
participation are Bonvin’s and Farvaque’s suggestions.37 Following the ideas of 
Sen, which are to a large extent similar to Habermas’, they assert that 
responsibility should not be conceived as the outcome of public policies, but 
rather be seen as a starting point. An evaluation of responsibility should not be 
used as an instrument to decide about eligibility for cash benefits. Policy should 
aim to render recipients more active and responsible, to help them make good 
choices, rather than classify them with respect to their previous choices. In other 
words, responsibility has to be seen as a dynamic concept in which social 
responsibility, individual responsibility, regulation and autonomy, are combined. 
This policy requires an administration which is sensitive to individual 
circumstances and the specific social context.  
 
Lastly, we refer to those who continue to argue in favour of a universal basic 
income which releases the granting of government benefits of the chains of any 
conditions. This is a separate school to which has attracted may scholars with a 
humanist and libertarian ideas, from Thomas Paine in the 18th century to Philippe 
van Parijs in the present.   
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This balancing between the insights of grand theories merely indicates how 
difficult it is find definite answers. The concrete is loaded with normative 
ambiguities and more issues which have to be dealt with in terms of more or less, 
rather than categorical classifications. Better to regard the grand theories as 
providing sensitising concepts which indicate which paths should be rejected or 
in which direction viable answers may be found. Whatever the differences 
between Foucault, Wacquant, Giddens and Habermas, all show a commitment to 
equality and resist a moral technology in which individuals are pressed into 
disciplinary (economic-utilitarian) frameworks. As long as the transformations of 
the welfare state are presented simply in terms of participation, activation and 
individual responsibility – headings which in fact are merely covering up systemic 
deficiencies, failing collective responsibilities and the material divide between the 
rich and the poor – all theories provide ammunition to reject these tendencies.  
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Public Trust in the Regulatory Welfare State
Albertjan Tollenaar*
Social security is by definition a mixture of public and private legal mecha-
nisms. This mixture is expected to provide efficient, tailor-made solutions that 
still meet public interests like reliability, solidarity and equity. From the per-
spective of the individual citizen, this mixture of instruments might seem rather 
confusing. The central question of this contribution is therefore: what are the 
consequences of the mixture of public and private social security for public 
trust?  
To answer this question, a model of the concept of “public trust” must be con-
structed. This model contains four factors that might affect public trust. This 
model is then used to compare the social security for short-term disablement and 
for sick employees in Germany and the Netherlands. The comparison focuses on 
the distribution of responsibilities and the criteria determining incapacity for 
work. The comparison shows that both countries score differently on the identi-
fied factors, meaning that it is likely that there is a difference in public trust in 
both countries.  
1. Introduction
Social security is, by definition, a combination of public and private responsibil-
ities and regulation.1 Private social security is always the first safety net against 
the loss of income or poverty. Individual arrangements such as insurances of-
fered by assurance companies and solidarity within a family or within a social 
group (charities) provide a certain protection against social risks. The instru-
ments used are mainly contracts and gifts.2 Public social security is subsidiary 
and provides income security where private instruments fail. The instruments in 
the public sphere are mainly benefits based on statutory acts.3
*  Dr., Assistant Professor, University of Groningen, Faculty of Law, Department of 
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1 D. Pieters, Social security: an introduction to the basic principles, Kluwer Law Inter-
national: Alphen aan den Rijn 2006, p. 137. 
2 J.B. Williamson & F.C. Pampel, “Does the privatization of social security make sense 
for developing nations?” International Social Security Review 1998 (4), p. 3-31. 
3 A. Tollenaar, “Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective”, in: 
G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidiscipli-
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The last two decades show a new balance between these two types of instru-
ments. The modern approach is to use more private instruments to fulfil public 
goals. Public coverage decreases, leaving room for society and the market to 
provide a safety net. In the institutional framework one can observe the use of 
private instruments to create new incentives that are expected to enhance effi-
ciency.4 These instruments are often derived from the school of New Public 
Management, and result in the contracting out of social services, or in creating a 
market to enhance competition between public and private providers.5
This contribution aims to explore the actual pathology of this public-private 
mixture in two modern welfare states and uses the perspective of the citizen. The 
question that will be addressed is: what are the consequences of the new balance 
between public and private social security for public trust?  
The answer to this question first requires an exploration of the public and private 
regulation in the welfare state (section 2). Then a model for public trust will be 
developed (section 3). This model is meant as an instrument to assess the public-
private mixture of welfare states and to identify potential threats therein for pub-
lic trust. This model is then used to compare two systems of social security (sec-
tion 4 and 5). Section 6 contains the concluding remarks.  
2. The rise of the regulatory welfare state 
A brief history of the welfare state 
Western European welfare states show a similar history. In the era of industriali-
sation employees and employers founded mutual funds as a safety net against 
employment related risks like industrial accidents or unemployment. Poor relief 
was provided by churches.6 In that period the role of the state was subsidiary; it 
was first and foremost a private matter to organize social security. As Vonk & 
Katrougalos observe, the legal conceptualisation of social security emerged in 
the 19th century as an institutional answer to “the social question” that dealt with 
4 J. Pacolet & V. Coudron, “De Europese verzorgingsstaten: op zoek naar tendensen 
binnen een economische en sociaal-politieke samenhang” Belgisch Tijdschrift Voor 
Sociale Zekerheid 2006 (4), p. 495-586. 
5 M. Plantinga, J. de Ridder & A Corrà, “Choosing whether to buy or make: The con-
tracting out of employment reintegration services by Dutch municipalities” Social 
Policy and Administration 2011(45), p. 245–263; S. Greß, “Regulated competition in 
social health insurance: a three country comparison” International Social Security Re-
view 2006 (3), p. 27-47.; R. Böckman, “The Private Health Insurance: Demarketiza-
tion of a Welfare Market?”, German Policy Studies 2009 (1), p. 119-140. 
6 M. Dupeyroux, Ontwikkeling en tendenties van de stelsels van de sociale zekerheid 
der lidstaten van de Europese Gemeenschappen en Groot-Brittannië, EGKS Luxem-
burg 1966. 
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the position of the powerful working class and the fear of socialist revolution.7
This did not result in entitlements immediately, but merely in a facilitative role 
of the state to enable societal institutions, like churches and trade unions, to pro-
vide social security.  
The role of the state increased as a response to failure of these private institu-
tions. Churches only provided security for their members leaving large groups of 
paupers unprotected. The mutual funds went bankrupt in case of an incident, or 
were not reliable due to mismanagement.8 These apparent failures justified state 
interference. The Beveridge reports (1942) form an important milestone in this 
development. The state was given the responsibility for insurance against loss of 
income or poverty. Social security slowly transformed in a universal human 
right with the institutional framework of the International Labour Organisation 
and the Declaration of Philadelphia in 1944.  
In this public welfare state, benefits and provisions were mainly based on acts 
and statutes. Social assistance became a right instead of a gift and anonymous 
public bureaucracies slowly crowded out the civil society organisations making 
these groups less and less relevant. In the words of Levi-Faur, one could call this 
a phase of nationalisation.9
The countermove emerged in the economic crisis of the last quarter of the 20th
century. Public social security caused moral hazards: employers did not feel an 
incentive to invest in improving working conditions that might lower the risk of 
incidental accidents, and employees felt an incentive to claim for benefits.10
Public bureaucracies lacked the capacity to verify claims resulting in an even 
further abuse of social schemes.11
The burst of the public welfare state seemed inevitable. In many Western Euro-
pean states, the solution was found in two mechanisms. On the one side the reac-
7 G.J. Vonk & G. Katrougalos, “The public interest and the welfare state: a legal ap-
proach”, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A 
multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Intersen-
tia: Antwerp 2010, p. 69.  
8 P. Taylor-Gooby, New Risks, New Welfare. The transformation of the European Wel-
fare State, Oxford University Press: Oxford 2004, p. 2. 
9 D. Levi-Faur, “The odyssey of the regulatory state. Episode one: the rescue of the 
welfare state” Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & Governance, Working paper No 39. 
2011, p. 22. 
10 A. Nentjes & E. Woerdman, “Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social secu-
rity: an economic perspective”, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as 
a public interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory 
welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010; C.A de Kam & F. Nypels, Afscheid van het 
paradijs: de herziening van de sociale zekerheid, Amsterdam: Contact 1984. 
11 P. Spicker, How social security works. An introduction to benefits in Britain, Bristol: 
The Policy Press 2011, p. 245. 
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tion was austerity: less public coverage and more repression for those relying on 
social security. The decrease of public coverage also meant a reshuffle of the 
rights and duties of employers and employees in labour law, creating new incen-
tives that would prevent using public means.12
The second response was that of using “market type mechanisms” meant as a 
tool to organize public coverage more efficiently.13 This development fits the 
school of New Public Management. Contracting out services and enhancing 
competition were thought to force agencies to act more efficiently. 14  What 
emerged is what one could call the “regulatory welfare state”.15
Public interests in the regulatory welfare state  
To explore the regulatory welfare state, it is necessary to understand how public 
and private responsibilities are balanced. The regulatory welfare state is based 
on the notion that the state is responsible for the provision of social security for 
as far as public interests are involved.16 Public interests are those interests that 
go beyond the individual interests. In the hypothetical situation the market of 
supply and demand can serve these interests. Transactions will emerge, enlarg-
ing the welfare of the parties involved.17
The history of the welfare states shows that private transactions are unable to 
provide sufficient security for all, causing the state to interfere. The first public 
interest is therefore that social security has to provide protection; a decent stand-
12 A. Tollenaar, “Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective”, in: 
G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidiscipli-
nary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010. 
13 P. Taylor-Gooby, New Risks, New Welfare. The transformation of the European Wel-
fare State, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2004, p. 3; J. de Ridder, “Instrumentalisa-
tion of public values in social security: a public administration perspective”, in: 
G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidiscipli-
nary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010.  
14 R. Böckman, “The Private Health Insurance: Demarketization of a Welfare Market?”, 
German Policy Studies 2009 (1), p. 119. 
15 G.J. Vonk, “Social Security as a Public Interest, a Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the 
Foundations of the Regulatory Welfare state”, European Journal of Social Security 
2010 (1), p. 2-16. 
16 B. Bozeman, Public values and public interest. Counterbalancing economic individu-
alism,  Washington:  Georgetown  University  Press  2007;  T.B.  Jørgensen  & 
B. Bozeman, “Public Values: An Inventory” Administration & Society 2007 (39), p. 
354-381. 
17 A. Nentjes & E. Woerdman, “Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social secu-
rity: an economic perspective”, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as 
a public interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory 
welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010. 
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ard of living. This notion of protection is supported with two other public inter-
ests: participation and reliability. Public welfare supports its beneficiaries to 
participate, to earn an income and become independent from public support. In 
the early days of the public interference this notion was underlined in dogmatic 
pamphlets, such as the Rerum Novarum, in which the Catholic Church empha-
sised that the “man in the household” should be enabled to take his responsibil-
ity for his family. Reliability is the other side of the coin: if the citizen has a val-
id claim on support, it is important that this claim can be realized. This calls for 
specific regulation ensuring the strength of the supporting mechanisms, like the 
cover ratio of the insurance fund.18
These public interests form the kernel of the welfare state but do not prescribe 
the organisation of social security.19 After all: protection, participation and relia-
bility can be organized in either a public or a private environment, using public 
or private instruments. There are nevertheless two major restrictions that are 
constitutional or intrinsic to social security. One is the restriction that the wel-
fare state has to aim for solidarity within a society. In Germany this is seen in 
article 20 of the constitution, which states that the Republic of Germany is a so-
cial federal state - this includes solidarity.20 A second restriction is that it has to 
ensure equality; equal treatment of everyone in similar circumstances.  
The last two public interests which guide the discussions on the regulatory wel-
fare state are related to the institutional framework. The interests that come to 
mind are principles related to the rule of law and of good governance. The rule 
of law has a legal connotation and contains the general principle that public bod-
ies have to apply and are restricted by legislation. Good governance has a wider 
meaning, and includes principles like transparency, effective, and efficient adju-
dication.21
18 M.H.D. van Leeuwen, “Trade Unions and the Provision of Welfare in the Nether-
lands, 1910-1960” The Economic History Review 1997 (50), p. 764-791; A. Knotter, 
B. Altena & D. Damsma, Labour, social policy and the welfare state, Amsterdam: 
Stichting beheer IIS 1997.  
19 G.J. Vonk, “Social Security as a Public Interest: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the 
Foundations of the Regulatory Welfare State”, European Journal of Social Security
2010(12); G Esping-Andersen, “After the Golden Age? Welfare dilemmas in a global 
economy”, in: G Esping-Andersen (ed), Welfare states in transition: national adapta-
tions in global economies, Thousand Oaks: SAGE 1996, p. 1-30. 
20 S. Muckel, Sozialrecht, München: C.H. Beck 2009, p. 28. 
21 J. Graham, B. Amos & T. Plumptre, Good Governance in the 21st Century, Ottawa: 
Institute on Governance 2003, p. 3; D. Levi-Faur, “The odyssey of the regulatory 
state. Episode one: the rescue of the welfare state” Jerusalem Papers in Regulation & 
Governance, Working paper No 39. 2011, p. 22. 
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Regulatory welfare state: a tense relation between public and private regulation 
The public interests of social security are flexible with regard to the design of 
the welfare state. One could think of statutory acts providing agencies with cer-
tain competences.22 This mode of realising public interests in the welfare state is 
likely to provide legal certainty and equality in transparent legal procedures. The 
disadvantages of public regulation are also known: bureaucracies seem to lack 
the capabilities to respond to the individual needs of the citizens. Esping-
Andersen furthermore points out the fact that public protection is often “frozen” 
in a past socio-economic order that no longer obtains nor is capable of respond-
ing to new risks.23
An alternative mode of regulation is that of privatising and market type mecha-
nisms. Contracting out with private actors and enlarging the role of private par-
ties are then the instruments used.24 These instruments have their known threats 
as well, known as market failures.25 Adverse selection, meaning that those with 
a higher risk of incapacity to work will not find access to the labour market, 
might harm interests like solidarity and equality.  
As a concluding remark one could say that public regulation will give reason for 
more private (market type) instruments and private regulation will cause a pub-
lic correction. This forms the expected pathology of the regulatory welfare state: 
a continuous struggle between two opposite spheres, resulting in an even more 
complex regulatory reality. 
3. A model of public trust  
The question is then how the citizen sees this complex regulatory reality. In oth-
er words, how does the regulatory welfare state affect public trust? Public trust 
is seen as trust of the citizen (the trustee) in the regulatory system and the actors 
within that system that have to make decisions and provide social security. In 
22 A. Tollenaar, “Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective”, in: 
G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public interest: A multidiscipli-
nary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 
2010. 
23 G Esping-Andersen, “After the Golden Age? Welfare dilemmas in a global econo-
my”, in: G Esping-Andersen (ed), Welfare states in transition: national adaptations in 
global economies, Thousand Oaks: SAGE 1996, p. 1-30. 
24 J. de Ridder, “Instrumentalisation of public values in social security: a public admin-
istration perspective”, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as a public 
interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory welfare 
state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010. 
25 C.N. Teulings, A.L. Bovenberg & H.P. van Dalen, De Calculus van het publieke be-
lang, The Hague: Ministry for Economic Affairs 2003. 
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the literature on public trust, one can distinguish four factors that are relevant to 
public trust.  
The first factor is that of predictability. This is the approach Luhmann uses.26
Everyone has expectations or beliefs on the way the government protects rights. 
Harming these expectations will negatively affect public trust. From this per-
spective one could derive the expectation that transparent norms on the exact 
entitlements may play an important role for public trust. After all, expectations 
and beliefs are mainly based on clear cut rules and regulations on the substantive 
rights and obligations.27
Clear rules and regulations alone are not sufficient for public trust. It is also a 
matter of institutionalised capability to realise these rights. This refers to what 
Craig Thomas (1998) calls “fiduciary trust”.28 Fiduciary trust refers to the confi-
dence of the trustee that his rights and individual position is fully respected and 
taken into account. Fiduciary trust is a characteristic of individual relationships. 
For fiduciary trust, it is important that the actors in this relationship are aware of 
each other’s competences and responsibilities. Fiduciary trust furthermore re-
quires that there is a corrective mechanism if the other party in the relationship 
does not respect the interests of the trustee.29 From this perspective two factors 
might play a role for public trust. Firstly, the extent to which the trusted actor 
has clear responsibilities. This would imply that the incentives and agenda have 
to be transparent. The second factor deals with the availability and complexity 
of procedures to correct the trusted actor.  
The corrective mechanisms refer to a third perspective on trust: that of institu-
tional-based trust. Some institutions enjoy a trust that is seldom questioned.30
One may think of legal procedures or democratic decision-making. Institutions 
like these have a history-based positive effect on public trust. This becomes vis-
ible when the design of an institution is changed. When for example access in a 
legal procedure is made more difficult, this potentially has a negative effect on 
public trust. This results in the fourth factor of public trust: the extent to which 
procedures differ from trusted institutions like democratic procedures or known 
legal procedures.  
26 N. Luhmann, Trust and power, Chichester: Wiley 1979.  
27 R. Bachmann, Trust and power as means of co-ordinating the internal relations of the 
organization – a conceptual framework, Groningen: University of Groningen 2002. 
28 Craig W. Thomas, “Maintaining and Restoring public trust in Government agencies 
and their employees”, Administration & Society 1998 (30), p. 166-193. 
29 Craig W. Thomas, “Maintaining and Restoring public trust in Government agencies 
and their employees”, Administration & Society 1998 (30), p. 166-193. 
30 Craig W. Thomas, “Maintaining and Restoring public trust in Government agencies 
and their employees”, Administration & Society 1998 (30), p. 166-193. 
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The four identified factors form a descriptive model of public trust. The clarity 
of rules, the clarity of responsibilities, the availability of corrective mechanisms 
and the quality of these procedures are factors that potentially affect public trust.  
The next step is to “fill” this model: what are the exact variables that are meant 
with clarity of rules, responsibilities, corrective mechanisms and procedures? To 
answer this question, systems of social security in two countries have been com-
pared: Germany and the Netherlands. Both countries have a relatively high trust 
in the government and in the legal system,31 and are comparable in the sense that 
both countries are mainly occupational welfare states, meaning that the coverage 
of social security aims to protect the income of the employee.32
The major distinction between the Netherlands and Germany is that in Dutch 
legislation the cause of sickness or disability is irrelevant and the coverage is 
extended to the so-called “risque social” instead of only the “risque professio-
nel”. In German law the cause of sickness or disability is a relevant factor for the 
type and amount of benefits. In Germany benefits are not only meant as an in-
come protection, but also as a compensation of damages.33 This distinction is 
relevant to understand the differences between the two states.  
The comparison focuses on two elements of income security for employees who 
report illness or who become disabled. Particularly in this part of social security, 
one might find a mixture of public and private instruments, since it is founded 
on a private relationship between employer and employee. The two elements 
that are compared are firstly the distribution of responsibilities between the em-
ployer and the government (section 4) and secondly the assessment of medical 
facts (section 5).  
4. Continued payment of salary and sickness benefits
What happens if the employee reports in sick? Is there an entitlement to contin-
ued payment of salary or a (public) benefits? The regulatory framework often 
31 According to the Eurobarometer 50% of the citizens in The Netherlands and 48% of 
the citizens in Germany answered that they “tend to trust the national government”, 
based on a survey in 2014. To compare: in Greece 16% tend to trust the government 
and in Belgium 43%. Trust in the legal system is 60% in Germany and 65% in the 
Netherlands (based on a survey in 2010). In the European Social Survey on 2012 
these percentages are even higher: 70% for Germany and 80% for the Netherlands.  
32 G. Bonoli, “Classifying Welfare States: a Two-dimension approach” Journal of Social 
Policy 1997 (26), p. 351-372; E. Immergut, “Between state and market: sickness ben-
efit and social control”, in: M. Rein & L. Rainwater (eds), Public/private interplay in 
social protection: A comparative study, N.Y.: Sharpe 1986, p. 57-98. 
33 S. Klosse, Menselijke schade: vergoeden of herstellen?, Antwerp: Maklu 1989. 
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contains a combination of both. The result is a shared responsibility of both the 
state and the employer.34
Germany
The German Civil Code (Burgerliches Gesetzbuch, BGB) contains the principle 
“no work, no pay”. This principle has an exception in article 326 II: if the em-
ployee is unable to work due to sickness, the employer is obliged to continue 
paying the wages for the first six weeks.35 This right to continued payment of 
wages is regulated in the Entgeltfortzahlunggesetz. After six weeks of sickness 
the employee is entitled to the (public) statutory health insurance funds (Kran-
kenkassen). 
The main goal of the Entgeltfortzahlunggesetz is to consolidate employees’ in-
come security when unable to work due to sickness. The act transfers the re-
sponsibility and liability for employees’ income security to their employer. The 
cause of sickness is not relevant.36 Only if the sickness is caused by an accident 
and a third party can be held liable for said accident, the employer has a right of 
recourse against the third party. The employee has to cooperate and to support 
the execution of this right.  
The responsibility for continued payment during sickness forms a serious finan-
cial risk for employers with few employees. To cover this risk there is a public 
compensation scheme for these small companies. For employers with fewer than 
30 employees the Aufwendungsausgleichgesetz (AAG) provides the opportunity 
to reclaim 80% to 100% of the Entgeltfortzahlung at the public Krankenkasse.
The Entgeltfortzahlung is an important transfer of income security of employees 
to the private sphere. The importance is underlined by the fact that about 90% of 
the income for sick and disabled employees rests upon the employers in the 
form of Entgeltfortzahlung. The remaining, 10% of the costs of income security 
is based on the public Krankenversicherung.37
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, employees who are unable to work due to sickness, are enti-
tled to sickness benefits, under the rules laid down in the sickness benefit act 
34 A. Nentjes & E. Woerdman, “Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social secu-
rity: an economic perspective”, in: G.J. Vonk & A. Tollenaar (eds), Social security as 
a public interest: A multidisciplinary inquiry into the foundations of the regulatory 
welfare state, Antwerp: Intersentia 2010. 
35 A. Junker, Grundkurs Arbeitsrecht, München: Beck 2009, p. 528. 
36 J Schmitt, Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz und Aufwendungsausgleichgesetz, München: 
Beck 2007, p. 2. 
37 A. Junker, Grundkurs Arbeitsrecht, München: Beck 2009, p. 155. 
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(Ziektewet, ZW). Under this act, the entitlement to sickness benefits only exists 
if there is no right to payment of wages (art. 29 ZW). Under the Civil Code 
(Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW) the employee has the right to continued payment of 
70% of the last earned wages for the first two years (104 weeks) of sickness (art. 
7:629 BW). In practice this percentage is often higher, depending on the agree-
ments with trade unions in the collective labour agreements. In any case, the 
public safety net of the Ziektewet functions only as a safety net in case the em-
ployer is incapable of continuing to pay wages (for example due to bankruptcy).  
It goes without saying that the obligation to continue paying wages form a huge 
risk for the employer. The employer can decide to take out insurance for this 
risk with a private insurance company. There is no public interference with this 
insurance, except for the fiscal incentive that the employer can deduct the con-
tributions from corporate taxes. 
The transfer of the risk of loss of income to the employer was initially believed 
to provide an incentive for the employer to invest in improving working condi-
tions and reducing absenteeism.38 The fact that the employer has to pay the bill 
was expected to form an incentive for the employer to carefully monitor the rea-
sons for sickness and to ensure a quick reintegration of the employee. In addi-
tion, the legislation also contains an entitlement for the employee that the em-
ployer would take re-integrative measures to enable him to work. An employee 
can enforce this right in civil law proceedings.  
Comparison 
The obligation of continued payment of wages during sickness can serve many 
goals. One goal might be maintaining income security for the employee, which 
is, especially in the German situation, a relevant factor where the employer has 
to pay full salary for the first six weeks. Another goal is to lower the bureaucrat-
ic costs of assessing the claim of the sick employee. Since the employer is re-
sponsible, the claim has to be settled in the private relations between employee 
and employer first.  
The obligation to continue paying wages in the Netherlands for two years forms 
an incentive for the employer to prevent sickness or disability. The private in-
surance market that covers this risk will even be stricter in enforcing these ef-
forts, for example, in the form of higher premiums if the employer has many 
sick employees.  
What does this comparison show concerning the model of public trust? The enti-
tlements as such are rather clear: in Germany full salary during six weeks fol-
38 Explanatory Memorandum of the Wet Terugdringing Ziekteverzuim (Parliamentary 
Papers II, 1992-1993, 22899, nr. 3), p. 19. 
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lowed by Krankengeld, based on statutory acts. In the Netherlands the entitle-
ment is at least 70% of the earned income, but this may be more depending on 
the collective labour agreement. It is however especially less clear regarding the 
right to re-integration what the entitlements of employees are. For this part the 
employer might feel an incentive to invest in changing working circumstances to 
enable the sick employee to work again, but the employer might also calculate 
costs and conclude that these investments are unprofitable.  
In Germany the smaller companies do not feel the incentive that is related to the 
Entgeltfortzahlung. For this category the responsibilities are not clear. For larger 
companies it is just as in the Netherlands: the employer is fully responsible for 
income security for the employee, insofar as the employer has a clear responsi-
bility to do what it takes to provide income security.  
With regard to corrective mechanisms, the shared responsibility during the first 
phase of sickness causes in both countries high thresholds, since the rights have 
to be enforced using ordinary court procedures. In Germany this ends after six 
weeks; in the Netherlands the employee has to enforce their rights in ordinary 
court procedures during the first two years of sickness.  
Finally, the question whether or not the private part of social security crowds out 
trusted institutions remains. In Germany the private part is rather limited and the 
roles of the employer and Krankenkasse are rather clear. For the employee this 
means that it is rather easy, or at least clear, as to how he or she has to enforce 
the entitlements. Compared to this, the Dutch situation is a more serious threat 
to public trust, since an employee is in a mixed situation with the employer. An 
employer might hire company doctors or insurance companies to assess on his 
behalf. For the employee this results in a rather unclear situation of who he has 
to address and which procedures he then can use. This design uses institutions 
that do not have a trusted reputation. It is actually on the contrary; private law 
procedures are often associated with an abuse of powers. The employee is a one-
shotter who has to enforce his rights in a procedure against a repeat-player (the 
insurance company hired by the employer) while the procedure as such does not 
compensate this inequality.39
The next table summarizes the comparison on the four factors of public trust 
related to the first phase of continued payment of salary and sickness benefits.  
39 Marc Galanter, “Why the “haves” come out ahead: speculations on the limits of legal 
change”, Law and Society Review 1974 (1), p. 165-230. 
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Table 1: Public trust in the first phase of sickness 
 Germany The Netherlands 
Clear rules Yes: full salary during 
six weeks 
Partly: salary depends 
on collective labour 
agreement, re-
integration is not 
regulated
Clear responsibilities Partly: small employers 
receive compensation 
and don’t feel an incen-
tive 
Yes: for the first two 





dures against the em-
ployer, administrative 
procedures after six 
No: high thresholds 
since corrective 
mechanisms are part of 
labour law 
Trusted institutions Yes: the employee has 
to deal with his em-
ployer and the public 
agencies  




cedures are not clear  
5. Assessing incapability of work
Entitlements to continued payment of wages or to public benefits are based on 
the question of whether or not the employee is “sick” and “incapable of work”. 
These definitions need an assessment of medical facts by medical professionals. 
In this medical assessment, various public and private instruments seem rele-
vant, such as the (contractual) relation between the medical professional and the 
employer or employee, and the rules applied when assessing medical facts.  
Germany
The entitlement to Entgeltfortzahlung depends on “incapacity for work” (ar-
beitsunfähigkeit) that is caused by “sickness”. When an employee reports sick-
ness he is obliged to inform his employer of the expected length of his sickness 
(§ 5 EntgFG). If the sickness will be longer than three days, the employee has to 
provide a medical notice, written by a doctor that states the expected duration of 
the sickness.40
Any doctor can write medical notices. The only requirement is that the doctor is 
certified. When writing a medical notice, the doctor has to apply the guidelines 
40 W. Hunold, Krankheit des Arbeitnehmers, Freiburg: Rudolf Haufe 1994, p. 112; 
H. Vogelsang, Entgeltfortzahlung, München: C.H. Beck, 2003, p. 26. 
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laid down by the Gemeinsame Bundesausschuss, a professional association of 
doctors and medical practitioners. The authority to formulate these guidelines is 
laid down in § 92 of book 5 the social security act. The guidelines define inca-
pacity for work as the situation where the sickness makes it impossible for the 
employee to do the job, or will worsen when doing the job.41 The rules state that 
the doctor has to ask about the details of the job, the demands of the job and has 
to assess whether or not there is a causal relationship between the sickness and 
performing the job activities.42 Furthermore, these rules state that the medical 
notice has to be based on a “medical assessment” (§ 4 paragraph, 1 Richtlinien).
If a doctor does not obey the rules laid down in the guidelines, he runs the risk 
of being fined.43
If the employee fails to provide a medical notice the employer may refuse fur-
ther payment (§ 7 EntgFG). If the employer doubts the quality of the medical 
notice, the employer has the option of informing the medical service of the statu-
tory health insurances (Krankenkassen). This medical service then has to check 
whether or not the medical assessment by the doctor meets the criteria demand-
ed (§ 275 Abs. 1 Nr. b SGB V).  
The Netherlands 
In the Netherlands incapability of work due to sickness occurs when the em-
ployee is physically not able to work, or work will harm his health. Once the 
employee reports ill, it is the employer who has to agree that the employee is 
truly “too ill to work”. For this assessment the employer might ask the company 
doctor for advice. The Working Conditions Act obliges employers to contract a 
company doctor or company advisor, to supervise the company policy on absen-
teeism. This company doctor has access to all (medical) information necessary, 
including medical files. He can even call in the employee for a medical assess-
ment. With regard to the company doctor the only requirement is that these pro-
fessionals have a certificate (art. 14 Working Conditions Act). However, which 
rules they apply and how they assess whether or not the employee is truly ill and 
incapable for work, is not made explicit. The rules that are applied are often pro-
fessional protocols, meant as general standards of the most common causes of 
incapability to work. These protocols are not binding nor provide entitlements to 
the employee. 
If an employee does not cooperate with the medical assessment, or if the com-
pany doctor judges that the employee is not incapable of doing his job, the em-
41 H. Vogelsang, Entgeltfortzahlung, München: C.H. Beck 2003, p. 28. 
42 See: § 2, par. 5 Richtlinien über die Beurteilung der Arbeitsunfähigkeit und die 
Maßnahmen zur stufenweisen Wiedereingliederung, of the Gemeinsame Bundesaus-
schuss 01.12.2003 BAnz. Nr. 61 (S. 6501) vom, 27.03.2004.  
43 W. Hunold, Krankheit des Arbeitnehmers, Freiburg: Rudolf Haufe 1994, p. 102. 
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ployer can impose a “pay freeze”, meaning that the employee does not receive 
wages until he cooperates or returns to his job. If the employer imposes a “pay 
freeze”, the employee has to start action for recovering the wages, stating that he 
is truly ill and incapable of work. In this procedure the employee must first ap-
ply for a so-called “expert review” by a medical advisor appointed by the em-
ployee insurance agency, the public body that is responsible for the payment of 
invalidity benefits (art. 7:629a BW). This expert review has high practical value. 
If the medical advisor judges that the employee is incapable of work due to 
sickness, the employee has a stronger position in the legal procedure to claim his 
wages. On the other hand, if the medical advisor concludes that the employee is 
not incapable of work due to sickness, the position of the employee in the pro-
cedure for recovering wages is very weak. 
Dutch law does not contain specific requirements with regard to the authority to 
assess whether or not the employee is incapable of work. There are, for example, 
no specific requirements with regard to the expert appointed by the employee 
insurance agency who gives the “expert review”. It is further unclear where the 
employee can address complaints regarding this expert review, since this review 
is not regarded a “decision” in the meaning of the General Administrative Law 
Act and is therefore immune for judicial review.44
Comparison 
The assessment of medical facts is mainly publicly regulated in Germany, 
whereas in the Netherlands it is primarily a private matter between employee 
and employer. The medical notice in Germany is provided by general practition-
ers who act more or less as public agents. In the Netherlands the question of 
whether or not the employee is truly incapable for work is first of all a private 
dispute between employee and employer. The employee has to cooperate if the 
employer wishes to investigate the grounds of absenteeism and the employee 
runs the risk of losing wages due to the pay freeze. The “expert review” can be 
seen as an attempt to compensate this unequal relationship. It is debatable 
whether or not this requirement is truly a support for the employee. After all, 
with a negative expert review it becomes quite impossible to plead the case that 
the employee is really ill.  
Seen from a perspective of public trust it is interesting to notice that the exact 
rules on who is incapable for work and who not is regulated quite differently in 
the Netherlands and Germany. In the Netherlands, it is up to the professional 
standards of the company doctor and the doctor of the public agency to assess 
the incapability to work. The protocols they use are not relevant in court proce-
dures. The procedures used when developing these protocols are not regulated. 
44 See: A.M.P. Rijpkema, Toegang tot het recht bij ziekte en arbeidsongeschiktheid,
Deventer: Kluwer 2013. 
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Compared to this, the German Richtlinien seem to be the result of delegated 
rule-making. The legal basis is made explicit, giving a competence to promul-
gate these rules. In practice these rules will play a more important role since the 
assessment of incapability for work by the general practitioner has to be based 
on these rules.  
Regarding the responsibilities, the picture is mixed as well. In Germany it is 
striking that the general practitioner can assess whether or not his client is inca-
pable for work. For this assessment the general practitioner does not have to 
know anything about the actual working situation and whether or not the em-
ployer would be able to offer a different kind of work. In that sense the respon-
sibilities are clearly demarcated. In the Netherlands, the responsibilities are con-
centrated with the employer; he has to agree on the incapability to work and can 
ask a company doctor for advice. This may provide the opportunity to make tai-
lor-made decisions, meaning that the employer would be able to offer work that 
suits the specific handicaps that the employee faces.  
The other side of the coin is that in this system the corrective mechanisms are 
not easy to use. In case of a dispute the procedure is quite burdensome for the 
employee. The expert review by the public agency provides only limited sup-
port, since this review cannot be questioned. Compared to this, the German sys-
tem has clear corrective mechanisms; correspondingly also for an employer who 
thinks that the medical notice is inadequate.  
The mixture of procedures in the Netherlands is also relevant for the last factor 
of trusted institutions. The expert review is an intervention meant to strengthen 
the position of the employee. This already shows that the original design, in 
which the employee and employer have to solve their issues together, has its 
problems and does not promote public trust. The expert review can be seen as an 
attempt to solve this issue, but it is then striking that this review cannot be ques-
tioned in administrative procedures. Compared to this, the German system con-
tains administrative procedures that normally do promote public trust.  
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The next table contains a summary of this analysis.  
Table 2: Public trust when assessing sickness 
 Germany The Netherlands 
Clear rules Yes: guidelines promul-
gated by the medical 
association  
No: medical protocols 
with a vague status 
Clear responsibilities Yes: general practitioner 
has to assess incapability 
for work 
No: the employer is 
fully responsible for 
agreeing on 
incapability for work. 
Corrective mechanisms Yes: Krankenkassen can 
intervene 
Partly: there is a proce-
dure (expert review) 
but the employee can-
not fully challenge the 
assessments of this 
reviewer
Trusted institutions Yes: administrative 
court procedures 
No: mixed procedures, 
with expert review that 
cannot be challenged 
6. Concluding remarks 
What are the consequences of mixed public and private social security for public 
trust? With the observation that social security contains more and more private 
elements, this question seems very relevant. Public trust is described as a de-
pendent variable in a model with four factors. These factors are clear rules and 
norms on substantive rights and obligations, clearly demarcated responsibilities, 
the availability of corrective mechanisms, and the use of institutions that have a 
trusted reputation. In a regulatory welfare state, it is likely that these factors are 
affected and therefore that public trust is endangered.  
The comparison of the actual regulation of the social security in the Netherlands 
and Germany show many differences in the balance between public and private 
social security. The general tendency is that the public regulation is retreating, 
leaving room for private initiatives. With regard to the substantive rights on con-
tinued payment of salary when reporting sick, the employee in the Netherlands 
is depending on vague standards and protocols that do not have a legal effect. 
On the other hand, in the Dutch situation the employee and employer are able to 
work out solutions together and finding work that is still feasible with the expe-
rienced physical obstacles. This is aimed at preventing long-term absenteeism.  
In this regard the German design is more clear, with clear distinctions between 
public and private responsibilities and clear rules on who is incapable for work 
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and who is not. The privatisation in Germany is mainly seen as an instrument to 
avoid too much bureaucracy. A short period of continued payment of wages, 
combined with the compensation scheme for smaller companies makes it less 
likely that the medical facts will be disputed. Therefore, there is no reason to 
compensate the weak position of the employee, and responsibilities are clearly 
distinguished.   
The comparison in this contribution focuses only on two aspects, related to the 
income security of sick employees. With the model of public trust one might be 
able to fully assess the quality of a regulatory design in terms of promoting or 
harming public trust.  
To conclude, if one compares the two systems of social security it seems more 
likely that public trust is better maintained in Germany. At least the score on the 
factors in our model seems more positive for the German system. The Dutch 
system contains more private elements, with new public corrective mechanisms. 
This system is therefore an example of the regulatory paradox: private instru-
ments to replace failing public provision result in even more, but slightly differ-
ent public interference, resulting in an even more complex regulatory welfare 
state.  
Though the comparison shows a different pathology the tendency in both coun-
tries is similar. Recent German developments with institutionalised competition 
between statutory and private health insurance show also that in Germany the 
search for efficiency comes with regulatory complexity. It is therefore interest-
ing to monitor the consequences with regard to public trust. Will solidarity in-
deed fade away? To answer that question (more) empirical data is needed. Or, as 
the German constitutional court judged in its decision on the reform of the 
health insurance stated: “Expectations of the legislator on the functioning of 
specific instruments can prove to be wrong. That should be a reason to correct 
the law.”45
45 BVerfG, 1 BvR 706/08 vom, 10.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. 170. 
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Crowding Out Administrative Justice
Jacobus de Ridder*
1. Introduction
A minor integrity incident that took place in the year 2011 at the Dutch ministry 
of defense, and which was blown out of proportion by the press, resulted in a full-
fledged investigation of the integrity policies of the defense department. In the 
course of that investigation the defense department’s Chief Administrative 
Officer (CAO) was questioned about his take on integrity issues. During that 
conversation the CAO picked up two cell phones. “This one is mine”, he said, 
“and this other one is the government’s phone. Everyone knows that I can use that 
second phone to call home to my wife to inform her that I will be late because of 
a meeting. Everyone knows that I can NOT use that phone to call my son who is 
South America to discuss his troubles over there”. His point was that the norm 
was clear: “government issued cell phones can be used privately in an appropriate 
manner”. In a way, he emphasized the importance of unwritten rules, or social 
norms. Still, the ethics rulebook at the ministry contained many pages. For this 
specific issue, the written rule was: “limited private usage of service telephones 
is allowed”. Clearly this rule is ambiguous and open to interpretation. The 
bureaucratic reaction of choice in such a situation is to supplement the rules so 
that the ambiguity is eliminated. The department’s CAO clearly was in favor of a 
different reaction: no additional rules because “everybody knows” how to behave; 
common sense should prevail. Unwittingly he expressed one of two specific views 
on the rules-or-customs divide; the tension between “more rules” (regulation) and 
more social norms (socialization).  
This tension between juridification and socialization as two main forms of 
controlling behavior is the topic of this paper. The main thesis is that under certain 
circumstances, additional rules may drive out the intrinsic motivation in a public 
agency to administer justice: the crowding out effect of juridification. First we 
will discuss juridification and its crowding out effect from a theoretical point of 
view. Then we will illustrate the crowding out phenomenon with the integrity case 
mentioned above. 
                                                            
*  Honorary, Professor of Comparative Public Management, University of Groningen. 
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2.  Theories of bureaucratic behavior 
2.1  The classical approach
The idea that rules should bind government and its officials and that rules are 
indispensable to guarantee a fair administration of justice is a basic assumption of 
the modern state. Restraining the use of power of the state through legal 
boundaries that purge arbitrary rule and promote equal treatment by public 
officials is the essence of both the continental Rechtsstaat and the Rule of Law 
governance program in common law countries. Over the past two hundred years, 
nation building developed parallel with more and more intricate systems of 
administrative law.  
The Rechtsstaat model contains a core notion of social engineering, already 
suggested by Max Weber. It is the notion that an adequate civil bureaucracy is 
indispensable for the administration of justice in the Rechtsstaat. An adequate 
bureaucracy controls the behavior of its personnel, the civil servants. What are the 
ways and means for such control? 
Our knowledge of the characteristics of the classical Rechtsstaat bureaucracy is 
primarily derived from its theoretical reconstruction made by Weber at the 
beginning of the 20th century. Weber could look back on a century of 
development and experience with the then modern rational way of organizing 
state affairs. His bureaucratic model was not a prescription but an empirical 
reconstruction, an important building block in his explanation of the 
rationalization of the state. Close to the core of his model was the position of the 
civil servant. What makes him tick? What are the mechanisms that make the 
bureaucrat apply the law sine ire et studio, that make him formulate decisions in 
a rational and lawful manner, without prejudice or arbitrariness and that have him 
thus produce administrative justice? 
On the one hand, the model flaunts the obtrusive control instruments of 
organizational rules and hierarchy. They are the most obvious building blocks of 
a bureaucracy. Yet their significance in controlling behavior can easily be 
overstated. At least as important are the indirect or unobtrusive control 
mechanisms: the social conditions in the bureaucratic organization. One set of 
such conditions incorporated in Weber’s model can be summed up as job security. 
The Weberian bureaucrat had tenure, was protected against arbitrary rule by his 
superiors and could look forward to a small but adequate pension.  
Another set of conditions can be epitomized with what nowadays would be called 
“organizational culture”. The classical bureaucrat has often been portrayed as a 
cog in a machine, an automaton without personal judgement or initiative. In 
Weber’s reconstruction however, the bureaucrat is a highly trained professional 
with his own competencies, shaped by the organization he is part of. In the 
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discharge of his duties he is guided by the norms and values of the organization, 
its mores, its pride, its esprit de corps. He is socialized in the organization; the 
organization installs intrinsic motivation to do the right thing. Socialization goes 
a long way in explaining why the classical bureaucrat upheld the standards of the 
Rechtsstaat.  
Still, there is a tendency in the practice of administration to emphasize rules over 
socialization. As mentioned before, rules are often inherently ambiguous. Just as 
“complete contracts” (that cover all possible future eventualities) are hard to come 
by, “complete regulation” that does justice to all possible relevant differences and 
exceptions is difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.1 It is a bureaucratic reflex 
mechanism to address an apparent ambiguity in regulation with additional rules, 
in order to strengthen its effect on behavior. The problem with that reaction is that 
the additional rules most likely require interpretation too. That, in turn, may be an 
incentive to create new additional rules. Crozier, who labeled this phenomenon: 
“the vicious circle of the bureaucracy”, attempted to show that “the more rules the 
better” is often not true.2
The idea of “the more rules the better” has been met with far more opposition than 
solely Crozier’s. The classical criticism is threefold: First of all, the vicious circle 
is thought to be a threat for the effectiveness of administrative decision making. 
Fine tuning the rules leads to the opposite of what is intended; the resulting 
rigidity of the rule system prohibits the tailor-made solutions that the fine tuning 
was meant to facilitate. Professionals (“bureaucrats”) who are to apply the rules 
in a just way, may find themselves unable to make the decision that fits best. A 
second perceived threat is that too many rules may undercut the legality of 
administrative decision making. Professionals who find rules to be a hindrance 
for making fitting decisions may be tempted to game the rule set, or ignore rules 
altogether.3 A third type of criticism sees the threat of judicial decision-making 
replacing political decision-making. Since decision making becomes a matter of 
interpreting rules rather than making choices, the judge, rather than the elected 
official, would be calling the shots. Present day denunciation of detailed 
regulation in many ways echoes that of earlier critics. In the international literature 
of the past ten years,4 one may find that detailed regulation is an obstacle for the 
                                                            
1  Trevor L. Brown, Matthew Potoski & David M. Van Slyke, “Trust and Contract 
Completeness in the Public Sector”, Local Government Studies 33, 4, 2007: 607-623. 
2  Michel Crozier, The bureaucratic phenomenon, London, 1964. 
3  A well-documented example in the Dutch literature is the tendency of street bureaucrats 
charged with making building permits to strive for “a good permit”, more or less 
ignoring the applicable rules. See M.V.C. Aalders, Implementatiestijlen in 
ambtenarengroepen, (Patterns of rule application) rapport van het onderzoek Patronen 
van regeltoepassing door ambtenaren. Amsterdam (UvA) 1984.   
4  Gráinne de Búrca and Joanna Scott (eds.), Law and new governance in the EU and the 
US, Oregon 2006; Jason. M. Solomon, “Law and governance in the 21st Century 
Regulatory State”, Texas Law Review, 2008: 820-856. 
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administration of justice, for a trust-based contact between administration and 
administered,5 or more generally, for public trust in administration.  
Much of these critical appraisals circle around a more general matter: the tension 
between the individual case and the general rule. The solution to most of these 
issues is finding some kind of balance between the two, as Kagan already 
showed.6 These days there seems to be a penchant for less rules (less “bureau-
cracy”) and more Einzelfallgerechtigkeit, not only in the literature, but also in 
administrative reality. The Dutch legislator, for one, has recently deregulated most 
of the welfare state arrangements. Even though the debate about the tension 
between the single case and the general rule is important, this classical approach 
is not the one taken in this paper. What I want to do here is explore the effect of 
“more rules” from a different angle: that of the crowding out theory.  
2.2  Juridification and crowding out 
Administrative relations – both relations within the administration and relations 
between the administration and the administered – can be conceived of as social
relations. Social relations are more or less sustainable sets of interactions. In more 
mundane words: administrators converse with citizens and with other 
administrators; they relate to each other in some way. Social relations are 
governed by social norms, implicit and unarticulated shared convictions about 
what is the right thing to do. At the same time, administrative relations can be 
regarded as legal relations, that is, relations that are founded in law. Legal 
relations are governed by explicit rules. Administrative relations thus can be 
modelled as a cord of two intertwined strings, the social and the legal strings. 
What happens between administrators or between administration and citizens can 
only partly be explained by the legal rules under which interaction takes place and 
an outcome, usually an administrative decision, is realized. Social norms and 
customs are equally important for understanding the behavior of the players in an 
administrative game.  
By “the juridification of administrative relations” it is meant that the legal aspect 
of a relation is overly augmented by extending and refining the set of rules that 
governs the administrative relation. Rules and judges become more important in 
shaping what passes in the relationship. The actions, decisions and behavior of 
the participants are more and more lead by rules, while the importance of social 
norms diminishes. Eventually, juridification will reduce “administrative rela-
                                                            
5  Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations, Prettig contact met de overheid 2, The 
Hague 2010. 
6  Robert A. Kagan, Regulatory justice - Implementing a Wage-Price Freeze, New York 
1978. 
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tions” to legal relations and “administrative justice” to legal opportunism.7 In the 
next sections it will be shown that juridification can be interpreted thus, that the 
social string of an administrative relation is crowded out by the legal string. 
The concept of crowding out refers to an intriguing set of phenomena analyzed in 
the social sciences. Most generally the concept stands for unanticipated and often 
unwanted effects of an intervention in societal processes. Traditionally in macro-
economics, “crowding out” is an effect of expansionary fiscal policy. The 
intervention of increased government spending is intended to boost demand in the 
economic cycle. Yet such an increase requires increased government borrowing, 
which raises interest rates to such a level that more and more private firms are not 
capable of borrowing anymore. The unintended and unwanted effect is that 
government policy pushes the private sector out of the financial market. It is but 
one category out of many that are labelled as crowding out, in which government 
actions are thought to curb private sector initiatives. A particular form of crowding 
out outside the realm of macroeconomics – the form that interests us in this paper 
– is called motivational crowding. It refers to the motivation of people to 
accomplish a task or do a job. The basic idea is that intrinsic motivation to do a 
good job can be crowded out by monetary rewards. An actor’s behavior may 
reveal an altered amount of intrinsic motivation due to an external intervention 
such as contingent rewarding.8 The intentions associated with the application of 
the tools of contingent rewarding (performance payment, bonus etc.) are to 
increase the quantity and quality of employee output. Yet it may have the 
unintended effect that the employee will only perform the activities explicitly 
rewarded, thus decreasing the intrinsic motivation for “doing a good job”. The 
phenomenon of crowding out intrinsic motivation by external monetary rewards 
has been well researched and documented for a long time already.9
In public administration, the debate on the motivation of public employees arose 
as an upshot of the wave of New Public Management (NPM) that has dominated 
the field since the late nineteen eighties. A core element of this movement was the 
application of “market type mechanisms” in the running of public organizations.10
                                                            
7  More extensively in: J. de Ridder, “Problematische kanten van toenemende 
juridificatie”, in: J.W.M. Engels et. al. (eds), De rechtsstaat herdacht, W.E.J. Tjeenk 
Willink, 1989, p. 191-203. 
8  Bruno S. Frey, Reto Jegen: “Motivation crowding theory”, in: Journal of Economic 
Surveys 15 (2001); 589-611.  
9  K.O. McGraw, “The detrimental effects of reward on performance: a literature review 
and a prediction model”; in: Mark R. Lepper and David Greene, The Hidden Costs of 
Reward: New Perspectives on the Psychology of Human Motivation, New York 1978. 
For a recent overview, see: Agnès Festré: “Theory and evidence in psychology and 
economics about motivation crowding out: a possible convergence?”, in: Journal of 
Economic Surveys 29, 2 (2015); 339-356. 
10  Christopher Pollitt and Geert Bouckaert, Public management reform: a comparative 
analysis, 2e ed., Oxford 2004. 
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Payment according to performance is one important tool in the NPM toolbox, to 
be used in many public service relations, from public-private partnerships to 
contract management within a public agency. Human resource management was 
no exception: employer-employee relations had to be cast in the same mold. 
Theorists of New Public Management deny the importance of social control and 
intrinsic motivation for the behavior of civil servants. They emphasize rewards 
and punishments. Take for instance the economist Julian Le Grand, an important 
adviser of the Blair administration in its quest for “reinventing government”.11 Le 
Grand argues that civil servants are no different from other employees with a 
healthy dose of egoism and opportunism. Civil servants are not the “knights of 
society” as compared to employees in other sectors, and the employees in other 
sectors are not “knaves”, either. All of them need disciplining to make sure that 
public goods and services are delivered in an equitable manner and with the 
requisite quality, according to Le Grand. Market type mechanisms such as 
competition and pay-for-performance are the tools for disciplining the civil 
servant into doing the right thing. Intrinsic motivation thus was argued away as a 
factor that might influence administrative behavior.  
Yet, as pointed out before, intrinsic motivation was one of the building blocks of 
classical bureaucratic theory. It did not need monetary incentives, just basic 
security, entirely in accordance with the first two levels of Maslow's hierarchy of 
needs. Beyond that, socialization, the grooming of the civil servant in the norms 
and values of the organization, was considered a prerequisite for adequate 
administrative behavior. Social norms thus are as indispensable as written rules 
for the administration of justice. In terms of LeGrand: the employees of the classic 
bureaucracy may not be knights by nature, but the organization is certainly doing 
its level best to make them knights, installing an intrinsic motivation to strive for 
administrative justice.12
We now hypothesize that social norms and the corresponding intrinsic motivation 
can be crowded out by rules, in just the same way as they can be crowded out by 
monetary incentives: more rules negatively affect the intrinsic motivation to 
achieve administrative justice.13 If detailed rules dominate the decision making 
in concrete cases, the bureaucrat will feel compelled to make sure that the decision 
is judge proof. If compliance and judge-resistance are the prime standards for the 
                                                            
11  J. Le Grand, Motivations, Agency and Public Policy, of Knights and Knaves, Pawns 
and Queens, Oxford, 2003. 
12  Modern organizational theory from before the NPM wave re-emphasized the 
importance of socialization in the management of organizations. The foundation for this 
resurrection is Herbert A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: a Study of Decision-Making 
Processes in Administrative Organization (2nd ed.), New York 1957. Even modern 
institutional economics implicitly recognizes the importance of social norms for 
organizational behavior when dubbing the risk of deviation from established rules and 
contracts a moral hazard.
13  Frey & Jegen (2001: 592) suggest that an increase in (internal) regulation has a similar 
crowding out effect as monetary incentives. 
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quality of a decision, the intrinsic motivation to come up with a just solution is 
accordingly reduced. More precisely, one might observe the result of two 
contradictory effects of an increase in the detail of regulation the bureaucrat is to 
apply. On the one hand, the increase in regulation is supposed to improve the 
administration of justice in decision making: the compliance effect. On the other 
hand, the increase of regulation may undermine the intrinsic motivation of the 
bureaucrat to strive for administrative justice: the crowding out effect. Generally, 
one might suppose both effects are active, thus an increase in regulation has two 
opposing effects on the decision-making performance of the bureaucrat.  
Figure 1 portrays the interaction of the compliance effect and the crowding out 
effect.14 In that graph, S is the curve delineating the relationship between the 
degree of regulation (juridification) and the amount of effort bureaucrats put in 
administrative justice. If the amount of regulation increases from O to R, the effort 
increases from A to A’. The crowding out effect is represented as a shift of the 
S curve to the left: S’. Because of that shift, induced by the increase in regulation, 
the effort is reduced from A to A’’. Thus the net effect of the combination of the 
compliance effect and the crowding effect on effort in this example is negative.  
                                                            
14  After Frey & Jegen 2001: 594.  
On Lawmaking and Public Trust
160 
Yet the net effect does not always have to be negative. From the evidence in the 
literature, one may conjecture that the effect of an increase in regulation meant to 
improve bureaucratic performance depends on the way the bureaucratic 
professional experiences those rules. Frey and Jegen15 distinguish two possible 
psychological processes that play a role: impaired self-determination and 
impaired self-esteem. When an individual bureaucrat perceives the increase in 
regulation as a reduction of self-determination, intrinsic motivation is replaced by 
external control. Likewise, when the bureaucrat interprets an increase in 
regulation as a denunciation of personal motivation, competence and 
involvement, the intrinsic motivation to make an effort dwindles. From these 
general findings, two complementary hypotheses can be derived:16
• An increase in regulation crowds out intrinsic motivation if the 
professional perceives the (new) rules to be controlling and intrinsic 
motivation is reduced. 
Professional bureaucrats may experience the new rules as 
controlling, if self-esteem and self-determination are negatively 
affected. Regulation turns into juridification.
 
• An increase in regulation crowds in intrinsic motivation if the 
professional perceives the (new) rules to be supportive.  
The professional bureaucrats may feel that the new rules are 
supportive if the rules provide them with more opportunities to 
administer justice while nurturing their self-esteem.    
Thus in this model there is a dynamic yet delicate balance between hard rules and 
soft social norms in the management of the behavior of bureaucrats. One specific 
aspect of administrative relations that demonstrates the delicate balance between 
rules and norms is “integrity”.  
3.  The case of integrity in bureaucratic behavior 
3.1  Integrity as behavioral control 
Integrity in organizational behavior is usually referred to in the context of 
“ownership of the office”: since employees do not own their office, they cannot 
freely dispose of its resources. Abuse of the office may range from private use of 
organizational assets such as a car or a telephone, to all-out corruption, providing 
favors for third parties in exchange for personal material rewards. However, abuse 
of office also covers the use of hierarchical authority in improper ways and 
                                                            
15  Frey & Jegen 2001: 594. The hypotheses in the original are about the crowding effects 
of monetary rewards. They are adapted here to fit the juridification phenomenon. 
16  After Frey & Jegen 2001: 595. 
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inappropriate behavior towards fellow members in the organization. 
Organizational integrity is commonly defined as a personal trait of individual 
employees or bureaucrats; a disposition for compliance with internal rules. This 
is illustrated in the following example, taken from a random management 
manual:17
Integrity (or integer behavior) means that you practice your function 
adequately and accurately, taking into account your responsibilities and 
the applicable rules. If rules are lacking or if they are ambiguous, you make 
your assessments and decisions in an ethically acceptable way, on the basis 
of generally accepted social and ethical norms.  
According to this description, integrity is first and foremost the faithful discharge 
of organizational duties, in compliance with the standing rules in the organization. 
Yet there is also a recognition that not all that is expected from the good employee 
can be captured in rules. If a situation occurs for which no rules apply, the 
employee is, in a way, requested to invent what could have been the applicable 
rule. Certainly, controlling the behavior of the members of an organization cannot 
be done without rules and enforcement of those rules.18 One could add, however, 
that in a well socialized organization, rules are primarily invoked for those who 
somehow evade the pressure of socialization in the organization and behave 
opportunistically. Formal sanctioning then is one element in behavioral control. 
To put it in a different way, rules and sanctions are a specialized form of social 
control. The larger part of behavioral control can be attributed to general social 
control, imbedded in organizational culture. The remaining social control takes 
the form of rule enforcement.19 Thus organizational integrity can be seen as a 
special case of the general juridification dilemma.  
Juridification imbalances may particularly show when integrity issues come up, 
because both formal and informal rules of proper conduct have been breached. 
The question then arises whether this constitutes a failure of the formal rules or a 
breakdown of social control. If the two juridification hypotheses cited in the 
previous section hold, one should find that the formal rules in place are not 
perceived as supportive by those behaving improperly – when measured against 
organization standards. More specifically, can integrity issues be attributed to the 
crowding out of social norms and intrinsic motivation? To trace possible crowding 
out effects in integrity issues, we now return to the case this paper started out with. 
                                                            
17  http://www.carrieretijger.nl/. 
18  Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations, Glenview Ill. 1972, p. 23-30. Also: Herbert 
A. Simon, Administrative Behavior: a Study of Decision-Making Processes in 
Administrative Organization (2nd ed.), New York 1957. 
19  For a review of the literature about this topic: Centrum voor Criminaliteitspreventie en 
veiligheid, Handhaving en gedrag, achtergronden van regelnaleving, (Enforcement 
and behavior, explaining compliance), Utrecht 2011. 
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3.2  A breach of integrity at the ministry of Defense 
In March of 2011 one of the major newspapers published an article citing serious 
breaches of integrity that allegedly had taken place two years prior in the Centre 
for Automation of Mission-critical Systems – Force Vision (CAMS). CAMS is 
the software department of the Defense Material Organization (DMO). The 
publication resulted in parliamentary debate and an inquiry into the matter by an 
independent commission. The work of the Commission of Inquiry resulted in a 
report on which the following account is based.20
CAMS
The software department CAMS had been a unit within the Defense Material 
Organization (DMO) since 2005. CAMS developed specialized software for 
integrated commando systems aboard the Navy’s frigates and submarines. CAMS 
was part of a larger conglomerate called Sea Systems, and that conglomerate again 
was part of the Directorate of Weapons Systems – one of the directorates of the 
Defense Material Organization. All of DMO accounted for 6000 employees. 
CAMS was headed by the director-CAMS, a military man with the rank of Navy 
Captain. The breaches of integrity took place in the section Internal Affairs of 
CAMS. CAMS staff consisted of 150 employees. Most of them were civilians 
who had been employed for long periods of time. Military personnel on the other 
hand were few and frequently rotating to other parts of the defense organization. 
The members of the civilian staff knew each other well and often maintained 
friendly relationships that extended into private life. All the persons involved in 
the integrity breaches were civilians.  
                                                            
20 Rapport Commissie Integriteitszorg Defensie (Report of the Committee for the 
investigation of Integrity Implementation at the Defense Ministry; Committee-De 
Veer); Parliamentary Papers 32 678, nr. 13, The Hague 2011. The author of this paper 
was a member of the Committee-De Veer. 
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Figure 2: Organogram of DMO
The incident 
In November 2009, the Director-CAMS received a complaint according to which 
one of the employees of Internal Affairs, civilian X, had illicitly taken a TV 
monitor screen home. The Director directly approached civilian X, who defended 
himself by stating that he had taken the TV screen home for testing and that he 
would bring it back immediately. Director-CAMS formally reprimanded civilian 
X. A few weeks later, the Director received a second complaint, containing 
allegations against both civilian X and his superior. Now the Director ordered a 
so-called “Domestic Investigation” that, according to formal defense procedure, 
has to be conducted by two independent officers. This investigation concluded 
that the allegations could not be proven – with the exception of one violation of 
internal rules: unlawful private use of a service vehicle. The investigators advised 
to shore up the internal rules and procedures of Internal Affairs and to “address” 
the seriously disrupted labor relations at CAMS. Director-CAMS now formally 
reprimanded both civilian X and his chief and followed up on the first part of the 
advice only. The results of the investigation were communicated to both the 
accused and the complainant. The latter, civilian M, gave an extensive negative 
reaction. He requested an independent inquiry and threatened to activate the 
watchdog Committee on Integrity in Government if his request was turned down. 
Director-CAMS responded in writing, after conferring with his superiors, stating 
Directeur-DMO 
Directorate of Weapon Systems Directory … etc Etc. 
Staff units 
Ressort Sea Systems Other ressorts 
CAMS-FV 
Etc. 
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that the Domestic Investigation had been conducted in a conscientious and 
thorough manner and that he saw no indication for reopening the case. 
In April of 2010 civilian M formally lodged a complaint with the Director-DMO 
about the way the Director-CAMS had dealt with his complaints against his 
colleagues. The Director-DMO found sufficient reason to reopen the enquiry in 
the case and he charged two experienced former ranking officers with the job. 
These investigators established a number of breaches of integrity, such as the 
private use of a service telephone, unexplained absenteeism, eight trips in a 
service vehicle that could not be accounted for, improper conduct towards 
colleagues and a suspicion of the misappropriation of service assets. On the 
strength of this investigation, the Director-DMO took disciplinary action: civilian 
X and his chief were penalized with a punitive transfer. Civilian M received a 
formal letter affirming his complaints. However, in the meantime, the Director-
CAMS was informed that civilian M himself had also committed serious breaches 
of integrity, such as private use of a service vehicle. This time the Director filed a 
declaration with the military police. Civilian M then sought recourse with the 
newspapers, threatening even the position of the minister of defense himself.   
3.3  Analysis 
One might wonder how such a tiny incident could grow out of proportion in such 
a way that it caused considerable political upheaval. Yet, that is not the question 
that concerns us here. The question to be answered now is whether these breaches 
of integrity can be attributed to an imbalance between formal rules and social 
norms. Were the rules governing the utilization of service assents perceived by 
the CAMS staff as supportive or controlling?   
The rules in the case 
The ministry of defense and the armed forces are well equipped with rule books 
on how to behave in myriads of different situations. In the area of financial 
control, or more generally, administrative management, the rules are extensive 
and detailed. On the topic of interpersonal behavior between members of the 
organization, the rules are sketchy at best. Yet, however detailed the regulation is, 
there is always room for additional interpretation. Take for instance the seemingly 
trivial question of the private use of the service telephone: is it allowed, and to 
what extent? The investigators of the Director DMO in the CAMS case thought 
that they established an illicit utilization of the service telephone. The applicable 
written rule was rather vague, however: “limited private use is allowed”. Certainly 
this is a rule that begs interpretation. The management might be tempted to extend 
the rule; this actually was one of the suggestions made by the investigators in the 
domestic inquiry. Thus, one might have stipulated what constitutes “private use” 
for instance. Another course of action would have been to simplify the rule 
(“private use is only allowed in evident emergencies”.) As a third possibility, the 
 Crowding Out Administrative Justice
 
 
  165 
management might take the position that the rule is not ambiguous at all: everyone 
knows that you can use the service phone to call home to say that you have to stay 
late at work, but that regular personal conversations are not allowed. This was 
actually the position of the CAO, quoted in the introduction of this paper. It 
implies that integrity has to be internalized and become part of the mindset of the 
employees.  
More generally, the CAMPS case shows that organizational integrity, like any 
area of regulation, is a mixed bag, containing formal regulation as well as informal 
norms, enforcement as well as social control. Indeed, the Dutch ministry of 
defense puts a lot of time and energy in all sorts of “integrity training”, in order 
to enable employees and servicemen to make the right choice in un- or under-
regulated situations. The defense leadership thus shows an acute awareness of the 
importance of informal norms and socialization. Still, the rule-sets for integrity 
have the stamp of military discipline all over them, and the same is true for the 
social norms in which personnel are being trained. 
The domain 
The staff of CAMS was predominantly civilian. Most of them had worked with 
the unit for long time. CAMS’ military management, on the contrary, changed 
every three years. Many of the employees were highly educated IT specialists. 
Their sets of social norms were far removed from military discipline and its rules 
and norms. Indeed, the reports based on the several “domestic inquiries” and other 
investigations conducted, paint a picture of a unit that in many ways operated 
outside the rules and norms that were the standard for the ministry of defense and 
the armed forces generally. The organizational integrity rules were embedded in 
military culture. Thus the extensive regulation of organizational integrity would 
likely be perceived as supportive in most of the defense ministry. Yet it is 
plausible that the civilian staff of CAMS perceived these rules, which were going 
against the grain of their own set of norms about how to behave properly, to be 
controlling rather than supportive. To put it in the terms of figure 1, in most of the 
military organization, the relationship between regulation and just behavior would 
be fairly stable and linear, in accordance with curve S. For CAMS however, curve 
S’ would apply: the military regulation undermined rather than supported the 
intrinsic motivation of the civilians to do the right thing. Indeed, the empirical 
evidence shows that the integrity of behavior in the CAMS unit was all in all 
relatively low, indicating that intrinsic motivation was largely crowded out. 
Enforcement of the rules was lacking, mostly due to the fact that the managing 
officers were passers-by, sitting out their three-year-term at CAMS while awaiting 
more rewarding (military) assignments. Strict enforcement would not have been 
able to make up for the crowding out effect either. On the contrary, it would most 
likely have had a perverse effect in the sense that it would have emphasized the 
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controlling character of the military rule set, thus reinforcing the crowding out. 
The records of the few instances in which disciplinary surveillance of the unit was 
temporarily increased all show that the attempts at enforcement were met with 
denunciation and had no impact whatsoever. It is unlikely that a more sustained 
effort of this kind would have garnered better results.       
4.  Conclusion 
A perennial debate in both organizational theory and organizational practice 
revolves around the issue of the level of regulation of organizational behavior. 
This debate can be seen as a special case of the more general issue of 
juridification. Juridification is the process of excessively increasing the amount 
of regulation at the expense of social control. Organizations apply both rules and 
social norms for the advancement of integer behavior. There is a delicate balance 
to be struck between the two modes of organizational control. Juridification, the 
pathological strand of regulation, causes an imbalance by overemphasizing rules. 
This in turn may result in the crowding out of the intrinsic motivation to do the 
right thing. In the special case of organizational integrity, rules that do not support 
intrinsic convictions and preferences may crowd out a sense of integrity. The 
CAMS case shows that integrity rules that are supportive in one organization may 
well be counterproductive in another organization. The strict military culture 
clashed with the free spirited culture of scientists and developers. A famous 
account of such a brawl is Davis’ book on the Los Alamos project that served to 
develop the atomic bomb during the second world war.21 Originally, the Los 
Alamos laboratory was run as a military operation, under command of an army 
general. His comprehensive way of regulating the project thoroughly contravened 
with the norms and values of the high level scientists (amongst whom were a 
handful of Nobel laureates) that were to do the job. The solution in Los Alamos 
was to do away with military rules and to put a civilian physicist, Oppenheimer, 
at the helm of the project. Both the CAMS case and the Los Alamos story indicate 
that it depends on the context whether regulation is perceived as supportive or 
controlling. Supportive rules are rules that match the environment in which they 
are to operate.  
                                                            
21  Nuel P. Davis, Lawrence and Oppenheimer, New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968. 
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“The best way to find out if you can trust somebody is to trust them.”  
ʊ Ernest Hemingway 
Introduction
 
This article proposes a mediation process that might help public organizations 
enhance public trust by first increasing the levels of trust between their members. 
While literature about mediation emphasizes the importance of trust in the 
mediator and in the process, this article examines the relevance of trust between 
the parties during the mediation process in an organizational context. Based on a 
review of the literature on trust and organizational conflicts, the text argues that 
trust between parties is a key issue in organizational mediation and proposes a 
mediation process likely to increase both trust among organization members and 
public trust.  
 
After a brief study of the importance of trust in an organization’s performance, 
we will review the literature on the psychology of trust and on the concept of 
organizational conflict. We shall then draw conclusions concerning the mediation 
process and propose a method by which the public’s trust in organizations can be 
enhanced. 
 
1. On the importance of trust in an organization’s performance 
 
Literature has discussed at length the various practices that can be used to increase 
trust in public sector organizations.1 The mediation process is one such practice 
that offers the possibility of restoring trust among the people who work within 
public organizations. In recent years, mediation processes have, for various 
reasons, been used more frequently by organizations.2  
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ȗ Administrative Judge, Tribunal administratif du travail, LL.B., D.E.A. (Private Law), 
LL.M. (Dispute Prevention and Resolution).
1  R.C. NYHAN, “Changing the paradigm; Trust and Its Role in Public Sector 
Organizations”, (2000) American Review of Public Administration, 30 (1) 87-109. 
2  In Quebec, the increased use of mediation within organizations is related to an 
amendment of the Act respecting labour standards which added a chapter on 
psychological harassment.  Since provision 81.19 establishes that “Employers must take 
reasonable action to prevent psychological harassment and, whenever they become 
aware of such behaviour, to put a stop to it”, many have adopted a policy that includes 
the possibility of mediation.  





An organization is defined as a group of people engaged in specialized and 
interdependent activities in order to reach a goal or to undertake a mission.3 
Today, organizations operate in a complex environment that affects the means put 
in place to increase productivity and strengthened organizational commitment.   
 
Public organizations are not any different than private organizations in that 
respect, though one well-acknowledged difference between public and private 
organizations is the public expectations. Since they are part of the government, 
having been created by law for the purpose of accomplishing specific 
administrative activities, public organizations have to be accountable to both 
elected officials and the public.4  
 
Effectiveness and accountability are a result of a public organization’s 
performance. Public satisfaction, which leads to public trust, is mostly related to 
the perceived quality of the services provided by public organizations.5 More 
generally, the ability of an organization to accomplish its mission, which serves 
public purposes, and to achieve its goals is an important aspect of public trust.   
 
To achieve its goals, the organization requires the interaction of many people and 
teams who must work interdependently. This, in itself, requires a certain level of 
trust.  Collaboration is not possible without trust.6 Where there is trust among the 
members of an organization, collaboration becomes possible7 and reaching the 
organizational goals is then easier.   
 
Research8 has shown the positive effects of trust on organizational performance 
and on organizational outcomes. Highly efficient and accountable public 
organizations usually have a high level of trust among their members.9 So, in 
order to establish and maintain public trust, public organizations should focus on 
trust within their organizations. 

3  H.F. GORTNER, J. MAHLER and J.B. NICHOLSON, La gestion des organisations 
publiques, 1994, Presses de l'Université du Québec, 587 p. 
4  Id.; J.R. TOMPKINS, Organization Theory and Public Management, Wadsworth, 
Cengage Learning, 2005, 416. 
5  H. DANAE FARD and A. ROSTAMY, “Promoting Public Trust in Public 
Organizations: Explaining the Role of Public Accountability”, (2007) Public Organiz 
Rev (2007) 7:331–344. 
6  T.R. TYLER, Why people cooperate: the role of social motivations, Princeton, 
Princeton University Press, 2011, p. 215; BALLIET, D. and VAN LANGE, P.A., 
“Trust, Conflict and Cooperation: a Meta-Analysis”, (2013) 139 (5) Psychological 
Bulletin 1090-1112.  
7  T.R. TYLER, id. 
8  K.T. DIRKS and D.L. FERRIN, “Trust in Leadership: Meta-Analytic Findings and 
Implications for Research and Practice”, (2002) Journal of Applied Psychology Vol. 87, 
No. 4, 611–628;  R.C. NYHAN, op. cit. note 1. 
9  S.M. PARK, “Toward the Trusted Public Organization: Untangling the Leadership, 
Motivation, and Trust Relationship in U.S. Federal Agencies”, (2012) The American 
Review of Public Administration 42(5) 562–590. 





Different practices have been put in place within organizations in order to 
maintain trust, restore trust and solve conflicts. For instance, the trust-based model 
has been suggested as a viable paradigm for increasing interpersonal trust, 
organizational commitment and productivity in the public sector.10 Trust between 
the members of an organization also contributes to conflict prevention. On the 
contrary, when mistrust takes place, the situation can eventually develop into 
conflict. This article emphasizes the potential of mediation as a means of helping 
parties solve their conflict and restoring trust between them.  
 
The use of mediation as a practice to solve conflicts within organizations has 
increased significantly in recent years.11  Mediation is generally defined as the 
intervention of a third party, the mediator, in a negotiation or a conflict in order 
to assist the parties in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement to settle the issue 
in dispute.12 Mediation presents many cost-reduction advantages in terms of time, 
emotional distress and money. It is so namely because in a mediation process, 
parties retain better control over the outcome.13 Based on a generally accepted 
approach, the parties are responsible for and have control over the content and 
outcome of mediation, also called “substantive decisions”.  Thus, as opposed to a 
trial, where the outcome is unilaterally determined by an external authority, the 
parties are more likely to commit to any final agreement reached through 
mediation.  
 
Mediation is also a more effective way of repairing relationships and a more 
acceptable approach to dispute resolution between parties. It has the potential to 
help increase trust between parties and, consequently, within a public 
organization. Authors have proposed various strategies to help the mediator 
increase trust between parties. 14   However, the literature on mediation has 
traditionally put an emphasis on trust in the mediator and trust in the process,15 
the logic being that trust between parties should increase by itself if trust in the 
mediator and in the process is high enough.  Consequently, according to literature, 
the only situation where trust between the parties would have to be directly 

10  Id.  
11  In Quebec, as mentioned in note 2, the increases use of mediation is related to an 
amendment of the Act respecting labour standards.   
12  MOORE, C.W. The Mediation Process, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1996, 2e ed., 
599 p. 
13  O. SHAPIRA, “A Theory of Sharing Decision-Making in Mediation”, (2013) 44 
McGeorge L. Rev. 923. 
14  MOORE, C.W., op. cit. note 12, p.194. 
15  J. POITRAS, “What makes parties trust mediators?”, (2009) 25(3) Negotiation Journal, 
307; A. STIMEC and J. POITRAS, “Building trust with parties: Are mediators 
overdoing it?”, (2009) 26(3) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 317; A.M. DAVIS and 
H. GADLIN, 1988, “Mediators Gain trust the old-fashioned way. We earn it”, (1988) 
Negociation Journal 55; W.H. ROSS and C. WIELAND, “Effects of interpersonal trust 
and time pressure on managerial mediation strategy in a simulated organizational 
dispute”, (1996) 81(3) Journal of Applied Psychology 228. 





addressed is when the level of trust is too low to conduct the mediation process or 
to conclude an agreement.  
 
This paper examines the hypothesis that trust between the parties should be 
addressed during the mediation process in public organizations. We propose 
different recommendations, including the measurement of the trust level at the 
beginning of the process to bring awareness of the dynamics of trust to the parties.  
We also suggest, based on the literature on trust and organizational conflict, that 
the mediation process should focus on helping the parties first solve their 
relationship conflict as opposed to their task conflict.  
 
2. On the psychology of trust 
 
2.1 Definition  
 
Trust has been defined in many ways. One commonly accepted definition is the 
willingness to accept vulnerability based on positive expectations of intention or 
behaviour of another.16  Furlong proposes a simple definition of trust: “having 
positive expectations about another’s motives and intentions toward us where 
potential risk is involved”. 17  Lewicki and Wiethoff18 define trust in a similar 
way, as a personal belief and willingness to act based on another’s words, actions 
and decisions. In that perspective, there is an expectation that the other will take 
us into account before choosing to act a certain way.  
 
Expectations toward another, which is part of the definition of trust, will condition 
the cooperation with that person. When a person’s expectations towards an 
organization are not fulfilled, there is a psychological contract breach, which is 
linked to the lowering of trust.19 Kramer and Lewicki20 talk about Presumptive 
Trust within organizations based on four categories of expectations:  
 
1) identity-based expectations: essentially based on the perception of 
coherence between individuals and collective values. As a member of an 
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16   R.J. LEWICKI, “Trust and distrust” In The negotiator’s fieldbook: The desk reference 
for the experienced negotiator, edited by A.K. Schneider and C. Honeyman. 
Washington, D.C.: American Bar Association.  
17  G. FURLONG, The conflict resolution toolbox: models & maps for analyzing, 
diagnosing and solving conflict? John Wiley & Sons Canada, Ltd., 2005, p. 128.  
18  R.J. LEWICKI and C. WIETHOFF, “Trust, Trust Development, and Trust Repair”, in 
DEUTSCH, M. and P.T. COLEMAN, The Handbook of Conflict Resolution, San 
Francisco, Jossey Bass, 2000, 86. 
19  BAL, P.M., De LANGE, A.H., JANSEN, P.G., & VAN DER VELDE, M.E., 
“Psychological contract breach and job attitudes: A meta-analysis of age as a 
moderator”, (2008) Journal of Vocational Behavior, 72, 143–158. 
20  R.M. KRAMER. and R.J. LEWICKI, “Repairing and Enhancing Trust” (2010) 4 (1) 
The Academy of Management Annals 245. 





organization, a person will be associated with favorable characteristics 
such as honesty, cooperativeness and trustworthiness; 
 
2) role-based expectations: information about roles gives knowledge that 
brings positive expectations about others occupying particular roles; 
 
3) rule-based expectations: the organizational rules constitute codified 
norms for conduct that provide a formal enunciation of collective 
expectations about how members will behave; 
 
4) leader-based expectations: the signals that the organizational leaders 
send are a source of presumptive trust. They have a large share of the credit 
for things that happen and do not happen inside their organizations.  
 
If trust within organizations is related to expectations, it also has to do with risk, 
since the notion of trust includes the decision to take a risk. Karsenty21 defines the 
risk members face within organizations in terms of two categories: 1) risks related 
to success at work; 2) risks related to the meaning of work. The first category has 
to do with the accomplishment of work. The other category can be further divided 
in five classifications of risks: identity (status, position, and responsibilities), 
relational (identification to the organization, relations with colleagues and 
clients); activity (practice, autonomy); motivational (work conditions, utility and 
interest in work, pride) and future (evolution and development).   
 
Figure 1: Different categories of risks related to work according to Karsenty 
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21  L. KARSENTY, « Comment appréhender la confiance au travail ? » in KARSENTY, 
L. (dir.), La confiance au travail, Toulouse, OCTARÈS Editions, 2013, p. 13. 





With risk, comes the decision to take a risk. Trust can certainly be seen as a 
decision.22 Sometimes, it is a conscious one but often, the decision to trust is a 
result of an intuitive process. Darley23 explains the notion of “intuitive auditor” 
elaborated by Kramer24 as part of the noncalculational trust theories which have 
an important role to play in relationships within organizations.  He says that once 
there is an identification of goals between the interactors, “the internal auditor can 
“take vacation”. However – and this is perhaps a friendly amendment to Kramer’s 
concept- the auditor can quite unexpectedly get called back from vacation”. In 
fact, new information might lead to a mental adjustment when there is evidence 
“that the noncalculational trust is not warranted”.  
 
So, based on Kramer’s concept, using also the types of trust 25  that will be 
explained further and Sheppard and Tudrinsky’s sequence of trust development 
in organizations,26 Darley presents the different stages of trust. The evolution of 
trust shows that it goes from knowledge of the other’s perspective to identification 
with the other’s perspective, which “includes an empathetic identification with 
the other person’s goals”. 27 
 




22  The quotation in exergue from Hemingway reflects that aspect.  
23  J.M. DARLEY, “Commitment, Trust, and Worker Effort Expenditure in 
Organizations”, dans R.M. KRAMER, and K.S. COOK (Editors), Trust and Distrust in 
Organizations: Dilemmas and Approaches, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2004, 
p. 127. 
24  R.M. KRAMER, “Divergent Realities and Convergent Disappointments in the 
Hierarchic Relation. Trust and the Intuitive Auditor at Work” in Trust in Organizations: 
Frontiers of the Theory and Research, edited by R.M. KRAMER and T.R. TYLER, 
1996, Thousand Oaks, Cafifornia, Sage.  
25  Id., page 8.  
26  B.H. SHEPPARD and M. TUCHINSKY, “Micro-OB and the network organization”, 
in KRAMER, R.M. AND T.R.TYLER, (editors), Trust in Organisations: Frontiers of 
Theory and Reseach, Thousand Oaks, Sage, 140. 
27  DARLEY, op. cit. note 23. 





To summarize, trust has been recently defined as a serene feeling that comes from 
the relationship with an actor in a specific context with the expectation that that 
actor will take care of our interests.28  
 
2.2 Characteristics  
 
Trust is impalpable, intangible and invisible. It cannot be forced. It does not exist 
just because it is written in a contract. In fact, it can hardly be the subject of a 
contract. It does not respond to any automatism. Trust is not fixed, definite, nor 
permanent. It varies in time and usually takes a while to develop. It can appear 
spontaneously but can also disappear quickly. It is dynamic rather than static.29  
 
Trust builds with circularity, reciprocity and mutuality. A person will be more 
willing to trust someone by whom she/he feels trusted.30 There is a proportional 
relation between the perception of being trusted by the other and the level of trust 
in the other. We are more likely to take risks with those who take risks with us. 
 
Trust is seen as a social lubricant that facilitates communication, contacts, 
exchanges and relationships. It palliates for the uncertainty in relationships. Trust 
builds with experience of the other and can vary according to the other’s behavior.   
 
2.3 Types of trust  
 
Many authors have tried to classify trust in different types, based on its origin or 
on behaviors. Lewicki and Bunker31 have identified three different dimensions of 
trust: calculus-based trust, identification-based (or identity-based) trust and 
knowledge-based trust. These dimensions of trust are different, but linked, and 
build on each other. 
 
The first dimension describes a calculation process 32  by which one person 
evaluates if another is reliable or not. Calculus-based trust exists if the estimated 
consequences of not trusting exceed the potential gains due to trust.  
 
When a person has enough information about another person, knowledge-based 
trust occurs. The understanding about the other allows one to predict that person’s 
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28  L. KARSENTY, op. cit. note 21. 
29  J. WU and D. LAWS, “Trust and Other-Anxiety in Negotiations: Dynamics Across 
Boundaries of Self”, (2003) 19(4) Negotiation Journal 329. 
30  G. LE CARDINAL, J.-F. GUYONNET and B. POUZOULLIC, La dynamique de la 
confiance : construire la coopération dans les projets complexes, 3rd Edition, 2008, 
246 p. 
31  LEWICKI, R.J. and B.B. BUNKER, “Developing and Maintaining Trust in Work 
Relationships”, in R.M. KRAMER and T.R. TYLER, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers 
of Theory and Research, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 114. 
32  LE FLANCHEC, A., ROJOT, A. and C. VOYNNET FOURBOUL, « Rétablir la 
confiance dans l’entreprise par le recours à la médiation » (2006) 61(2) RI/IR 271. 





behavior. Accurate prediction in connection with expectations depends on 
understanding, which develops from repeated interactions, communication, and 
building a relationship. 
 
The identification-based trust is a more affective type of trust. It takes place when 
one person perceives the other as sharing the same interests or values. 
Identification-based trust involves a shift from extending the knowledge about 
another person to more personal identification. Some authors33 assimilate identi-
fication-based trust to relational trust, which develops through experience of the 
other’s reliability.  
 
In an organizational context, trust will not necessarily become identification-
based. The relationships within an organization are generally linked to low 
identification-based trust and high calculus-based trust.34 Trust between union 
representatives and managers is usually more positive when based on calculus and 
can improve with regular exchanges that provide structured information.35  
 
There are different types of trust within organizations:36 trust in the relationship 
with the other, trust in the other’s competence and trust in the other’s 
collaboration.  After interviewing workers, Mishra37 identified four dimensions 
of trust related to leaders: competence, openness, support and reliability. Similar 
dimensions were enumerated with respect to high-trust organizations: 
competence, openness and honesty, caring for employees, reliability and 
identification. Karsenty38 defines five categories of behaviors that determine trust:  
 
- Competence: knowledge, technical and non-technical know-how, 
mastering of tools; 
- Reliability: commitment, respect of promises, coherence between 
words and deeds;  
- Frankness and honesty: facts reported without distortion; 
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33  D.J. McALLISTER, “Affect and Cognition Based Trust as Foundations for 
Interpersonal Cooperation in Organizations” (1995) 38(1) Academy of Management 
Journal 24. 
34  J.-F. ROBERGE and R.J. LEWICKI, “Should We Trust Grand Bazaar Carpet Sellers 
(and Vice Versa)?” dans Venturing beyond the classroom, Saint Paul, Minn.: DRI 
Press, 2010, p.119.  
35  HARRISSON, D., « Les représentations de la confiance entre gestionnaires et 
représentants syndicaux », (2003) 58 (1) Relations Industrielles/Industrial Relations 
109. 
36  G. LE CARDINAL, J.-F. GUYONNET and B. POUZOULLIC, op. cit., note 30. 
37  A.K. MISHRA, “Organizational responses to crisis: the centrality of trust”, in 
R.M. KRAMER and T.R. TYLER, Trust in Organizations: Frontiers of Theory and 
Research, Thousand Oaks, Sage Publications, 261 p.  
38   L. KARSENTY, op. cit., note 21. 





- Concern for the other person (or benevolence): demonstrated by 
listening, understanding, empathy, searching for compromise 
solutions; 
- Identification to the other person: sharing the same values, beliefs, 
intentions, sensitivity and affinity.  
 
After a review of various classifications, Gratacap and Le Flanchec39 suggest that 
all the elements of trust within organizations could be reduced to two general 
parts: an affective part of trust, which includes openness, justice, availability and 
benevolence; and a calculational part related to competence, coherence and 
commitment. The following figure shows how this notion relates to the behaviors 
that influence trust. 
 





2.4 Measuring the level of trust 
 
Trust is not easy to measure. One way would be to determine the maximum risk 
a person is willing to take on another.40 Some have suggested that, in order to 
build trust, the latter should be measured regularly to create awareness of what is 
going on within the organization.41 There are many tools that can help monitor 
trust levels. These take into account various aspects related to trust such as: 
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39  A. GRATACAP and A. LE FLANCHEC, La confiance en gestion, un regard 
pluridisciplinaire, Paris, Groupe De Boeck, 2011, 232 p. 
40  G. LE CARDINAL, J.-F. GUYONNET and B. POUZOULLIC, op. cit. note 30.  
41  P.S. SHOCKLEY-ZALABAK, S.P. MORREALE and M.Z. HACKAM, Building the 
high-trust organization, John Wiley & Sons, 2010, 256 p. 





collaboration, flexibility, openness toward innovation, presence at work and 
loyalty.  
 
The Organizational Trust Index is an example of such a tool. It is a questionnaire 
that examines five dimensions of trust: employees’ concerns, openness and 
honesty, identification, reliability and competence. There are questions on 
commitment, coherence, competence to accomplish the organization’s mission 
and calculus-based trust. For instance, some questions concern one’s willingness 
to express oneself and listen to others, openness to others’ concerns, participation 
in decisions about work and willingness to meet other people’s needs. These 
questions are related to knowledge-based trust, while questions on the subject of 
values and connection to others can be linked to identification-based trust.  
 
Other similar tools exist, such as the Organization Trust Inventory, which 
constitutes a scale for measuring the levels of trust between an employee and 
her/his supervisor and organization. The questionnaire includes questions 
concerning three types of trust. Questions about competence are linked to 
calculus-based trust, whereas questions related to reliability concern knowledge-
based trust. There are also questions about the understanding of roles which have 
to do with identification-based trust.  
 
Measuring trust levels is a way of addressing trust issues in organizations. Using 
a questionnaire to determine the level of trust could be a useful way of bringing 
awareness about trust during the mediation process. This has inspired our 
proposed strategy for the mediation process that will be explained after an 
overview of organizational conflict.  
 
3. Organizational conflict  
 
A public organization is a social unit of people and teams structured and 
conducted to pursue a public mission. Teams are created to perform tasks that are 
too complex for individuals. The accomplishment of complex tasks requires the 
involvement of many members of the organization. Members of an organization 
must work in interdependence, which means that two or more persons must 
interact in order to reach a goal and the outcome depends in part on the actions of 
each person.42   
 
The members of the organization might have different preferences, views, 
interests, skills, knowledge and information.43 The day-to-day functioning of the 
organization requires that its people share information and ideas as well as 
coordinate their tasks, but the differences between them in terms of preferences, 
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views, interests, knowledge and information, even in perceptions or attitudes, 
might generate conflict.  
 
Authors have defined conflict as “a process that begins when an individual or 
group perceives differences and opposition between itself and another individual 
or team about interests and resources, beliefs, values, or practices that matter to 
them”.44  The existing literature45 mostly concerns two different perspectives of 
conflict: task conflict and relationship conflict.  
 
Task conflict can be defined as different perceptions or disagreements among 
members related to task content, while relationship conflict refers to 
incompatibilities among members about personal issues which are not directly 
task-related.46 These disagreements or differing perceptions include differences 
in viewpoints, ideas, and opinions. Task content includes the distribution of 
resources, the procedures and policies, and judgments and interpretation of facts.47 
It is primarily based on non-relational issues. Relationship or relational conflict, 
on the other hand, has to do with everything related to the relationship. It includes 
personality clashes, interpersonal styles, and interpersonal incompatibilities. It 
generally involves emotions and accusations.  
 




44  M.J. GELFAND, L. LESLIE and K. Keller, “On the etiology of conflict cultures in 
organizations”, (2008) 28 Research in Organizational Behavior 137.  
45  DECHURCH, L.A., MESMER-MAGNUS, J.R. and D. DOTY, “Moving Beyond 
Relationship and Task Conflict: Toward a Process- State Perspective”, (2013) Journal 
of Applied Psychology Advance online publication doi:10.137/a0032896.  
46  Amy McMILLAN, Hao Chen Orlando C. RICHARD and Shahid N. BHUIAN, (2012), 
“A mediation model of task conflict in vertical dyads”, International Journal of Conflict 
Management, Vol. 23 Iss 3 pp. 307 – 332. 
47  Id.  





A recent meta-analysis48 shows that relational conflicts have a negative impact on 
team performance and can lead to negative affective consequences. However, in 
the case of task conflicts, the consequences are usually less perilous and are even 
sometimes beneficial. In concluding their research review, the authors suggest 
that constructive controversy characterized by actively expressing ideas and 
openly discussing issues enhances team functioning. A collaborative process 
integrating team members’ concerns also contributes to the effectiveness of a 
team.  On the contrary, avoidance and competing processes impair effectiveness. 
That might explain why conflicts are often seen as a threat in an organization: 
they could be associated with instability.49 Nyhan writes that “when sufficient 
trust exists in an organization, conflict can be a positive force. […] Conflict is 
inevitable in most organizations, but that energy, properly channeled, leads to 
innovation and increased productivity”.  
 
With the same perspective, some organizations see conflict as an opportunity to 
develop real collaboration,50 which implies that they must confront the conflict 
rather than simply look at the symptoms. For instance, instead of focusing on the 
fact that teams are not working together, authors51 suggest finding out the source 
of the lack of collaboration and treating it as a potential conflict to manage. In that 
perspective, conflict can be seen as an expression of differences, which has great 
value for finding creative solutions. 
 
Despite the fact that most organizational conflicts include both task and relational 
conflicts, Perron suggests that, when there is a relational conflict, the task conflict 
should not be addressed.52  If the parties are able to resolve the relational conflict, 
it is more likely that they will be able to solve the task conflict by themselves. In 
certain circumstances, the resolution of a relational conflict facilitates the 
resolution of the task conflict. It is the relational conflict that takes energy, is 
destructive, causes suffering at work and is a source of the development of 
psychosocial risks.53 
 
That perspective suggests that the conflict resolution process should start by 
addressing the relational conflict so that parties can afterwards focus on content 
or task conflict. The resolution of the relational conflict requires a better 
understanding of the dynamics of the relationship, independent from any question 
of content.54 During the process, the parties can develop new interactive working 
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48  DECHURCH, L.A., MESMER-MAGNUS, J.R. and D. DOTY, op. cit., note 45. 
49  R.C. NYHAN, op. cit. note 1. 
50  J. WEISS and J. HUGUES, “Want collaboration? Accept and actively manage 
conflict”, (2005) Harvard Business Review 93. 
51  Id.  
52  M. PERRON, « Promouvoir la confiance en entreprise par une démarche d’appui au 
dialogue social », in KARSENTY, L. (dir.), La confiance au travail, Toulouse, 
OCTARÈS Editions, 2013, p. 129. 
53  Id.  
54  Id. 





conditions. For example, they can agree to communicate any relevant doubts in 
order to build trust. The resolution could mean acknowledging and accepting 
differences in personalities or interpersonal styles.  
 
Once the relational conflict is resolved, the parties can focus on the task conflict, 
which is then easier to settle. The conflict resolution process could then be based 
on constructive controversy and collaboration in order to resolve the task conflict 
with the best possible outcomes. Once the relational conflict is resolved, the 
parties should actively express ideas and openly discuss issues.  
 
4. Mediation and trust repair 
There is definitively a relationship between conflict and trust. When individuals 
trust each other, they can usually overcome conflicts. When they don’t trust each 
other, the trust must be repaired.55  Different approaches in effective conflict 
management take trust into account. For instance, Duluc considers that awareness 
of the dynamics of trust leads to the development of trust.56 Others postulate that 
acknowledging the lack of trust is the first step to enhancing trust.57 Similarly, the 
awareness of trust between the parties with an appropriate vocabulary and 
knowledge of the depth and complexity of the trust dimension is likely to 
contribute to its development.58  
 
When speaking about trust repair, Kramer and Lewicki59  refer to “repairing 
damaged expectations”. They explain that trust is repaired when the relationship 
substantively returns to a positive state. They consider that most of research 
abstracts the dynamics of trust repair at the organizational level and that, despite 
a few exceptions, most approaches do not necessarily focus on addressing 
emotional or behavioral elements.  
 
Considering studies on trust violations in the workplace, Kramer and Lewicki 
state that explanations and apologies can have an impact on trust repair. Apologies 
will be more effective the sooner they occur, if perceived as sincere and expressed 
as “taking responsibility”. More specific reparation, like financial compensation, 
can also play a role in restoring trust. The third major area of trust repair, 
according to these authors, is the creation of structural solutions. These 
arrangements could include rules, contracts, regulation processes, monitoring 
systems and various other controls, such as penalties or other sanctions, in case of 
trust violations.  
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55  KRAMER., R.M. and R.J. LEWICKI, op. cit., note 20.  
56  A. DULUC, Leadership et confiance: développer le capital humain pour des 
organisations performantes, 2e édition, Paris, Dunod, 2008, 252 p. 
57  E.C. TOMLINSON and R.J. LEWICKI, “Managing Distrust in Intractable Conflicts”, 
(2006) 24(2) Conflict Resolution Quartely 219. 
58  J. WU and D. LAWS, op. cit., note 29.  
59  R.M. KRAMER. and R.J. LEWICKI, op. cit., note 20.  





Lewicki and Wiethoff 60  present actions and strategies to manage distrust 
depending on whether calculus-based trust or identification-based trust is 
affected. Strategies such as agreeing explicitly on expectations as to what is to be 
done, agreeing on procedures for monitoring actions, cultivating alternative ways 
to have one’s needs met and increasing the other’s awareness of how his own 
performance is perceived by others are related to managing calculus-based 
distrust. To build identification-based trust, parties should engage in a process that 
lets them share commonalities in terms of interests, goals, objectives, reactions, 
values and principles. For the parties, openly acknowledging their distrust and 
designing ways to keep these issues from interfering with their ability to work 
together can contribute to managing identification-based distrust.  
 
Considering more specifically the literature on the measurement and the 
awareness of trust, this article suggests that better awareness of trust between the 
parties, based on the measurement of the level of trust between them, will help 
develop trust. This suggestion implies that the development of trust between 
parties will be addressed during organizational mediation. Before going further 
on that, the mediation process will be examined.  
 
Although different approaches exist in mediation, the process generally includes 
four stages: 1) introduction to the process and collection of data about the dispute; 
2) identification of the stakes and interests involved; 3) exploration of possible 
solutions; 4) selecting the solutions and making an agreement.  
 
Moore identifies lack of trust as one of five problems that commonly create 
negative psychological dynamics during the mediation process. Trust is largely 
based on past experiences between the parties. To build trust during the mediation 
process, Moore suggests that the mediator assist the parties by encouraging them 
to undertake a variety of actions or gestures designed to increase credibility.61 For 
instance, these include making consistently congruent statements, performing 
symbolic gestures that demonstrate good faith, avoiding threatening the other, 
demonstrating an understanding for the other side’s concerns even if they are not 
shared.  
 
Moore expounds two common approaches to address issues of trust:62 one of these 
concerns attitudes and perception of attitudes while the other concerns the ideal 
working relationship between the parties and ways to improve and monitor it. 
Poitras and Raines63 give strategies that can be used to deal with mistrust among 
parties: 1) focus on finding a solution; 2) explain the mediation process; 3) bridge 
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61  Moore, op. cit., note12, p. 193. 
62  Id., p. 195. 
63  J. POITRAS and S. RAINES, Experts Mediators: Overcoming Mediation Challenges 
in Workplace, Family and Community Conflicts, Plymouth, Jason Aronson, 2013, 
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talks between parties; and 4) build trust in agreements. They describe the risks of 
using each strategy.  
 
The first strategy goes from helping the parties focus on how to make the future 
better, rather than looking at the past, to conducting a cost/benefit analysis and 
highlighting their commonalities in order to help them realize that their positions 
are not as far apart as they believe. When focusing on finding a solution, though, 
the risk is that the underlying concerns about distrust may be ignored, which is 
especially problematic if trust is a serious issue at hand.   
 
Explaining the mediation process to the parties includes telling them that the 
concerns of everyone will receive full consideration during the process, that there 
is no obligation to settle but that if they do, the result of mediation is enforceable 
under law. According to the authors, explaining the process is a low-risk strategy 
but is not enough in some cases.  
 
Bridging talks between the parties is a strategy used to avoid having them confront 
each other, thus reinforcing the rules of the mediation process and creating a safe 
place for them to share information through caucus or joint sessions. Mediators 
can also bridge talks between the parties by encouraging them to share 
perspectives before exploring the issues and by helping them to depersonalize 
ideas and to focus on the message and not on the messenger. Exposing the risks 
of such strategies, Poitras and Raines write: 
 
When there is a low level of trust between disputants, they often feel more 
comfortable allowing the mediator to speak for them or conducting the 
mediation session in ways that avoid direct contact. However, this greater 
level of comfort can come at a cost to the goal of repairing relationships. 
When parties communicate directly and face-to-face, they can look into the 
other’s eyes and size up his sincerity or lack thereof. If a party is truly 
remorseful for his past actions, an apology conveyed via the mediator will 
not carry the same weight as one delivered directly.64 
 
The fourth strategy is to build trust by helping the parties reach an agreement in 
spite of their distrust. For example, this can take the form of provisions concerning 
a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the agreement or future 
maintenance meetings that can be called by any of the parties. The agreement 
could also include penalties in case any provisions of the agreement are not 
fulfilled. That fourth strategy takes into account the difficulty of rebuilding 
relational trust in the time allowed for mediation. 
 
All of the above strategies are linked to one or more types of trust. Whereas 
focussing on commonalities is related to identity-based trust, penalties for 
noncompliance to a procedural trust agreement are related to calculus-based trust. 
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However, these strategies are useful for helping a mediator deal with distrust 
between the parties rather than for helping parties deal explicitly with the trust 
issue between them.   
 
Other authors65 have presented mediation as a way of acting on trust in organiza-
tions and of creating trust between parties. They studied the mechanisms by which 
the process of mediation can re-established trust among the parties when there is 
an organizational conflict involving a relational impasse. They were interested in 
determining if mediation would have similar effects on the different dimensions 
of trust. The change of behavior would provide information about the effects of 
mediation on trust. For instance, a change in tone, attitude, and participation of 
one of the parties would give an indication as to what is happening with trust.  
 
The authors found out that mediation has a positive impact on knowledge-based 
trust and calculus-based trust but not so much on identity-based trust, the impact 
on the latter being provisory and weaker. The intervention of the mediator should 
then vary depending on the type of trust involved.  
 
For knowledge-based trust, the mediator could help the parties reflect, take a step 
back, enlarge their cognitive universe and extend their awareness. The strategies 
used should focus on the mode of communication, on establishing a structured 
process, on engendering openness and on seeking solutions. In order to build 
calculus-based trust, the mediator could ensure a secure context for the exchange 
and establish rules of dialogue between the parties. The mediator could also help 
the parties overcome their emotional blockages. The role of the mediator would 
then consist in introducing the concept of respect for the identity of each other, 
reminding the parties that everyone has their own legitimacy. The interventions 
in that context should focus on awareness, acknowledgement of the other and 
acceptance of various points of view, with the ultimate goal of creating openness 
toward the other’s experience of the situation, which corresponds to a different 
but legitimate logic.   
 




65  LE FLANCHEC, A., ROJOT, A. and C. VOYNNET FOURBOUL, op. cit, note 32.  





Figure 5:  Strategies related to the types of trust and conflicts 
 
 
Taking into account the literature on organizations, trust and organizational 
conflict, we can draw some conclusions. Calculus-based trust is in fact the 
decision to trust based on the hope that the other will respond to our expectations 
in terms of their intentions, motivations, and competence. In an organizational 
context, this type of trust is related to competence and commitment. The task 
conflict can be associated to this type of trust.  
 
Knowledge-based trust has to do with the experience of and with the other. It is 
based, in major part, on the aptitude of the other to merit trust, the other’s 
trustworthiness. To be trusted, a person must act and behave in a way that 
engenders trust. When each party tries to be perceived the same way, trust will 
build in reciprocity and circularity. Within organizations, various behaviors are 
associated with trust: openness to communication, sharing of information, 
participation in decision-making and awareness of the dynamics of trust.  
 
On the other hand, identity-based trust, which is the affective dimension of trust, 
is related to emotions, values, benevolence within the relationship, coherence and 
honesty. When this type of trust is involved, the purpose of mediation is to bring 

















The literature66 shows that awareness of the dynamics of trust may help develop 
it. There is support for the idea of measuring trust during the mediation process 
because of the importance of trust for organizational effectiveness and the 
resolution of conflicts. A questionnaire67 was created in order to measure the level 
of trust before starting the mediation process. This questionnaire could be used 
during the process as well to evaluate the improvement of trust among the parties.  
 
The mediator might use the results of the questionnaire to bring awareness about 
trust to the parties. They could thus acknowledge the dynamics of trust between 
them. The result sheet for identifying the different areas of trust involved helps 
orient the intervention.  
 
We suggest using the questionnaire during the first meeting, which is usually 
individual, and then, at the first common meeting, sharing the results with the 
parties so they can become aware of the level of trust between them. That first 
common meeting could also serve the purpose of making the parties aware of the 
dynamics of trust. This could include an explanation of the reciprocity of trust, 
which is related to the perception of trustworthiness, the behaviors associated with 
trust both within and without the mediation process, and commitment during the 
mediation process.  
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66  A. DULUC, op. cit., note 56; J. WU  et D. LAWS, op. cit., note 29, 329. 
67  The Questionnaire has 35 questions about openness, communication, participation, 
taking risk, taking responsibility, coherence, identification and explicit statement about 
trust. The participants answer on a scale from 1 to 10 to each question. The result sheet 
identifies the questions related to each areas and the average result is calculated for each 
of them.  





The next step in the mediation process would be addressing the relational conflict. 
As exposed before, once the relational conflict is resolved, the task or content 
conflict should be easier to solve. At the end of the mediation process, the parties 
would be asked to complete the questionnaire again in order to evaluate the 
changes.  
 
The particularity of the proposed process is the use of the measurement of trust as 
a tool to bring awareness of trust to the parties. The first step would be to talk 
about the relational conflict and deal with that as an issue to solve. Once that 
conflict was resolved, the parties would be able to address the task conflict, if 
there is one, using the agreement about trust. 
 





This article described trust as key to the performance of public organizations. 
When public organizations perform well, public trust increases. To achieve its 
mission, a public organization must often tackle complex tasks. To do so, a sense 
of interaction and interdependence between various individuals and work teams 
is required. This implies a certain level of trust.  
 
Trust exists between individuals when the relationship gives everyone a feeling 
of serenity due to the expectation that her or his interests will be taken into account 
and respected by the other party. However, when mistrust takes place, the 
situation can eventually evolve and create conflicts. In an organizational context, 
such conflicts are referred to as task conflicts, interest conflicts or content and 
relational conflicts.  





There are various approaches to enhancing and repairing trust. Mediation, in 
helping parties resolve their conflicts, has the potential to restore the trust between 
them. People come to mediation in order to solve disagreements in a consensual 
way. 
 
Trust between the parties is discussed in the literature on mediation. Authors have 
listed various strategies to help the mediator increase the level of trust between 
the parties, some of these dependent on the type of trust. However, that literature 
has traditionally put the accent on trust in the mediator and in the process, the idea 
being that trust between the parties should then increase by itself. The only 
situation where trust between the parties would have to be directly addressed is 
when the level of trust is too low to conduct the process or to reach an agreement.  
 
On the other hand, the literature on trust suggests that the awareness of the 
dynamics of trust can help develop or restore trust. Literature about organizational 
conflicts also proposes different ideas such as that once the relationship conflict 
is solved, parties might be able to solve the task conflict.  
 
This paper suggested that the awareness of trust between the parties, based on the 
measurement of the level of trust, will help develop trust. This proposition implies 
that the issue of trust between the parties would be addressed during the 
organizational mediation. The process proposed also insists that the mediation 
process should first focus on helping the parties solve the relational conflict. By 
solving the relational conflict, and thus repairing the trust between the parties, the 
task conflict, if there is one, would be easier to solve.  
 
As such, by increasing the trust among an organization’s members, and thus 
improving the organization’s performance, the use of mediation within public 
organizations may very well contribute to enhancing public trust. 
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Tacit Authorization: A Legal Solution for 
Administrative Silence 
Nicole G. Hoogstra*
This article discusses one of the current legal instruments to stimulate timely 
decision-making by administrative authorities, namely the “Lex silencio positivo” 
or the “Silence is Consent” rule. Tacit authorization prescribes that the license 
sought by the applicant will be granted automatically if decisions are not taken 
within prescribed time limits. 
Timely decision-making is crucial in order to protect and affects adversely the 
public trust in the government. Furthermore, if decisions are not taken within 
prescribed time limits this often results in legal uncertainty for the applicant.  
The idea of a system of fictitious decision-making is that it motivates 
administrative authorities to make a decision within the prescribed time limits. In 
the Netherlands, general provisions concerning tacit authorizations are included 
in division 4.1.3.3 of the General Administrative Law Act (GALA) and contains 
several instruments to safeguard the interests of parties. A system of tacit 
authorizations seems to terminate the legal uncertainty of an applicant and at the 
same time contributes to the public trust in the government. However, it is 
questionable whether or not a system of fictitious decision-making transfers the 
problems of legal uncertainty of an applicant to the society as a whole. The broad 
introduction of a system of tacit authorization has been severely criticized, 
because a fictitious approval might compromise precisely those public interests 
for which the licensing requirement was introduced. In order to protect the 
interests of parties the legislator designed several legal instruments.
1.  Introduction 
In the Netherlands, timely decision-making by administrative authorities is 
repeatedly considered to be a problem. Various studies indicate that 
administrative authorities are having a hard time responding to a variety of license 
applications within a set time limit.1 Timely decision-making is crucial in order 
                                                     
*  Lecturer and researcher (PhD candidate) at the Department of Constitutional Law, 
Administrative Law & Public Administration of the University of Groningen. 
1 See for instance three research reports of the Evaluation committee of the General 
Administrative Law Act: Toepassing en effecten van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht 
1994–1996, The Hague, 18 december 1996, p. 32 (Committee Polak), Toepassing en 
effecten van de Awb 1997-2001, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2001, p. 20, 
(Committee Boukema) and Toepassing en effecten van de Algemene wet bestuursrecht 
2002-2006, The Hague: Boom Juridische uitgevers 2006, p. 59 (Committee Ilsink). In 
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to protect both the democratic constitutional state and the credibility of the 
government.2 Repeatedly exceeding the decision deadline affects adversely the 
public trust in the government. Citizens and businesses should be able to rely on 
the government when it comes to timely decision-making.3 From an economic 
and practical point of view it is understandable that it frustrates applicants that 
they are bound by strict time deadlines – that must be considered to be final – 
while the government with impunity can breach the time limits. Furthermore, if 
decisions are not taken within prescribed time limits this often results in legal 
uncertainty for the applicant. The consequence of failing to make decisions in 
time is that an applicant is left in the dark regarding the start of planned activities. 
Without prior official authorization, it is prohibited to perform activities that 
require a license. Until a decision is made about granting a licensing application, 
the desired activities may not be carried out.  
In the past few years, the legislator has invested in various legal instruments with 
the aim of contributing to a solution for the failure by the government to comply 
with time limits.4 The intended purpose of the legal instruments is to stimulate 
timely decision making.5 To achieve this goal, the objective of these instruments 
is to sanction the administrative authority in case decisions are not made within 
the prescribed time limit. This article focuses on one of these new legal 
instruments, namely the “Lex silencio positivo” or the “Silence is Consent” rule. 
This rule prescribes, that in a growing number of licensing systems, the license 
sought by the applicant will be granted automatically if decisions are not taken 
within prescribed time limits. In fact, the idea behind a system of tacit 
authorization is that it motivates administrative authorities to make a decision 
within the prescribed time limits. So, in an ideal scenario the instrument would 
                                                     
addition to this, see the Netherlands Court of Audit, “Beslistermijnen. Waar blijft de 
tijd?” Parliamentary Papers II 2003/04, 29 495, no. 1-2 and Parliamentary Papers II
2008/09, 29 495, no. 3-4. Furthermore, according to multiple annual reports of the 
National Ombudsman each year a large number of complaints relate to the length of the 
decision-making procedure. See for example Annual report 1994, Parliamentary 
Papers II 1994/95, 24 125, no. 1–2, p. 28, Annual report 1996, Parliamentary Papers 
II 1996/97, 25 275, no. 1–2, p. 19 and Annual report 1998, Parliamentary Papers II
1998/99, 26 445, no. 1–2, p. 21. 
2 Parliamentary Papers II 2006/07, 30 844, no. 3, p. 6. 
3 Parliamentary Papers II 2004/05, 29 515, no. 84, p. 39.  
4  Non-legislative causes of failures in timely decision-making, such as insufficient 
employee competence, the workload being too high for government officials or the 
complexity of applications are not taken into consideration. However, the legislator 
does acknowledge the fact that finding a solution for the problem cannot be guaranteed 
with (only) legislation and regulation. See for example Parliamentary Papers II 
2006/07, 30 844, no. 3, p. 6. 
5  In this paper the term legislator is used for the legislature consisting of the Government 
and the States General. 
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never be used, since in this case the administrative authority would always decide 
before the strict deadline. However, the daily practice shows otherwise.6
At first sight, it seems that this system of tacit authorization terminates the legal 
uncertainty of an applicant and at the same time contributes to the public trust in 
the government. However, it can be questioned whether or not a system of 
fictitious decision-making transfers the problems of legal uncertainty of an 
applicant to the society as a whole. It should be noted that a system of fictitious 
decision-making implies that it is no longer guaranteed that a permit is the result 
of a substantive assessment of the application. This particular fact might affect 
adversely the public trust in the government when it comes to proper decision-
making. By the introduction of the system of fictitious decision-making, these 
matters were taken into consideration. The legislator has tried to design a system 
of fictitious decision-making that entitles both the interests of the applicant and 
the interests of society. This leads to the research question which is the central 
theme of this article:  
How does the system of tacit authorization contribute to maintaining the 
public trust in the government by (finding a balance in) safeguarding the 
public interests, interests of third parties and the interests of the applicant? 
To answer this research question, this article firstly describes the introduction of 
a system of fictitious approval in national administrative law in the Netherlands 
(section 2). It is discussed how the legislature has determined when and under 
what conditions tacit authorization will be granted. Subsequently, this article 
focuses on the severe criticism the system of fictitious approval had to face 
(section 3). That the legislator has taken notice of criticism and has introduced 
legal instruments to reduce possible negative effects of a system of tacit 
authorization is then examined (section 4). Finally, this article concludes with a 
summary and a few concluding remarks (section 5). 
2.  The broad introduction of the system of tacit authorization  
Since December 2009, the General Administrative Law Act (in short: GALA) 
contains a special division with general rules on fictitious authorizations. This 
division is added to the GALA by the implementation of the Services Directive 
                                                     
6  Nevertheless, regarding the case law based on for example the Environmental law act 
(in short: ELA) this is not the case in practice. See for example District Court of 
Amsterdam 27 March 2012, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2012:BW5007, JM 2012, 88 with 
annotation N.G. Hoogstra, District Court of Zeeland-West-Brabant 30 January 2013, 
ECLI:NL:RBZWB:2013:BZ0877, M & R 2013, 77 with annotation N.G. Hoogstra, 
Council of State 24 June 2015, ECLI:NL:RVS:2015:1986, JM 2015, 106 with 
annotation N.G. Hoogstra.  
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(2006/123/EC)7 in the Netherlands and relates in principle to all administrative 
legislation.8,9 It is worth mentioning that despite division 4.1.3.3 of the GALA 
existing only since a couple of years, tacit authorizations were not a new 
phenomenon in the Netherlands. For some licenses, special legislation already 
stipulates that failure on the part of the public administration to make a timely 
decision will result in a fictitious approval. A prime example of this system of 
tacit authorization based on national policy are former building permits. For a 
long time, these were granted tacitly under the Housing Act if no decision had 
been taken within the statutory time limit.10 Division 4.1.3.3 has replaced these 
different arrangements of fictional approval in the special acts for one general 
optional scheme.11
It is worth stating that specific acts can contain supplementary measures 
that deviate from the general scheme. An example is found in the 
Environmental law act (in short: ELA) which prescribes that division 
4.1.3.3 of the GALA applies in cases of using the so-called standard 
decision-making procedure with the exception of article 4:20b(3) and 
article 4:20f of the GALA.12 For these specific provisions, the ELA has its 
own scheme which will be discussed in more detail in section 4.  
The main reason for the broad introduction of a system of tacit authorization is 
Article 13(4) of the European Services Directive13 which obliges Member states 
to include a system of tacit authorization in their national legislation:  
                                                     
7  Directive 2006/123/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
12 December 2006 on services in the internal market (PbEU 2006, L 376/36). 
8  In other words, this division is applicable to legislation within and outside the scope of 
the Services Directive. 
9  The legislator has attempted to simplify complex licensing procedures. The result of 
this project is that various licensing systems are converted into general rules. In the 
remaining licensing systems, a strict deadline to make a decision is often included. See
Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 29 515, no. 224. 
10  Other former examples are the Monuments and Historic Buildings Act and the Mining 
Decree. 
11  This division only applies when stated in a specific Act. For legislation within the scope 
of the Services Directive this is the standard based on article 28(1) of the Services Act. 
For legislation outside the scope of the Services Directive an explicit provision that 
division 4.1.3.3 of the GALA is applicable is required. 
12  It is hardly surprising that a strict deadline for making an administrative decision is 
incorporated in the ELA, since this instrument did already apply to several licensing 
systems – for example the building permit based on the former Housing act – that now 
are included in the ELA. 
13  One of the main reasons for the introduction of the European Services Directive was 
that the administrative licensing procedures that service providers had to follow in order 
to set up businesses in different member states were perceived as complicated and time-
consuming. In other words, it has not always been easy for service providers to start 
their activities in other European counties, despite the idea of freedom of movement of 
services. The main goal of the Services Directive is to change this situation and to 
facilitate the free movement of services. In order to contribute to the free movement of 
services, the Services Directive contains several articles focusing on licensing 
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Article 13(4) Services Directive: “Failing a response within the time period 
set or extended in accordance with paragraph 3, authorization shall be 
deemed to have been granted. Different arrangements may nevertheless be 
put in place, where justified by overriding reasons relating to the public 
interest, including a legitimate interest of third parties.” 
This rule prescribes that the license sought by an applicant will be granted 
automatically if decisions are not taken within prescribed time limits. However, 
the European Services Directive leaves room for member states to make “different 
arrangements”. This indicates that exceptions to the basic rule of tacit 
authorization can be made for certain licensing systems if this can be justified “by 
overriding reasons relating to the public interest, including a legitimate interest of 
third parties”. The concept of “overriding reasons relating to the public interest” 
has been developed by the Court of Justice in its case law on the articles 49 and 
56 TFEU and may continue to evolve.14
It is worth mentioning that during the legislative process at the European 
level a lot of criticism has been directed at the introduction of the system 
of tacit authorization.15 It was even proposed to delete paragraph 4 of 
article 13 of the Services Directive because of the risk of evidentiary 
problems, such as danger to public health. Nevertheless, the instrument 
was included in the final version of the Services Directive and it had to 
be implemented in the national law of the member states by 28 December 
2009. 
In the Netherlands, the European Services Directive is mainly implemented in the 
Services Act.16, 17 As already mentioned, apart from this Act a new division was 
added to the General Administrative Law Act (GALA), especially for the 
introduction of tacit authorizations.18 It is worth mentioning that the Services Act 
itself does not contain any general rules regarding fictitious authorizations, 
                                                     
procedures. The idea behind these different provisions is that licensing procedures 
should not discourage service providers from setting up businesses in other member 
states. In other words, a licensing procedure should not be an (huge) obstacle for a 
service provider. See COM(2002) 441 (The state of the internal market for services),
p. 19-20. 
14 See also Article 4(8) and Recital 40 of the Services Directive. 
15  European Parliament, Amendments 747-941, 2005, PE 360.092v02-00 (p. 3/142). 
16  In Dutch: Dienstenwet.  
17  This article pays no attention to questions if Article 13 (4) of the Services Directive is 
implemented in the right way in the Netherlands. See on this subject K.J. de Graaf & 
N.G. Hoogstra, Silence is Golden? Tacit Authorizations in the Netherlands, Germany 
and France, REALaw 2013-2, p. 7-34 (section 3.2). 
18  In the Netherlands, this part of the implementation of the European Services Directive 
that has been most discussed. See U. Stelkens, W. Weiß & M. Mirschberger, “The 
Implementation of the EU Services Directive. Transposition, Problems and Strategies”,
The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press 2012, p. 37. 
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however the Act simply refers to division 4.1.3.3 of the GALA, which (again) sets 
out general rules on this matter.  
3.  Critical observations with regard to safeguarding of interests 
The introduction of a broad system of fictitious approvals has been severely 
criticized. In particular, the Council of State, in its advisory role, is not in favor of 
tacit authorizations and even recommended to withdraw this legal instrument 
from national administrative law in the Netherlands.19
The main point of criticism directed at this instrument is that it is very likely that 
the public interest and the interests of third parties are not taken into consideration. 
In addition, a tacit authorization places the applicant’s interest above the public 
interest and the interests of third parties. In other words, public interests, as well 
as private interests of third parties, can be set aside in favor of the licensee. The 
exercise of activities requiring prior authorization must now be allowed without, 
as is customary, being tested for compatibility with the public interest. In a system 
of tacit authorization, activities contravening the public interest are all of a sudden 
allowed, which means that, as with the legal certainty of third parties, protection 
of this interest is no longer safeguarded without further regulation.  
Fictitious approval can cause legal uncertainties, considering the fact that this type 
of permit does not comply with the procedural and substantive demands which 
normally apply to formal administrative decisions. Moreover, the Council of 
State, in its advisory role, notes that a tacit authorization is not based on an 
adequate balance of interests.20 The interests of third parties are not properly being 
weighed up against other interests, either because a substantive assessment of the 
license application has not taken place or because this assessment has not resulted 
in an actual administrative decision. 21   In addition, the decision will not be 
properly motivated, especially because of the fact that there is not even a written 
decision. Normally, the administrative authority has to fulfill the obligation to 
provide reasons for the administrative decision that explain why the decision was 
taken.22
                                                     
19  The Council of State has been reserved with regard to the introduction of a system of 
tacit authorization. See Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 29 515, no. 224, 
Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 579, no. 4, Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 32 
844, no. 4 and Parliamentary Papers II 2009-2010, 32 454, no. 4. 
20  The Council of State believes that a fictitious approval can have harmful effects for 
third parties or society as a whole. This is especially the case when the tacit 
authorization occurs with licensing systems regulated in the ELA, because these 
licensing systems do almost always affect the physical living environment, the interests 
of third parties and the public interest. See Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 32 844, 
no. 4, p. 9-10.  
21 See article 1:3(2) of the GALA: “Administrative decision” means an order which is not 
of a general nature, including rejection of an application for such an order. 
22  Article 3:46 of the GALA.  
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4.  Protection of interests: instruments  
4.1  Introduction  
The legislator took notice of the criticism and acknowledged that tacit 
authorization might have harmful effects on the public interest and the interests 
of third parties. In order to protect these interests, the legislator introduced several 
legal instruments in the GALA.23 These instruments will be discussed in this 
section. In addition, there will be attention drawn to the supplementary 
instruments from the ELA which are also included in the law in order to safeguard 
the public interests and the interests of third parties. 
In this context, one of the first questions that arises is when a fictitious approval 
enters into force and how interested parties are given notice that authorization has 
been granted (section 4.2). Another relevant issue is which legal possibilities an 
administrative authority has to protect the interests of parties, after an 
authorization is granted tacitly (section 4.3). The third matter that is examined is 
how legal protection against tacit authorizations is regulated (section 4.4).  
4.2  Notification and the entering into force of tacit authorizations  
When division 4.1.3.3 of the GALA has been declared applicable to a certain 
licensing system, then tacit authorization can be granted if the statutory time limit 
has expired and the administrative authority has not responded to the 
application. 24  In case a statutory time limit is missing in a specific Act, a 
“reasonable time limit” of eight weeks will apply.25 Since exceeding the strict 
deadline results in a fictitious approval, it is important that the both the applicant 
and third parties stay informed of the strict deadline. For that reason, it is strongly 
recommended that the competent administrative authority send an acknowl-
edgment of receipt of the application as soon as possible, stating both the time 
limit for the response and the fact that tacit authorization will be granted if no 
response is sent within the given time limit.26
In case a tacit authorization is deemed to have been granted, this approval takes 
effect on the third day after the time limit has expired.27 There is a reason why 
                                                     
23  The expectation of the legislator is that these instruments will only be used in 
exceptional cases. Parliamentary Papers II 2006/07, 30 844, no. 3, p. 36. 
24  For example, there is a prescribed time limit of eight weeks for applications covered by 
the standard preparatory procedure as set out in Article 3.9(1) of the ELA. This time 
limit can only be extended once by the administrative authority for 6 weeks at most. So 
the time limit is fourteen weeks at most. 
25 See also Article 31 of the Services Act and Article 4:14 of the GALA.  
26  This is mandatory by applications for an environmental license. See Articles 3.8 and 
3.9(1) of the ELA.  
27  Article 4:20b(3) of the GALA.  
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there is “gap between the tacit authorization itself and the entry into force of this 
license. The legislator has chosen the third day after expiry of the time limit to 
ensure that a formal decision sent by the administrative authority on the last day 
of the time limit could be delivered by mail.  
It is worth mentioning that due to formal decisions, a notice that the authorization 
has been granted tacitly based on the GALA is not required for the entry into force 
of the fictitious permit. It is remarkable that a notification, in which it is stated 
that a license has been tacitly granted, is not a condition in the GALA for entering 
into force. Normally, an administrative decision shall not take effect until it has 
been notified.28 A benefit from the situation that a tacit authorization enters into 
force automatically is that the administrative authority has no influence on the 
moment the license takes effect.29
Notable is that Article 4:20b(3) of the GALA is not applied mutatis mutandis in 
the ELA.30 According to the ELA, a fictitious permit needs to be notified before 
it can become effective. In addition, the licensee of a fictitious environment permit 
can only benefit from this license once the time limit for formally filing in a notice 
of objection has expired, or in case a notice of objection has been filed, after a 
decision on that objection has taken place.31 In other words, the entering into force 
of a tacit environmental permit will be automatically suspended for a numbers of 
weeks.32
Nevertheless, in the events referred to in either the GALA 4 or the ELA the 
administrative authority is obliged to give notice of the fictitious authorization 
within two weeks of its entry into force or its emergence.33 In addition, the 
administrative authority is required to give public notice that it is a fictitious 
approval instead of a formal (real) license.34 With this public notification, third 
parties are informed of the fictitious approval. However, it is questionable whether 
public notification of tacit authorization does always take place. It has been 
discussed whether an administrative authority, unable of making a decision within 
                                                     
28  Article 3:40 of the GALA: “An order shall not take effect until it has been notified”. 
Article 3:41 of the GALA: “Orders which are addressed to one or more interested 
parties shall be notified by being sent or issued to these, including the applicant”. 
29 Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31579, no. 3, p. 129-130. 
30  For the record, this means that a tacit authorization based on the ELA does not entry 
into force after three days after the time limit has expired. 
31  Article 6.1(4) of the ELA.  
32  Moreover, it is possible for the licensee of the fictitious permit to ask for a preliminary 
injunction in order to reverse the suspensive effect. See also C.M. Saris, “Tijdig 
beslissen. Het doel dichterbij met de Wet dwangsom en beroep bij niet tijdig beslissen 
en de verruiming van de lex silencio positivo?”, De Gemeentestem 2008, nr. 30. 
33  An interesting question might be how a (notice of) fictitious approval would look like, 
because of the absence of a written administrative decision. 
34  Article 4:20c(2) of the GALA. 
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the prescribed time limit, would announce an issued fictitious license in time.35 In 
other words, it would be highly likely that the administrative authority fails to 
give a notification within two weeks after the strict deadline, the expiration of 
which has led to a tacit authorization. 
If the administrative authority fails on the duty of notification, there is a risk that 
the administrative authority has to pay a penalty.36 This is the case when the 
applicant has asked for notification by a written notice of default and the 
administrative authority has not answered this request within two weeks.37 The 
penalty payment can be € 1260 at most.38 The exact size of the penalty payment 
depends on the amount of time it takes before the administrative authority notifies 
the tacit authorization. With this instrument, the administrative authority is once 
again sanctioned for the fact that a decision has not been made before a strict 
deadline. Secondly, it is also possible to force the administrative authority to send 
notice by filing an appeal with the administrative court, again, after a written 
notice of default has been issued and two weeks have passed.39
4.3  Authority to amend or revoke tacit authorizations 
In order to safeguard interests after a license is granted tacitly are so-called 
standard conditions automatically attached to the fictitious approval. If a statutory 
provision or a policy guideline were to stipulate the standard conditions that are 
normally to be included in the permit, they apply by operation of law to tacit 
authorizations.40 This particular regulation aims to equalize license conditions for 
substantive administrative decisions and fictitious decisions.41
                                                     
35  J. Robbe, “De omgevingsvergunning van rechtswege”, in: A.A.J. de Gier e.a. (red.), 
Goed verdedigbaar, Vernieuwing van bestuursrecht en omgevingsrecht, Deventer: 
Kluwer 2011, p. 477-490; J. Robbe, “De Awb en de omgevingsvergunning van 
rechtswege”, TO 2012/3, p. 55-63. 
36  Article 4:20d of the GALA.  
37  Article 6:12 of the GALA. 
38 See the rapport “Monitor Wet dwangsom” attachment by Parliamentary Papers II
2012/13, 29 934, no. 29. 
39  Article 8:55f of the GALA.  
40  By way of example, in the explanatory memorandum attached to this instrument, the 
case of a license that gives permission to set up a terrace is mentioned. Attached to this 
type of license, most municipalities in the Netherlands have a standard condition with 
regard to closing times. The same closing time applies in case of a fictitious terrace 
permit, irrespective of whether or not this is included in the license application 
(Parliamentary Papers II 2007/08, 31 579, no. 3, p. 133). 
41  A standard condition is a rule which is included in a legal provision or a policy rule. 
However which exact rules can be seen as standard conditions is unclear. This has led 
to some debate in Dutch literature. See B. de Kam, “De vergunning van rechtswege en 
standaardvoorschriften”, De Gemeentestem 2010, 107 and B.M. Kocken, “Lex silencio 
positivo. Stand van zaken”, Vastgoedrecht, 2011-1, p. 5-11. 
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Besides standard conditions, the administrative authority has the power to either 
add conditions to the fictitious approval or to revoke the license if this is needed 
to avoid serious consequences for the public interest.42 Both can be done within a 
time limit of six weeks after sending a notification of the tacit authorization.43 The 
licensee is entitled to compensation if the administrative authority decides to 
amend or revoke a tacit authorization. Only the damage resulting from the 
amendment or revocation of the license is considered for compensation, not the 
damage which may arise after a license issued by right is granted.44
It is remarkable that (again) the ELA contains its own rules about the possibility 
to attach conditions to the authorization or to revoke it in case of serious 
consequences for the physical living environment.45  Keep in mind that, as ex-
plained in the previous section, a tacit environmental license will only enter into 
force until the term to file in a notice of objection has expired, or if a notice of 
objection has been registered after a decision is made on this objection. Therefore, 
no detrimental consequences for the physical living environment will occur within 
at least six weeks after the license is announced. This gives the administrative 
authority the opportunity to examine if the fictitious license has detrimental 
consequences for the physical living environment and which measures might offer 
an adequate solution. Consequently, together with the announcement of the tacit 
license to the license applicant, the conditions attached to the tacit decision or the 
(partial) revocation of the license can also be announced.  
It is interesting to note that the wordings used in the ELA are different from the 
terminology used the GALA. The scope of this regulation in the ELA appears to 
be more restrictive, since “serious consequences for the physical living 
environment” is a more restricted concept than “serious consequences for the 
public interest”, which is used in the GALA. In this context, it is worth pointing 
out that the ELA includes a quite rigorous obligation for the administrative 
authority to amend or to revoke the fictitious approval, whereas the GALA only 
stipulates the competence to do so. Furthermore, in the ELA, the administrative 
authority is not subject to a strict period of time in which conditions need to be 
attached to the license or in which the license has to be revoked. Naturally it would 
be best if the administrative authority takes measures within a short period of time 
in light of the serious detrimental consequences that the tacit authorization might 
have. 
                                                     
42  Article 4:20f of the GALA.  
43  Notification in the sense of Article 4:20c of the GALA.  
44  Article 4:20f(3) of the GALA.  
45  Article 2.31 and 2.33 of the ELA. 
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4.4  Legal protection in case of tacit authorizations  
A fictitious authorization can be legally challenged the same way a formal (real) 
decision on an application is challenged.46 This generally means that first an 
objection shall be made by submitting a notice of objection to the administrative 
authority which “made” the fictitious approval.47 Next, the fictitious approval can 
be challenged at the district court and the decision can be appealed at the 
Administrative Jurisdiction Division of the Council of State.48
The six-week period during which an appeal can be lodged against a tacit 
authorization begins when notice is given of the authorization.49 As explained 
earlier there can be a substantial difference between the moment the tacit 
authorization takes effect and the moment an administrative authority gives notice 
of this license.50 This means that third parties have to wait until notice is given 
before they can officially object against the tacit authorization.  
Another issue – which automatically occurs in case of a fictitious license – is that 
there is no written document in which the reasons for the decision are stated. It is 
assumed that it is not really possible to check for compliance with procedural 
requirements, such as the requirement that sound reasons are given; that would 
mean that any legal action would lead to a successful appeal which could hardly 
have been the intention of the legislature.51 If the administrative court completely 
or partially annuls the tacit authorization, the authority must make a new decision. 
Failure to comply with the administrative court’s order to make a new decision 
cannot lead to another tacit authorization.52
5.  Summary and concluding remarks  
In this article, the introduction of a broad system of tacit authorization in the 
Netherlands is analyzed. The objective of tacit authorization is to stimulate timely 
decision making by administrative authorities; it implies that if the administrative 
authority fails to respond to the license application within the set time limit, the 
license that is being sought by the applicant is automatically granted.  
                                                     
46  Although theoretically a tacit authorization cannot been seen as an “order” (defined in 
Article 1:3(1) of the GALA as a written decision of an administrative authority 
constituting a public law act), Article 4:20b(2) simply states that it is regarded as an 
order.
47  Article 6:4 of the GALA.  
48  Article 8:1 and 8:104 of the GALA.  
49  Article 6:8 of the GALA: “The time limit shall start on the day after that on which the 
order is notified in the prescribed manner”. 
50 See in detail section 4.2.  
51 See also M.I.P. Buteijn, “Lex silencio positivo: spreken is zilver, zwijgen is goud…of 
niet”, Journaal Bestuursrecht 2009, 15, p. 238. 
52 Parliamentary Papers II 2009/10, 32 454, no. 3, p. 4. 
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Various studies show that administrative authorities are having a hard time 
responding to a variety of license applications within the set time limit. Timely 
decision-making is crucial in order to protect both the democratic constitutional 
state and the credibility of the government. Furthermore, if decisions are not taken 
within prescribed time limits, then this often results in legal uncertainty for the 
applicant. The legislator tries to solve these problems caused by exceeding the set 
time limit with the introduction of a system of tacit authorizations in a growing 
number of licensing systems. The question is whether or not the solution of a 
system of tacit authorization transfers the problems of legal uncertainty of an 
applicant to the society as a whole. This particular fact might affect adversely the 
public trust in the government when it comes to proper decision-making. This 
leads to the research question how the system of tacit authorization contributes to 
maintaining the public trust in the government by (finding a balance in) 
safeguarding the public interests, interests of third parties and the interests of the 
applicant.  
Since December 2009, general provisions concerning fictitious approvals are 
included in division 4.1.3.3 of the GALA. The main reason for the broad 
introduction of a system of tacit authorization is Article 13(4) of the European 
Services Directive which obliges Member states to include a system of tacit 
authorization in their national legislation.  
In the Netherlands, the introduction of a system of tacit authorization has been 
severely criticized. One of the main points of criticism directed at this instrument 
is that public interests, as well as private interests of third parties, can be set aside 
in favor of the licensee. In addition, it was suggested that a system of tacit 
authorization would cause legal uncertainties for the applicant as well as for third 
parties, considering the fact that this type of permit does not comply with the 
procedural and substantive demands which normally apply to formal admin-
istrative decisions.  
The legislator acknowledged that a system of tacit authorization might have 
negative effects for the public interest and the interests of third parties. In order to 
protect these interests, the legislator has included special provisions on 
notification and entry into force in the GALA in order to ensure that parties are 
informed about the fictitious approval. Next, a fictitious authorization can be 
legally challenged the same way a formal decision on an application is challenged. 
Essentially, negative consequences are restricted to those cases where no legal 
instruments are used against tacit authorization. In those cases, the administrative 
authority has the power to amend or revoke a tacit authorization if this is needed 
to avoid serious consequences for the public interest. Moreover, so-called 
standard conditions are normally to be included in a license also apply to tacit 
authorizations. 
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However, the question remains as to what extent a system of tacit authorization 
contributes to safeguarding the interests of parties and maintains the public trust 
in the government. The fact is that the applicant automatically obtains a license 
after the set time limit exceeds. An applicant is no longer left in the dark with 
regards to the start of planned activities. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the 
applicant can derive sufficient legal certainty from a fictitious approval, since 
there is no (written) documentation of the arguments in support of the decision. 
Moreover, because of the safeguards introduced by the legislator, the applicant 
cannot simply rely on the fictitious approval. At the same time, despite these 
safeguards, it cannot be guaranteed that the fictitious approval has detrimental 
consequences for the public interests and the interests of third parties. As a result, 
it cannot be discounted that a system of fictitious decision-making transfers the 
problems of legal uncertainty of an applicant to the society as a whole. 
In conclusion, the current system of tacit authorization has both positive and 
negative aspects, and as a result of which it remains questionable whether it will 
affect the public trust in the government. In the end, the real impact of a system 
of fictitious decision-making depends on the use of the instrument in practice, 
which could be developed in future research.  
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The European Citizens’ Initiative’s Role in 
Having the Grass Roots Associations Connect 





The European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) is meant to give citizens an instrument to 
call on the European Commission to propose legislation on matters where the 
Commission has the competence to do so.1  The ECI is labelled as an instrument 
for “direct political participation” of citizens in the EU and would provide EU 
citizens with a form of “direct democracy” as a complement to representative 
government. With the ECI citizens can try having an issue put on the political 
agenda of the EU directly by themselves, instead of being dependent on political 
parties and representative democratic institutions. 
 
In order to submit an ECI to the European Commission, the organizers in the time 
of one year have to collect one million eligible signatures coming from at least 
seven Member States.2 Once submitted, the ECI is a formal demand to the 
Commission to propose legislation. The Commission will invite the organizing 
committee to explain the Initiative and a public hearing at the European 
Parliament will be organized. The Commission is obliged, within three months, 
to communicate its legal and political conclusions on a Citizens’ Initiative as well 
as the action it intends to take and the reasons for doing this. 
 
The ECI seems to have little to offer in terms of direct access to the EU agenda. 
The European Commission, having the monopoly of legislative initiative, indeed 
is obliged to give an answer to the demand that is made in each submitted 
initiative. However, it retains full control over whether and how to turn such 
demand into an agenda item. In addition, although not in their formal role, also 
                                                            
*  Assistant Professor in Political Science at the Faculty of Law, University of Groningen. 
1  In article 1 of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 this is formulated as follows: “‘citizens’ 
initiative” means an initiative submitted to the Commission in accordance with this 
Regulation, inviting this commission, within the framework of its powers, to submit any 
appropriate proposal on matters where citizens consider that a legal act of the Union 
is required for the purpose of implementing  the Treaties’ The Regulation, containing 
the rules and procedures governing the ECI, was adopted by the EP and the Council of 
the EU on 16 February 2011.The Citizen’s Initiatives could be launched from 
April 1, 2012. 
2  In addition, a minimum number of signatures has to come from each member state 
which equals the member states number of MEP’s multiplied by 750. 





the European Council and the Council tend to put their stamp on this first phase 
of decision making in which law proposals are initiated and, compared to theirs, 
the pressure of ECIs on the Commission will carry less weight.3 
 
But what about stimulating public trust? The 2010 report of Statistics Netherlands 
expects “networks where common values are shared” to have positive effects on 
citizens’ trust in each other as well as in the governmental institutions that 
formulate public law.4  Also, according to Putnam and more recent research 
concerning citizen participation in policy making, the partaking of citizens in such 
networks is positively correlated to trust in each other and in the community.5 
Because the success of ECIs is dependent on organizing the collection of 
signatures well and connecting as many individuals and groups as possible to the 
ECI’s cause, it can be regarded as an instrument for creating new policy networks 
or expanding existing policy networks at the EU level.6 So, through its capacity 
to mobilize citizens into networks the ECI may very well foster public trust.  
 
Because of the “democratic deficit” the European Union has a clear interest in 
increasing citizens’ trust in and engagement with each other across the Member 
States. In the context of the creation of the ECI, political science scholars have 
debated the role interest groups (could) play in this process. This debate will be 
summarized in the first section of this article in order to make clear that a stronger 
connection between existing EU interest groups and grassroots associations in the 
member countries is considered to be a necessary condition for involving citizens 
in the EU as a political community and stimulating their trust in each other. 
Because this connection is seen as a necessary condition, in the remainder of the 
article the hypothesis will be explored of whether ECIs produce such connections. 
This will be done by looking into what kind of interest groups have been involved 
in the sixteen ECIs that were closed before May 2014. 
                                                            
3  See Vogiatzis who states that the monopoly of legislative initiative of the EC comes 
down to its proposal of bills “that are likely to be accepted at the level of the European 
Parliament and the Council”, Vogiatzis, N. Is the European Citizens’ Initiative a serious 
threat for the common method? European Journal of Legal studies, Volume 6, Issue 1 
(2013), p. 91-107. 
4  As Statistics Netherlands admits, the exact causal relation here is difficult to establish; 
CBS (2010) De Nederlandse samenleving. The Hague: Centraal Bureau voor de 
Statistiek, p. 179. 
5  Bovens, M. and A.Wille (2010) The education gap in participation and its political 
consequences, Acta Politica, Vol. 45,4, 393-422.; Putnam, R, (2000), Bowling alone: 
The Collapse and Revival of American Community. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
6  Policy network is the term used in political science to describe the interactions between 
actors within and outside the political system’s institutions that are directed at the 
exchange of information and also include taking part in the writing of and bargaining 
over policy proposals, in short in policy making, Heywood, A. (2013), Politics, 
Basingstoke/ New York: Palgrave, p. 358; Rhodes, R. A. W. (1996), The New 
Governance: Governing without Government. Political Studies, 44, 4, pp. 652–667. 
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1. Theories concerning citizen interest groups as the missing connection 
for EU’s democratic legitimacy 
 
On the occasion of the EU setting up the ECI, political science scholars debated 
the role interest groups could play with respect to this instrument as well as 
strengthening the link between citizens and the European Union more generally.  
 
Chalmers sees a predominantly positive role for interest groups.7 The first reason 
mentioned by this author is the long-time engagement between interest groups 
and the EU based on the mutual benefit that results from their collaboration. EU 
decision makers need interest groups, who are experts in their fields, to fill in their 
lack of knowledge and information. Interest groups in return for this knowledge 
and information are given a voice or even influence in policy making. Such long-
time engagement indeed can be witnessed in the vast number of business, labour 
and professional groups that already in the early nineties had found their way to 
Brussels and/or even had gained insider access to EU decision making. At that 
point in time, environmental, consumer, women and other social interest groups 
made themselves heard. In the light of the pluralism of interest representation that 
is required for democratic legitimacy, these groups convinced EU decision 
makers that they should be consulted in addition to the business groups, unions 
and professional groups that usually were involved. Since the 1992 summit in 
Maastricht the EU therefore has stimulated such citizen interest groups by funding 
in addition to involving them in dialogues with the European Commission and 
inviting them to hearings in the European Parliament.  
 
The second reason Chalmers gives for the positive role interest groups can play 
revolves around the idea of input legitimacy. By input legitimacy it is meant that 
political systems should provide a channel for citizens to make their views known 
and have chances to shape its policy in a way that expresses their collective 
interests. Output legitimacy refers to the extent to which a political system is able 
to respond to the needs of its members. Whereas until recently the EU did well 
with respect to the output legitimacy, the economic and financial crisis severely 
deteriorated this legitimacy. The attention now has shifted to the EU’s input 
legitimacy, where weakness has existed already from the beginning, but makes 
itself felt now stronger than before. Chalmers sees interest groups as providing an 
extra channel for citizens’ input, a channel that possibly is more attractive than 
European parliament elections, considering the consistently low voter-turnout 
rates. Interest groups in some cases may offer better opportunities than the one 
vote that is counted in elections because interest group representatives can take 
the intensity of citizen preferences on certain issues into account. In addition, such 
groups provide arenas for discussion on EU issues. Chalmers even believes 
interest groups work to generate a sense of trust, or so called social capital, 
                                                            
7  Chalmers, A.W. (2011) Direct Democracy for the EU: A place for Interest Groups in 
the European Citizens’ Initiative. Working paper FG 1, 2011/05, December SWP 
Berlin. 





between members.8 Here the optimism of the Commission’s White Paper on 
Governance on citizen interest groups reverberates.9 In this white paper, citizen 
interest groups are more or less assigned with giving citizens the feeling that their 
contribution matters and encouraging them to participate in policy formulation of 
the EU.10 
 
Other scholars agree with the importance of input legitimacy for the EU but 
clearly consider it as a requirement still to be fulfilled. With respect to the 
importance of input legitimacy, they claim that the majority principle in a polity 
can only be democratically legitimate if its constituents are able to recognize each 
other as members of that polity. Making citizens feel able to influence the choices 
of the EU decision makers is therefore regarded as a crucial part of such 
legitimacy.11 However, they are less optimistic than Chalmers about whether 
interest groups could make this happen. According to Sudbery,  
 
NGOs prioritize the optimization of their influence on the outcomes over 
encouraging their members to participate in the formulation of standpoints. The 
author concluded this from interviews with NGO members about their role in the 
development of the mentioned white paper.12 Bouza Garcia did research into the 
way in which citizen interest groups in the last two decennia have tried to secure 
a role in the EU’s policy making process more generally.13 His conclusion is 
similar: the focus of citizen interest groups at the EU level is on advocacy with 
the institutions, and the mobilization of activists and grass roots members only 
has a modest place in their collective action register. According to Bouza Garcia, 
these groups choose insider access to the political agenda as the strategy to exert 
influence on EU decision making instead of the involvement of “ordinary” 
citizens in their activities and plans. This goes at the expense of the participation 
of such citizens in European politics.   
 
                                                            
8  Chalmers, 2011, p. 4. 
9  White Paper on Governance (2001) COM(2001) 428 final - Official Journal C 287 of 
12.10.2001. 
10  Id. 
11  Barber, B. (2003) Strong democracy. Participatory politics for a new age. Berkeley and 
Los Angeles: University of California Press; Weiler, J. (1991) Problems of Legitimacy 
in Post 1992 Europe, Aussenwirtschaft, Vol. 46, nr. ¾, p. 411-437; Sudbery, I. (2003) 
Bridging the Legitimacy Gap in the EU: Can Civil Society Help to Bring the Union 
Closer to Its Citizens? Collegium, No. 26, Spring 2003, 83. 
12  Sudbery 2003. 
13  Bouza Garcia, L. (2012) Anticipating the Attitudes of European Civil Society 
Organizations to the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI): Which public Sphere may it 
Promote? Bruges Political Research Papers, No 24, February 2012, pp. 23- 51, p. 39; 
Bouza Garcia, L. (2015) Participatory Democracy and Civil Society in the EU. Agenda-
Setting and Institutionalization. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan. 
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The European Citizen’s Initiative could possibly bring a change in these 
mechanisms as it offers citizens and citizen groups from outside the Brussels 
bubble the opportunity of contributing to EU agenda setting.14 A concerted effort 
for EU agenda setting would consist in either citizens (groups) starting from grass 
roots to associate themselves around the issue they would like to be put on the 
European agenda or already existing grass roots groups forming coalitions with 
the Brussels based citizens interest groups, such as Social Platform or Amnesty 
International Europe.15 The latter kind of organizations are expected after all to 
make use of the ECI as an extra channel for furthering their causes. In order to do 
this, these Brussels based organizations would need the support of many citizens 
living across at least seven member states in order to launch an ECI successfully. 
This is the reason why they are likely to create connections with grass roots 
associations in ECI signature collection campaigns. Therefore, the ECI can be 
expected to create grass roots activism as well as to create links between the 
existing Brussels-based citizen interest groups and grass roots associations. The 
following hypothesis will be tested in this article:  
 
The ECI will stimulate: 
a) the creation of grass roots associations directed at European policy 
making 
b) the creation of connections between Brussels orientated citizen 
organizations (professional advocacy groups) and grass roots 
associations. 
 
2. Approach taken to test the hypothesis  
 
In order to test the hypothesis, a clear definition of grass roots association is 
needed by which a distinction can be made between associations that are either 
grass roots or not. Different definitions of grass roots exist. Grass roots advocacy 
for instance is described as a political strategy of companies and political parties 
to influence public debates and policy through first harnessing the ideas and 
thoughts of their employees or members.16 However, for the academic purpose of 
this article the more neutral definition of grass roots association by sociologist 
David Horton Smith has been taken as reference point. According to him, grass 
roots associations are “locally based, significantly autonomous, volunteer-run, 
formal non-profit groups, that manifest substantial voluntary altruism and use the 
associational form of organization”.17  
 
                                                            
14  Or at least make a contributions to the public debates at the EU level.  
15  A definition of grass roots association will be given in section 2.  
16  See http://www.votility.com, last visited on 19 June 2015. 
17  Smith, D.H. (2000) Grassroots associations. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 7. 





Altruism is described by Smith as the tendency or disposition of an individual or 
group to provide a significant service to another individual or group.18 He 
explicitly wants to stay away from making altruism too virtuous and he stresses 
that altruism is not identical to philanthropy and instead considers altruism to be 
widespread among human beings and forming a normal and integral part of life 
since human beings are social animals.  
 
In the following, I will elaborate on the three criteria derived from Smith’s 
definition of grass roots associations that have been applied in this article. This 
elaboration is needed because the ingredients of this description by themselves do 
not provide for clear-cut dividing lines, but instead are more a matter of gradation. 
The first criterion to be discussed in this context is: grass roots meaning groups 
that are volunteer-run. There are many well-known formal non-profit groups that 
have paid-staff as well as volunteers, Amnesty International for example. Smith 
acknowledges that distinguishing grass roots associations from paid staff 
voluntary groups is “a matter of gradation rather than a hard-and-fast cutting point 
on the all volunteers versus all paid dimension”.19 His suggestion is to make the 
cutting-point where 50% of the analytical members of the group are 
unremunerated, analytical members being “regular service-providing affiliates” 
of the groups (2000,). This suggestion has been followed in this article.  
 
The second criterion to be fulfilled in order to categorize voluntary groups as grass 
roots is that they should be significantly autonomous. The adjective 
“significantly” already makes clear that this criterion which concerns the relation 
between the voluntary group to other groups, either business, government or 
hierarchical organized religion, does not provide a clear-cut dividing line but is a 
matter of degree. This can be described as a scale representing total autonomy on 
the one side and totally being controlled by another person or group on the other 
side, and the actions of voluntary groups involved in ECIs finding themselves 
somewhere between these two opposites. So again the question is where on this 
scale the cutting-line has been drawn in order to categorize voluntary groups as 
acting significantly autonomous. The approach chosen is not to include those 
voluntary groups that in the ECI signature collection campaign manifestly made 
use of vested hierarchical relations in order to organize support for their cause. In 
the case of the ECI One of Us for instance two Catholic popes have subsequently 
asked their faithful to support and sign the initiative.20 In addition, Catholic 
Bishops in various countries did likewise and signatures were often collected in 
                                                            
18   Smith sees providing significant services to other people as something people are 
usually inclined to do in their jobs, families as well as in other associations they are 
involved in The adjective “voluntary” he has added to altruism in his definition of grass 
roots association in order to distinguish the altruism displayed in the latter associations 
from the altruism displayed in the workplace and family. Smith, D.H. (1981) Altruism, 
volunteers and voluntarism, Journal of Voluntary Action Research 10 (1).  
19  Supra, n 17, p. 28 and 30. 
20  Pope Benedict who resigned on 28 February 2013 and his successor Pope Francis.    
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churches. This is why the supporting pro-life organizations in this context have 
not been categorized as significantly autonomous. The last criterion, that grass 
roots associations should be locally based in this research has been 
operationalized as not being Brussels or Strasbourg based. 
 
Organizations can be involved in an ECI in two ways.21 Firstly, as the organization 
the Citizens’ Committee’s members are affiliated with. The Citizens’ Committee 
is a committee of seven EU citizens that organizes the initiative and manages the 
procedure through the whole process from initiation to receiving a conclusion 
from the European Commission.22 The members of such committee must be 
natural persons.23 However, this does not exclude the possibility of these 
members being connected to relevant pre-existing associations. So in addition to 
the new association formed with the other committee members, also other, pre-
existing associations, may be involved at this point. These associations can be 
either Brussels based European organizations, grass roots or other associations. 
Therefore, the interest associations that are connected to the Citizens’ Committee 
members have been traced and categorized as grass roots or not (see table 2).  
 
A second way in which organizations are involved in an ECI is as supporting 
groups.24 The support of the group to the ECI can be either a financial contribution 
and/or a public expression of them supporting the ECI.25 These organizations have 
also been categorized in terms of grass roots or non-grass roots.  
 
3. Analysis of the officially registered ECIs closed within the first two 
years 
At the end of April 2014, sixteen of the then twenty-four registered ECIs were not 
open for support anymore.26 These ECIs are presented in the table below in order 
of the status reached in the signature collection campaign. 
 
  
                                                            
21  I would like to thank Wessel de Weijer for his contribution to this part of the research. 
22  These must be EU citizens who have a right to vote and who each live in a different 
country. 
23  See Article 2(3) of the Regulation (EU) No 211/2011. 
24  According to Article 2(3) of the Regulation (EU) No 211/2011, organizations are 
entitled to promote or sponsor an ECI if they do so with full transparency.  
25   An official ECI website exists on which the following information is provided: A short 
description of the subject of the initiative, provisions of the treaties considered relevant 
by the organisers, the members of the citizens' committee, the website and a list of the 
sources of funding and support. NGO’s in contradiction to business like to make their 
lobby activities public (Joost Berkhout in Volkskrant 16 May 2015).   
26  Each of these sixteen initiatives is presented in the appendix with the last column 
indicating the number of signatures gathered. 





Table 1: All ECIs closed before 1 May 2014 
 
Number 1 to 3, Right 2 Water, One of us and Stop vivisection, have reached the 
signature collection thresholds and therefore could and have been submitted to the 
European Commission. The other thirteen did not reach this threshold. These ECIs 
therefore could not be submitted to the Commission. Different to the ECIs 
numbered 4 to 13, the ECIs numbered 14 to 16 were even withdrawn before the 
end date for gathering signatures had been arrived. In the case of End EU-
Switzerland Agreement on Free Movement of People, a signature collection 
campaign had not even been started, so the initiators must have had other motives 
for registering it. With respect to the other two withdrawn initiatives, the reasons 
for withdrawal are not clear. As these three initiatives were withdrawn shortly 
before the deadline, the forming of, or connecting with existing, grass roots 
associations already had taken place and therefore they are taken into account in 
the test of the central hypothesis.27
 
                                                            
27  Among the other nine cases there are also initiatives that at some point in time were 
withdrawn but that subsequently have been resubmitted.  
European Citizens’ Initiatives  
closed/withdrawn before  
1 May 2014 
 
Submitted ECIs  
1. Right 2 Water 2. Stop vivisection 
3. One of Us  
Not submitted ECIs  
4. Let me Vote 5. 30 km/h 
6. Central Online 
Collection 
7. Suspension EU Climate 
and Energy Package 
8. Responsible waste 
incineration 
9. High Quality European 
Education for all 





13. End Ecocide 
Withdrawn ECIs  
14. Dairy Cow Welfare 15. End EU-Switzerland 
Agreement on Free 
Movement of People 
16. Turn me off  
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The light grey cells in the table below indicate the ECIs that of themselves exist 
in grass roots activism directed at the EU. Whereas the organization of ECIs in 
the table with white cells did involve already existing European citizen 
organizations, members of the European Parliament or political (groups of) 
parties in the European Parliament, the ECIs with the light grey cells, such as 
Central Online Collection and Responsible waste incineration, were organized 
without the direct involvement of such formal organizations.  
 
Table 2: ECIs organized from grass roots 
 
 
The ECIs that were initiated by persons belonging to European formal 
organizations still might have been important in creating links between the EU 
and grass roots associations, namely by drawing grass roots organizations into 
their policy network.28 In table 3 it is indicated per ECI whether such is the case 
                                                            
28   Policy network denotes the network of the interactions between actors within and 
outside the EUs institutions that are directed at the exchange of information and also 
European Citizens’ Initiatives Grass roots association by itself 
Submitted ECIs  
1. Right 2 Water  
2. Stop vivisection  
3. One of Us  
Not submitted  ECIs  
4. Let me Vote  
5. 30 km/h  
6. Central Online Collection  
7. Suspension EU Climate and 
Energy Package 
 
8. Responsible waste incineration  
9. High Quality European 
Education for all 
 
10. Fraternité 2020  
11. Unconditional Basis Income  
12. Single Communication Tariff 
Act 
 
13. End Ecocide  
Withdrawn ECIs  
14. Dairy Cow Welfare  
15. End EU-Switzerland Agreement 
on Free Movement of People 
 
16. Turn me off  





at the level of the Citizen’s Committee (second column) and/or the level of 
supporting groups (third column). The dark grey cells stand for the classification 
as grass roots (according to the criteria elaborated on in section 2). In the case of 
white cells the groups involved in the ECIs could not be classified as such.  
 
Table 3: ECIs characterized by grass roots association  
 
   
                                                            
include taking part in the writing of and bargaining over policy proposals, in short in 
policy making (Heywood, 2013, p. 358; Rhodes, 1996). 
 




Submitted ECIs   
1. Right 2 Water   
2. Stop vivisection   
3. One of Us   
Not submitted  ECIs   
4. Let me Vote   
5. 30 km/h   
6. Central Online 
Collection 
  
7. Suspension EU Climate 
and Energy Package 
  
8. Responsible waste 
incineration 
  
9. High Quality European 
Education for all 
  
10. Fraternité 2020   
11. Unconditional Basis 
Income 
  
12. Single Communication 
Tariff Act 
  
13. End Ecocide   
Withdrawn ECIs   
14. Dairy Cow Welfare   
15. End EU-Switzerland 
Agreement on Free 
Movement of People 
 No signature 
collection 
campaign 
16. Turn me off   




  211 
What can be concluded from these tables with respect to the central hypothesis? 
The light grey cells in table 2 as well as table 3 show that five out of sixteen 
signature collection campaigns were organized by grass roots association alone. 
In addition, the dark grey cells should also be taken into account as positives, as 
the hypothesis also concerned the creation of connections between Brussels based 
European organisations and grass roots organizations. The total proportion of grey 
cells in table 3 shows that in a majority of the ECIs organised in the first two 
years, grass roots associations have been involved, either in the initiation or in the 
supporting phase, or in both phases.   
 
The table also shows that the ECIs that have reached the signature threshold 
(submitted ECIs) to a lesser extent involved grass roots association already from 
the start than the ECIs that did not reach it. This is consistent with the expectation 
that, considering the requirements in terms of knowledge of the EU policy process 
as well as the number of signatures to be gathered, ECIs are most likely to be 
successfully used by an already well organized civil society.29  
 
In any case, success must be put in perspective, as for the organizers of submitted 
ECIs there is still a long way to go if they want to have their issue on the agenda 
of the policy makers, as it is up to the Commission how to respond.30 As the 
organizers of One of us have experienced, the response can be not to act on an 
ECI at all.31 Actually, even in the case of Right2Water where the Commission did 
commit itself to measures directed at the ECIs objective, none had the character 
of a legislative initiative. Notwithstanding the lukewarm responses of the 
Commission at first instance, the ECI campaigns in future still can turn out to be 
worthwhile, as the co-legislatures can call upon the Commission to act or to act 
more ambitiously. However, the current track record of the Commission’s 
Communications may not have been very motivating for new ECIs to be 
organized and the statistics of the proposed ECIs per year seem to witness a strong 
decline in the number of ECIs registered.32  
                                                            
29  Bouza Garcia, L. (2015) Participatory Democracy and Civil Society in the EU. Agenda-
Setting and Institutionalization. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: 
Palgrave MacMillan, p. 134. 
30  The Commission is required to reply within three months and explain its political and 
legal conclusions, including the actions it intends to take. However, as Bouza Garcia 
(2015, p. 133) puts it the commission is not bound by the proposal and is free to accept, 
reject or modify it.  
31  The organizers are seeking annulment of the Commissions Communication before the 
European Court of Justice.  
32  In addition, almost 40 percent of the proposed ECI’s has been declared legally 
inadmissible by the Commission, which must be experienced as another barrier by 
potential initiators.  







For the 16 ECIs addressed in this research, in which signature campaigns were 
closed before 1 April 2014, the hypothesis is confirmed: grass roots associations 
directed at European policy making have been stimulated either directly, or via 
connections between Brussels-orientated citizen organisations (professional 
advocacy groups) and grass roots associations in member countries. 
 
4.  Discussion concerning the mobilizing effects of ECIs 
 
Bouza Garcia and Greenwood also have studied ECI signature collection 
campaigns (official and pioneering experiments).33 They expected the ECIs to 
draw different actors in the agenda-setting arena and also to increase the diversity 
in issues addressed in this arena. The positive evidence the authors found with 
regard to the latter are the contentious issues introduced by ECIs, such as Stop 
vivisection, One of Us and Criminalize ecocide.34 These ECIs have stimulated 
debate and deliberation that go far beyond institutionalized discussions in the 
“Brussels bubble”.35 From the 21 registered ECI’s, according to Bouza Garcia and 
Greenwood (2014), 6 are qualified as contentious. The inward looking 
communication between the EU institutions and professionalized EU lobbyists 
according to these authors has been opened up.  The European public sphere has 
been expanded by addressing issues in public that can be considered contentious 
in the sense of challenging the boundaries of the scope of EU treaties or the 
fundamental direction the European Commission has taken.  
 
Bouza Garcia and Greenwood also point at the new actors that together with such 
new topics have entered the sphere of EU politics: another set of activists than the 
professionalized EU lobbyists usually involved in consultations by the European 
                                                            
33  Bouza Garcia, L. and J. Greenwood (2014) The European Citizens’ Initiative: A new 
sphere of EU politics? Interest Groups and Advocacy, Vol. 3, 3, 246-267 and 
Bouza Garcia (2015). 
34  Bouza Garcia and Greenwood, 2014, id., p. 252; Bouza Garcia, 2015, id., p. 136. 
35  Id., p. 265 and p. 253-257 table 1, 2 and 3. 
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Commission. The research addressed in this article confirms the entrance of a 
different set of actors in the EU sphere of politics, not only in those addressing 
contentious issues, but in 80 % of all the ECIs that were open for signature 
collection until 1 May 2014. This finding is based on systematically tracing the 
associations involved in the sixteen ECIs and categorizing these associations in 
terms of grass roots or non-grass roots. From these findings it can be inferred that 
the ECI in its first two years has widened EU public debate and opened it up for 
a more general public where in earlier days, before the existence of the ECI as 
instrument, specialized actors had participated almost exclusively. 
5.  Relevance for public trust 
 
With respect to public trust it is important that engaging new actors and issues in 
EU policy networks would not only be a short lived but a long lasting effect of 
the ECI. In order to stimulate trust of citizens in the institutions of the European 
Union, the European Commission and the other institutions should be committed 
to the creation of long lasting relationships with different groups of citizens. The 
recent decline in the number of ECIs proposed is a sign that without organisational 
and procedural improvements, the ECI will not work out as the early enthusiasm 
of grass roots activists promised. Much will depend on the European 
Commission’s reaction to the observed shortcomings in the implementation of the 
ECI regulation.36 In addition to improvements to the (online) collection and 
verification of signatures, organizational and/or financial support for the initiators 
of ECIs, political science scholars recommend improvements of a more political 
character. According to Bouza Garcia, for example, the Commission could have 
to accept all successful initiatives.37 We can have a closer look at what this would 
entail by addressing the example of One of Us. One of Us is an ECI which 
proposed to put a ban on all human embryo research. The Commission indeed has 
simply refused this, although the initiators succeeded in gathering almost 
2 million signatures.38 The reason given by the Commission for this refusal is that 
member states and the EP only recently, after long lasting debates, had decided to 
fund human embryonic stem cell research under very strict conditions.39 In the 
preceding policy-making process the objections of states that are principally 
against any use of human embryos were taken amply into consideration and had 
                                                            
36  See Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. Report 
on the application of Regulation (EU) No 211/2011 on the citizens’ initiative. Brussels 
31.3.2015 COM (2015) 145 final; European Parliamentary Research Service, 
Implementation of the ECI. The experience of the first three years, February 2015 and 
DG Internal Policies, ECI-First lessons of implementation, May 2014. 
37  Bouza Garcia 2012. 
38  European Citizens’ Initiative: European Commission replies to “One of us”, press 
release, 28 May 2014, Brussels. 
39  See section 3 of Article 19 of the Regulation of the European Parliament and the 
Council establishing Horizon 2020 - the framework programme for research and 
innovation (2014-2020) and repealing decision No 1982/2006/EC. Strasbourg, 
11 December 2013 PE-CONS 67/1/13 REV 1. 





led to more strict conditions than the Commission initially proposed.40 This puts 
the refusal of the Commission to put the issue on the agenda and start the debate 
all over again in perspective. Obliging the Commission to accept every successful 
initiative would be a bridge until an important downside becomes evident: 
Political actors who do not get what they want out of the conventional EU decision 
making process would be stimulated to seize the ECI as an opportunity to 
immediately start the process all over again without any change in the 
circumstances. Thus encouraging this route would not be the way. However, more 
commitment of the Commission to the organization of ECIs, for example by being 
less strict in the registration of initiatives and giving more support in formulating 
and organizing the initiative, including the signature campaign, would indeed be 
advisable. In addition, to make sure that the dialogue with citizens is kept alive, 
every successful initiative must be taken at least very seriously, primarily those 





                                                            
40  See my contribution in B. van Klink, van Beers and L. Poort (eds.) Symbolic 
Dimensions of Biolaw, 2016. 
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Appendix: Table with the ECIs, their cause, the individuals and organizations in 













Successful in reaching signature collection thresholds 
1. “Right 2 Water” 
 
Campaign against water 
privatization 
Public Service Trade 
Unions 
representatives 
connected to the 
European 




















                                                            
41  ATTAC (Association pour la Taxation des Transactions financière et l'Aide aux 
Citoyens) was founded in France in December 1998 after the publication in the Monde 
Diplomatique of an editorial entitled “Désarmer les marchés” (Disarm the markets). 
This Association for the Taxation of financial Transactions and Aid to Citizens opposes 
neo-liberal globalization and aims to develop social, ecological, and democratic 
alternatives so as to guarantee fundamental rights for all.  








Call to abrogate directive 
2010/63/EU on the 
protection of animals 
used for scientific 
purposes and to present a 
new proposal that does 
away with animal 
experimentation and 
instead makes 
compulsory the use - in 
biomedical and 
toxicological research - of 
data directly relevant for 
the human species. 
An Italian MEP 
together with three 















3. “One of us” 
 
Seeking an end to EU 
funding of activities 





and Patrick G. 
Puppinck, director 
of ECLJ.43  
 
Campaign address 









Not successful in reaching signature collection thresholds 
                                                            
42  Josephine Quintavalle (Great Brittain), Manfred Liebner (Ja Zum Leben, Germany) 
Filippo Vari (Movimento per la vita, Italy), Jakub Baltroszewicz, Edith Frivaldsky en 
Alicia Latorre. 
43  The European Center for Law and Justice (ECLJ) is an international NGO dedicated to 
the promotion and protection of human rights in Europe and worldwide and advocates 
in particular the protection of religious freedoms and the dignity of the person with the 
ECHR and the other mechanisms afforded by the UN, the Council of Europe, the EP, 
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and others. 
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4. “Let me vote” 
 
Extend voting rights of EU 





















  3.604 
5. “30 km/h” 
 
Setting a default speed 



































                                                            
44  EUGENT is the European Association for Deceleration a German organization. 
45  Martti Tulenheimo is working for the European Cyclists federation, an organization 
consisting of national organizations who represent the interests of cyclists. 
Anez Bertoncelj is a member of the Ljubljana Cycling Network, Rod King is a member 
of the UK organization “20's plenty for us”. 
46  OpenPetition is a German website where everyone can set up their own petition and 
collect online signatures, see www.openpetition.de. 
47  The initiator sees insufficient funding as reason for failing to gather enough signatures 
using the existing online collection system. An ECI that works! Learning from the first 
two years of the Europeans Citizens' Initiative, page 67, sub 14, see “editors summary”. 










This initiative wants the 
EU to radically change 
existing policy in the area 
mentioned, for economic 
reasons not to spend 
money for unilateral 
action on the climate and 
in order to increase 
energy security make fuel 
and energy cheaper and 
allow member states to 
use their own natural 
energy resources in order.  




members of the UK 
Independence 
Party, the Danish 
Peoples Party, the 
Austrian BZÖ and 
the Lithuanian 
Electoral Action of 
Poles. 









Pointing at the 
environmental impact of 
waste incineration 
Gaël Drillon 
together with spare 
time young 
campaigners living 








publiques avec le 
citoyen (dE2p)51 
754 
                                                            
48  The Europe of Freedom and Democracy party was a right-wing Eurosceptic political 
group in the European Parliament consisting of ten political parties – the largest being 
the UK Independence Party (UKIP) with eleven seats and the Italian Lega Nord with 
nine seats. On 24 June 2014 EFD group became Europe of Freedom and Direct 
Democracy (EFDD) for the 8th European Parliament, with the continuing membership 
of just two of the eleven political parties that formed EFD. 
49  There is no online collection system for signatures on its website which is a sign that 
they were not seriously focused at collecting the number of signatures needed for 
submittal to the EC. 
50  The d’Idées pour Beaumont is a local organization that provides news for the Beaumont 
area. The official website can be found here: http://www.idees-beaumont.org. 
51  The Association pour l’évaluation des politiques publiques avec le citoyen is a website 
where (French) citizens can discuss (French) politics. In January 2014 this website has 
been lifted. 
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Establish a stakeholder 
platform to formulate a 
European policy on school 
education 
Anna Gorey, 
president of the 
interparents 
organization52 and 






































(MEET) This is 






3 percent of EU budget to 
expand exchange 
programmes and improve 
the current ones (Erasmus 
and European Voluntary 
Service). 
Lucca Copetti and 
other (post) 
students who met 
each other at the 
Convention of 
Young European 
Citizens57 in Cluny. 
Four national 
organizations in the 




List of PhD 
students, 
researchers, 
professors or other 








and the Erasmus 
Student Network.
  71.057 60 








Asks to encourage EU 
member states to explore 
cooperation to improve 
social security 
Activists in national 
organizations linked 
to Basic Income 
Earth Networks 





















from universities in 










                                                            
52  The interparents organization aims to “represent all the parents of all pupils in the 
European Schools in the Board of Governors, its Committees and Working Groups.” 
website; http://interparents.eu/aboutus.php. 
53  The EPA “gathers the parents associations in Europe which together represent more 
than 150 million parents. EPA works in partnership both to represent and give to 
parents a powerful voice in the development of education policies and decisions at 
European level.” 
54  The Parents organization of Luxembourg (EEL) and the Parents organization of Britain 
(CESPA). 
55   This organization represents parents organizations and students of European Schools. 
Official website here: http://gudee.eu/revue.htm. 
56  Confédération Européenne des Syndicats Indépendants (CESI) and Union for Unity 
(U4U). 
57  The Convention s is a summer school for young EU-students who, according to the 
website, “come together to share their thoughts, ideas and perceptions of Europe and 
discuss their hopes, fears and solutions for the future.” http://www.europe. 
net/pdf/Young_European_Citizens_Convention_2014.pdf. 
58  For example the Allianz Kulturstiftung, l'École Supérieure des Sciences Commerciales 
d’Angers (ESSCA), and Fondation Hippocrène. 
59  http://en.fraternite2020.eu/citizens.html.  
60  Simona Pronckutơ (November 1, 2013). “European Citizens Initiatives – one year of 
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13. “End Ecocide”  
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The Influence of Economic Agents in the 
Lawmaking Process of Environmental Laws: 
The Case of Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE) Legislation in Europe
Heyd Más*
1. Introduction
During more than thirty years, there have been remarkable developments in the 
scope of environmental regulation in Europe. The concern for an environmental 
policy on the rapidly developing society arose as the First Environmental Action 
Program of the European Community, which was adopted in July 1973. Among 
other issues brought by the program, tackling the waste management issue was 
soon recognized as representing a great share of the environmental policy’s 
success for the European countries, which led to the coming into force of the 
Waste Framework Directive in 19751 for addressing the matters related to waste 
production, prevention and management. The European environmental policy has 
evolved significantly since then. In 1987, when the United Nations World 
Commission on Environment and Development released the report Our Common 
Future,2 economic, social and environmentally sustainable development was 
officially introduced worldwide as a major challenge to be pursued and achieved. 
Almost as remarkable has been the influence of economic agents exerted on the 
process of national lawmaking to implement European Directives regarding 
environmental topics, and it was no different in the case of the transposition and 
implementation of the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Directives 
(WEEE Directives). Throughout these processes a number of consultations and 
working group meetings took place with the involvement of public authorities and 
                                                            
*  Scholarship PhD Candidate of BABEL project (European Commission Action 2 
Programme) at the Department of Constitutional Law, Administrative Law and Public 
Administration at the University of Groningen. 
1  75/442/EEC. Council Directive of 15 July 1975 on waste. Considerably amended in 
1991 (Directive 91/156/EEC), reaching its most recent revised version in 2008 
(Directive 2008/98/EC). 
2  World Commission on Environment and Development, “Chapter 2: Towards 
Sustainable Development” in Our Common Future <www.un-documents.net/k-
001303.htm> accessed 5 March 2014. Usually referred as the 'Brundtland Report' as a 
homage to the commission's chairperson, then the Prime Minister of Norway Gro 
Harlem Brundtland. 
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industry representatives both at the national level and at the Council Working 
Party on the Environment (WPE). 
The market economy3 applied in most societies nowadays is understood as 
performing by having its decisions based on the behaviour and interactions4 of the 
coexisting forces of “supply” and “demand”. For the purpose of this article, 
“supply” is here represented by the producers and importers of electric and 
electronic equipment (EEE) which have the legal responsibility5 of organizing and 
financing the take-back system of end-of-life household EEE collection, 
treatment, recycling and reuse in a safe manner for human health and the 
environment. Still in the same context, “demand” stands for consumers of EEE, 
more specifically, private household consumers, the final users of EEE and, later 
on, the ones expected to return their end-of-life EEE to allow for the entire take-
back system for WEEE to perform successfully. 
Within the process of creating regulations for proper management of e-waste, the 
involvement of economic agents has visibly contributed to a design of rules that 
come closer to the expectations and possibilities of those to which it applies, 
allowing for the provisions to be perceived with greater acceptance and become, 
therefore, more likely to be complied with. At the same time, however, such 
influence over the legislator should be questioned. In that sense, it is relevant to 
consider: To what extent should the legislator allow themselves to be influenced 
by information provided by the very actors it means to regulate? And, above all, 
who are the actors actually considered to provide them with information? Does it 
take into account all angles? In order to allow for the legislator to obtain a real 
understanding of the dynamics to be regulated, one would assume that all players 
should be invited to participate at the discussion table. This is a concern that rises 
from the fact that “the economy” influencing laws – on several noticeable 
occasions – is mostly represented by those whose (powerful) interests are strongly 
organized – the “supply-side”. 
                                                            
3 See G Hoffman, “Market Economy: Economy in which fundamentals of supply also 
demand provide signals regarding resource utilization” in Comparing Economic 
Systems in the Twenty-First Century, ed. PR Gregory and RC Stuart (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin, 2004) 538. 
4 See T Gorman, “The Complete Idiots Guide to Economics” (Alpha Books, 2003), 9. 
“In a market economy, the private-sector businesses and consumers decide what they 
will produce and purchase, with little government intervention [...] In a command 
economy, also known as a planned economy, the government largely determines what 
is produced and in what amounts. In a mixed economy, both market forces and 
government decisions determine which goods and services are produced and how they 
are distributed.” 
5  2002/96/EC European Directive on Waste Electrical and Electronical Equipment 
(WEEE) of 27 January 2003. Article 8(1) “Member States shall ensure that, by 
13 August 2005, producers provide at least for the financing of the collection, treatment, 
recovery and environmentally sound disposal of WEEE from private households 
deposited at collection facilities”. 
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In an ideal situation, legislation should consider and disclose both sides – supply 
and demand – in a harmonic way. Instead, the major influence applied by highly 
organized corporations and their powerful lobbies are heard far clearer and taken 
into account far deeper than the one produced by consumers. The main 
stakeholders involved in these dynamics – producers, distributors, treatment 
operators, recyclers, municipalities and consumers – all have influenced the 
process according to their own perspectives and interests, however, as will be 
shown further, in distinctive proportions. 
Notwithstanding the connection of some of the economic actors’ involvement to 
the achievement of successful implementation, it must be questioned if better 
results could be achieved by the participation of all the different groups 
composing the dynamics of the WEEE management system. The discussion 
brought by this article is deeply related to one of the main concerns embedded in 
public trust and public law, as it is not possible to ignore the possible impact of 
influencing forces over the legislator’s performance and their ability to remain 
impartial to interests of a specific pressure group.  
Therefore, this article aims at understanding the dynamics of interest groups that 
might influence the legislator, taking the case of the WEEE Directives and their 
national implementation in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands, and 
discussing the relevance of all economic actors participating in the in the 
lawmaking process of e-waste laws. The theory of regulatory capture, the group 
politics theories, and the patterns of political interaction from the social sciences 
are used as support to understand the dynamics of the issues brought for 
discussion. 
Section 2 will explain the European legislation for management of WEEE, its 
drafting process (influenced by producers), and the obligations it has established 
as well as an example of the process by which the WEEE Directives were 
established. More examples of interest groups influencing legislation will be 
illustrated for the discussion at hand when section 3 introduces two case studies 
(respectively): (1) the United Kingdom; and (2) the Netherlands. Section 4 will 
present the theories of regulatory capture and group politics to understand the 
phenomenon of interest groups influencing the regulator, and the balanced 
approach between supply and demand adopted by this article. Final conclusions 
will be drawn in section 5 where remarks with regard to the influence of economic 
agents in the lawmaking process of European WEEE Directives and their 
relevance to public trust in that process, as well as recommendations for better 
involvement of consumers, aimed at a more balanced representation of interests. 
2.  In the field of environmental law: the European WEEE directives 
Within the discussions about the influence of economic agents over legislation, 
consumer and environmental laws are the most evident areas. Often, topics that 
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these laws seek to regulate have in their core the matter of producers’ compliance 
and a history of extensive negotiations during the process of new legislation. To 
mention a few: product design, programmed obsolescence, and take-back systems 
for proper treatment, recycling and reuse of waste. 
As a response to the side effects of the fast growth of technological innovation, 
the burden brought to municipal authorities, and the complex mixture of materials 
and components WEEE contains – some of which are harmful6 to human health 
and the environment, while others are valuable resources to replace raw material 
production – the European Union designated electrical and electronic waste as 
one of its priority waste streams. Following the Council Resolution of 7 May 
19907 calling for Community-wide action on waste, in 1991 the European 
Commission initiated the Priority Waste Streams Program which focused on six 
different waste streams; the Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) 
was one of them. 
Originally conceived in the late 90’s,8 the first draft regulation connected the 
collection and treatment of WEEE with the aims of the Restriction of Hazardous 
Substances Directive (RoHS) and the Energy using Product Directive (EuP), as 
complementary to these European Directives. When on 13 June 2000 the 
European Commission adopted both the proposal for a Directive on Waste 
Electrical and Electronic Equipment, and the proposal for a Directive on the 
Restriction of the use of certain Hazardous Substances in electrical electronic 
equipment, the announced purpose was the need for regulations to be designed to 
tackle the fast increase of the electrical and electronic equipment waste, and to 
complement European Union measures on landfill and incineration of this type of 
waste. Since the first debates started, the aims for the WEEE Directive expanded, 
including the objective of preventing the generation of EEE and promotion of re-
use, recycling and other forms of recovery, as a means to reduce the eliminated 
amounts of such waste. Naturally, the improvement of the environmental 
performance of economic operators involved in the treatment of WEEE became 
part of the focused upon topics. At that time, the EU Commissioner for the 
Environment, Margot Wallström, acknowledged the electrical and electronic 
equipment as one of the fastest growing waste streams in the EU – as a result of 
the fast pace of technological innovation – and how particularly important it was 
                                                            
6  Later on the provisions of the Directive, Article 3(l) 2002/96/EC defined “dangerous 
substance or preparation” as “any substance or preparation which has to be considered 
dangerous under Council Directive 67/548/EEC or Directive 1999/45/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council.” OJ 196, 16.8.1967, 1. Directive 1999 OJ L 
200, 30.7.1999, 1. 
7  OJ C 122/ 2 18.5.90. 
8  DS Khetriwal, R Widmer, R Kuehr and J Huisman, “One WEEE, many species: lessons 
from the European experience”, Waste Management & Research (2011) 954. 
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“to implement the key principles of EU waste management policy, especially the 
prevention and the recycling of waste, in this area.”9
The proposal for a Directive on WEEE has its legal basis in Article 192 TFEU (ex
Article 175 EC), and is supported by the Fifth Environmental Action Program. 
The Fifth Environment Action Program10 was launched with an emphasis on the 
need for an active role of all economic operators involved in the quest for 
sustainable development. At that moment, the new policy and action on the 
environment and sustainable development covered specific themes, which also 
included the “Management of Waste”. The focus of the Action Program on all 
economic operators involved in the process, and on significant changes in the 
patterns of development, production consumption and behaviour, can be further 
identified in the WEEE Directive. Public authorities, private and public 
companies, environmental organizations and, in particular, individuals – as 
citizens and consumers – are mentioned along the articles for the new established 
procedures proposing drastic changes in all patterns adopted until then. 
Even though all actors were equally referred to as relevant players in the WEEE 
management system being created in Europe at that time, it became clear that 
some had more room to influence the new legislation than others. The first 
European Directive on electrical and electronic equipment from 2002 is an 
example of the dynamics existing between the interests from the stakeholders 
representing the supply side of the market economy and the drafting of laws. The 
intense participation of the private-sector to be affected by the WEEE Directive 
in the negotiations for the Directive led to provisions that would allow for better 
compliance. For instance, distributors were pressuring the negotiations about the 
extra costs in the case of an obligation for them to collect so many WEEE. Specific 
limitations were created in order to satisfy the demands from those actors and still 
have the Directive creating a free-of-charge take-back possibility for end-users of 
WEEE. The specific provision explaining the amount and limiting conditions for 
distributor’s responsibility of collection of WEEE resulted in Article 5(2)(b) 
creating the “one-to-one basis”: “when supplying a new product, distributors shall 
be responsible for ensuring that such waste can be returned to the distributor at 
least free of charge on a one-to-one basis as long as the equipment is of equivalent 
type and has fulfilled the same functions as the supplied equipment. […]”.  
Another example was the Directive 2003/108/EC which mainly altered the 
conditions for producer responsibility brought by the WEEE Directive. Initially, 
the 2002/96/EC WEEE Directive had been published defining the financial 
responsibility of producers for collection, treatment, recovery and 
environmentally sound disposal of private household WEEE and other WEEE. 
                                                            
9  IP/00/602 European Commission, “Commission tackles growing problem of electrical 
and electronic waste” Brussels, 13 June 2000. 
10  OJ 1993 C138/5. 
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However, further studies indicated that the amount was considerably greater than 
imagined, and the costs and organization capabilities demanded from producers 
in a given short period of time was no longer reasonable. 2003/108/EC amended 
Article 9 and limited the responsibility of producers towards the “disposal of 
WEEE from users other than private households from products put on the market 
after 13 August 2005”.11
Finally published in the Official Journal in 13 February 2003,12 the WEEE 
Directive brought instructions for separate collection of e-waste13 from the regular 
waste in order to improve WEEE waste management, with a distinction between 
separate collection of WEEE from private households and collection from non-
households. Regarding physical responsibility, the Directive did not explicitly 
identify who should be responsible for setting up the infrastructure. Rather, it 
required distributors to accept WEEE from consumers on a one-to-one basis when 
selling new products. Member States could diverge from such requirements in the 
case of an existing alternative procedure being available for consumers. 
Concerning financial responsibility, producers were made financially responsible 
for at least collecting from the collection points onwards. This is an important 
issue which will be further encouraged at the recast of the Directive, where 
Member States will receive guidance to stimulate, when appropriate, producers to 
also finance the costs occurring for collection of WEEE from private households 
to collection points. 
Despite the significant changes in the patterns of collection and disposal brought 
by the WEEE Directive a few years after its implementation – only an estimated 
13% of WEEE going to landfill or incineration – there was a growing concern 
over the effectiveness and efficiency of the Directive. The EU collection target at 
the time was of 4 kg WEEE per capita, representing about 2 million tonnes per 
year, out of around 10 million tonnes of WEEE generated annually in the EU. By 
2020, the estimated volume of WEEE will increase to 12 million tonnes. When 
such figures were compared to the impact of the Directive, the conclusion was 
that although it represented an important instrument, the Directive still had 
brought insufficient results, which derived from problems in achieving its main 
objectives with efficiency. In order to approach those issues, in 2008, based on 
the experience gathered from stakeholders and Member States during a three-year 
                                                            
11  2003/108/EC, article 1. 
12  OJ 2003 L 37/24. 
13  Electrical and Electronic Equipment “means equipment which is dependent on electric 
currents or electromagnetic fields in order to work properly and equipment for the 
generation, transfer and measurement of such currents and fields and designed for use 
with a voltage rating not exceeding 1000 volts for alternating current and 1500 volts for 
direct current”. As clarified by the DG-Environment, “dependent on electric currents or 
electromagnetic fields” means that electricity is the primary energy to fulfil the basic 
function of the product. 
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review, the European Commission released a staff working paper for a recast of 
the WEEE Directive.14
It was concluded that the technical, legal and administrative problems caused by 
the implementation process of the Directive were resulting in; costly efforts from 
market actors and administrations, low levels of innovation in waste collection 
and treatment, unnecessary administrative burdens, and not fully preventing 
environmental harm. Some of the main issues identified were related to problems 
in interpretation due to the definitions provided by the Directive, enforcement of 
the provisions and, as a consequence to the latter, the existence of “free riders” 
and illegal flows of e-waste. Either by misinterpretation due to lack of clarity on 
which products fell in the scope of the WEEE Directive, or by clear intent of 
evading the new rules, producers of electrical and electronic equipment were 
performing their activities as “free riders”; that is, they did not join nor set up any 
collection scheme in order to provide for take-back of WEEE and proper 
treatment, recycling or reuse. In the case of intentional disobedience of the WEEE 
Directive provisions, the most serious consequence encountered was the practice 
of illegal shipments of e-waste to countries outside the EU where the legislation 
for management of WEEE was less strict or non-existent. 
In the reports evaluating the implementation of the first WEEE Directive, a 
recurrent complaint presented by the member states was the short deadline 
imposed for the national transposition of the Directive. It has been pointed out 
that due to the lack of time, proper consultations could not be performed.15 The 
burdens brought to the national economies due to a rather superficial involvement 
of producers and distributors in the process of national implementation of the 
Directive brought attention to the need to look for alternatives to discuss with the 
“supply-side” which solutions would be preferred and less costly. The 
engagement of some of the actors in the shaping of the recast was chosen as 
strategy to improve the results.16 Above all, producers’ associations, but also the 
recycling industry had close participation, providing position papers containing 
valuable data for improved legislation.  
Even if the focus was indeed on producers – given that those are the ones, along 
with distributors, to whom the financing of the take-back responsibility has been 
                                                            
14  SEC(2008) 2934. Commission staff working paper accompanying the proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on waste electrical and 
electronic equipment (WEEE) (recast) Summary of the Impact Assessment. 
15  European Commission, “Implementation of Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment 
Directive in EU 25” (EUR 22231), Joint Research Centre AEA Technology, M Savage 
(author), S Ogilvie, J Slezak and E Artim (contrib.), (Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies 2006) 9-11. 
16  Council of the European Union, Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on waste 
electrical and electronic equipment (WEEE) - (recast) - Impact Assessment (COD) 
2008/0241 (16 December 2008) 23. 
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imposed – a lack of space can be observed for participation of the civil society in 
the discussions. Relevant information could have been provided by the end-users 
of EEE and contributed to enhance the provisions concerning take-back logistics 
to distributors and collection centres, for instance. In addition, great knowledge 
from academia is ignored, where specialists could contribute with better data and 
specific knowledge, resulting in better legislation. 
3. Transposition of the WEEE directives into national legislation 
By the time a Directive comes into force, it is expected from EU member states 
to follow with procedures for transposition of the text into national legislation and 
for implementation within the deadlines. As explained by Prechal, according to 
articles 192 and 28817 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(TFEU), Member States are bound to the result prescribed by a directive. 
Therefore, as a directive is not directly applicable, Member States are expected to 
adopt transposition measures at the national level in order for it to become fully 
effective. In that sense, as the main feature of a Directive is the need to be 
transposed to national law, it allows for Member States to choose the form and 
method of achieving the adopted results by selecting the most suitable procedures. 
In fact, Member States are expected to adapt their laws only as much as necessary 
to reach “the objectives set out in the relevant Treaty provision which serves as 
the legal base for the directive”18 and it is “considered essential that the measures 
taken by the different Member States are applied with the same effectiveness and 
strictness as in the application of their national law”.19
According to implementation reports,20 the process of developing legislation for 
the transposition of the provisions specified in the Directive was strongly troubled 
by interpretation matters in most of the Member States. Discussions revolving 
around which products, and therefore, which producers and importers would be 
                                                            
17  Former article 249 TEC before amendments by the Lisbon Treaty, which came into 
force in 2009. 
18  S Prechal, Directives in EC law (Oxford: University Press 2005) 4. 
19  JH Jans, HHB Vedder, European Environmental Law: After Lisbon (Europa Law 
Publishing 2012) 141. 
20  The review process of the implementation of the WEEE Directive included consultation 
of national implementation reports sent according to deadlines brought by the Directive 
(reporting period 2004-2006, 2007-2009) Those reports are not made public, however, 
official reports  based on the information brought by the national ones could be 
accessed: European Commission, Implementation of the Waste Electric and Electronic 
Equipment Directive in the EU, Technical Report Series, Institute for Prospective 
Technological Studies (2006). European Commission, Final Implementation Report for 
the Directive 2002/96/EC on Waste Electric and Electronic Equipment (WEEE 
Directive) 30 January 2012, Consortium ESWI (2012). This report is a synopsis of 
national implementation reports in the form of responses by Member States to the 
questionnaire (contained in the Annex to Commission Decision 2004/249/EC) covering 
the period 2007-2009. 
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affected by the new rules, which roles and procedures were mandatory and which 
were desirable, among others, occurred. Naturally, industry was concerned and 
reluctant on the implementation of the Directive.  
Reaching for an agreement amongst producers proved to be a challenging task, in 
addition to one extra complicating factor: time shortage. The deadline for all the 
rules for the establishment of national WEEE systems to be fully transposed to 
the national legal framework was considered short by most Member States. The 
general complaint presented both by national authorities and producers referred 
to the uncomfortable position of having to make fast, important decisions while 
not enough data was available to lead to a clear understanding of the consequences 
of different approaches, or even to properly evaluate the options. As one example 
of the issues at hand, in some countries the stakeholders pressured for the creation 
of national compliance organizations, while others sought for a more market-
based approach, which meant the incorporation of a clearing house model. 
Member States with a strong Chamber of Commerce and tradition of centralized 
and collaborative decision-making tended to have producers presenting a united 
negotiated position to the government after resolving such issues amongst 
themselves. However, this was not the case for most of Member States.21
As a result, seeking to engage producers, importers and distributors for public 
consultations was adopted by the Member States during the process of drafting 
the national laws responsible for implementing the new Directive.  
3.1  The British transposition of the WEEE directives 
The UK was one of the last Member States to implement the WEEE Directive. As 
explained by the British Government, the WEEE Directive which was first agreed 
in 2003 proved to be a rather complex and costly text to be implemented. On 14 
December 2005 the Government’s Energy Minister, Malcolm Wicks, announced 
that the implementation of the Directive in the UK would have to be delayed until 
2007 as a consequence of the Government's commitment to implement it in a way 
that would enhance the environmental benefits while minimizing the costs to 
businesses.
The UK, since the coming into force of the first WEEE Directive, has been 
constantly revising and enhancing its WEEE Regulations. In those procedures, 
the participation of producers and distributors in the drafting of the first WEEE 
Directive has been notorious,22 however, little is known from the positions and 
requests of consumers of electrical and electronic equipment. 
                                                            
21   European Commission (n15) v. 
22  For instance, foreword by Rt Hon Michael Fallon MP Minister of State for Business 
and Enterprise at the 2013 Public Consultation: “The proposed changes to the WEEE 
system are an important part of that commitment. They are a direct response to concerns 
expressed by producers of electrical and electronic equipment about the cost of 
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The low participation of consumers has shown small figures of compliance with 
the take-back regulations for returning WEEE to the distributors or for properly 
disposing of their e-waste according to municipal rules. As a strategy to reach 
consumers and achieve better results of collection, the government took over the 
task of developing the information campaigns – initially a task for producers and 
distributors. Observing the public consultations launched for the transposition of 
the Directives into British legislation, the focus on producers, and business in 
general, becomes quite evident. For instance, although the last public 
consultation23 concerning WEEE legislation had been performed by the 
Department for Business, Innovations & Skills – responsible for supporting 
businesses and consumer protection – the questions were clearly directed to a 
target audience of producers. The questions listed in the consultation regarded 
only responsibilities assigned for producers, importers and distributors, the 
technical definitions, and procedures that those implied. Even though the base of 
the WEEE system relies on end-users properly disposing of their end-of-life 
electric and electronic appliances (WEEE), and that the collection of historic 
WEEE is financed by a visible fee included in the prices of new EEE, no 
consultations directed to the consumers could be found. 
All participants to the consultation were representing interests of businesses, 
including the only two names of individuals that could be identified in Annex A 
(referred to in the next paragraph) as they were identified as directors of 
businesses directly involved with the distribution of EEE. According to the 
summary of responses: 
We received 256 responses to the consultation. A full list of respondees is 
attached at Annex A. The largest response came from producers of EEE 
(Electrical and Electronic Equipment) with 100 respondents identifying 
themselves as producers. This was followed by local government with 49 
responses. 29 trade bodies also responded along with 22 Producer 
Compliance Schemes (PCS), 17 distributors of EEE, 16 WEEE treatment 
facilities, 16 charities or social enterprises, 14 electrical reuse organisations 
and 11 waste management companies (WMCs). The remainder of 
responses came from individuals, central government and staff 
associations.24
                                                            
compliance within the existing regulations.” Department for Business Innovations & 
Skills, Implementation of the WEEE Recast Directive 2012/19/EC and changes to the 
UK WEEE system (April 2013) 4. 
23  Department for Business Innovation & Skills, “Implementation of the WEEE Recast 
Directive 2012/19/EU and Changes to the UK Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE) System: Consultation”, April 2013 (2013). 
24  Department for Business Innovation & Skills, “Implementation of the WEEE Recast 
Directive 2012/19/EU and Changes to the UK Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment (WEEE) System: Summary of Responses to Consultation”, August 2013 
(2013) 6. 
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Perhaps questions concerning the preferences of consumers for options of 
disposal of old EEE (such as locations, schedules, types of WEEE), effective 
communication channels, and information being made available, among other 
factors, would contribute to an enhancement of the results of the WEEE system. 
Ensuring a greater involvement of consumers in the lawmaking process would 
increase their awareness of the essential role they have in the structure of the 
WEEE system. When end-users are not aware or engaged with the take-back 
system of WEEE, it leads to poor collection rates, which, in turn, result in 
unsatisfactory treatment, recycling and reuse rates. 
3.2  The Dutch transposition of the WEEE directives 
In 2004, the European WEEE Directive introduced legislation for e-waste take-
back systems which were to be implemented into Member States’ national legal 
framework no later than August 2006. Apart from Greece, the Netherlands was 
the only Member State to meet the deadline, achieved when the WEEE Directive 
was transposed to national law on 13 August 2004, causing no major impact 
caused on the Dutch system for WEEE Management. The explanation for a much 
simpler process than in most of the EU lies in the fact that the Netherlands was 
one of the pioneers of e-waste legislation, having had the concept of producer 
responsibility of electrical and electronic equipment exist in Dutch regulations 
since 1999, when a nation-wide system for the collection and recycling of end-of-
life EEE was set up. The Dutch government25 adds to the explanation the 
argument that the Directive was broadly inspired by the Dutch approach which, 
to some extent, contributed to a rather simple adaptation process of the national 
laws.  
The Disposal of White and Brown Goods Decree, published in 1998,26 established 
the requirements for the system to be based on; legislation which outlined the 
responsibilities of the producers with regard to waste electrical electronic 
equipment. However, there has been a strong influence from producers in the 
history of this decree. In 1989, white and brown goods were already identified as 
a special waste category in Dutch environmental policy. Further, in 1992 the 
Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), in the 
context of attempts to reduce waste and the recycling of materials, sought an 
agreement with producers and suppliers of white and brown goods concerning the 
disposal of their products. From 1992 to 1994, a process of intense negotiations 
                                                            
25  Ministerie van Infrastructuur en Milieu, “Handboek EU-milieubeleid en Nederland. De 
omzetting in nationale regelgeving” <http://www.infomil.nl/onderwerpen/ integrale/ 
handboek-eu/afval/afgedankte/omzetting-nationale/> accessed 13 April 2015. 
26  Staatsblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, “Jaargang 1998 Nr. 238 Gepubliceerd 
op 28 april 1998. Besluit  van 21 april 1998, houdende vaststelling van regels voor het 
na gebruik innemen en verwerken van wit- en bruingoed” (Besluit verwijdering wit- en 
bruingoed) http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0009561/geldigheidsdatum_18-03-2015# 
accessed 13 April 2015. 
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took place among members of the target group, the government, and third parties. 
Nevertheless, the goal of the process – the signature of a covenant – was not 
achieved. The outcome was influenced by the fact that producers were aware of 
the rising concern of other Member States on the matter. To settle for Dutch 
legislation on the matter would most likely force producers to adapt twice, thus 
leading to the choice to wait for homogeneous legislation defined at a European 
level, instead of having to adjust to a Dutch law which soon would be replaced 
and which would lead to extra costs. 
Producers managed to prevent the new regulations at that moment. Even so, 
despite the frustrated attempt to sign an agreement with producers, the 
establishment of national regulations for an electronic waste management system 
came a few years later. Pressured by the need of regulating the matter and the EU 
Directive to come – which would represent a difficult process of transposition 
unless an already ongoing system was already established – the government had 
this strategy clear in its agenda and followed with the intent of regulating the 
management of WEEE and drafted the Disposal of White and Brown Goods 
Decree. The Decree came into force on the 1st of January 1999 and obliged the 
sector to set up a system for the disposal of white and brown goods in cooperation 
with the municipal authorities and distributors.27
In the coming years, a considerable amount of effort from the government for 
consulting and involving producers took place. This was due to a great concern 
on effective compliance of producers to the new regulations, and therefore, it 
became a main focus of the new Dutch environmental policy at the time. 
4. Supply, demand, and their influence on new legislation 
The increase in productivity and standards of living during the past two hundred 
years have far exceeded those that had been reached so far by the previous two 
millennia. Markets have played a central role – though so have governments – on 
this unprecedented speed. The power of markets in the global scenario, “whether 
for good or evil”, is undeniably vast. According to key economic concepts, market 
economies are driven by the main forces of supply and demand,28 and a 
counterbalancing reaction to the power that markets represent is the practice 
pursued by governments to repeatedly have them controlled and moderated, as 
much as reality allows for. The focus has been to have markets working to the 
benefit of most citizens and, for this, laws have been created and enhanced, 
                                                            
27  H Bressers, E Immerzeel and JJ Ligteringen, “The Disposal of White and Brown 
Goods” in M. de Clercq (ed.), Negotiating Environmental Agreements in Europe: 
critical factors for success (Edward Elgar Publishing 2002) 218-240. 
28 See e.g. PR Gregory and RC Stuart, “Comparing Economic Systems in the Twenty-
First Century” (South-Western CENGAGE Learning 2004). 
 Environmental Laws and Economic Agents’ Influence
 
  235 
dedicating special concern for consumer and environmental legislation.29
Nevertheless, this has been a never-ending struggle. 
Naturally, in the lawmaking process for new legislation considerable pressure 
from competing interests is present every step of the way: from work group 
meetings and debates to voting procedures. Stakeholders such as governments, 
industry, local communities, and ecologists play greater and smaller roles in 
shaping new laws in the most favourable possible way to protect the interests they 
stand for. 
The balanced approach for the involvement of supply and demand in the dynamics 
of lawmaking in this field of law derives from empirical observation of the cases 
mentioned in this article, connected by the concepts of “bounded rationality”30
and the political discussion of “democratic deficit”.31 The observation that 
competing wills are not always perceived nor granted equally, but instead are 
recognized according to the level of influence of its players, lead to an observation 
of whether balance would be desirable or what the risks are of ignoring the 
balance. In theory, the regulator assures that the lawmaking process will produce 
legislation in the public interest. In reality, the outcome can be good regulation 
that is complied with, but it may also result in a representation of the interests of 
those with the resources and ability to advance their interests over other groups.  
The development of modern environmental law has been linked to the economic 
development of society. In this sense, the significance of engaging industry in the 
discussions must not be underestimated, especially if one considers that their 
participation can possibly assert more influence – and more adherence – on an 
environmental issue than a treaty ever could. As a consequence, States are more 
likely to comply with the demands presented by corporations due to their essential 
role in the economic development of a national market economy. At the same 
                                                            
29  JE Stiglitz, “Introduction” in From Cairo to Wall Street: Voices from the Global Spring
(The New Press 2012) 19. 
30  Bounded rationality is a school of thought about decision making that includes the 
subjective expected-utility variant of rational choice to the comprehensively rational 
economic and decision theory models of choice (integrating risk and uncertainty to the 
model). The model of “Bounded Rationality” was brought by Herbert A. Simon (in the 
1940s and 1950s) who critiqued the existing theories of public administration and 
proposed a new approach for the study of organizational decision making. A major 
implication of the approach is that behavior is determined by the mix of incentives 
facing the decision maker, as explained by Jones. BD Jones, “Bounded Rationality”, 
Annual Review of Political Science 2:297–321 (1999) 298-299.
31   Throughout the years, trust levels seem to have eroded in a number of democratic 
governments. The existence of a democratic deficit is a result of the fact that 
expectations about democracy have continued to rise, while satisfaction about the way 
democracy functions has, at best, remained the same. For more see also P Norris, 
“Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited” (Cambridge University Press 2011). 
On Lawmaking and Public Trust
236 
time, industry can also make environmentally friendly processes mandatory, 
thereby creating a beneficial effect on environmental issues.32
Under the understanding that the supply is already structured in a successful way 
to promote its private interests, Coston argues that, “ideally, support to the 
demand side would assure that there is sufficient competition among these special 
interests that capture of state and local resources and power is prevented.”33
Certainly the strength and effectiveness of the demand side will depend on the 
ability of civil society actors to aggregate interests and articulate preferences, 
combined with the creation and strengthening of institutions that bridge civil 
society actors and lawmakers. With respect to civil society and its role played in 
democracy, a healthy and active civil society is a necessary complement to 
political representation at the regional and national level. 
Since the early years of the twentieth century, there have been attempts to 
understand the interest groups phenomenon and to predict actions and outcomes. 
The behaviour of different pressure groups are deeply connected to public trust in 
policy, and naturally, the lawmaking process. It has been a concern of theories in 
the field of sociology and economics, which have discussed the dispute of groups 
of interests and their influence over policies in the social sciences. The next topic 
approaches these theories in order to bring some light to the discussion brought 
by the influence of the manufacturers of electric and electronic equipment in the 
cases mentioned in section 3. 
4.1  Regulatory capture theory 
One of the consequences of globalization is that governments have become far 
more vulnerable to different kinds of economic pressure. Even though they 
continue as significant players, dealing with global and local forces, they are no 
longer the only relevant players in the international arena ever since multinational 
corporations have been established. In this changing scenario, levels of public and 
private power are layered by networks of different actors, and rules derive not 
only from states, but also from private entities.34
Regulatory capture is one of the theories that approach the existing issues 
mentioned in the previous section of this paper. Over the years it has been adapted 
                                                            
32  M Eving-Chow and D Soh, “Pain, Gain, or Shame: The Evolution of Environmental 
Law and the Role of Multinational Corporations”, Indiana Journal of Global Legal 
Studies, Vol. 16, Issue 1 (2009) 195-222, 207. 
33  JM Coston, “Administrative avenues to democratic governance: the balance of supply 
and demand”, Public Administration and Development 18, 479-493 (1998) 483. 
34  AC Aman, “Globalization, Democracy, and the Need for a New Administrative Law”, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 10, Issue 1 (2003) 125-155, 136. 
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and taken a broader view35 from its original contribution, but nonetheless, it is a 
valid theory to explain and understand the influence of interest groups in 
regulations. Laffont and Tirole36 argue that the origin of the regulatory capture 
theory can be traced back to Marx and to the early twentieth century political 
scientists’ view that big businesses control institutions.  
According to one of the main authors on regulatory capture – George Stigler – 
regulation, as a rule, is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated 
primarily for its benefit.37 The explanation is that regulatory authorities mostly 
rely on information provided by the firms they regulate since it is virtually 
impossible for the regulatory authorities to have as much information as the firms 
in any other way than that. This practice provides an advantage for the firms to 
find ways to conduce the regulators to enforce regulations which, in the end, 
protect profits. In that sense, regulators find themselves “captured” by the very 
firms they are supposed to regulate. Therefore, although regulation – in its 
ultimate goal – is about controlling market entry, it is still made by politicians 
who make their decisions based not only on public policy goals,38 but also on 
lobbying, here understood in a broader sense as organized groups promoting their 
interests. 
For instance, a classical example is the case of regulations for appliance efficiency 
standards, more specifically, for washing machines.39 In the United States, 
                                                            
35  As explained by Laffont and Tirole, Stigler’s theory inferred that members of an 
industry have more incentives than dispersed consumers with a low per capita stake to 
organize themselves and affect the regulatory outcome. The emergence of some 
powerful consumer groups and the regulatory experience of the seventies led the 
academic profession to take a broader view of Stigler’s theory, that allows government 
officials to arbitrate among competing interests and not always in favor of business. 
JJ. Laffont and J. Tirole, “The politics of government decision-making: a theory of 
regulatory capture”, 106 (4) The Quartely Journal of Economics (1991) 1089-1127, 
1090. 
36  JJ. Laffont and J. Tirole, “The politics of government decision-making: a theory of 
regulatory capture”, 106 (4) The Quartely Journal of Economics (1991) 1089-1127, 
1089. 
37  G Stigler, “The Theory of Economic Regulation”, A Schiffrin and E Kircher-Allen 
(eds), The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2(1) (1971) 3–21. 
38  Birkland’s definition for public policy “as a statement by government – at whatever 
level – of what it intends to do about a public problem. Such statements can be found 
in the Constitution, statutes, regulation, case law (that is, court decisions), agency or 
leadership decisions, or even in changes in the behavior of government officials at all 
levels. […] Because we also define public policy as what government chooses not to 
do, the lack of a definitive statement of policy may be evidence of an implicit policy.” 
TA Birkland, An Introduction to the Policy Process: Theories, Concepts and Models of 
Public Policy Making (Taylor & Francis 2011) 9. 
39  Example taken place in the United States of America, concerning regulations for 
washing machines which were mostly drafted by the manufactures. Mentioned by 
Former Government official and professor at George Washington University: 
Susan Dudley. S Dudley, “What is Regulatory Capture” (The Center for Economic 
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manufacturers – by making use of their lobbyists – pressured for new regulations 
that would forbid washing machines which made use of too much water. The new 
regulation brought many of the ideas and arguments presented by the 
manufactures’ lobbyists and still seemed to be favouring consumers and the 
environment. However, this is only at a first sight, as with closer analysis of the 
situation reveals, the new machines that actually did not use too much water were 
significantly more expensive than the pre-existing ones which used more water. 
Before the new regulations, when consumers were presented with the low water-
consumption machines – a more expensive product – they were not interested in 
the product due to its high pricing, and preferred the cheaper ones which used 
more water. With the ban of the cheaper ones – as those did not achieve the new 
water consuming standards – consumers were deprived of their freedom of choice. 
At the same time, manufacturers’ concerns regarding consumer preference were 
no longer a problem. 
As one may learn from this example, it is possible that even though regulations 
enacted by regulatory agencies may seem to bring benefit to the consumer, if their 
evolution processes are observed closer, their implications will evidence 
favouring private industries rather than public interest. Real examples, such as the 
one mentioned above, are evidence that Stigler’s arguments in the theory of 
regulatory capture can be considered to understand current situations. 
A possible contribution to be considered for the prevention of “capture” of public 
institutions could be, therefore, the use of instruments to include consumers’ 
information (contributions) along with the data provided by industry (producers). 
Such instruments would provide the legislator with more complete – and balanced 
– information. The relevance of the information brought to the legislator relates 
to the concept of “bounded rationality” and the theories explained in the next 
section of this article. In the same vein, as explained by Coston: 
The essence of effective democratic governance is achieving an appropriate 
balance among interested parties such that the losses are minimized. Such 
a compromise is not possible if the state lacks the capacity to respond to the 
demands collectively, rather than putting out fires for short-term gain or 
responding only to the most vocal powerholders.40
To make a strategic institutional structure available to favour more room for 
citizens – “the least vocal powerholders” – to have their interests represented and 
balance the sometimes excessively influencing power of industry that could lead 
to regulatory capture, these are issues to be considered, and future studies could 
focus on possible structures to approach the matter exposed here. 
                                                            
Liberty 2012) http://centerforeconomicliberty.blogspot.de/2012/01/what-is-regulatory-
capture.html  accessed 29 July 2015. 
40  Coston (n33) 486. 
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4.2  Group politics theories 
Group politics theories begin by acknowledging the fact that the State is 
composed of actors, both institutional and non-institutional ones, and these are a 
product of a complex set of historical, social-economic, and political, among 
other, contexts. The theories also rely on the idea of the existence of different 
groups with competing sets of interests having the State acting as a control 
mechanism. 
One of the central matters of policy-making is the need for decisions to be made, 
decisions which will also result in lawmaking. However, the process for making 
decisions is based on information and, as described by the concept of “bounded 
rationality”,41 information is limited, especially considering that within the reality 
of different groups disputing, only a few are invited to join the discussion and 
provide their piece of information. As explained by the incremental models,42
decisions tend to be made on the basis of inadequate information and low levels 
of understanding. The outcome, as expected, could be no different: decisions 
based on information – and interests – provided only by “an elite” of groups.43
Although in a broader scope, Coston explained the problems of allowing for 
participation of more actors other than the public authority in a very enlightening 
way.
It would seem that government performance can be enhanced by delegating 
functions to more efficient and effective actors and by entertaining the 
demands of constituents. So what's the problem? A serious danger exists 
that the state may come to be perceived as the problem only, and not a 
source of solution and/or contribution. The reality is not so simple. Yes, 
delegation or privatization can enhance efficiency and effectiveness, but 
perhaps not in all circumstances and not for all functions. Yes, public sector 
performance can be enhanced through pressure from its constituents, if 
there are credible options for exit and voice and, especially, if government 
has the capacity to respond to these demands. In short, while citizens need 
                                                            
41  The concept of bounded rationality considers that decision makers work under three 
unavoidable constraints: (1) only limited, often unreliable, information is available 
regarding possible alternatives and their consequences, (2) human mind has only 
limited capacity to evaluate and process the information that is available, and (3) only 
a limited amount of time is available to make a decision. Therefore, even individuals 
who intend to make rational choices are bound to make “satisficing” (rather than 
maximizing or optimizing) choices in complex situations. Proposed by the US Nobel-
laureate economist Herbert Simon (1916-2001) in his 1982 book “Models Of Bounded 
Rationality And Other Topics In Economics.” <http://www.businessdictionary. 
com/definition/bounded-rationality.html#ixzz3hNznQVWs> accessed 30 July 2015. 
42  For more information see D Braybrooke and C Lindblom, A strategy of decision: policy 
evaluation as a political process (Collier Macmillan 1963). 
43  A Heywood, Politics (Palgarve Macmillan 2002) 401. 
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to demand, governments need to respond; both are capable of some supply; 
and none of these should be taken for granted.44
In an ideal scenario, either no interest group should be providing information for 
the decision-makers – who in turn would be responsible for producing their own 
sources of neutral information – or, what is proposed by pluralist theories,45 all 
interest groups are given equal ability to participate in the debate. In the same 
direction, Heywood46 explains that the core theme of pluralism is that political 
power is fragmented and widely dispersed. Consequently, decisions are made 
through a complex process of bargaining and interaction that ensures that the 
views and interests of a large number of groups are taken into account. This 
bargaining and involvement of industry into environmental legislation has been 
mostly successful and resulted, in most cases, in good legislation and good 
compliance.47 However, when legislation and its compliance also includes actors 
that were not part of the negotiations, a “sub-optimal” implementation level is 
noticed.48
Arthur Bentley was one of the first and most prominent authors to develop a 
pluralist “group theory” by emphasizing that organized groups are the 
fundamental building blocks of the political process. According to Bentley, 
“[w]hen the groups are adequately stated, everything is stated”.49 The 
development of neo-pluralism and more arguments to study the phenomenon 
carried on as the power of major corporations (business groups) arising since the 
50’s increased the concerns of political scientists focusing on the existence of a 
privileged position enjoyed by some business groups, and the negative effect it 
causes to democratic societies.50
   
5. Conclusions  
Based on the observations from both the drafting process of the WEEE Directives, 
and their national implementations in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, 
in addition to the interpretation brought by the theories explained in section 4, it 
becomes clear that interest groups are strong players capable of influencing the 
                                                            
44  Coston, (n33) 480. 
45  R Hague and M Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics (Palgarve Macmillan 
2004) 177. 
46  Heywood (n43) 273 – 274. 
47 See JK Levit, “Bottom-up lawmaking: The Private origins of Transnational Law”, 
Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 15, Issue 1 (2008) 49-73. 
48 See examples of the implementation in the UK and the Netherlands mentioned further 
in this article. 
49  The text makes reference to A Bentley, “The Process of Government: a study of social 
pressures”, (The University of Chicago Press 1908) 208. 
50  R Dahl, Who Governs? (1961). For “neopluralism” originating from Dahl’s pluralism 
model also see JK Galbraith, The New Industrial State (1985) and CE Lindblom, The 
Intelligence of Democracy  (1965). 
 Environmental Laws and Economic Agents’ Influence
 
  241 
drafting process of new legislation for e-waste. It is also noticeable that the 
strongest and most organized players promoting their interests on the WEEE 
systems – producers and, to some extent, distributors – have caused relevant 
influence in the processes that have led to the WEEE Directives and national laws 
for e-waste in the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. In that sense, the power 
of pressure groups over the legislator should be of greater concern and monitored, 
even though when seeking to protect their own interests it has been noticed that 
producers can also promote positive effects on legislation on environmental 
protection (e.g. regulations on washing machines). 
Consumers do not directly influence the legislation making process of e-waste 
regulations at the same pace or strength that producers and distributors do. As 
explained by the theories, with the instruments currently available to each side 
(supply and demand), it is easier to lobby for the interests of few than interests of 
many. Although the demand side of the market economy – for purposes of this 
article, understood as the consumers of EEE – can influence legislation by their 
preferences in shopping, this, when added to the democratic elections of their 
representatives, is still of minor power when compared to the performance of big 
firms (producers). There is great difficulty for direct representation to become 
stronger51 and organized. It has been noted that it is far more unlikely for 
consumers to be invited by the regulator to the discussion table and directly52
participate in the negotiations of new regulations.  
So far, in the dynamics of the WEEE system, it has been observed that even 
though consumers are of key importance for the success of the system itself, they 
have not been directly involved in the shaping process of its laws. In order for a 
more balanced representation of interests to be reached, it should be of concern 
that all are present to contribute to the discussions. A model somewhat closer to 
the framework proposed by the pluralist model, where all groups would be given 
room at the discussion table, to provide information and, along with it, to promote 
their interests in a direct way, seems to offer the most balanced representation of 
supply and demand sides of the economy in economic decisions and new 
regulations. 
                                                            
51  The influence power of an interest group, as stated by Rod Hague and Marin Harrop, 
relies on four of its main features: sanctions, legitimacy, membership and resources. 
Namely, those represent 1) the ability of a group to invoke sanctions (such as take 
investments elsewhere or go on strike); 2) a high degree of legitimacy, prestige, is more 
likely to prevail on particular issues; 3) high penetration (high density of membership) 
increases influence; 4) although resources available are relevant, “money talks but not 
always loudly”. R Hague and M Harrop, “Comparative Government and Politics” 
(Palgarve Macmillan 2004) 175. 
52  On regulatory capture theory members of industry have more incentives than dispersed 
consumers with a low per capita stake to organize to exercise political influence. 
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Therefore, better representation of the interests of consumers, who are also 
economic agents and relevant pieces of the dynamics of the WEEE management 
system, could increase the success rates of collection, treatment, recycling and 
reuse of WEEE, as compliance levels could increase. In the same direction, it is 
important to remember the central role of consumer protection within the EU set 
out in Article 153 of the Treaty.53 According to the Treaty, “the interests of 
consumers at EU level require that all markets across the European Member States 
(collectively the "internal market") work effectively. For the market to work 
effectively it should be competitive and deliver a fair deal for consumers. A 
competitive and efficiently regulated market provides the greatest opportunity for 
business and delivers the choice, low prices, innovation and better service that 
consumers desire.”54
These statements show that environmental regulations are strongly influenced by 
the interests and negotiations among the stakeholders involved. A level playing 
field to be offered for all presents itself as a way of approximating regulation to 
all players in the market economy, not only the strongest ones (the 'supply side of 
the market economy'). A change in these dynamics could provide more positive 
results for the WEEE management system and place it a step closer to a more 
symbiotic interrelationship between (environmental) law and the economy. 
                                                            
53  OJ C 325, 24/12/2002 0101. Treaty establishing the European Community - Part Three: 
Community policies - Title XIV: Consumer protection - Article 153 - Article 129a - EC 
Treaty (Maastricht consolidated version) Article 153. In order to promote the interests 
of consumers and to ensure a high level of consumer protection, the Community shall 
contribute to protecting the health, safety and economic interests of consumers, as well 
as to promoting their right to information, education and to organize themselves in order 
to safeguard their interests. 2. Consumer protection requirements shall be taken into 
account in defining and implementing other Community policies and activities. 3. The 
Community shall contribute to the attainment of the objectives referred to in paragraph 
1 through: (a) measures adopted pursuant to Article 95 in the context of the completion 
of the internal market; (b) measures which support, supplement and monitor the policy 
pursued by the Member States. 4. The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 251 and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, 
shall adopt the measures referred to in paragraph 3(b). 5. Measures adopted pursuant to 
paragraph 4 shall not prevent any Member State from maintaining or introducing more 
stringent protective measures. Such measures must be compatible with this Treaty. The 
Commission shall be notified of them. 
54  European Commission, Health and Consumers “Safeguarding Consumers' Interests” 





Five Lessons from the Low Countries 
Marc Hertogh*
1.  Introduction  
In the classic model of the Rechtsstaat, public lawmaking and public trust are 
strongly interconnected. Governments can only be effective if citizens trust their 
institutions. Moreover, citizens trust their government when they can participate 
in political decision-making through elected representative bodies and when 
government decisions are bound by clear and explicit rules. This model is based 
on two important assumptions. First, all laws are made by the state, which acts as 
the sole and central legislator. Second, as long as the legislator acts in accordance 
with public law, this will automatically generate public trust in government.  
In this volume, both assumptions were subjected to a rigorous “reality-check”. In 
this closing chapter, I will summarize and analyse the most important results. In 
the next section (section 2), I will examine the first assumption of the classic 
Rechtsstaat-model. Are all laws still exclusively made by the central state, or can 
we also observe examples of lawmaking without a central role for the legislator? 
In section three, I will focus on the effects of lawmaking. Here, I will examine the 
second assumption. Does public lawmaking always generate public trust or are 
there also cases where lawmaking lacks legitimacy? Based on the chapters in this 
volume, I will then draw five lessons about lawmaking and public trust (section 
4). In the final section, I will draw some general conclusions and I will make some 
suggestions for rethinking our conventional ideas about lawmaking and public 
trust (section 5). 
2.  Lawmaking without the legislator? 
According to the classic model of the Rechtsstaat, the national legislator plays a 
crucial role in the lawmaking process. However, the chapters in this volume 
illustrate that this is no longer an accurate picture of reality. In many cases, the 
national legislator is no longer the sole and central lawmaker.  
Two decades ago, a group of Dutch researchers published a study in which they 
argued that the balance in lawmaking in the Netherlands was gradually shifting 
from the central government in The Hague to numerous other locations. They 
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referred to this process as “the displacement of political decision-making”.1 Their 
study identified a number of important social and political trends. Comparing the 
situation to a bathtub in which the water level is constantly dropping because the 
bathwater is leaking away through several holes in the bath, they argued that these 
trends would result in a situation in which most lawmaking would no longer be 
carried out by the national legislator, but rather by numerous other actors, bodies 
and institutions.  
In 1995, most of these developments were still in their early stages. In 2016, 
however, the displacement of lawmaking is no longer just an abstract scenario but 
this has become an everyday reality.2 Moreover, this development is not unique 
to the Netherlands, but echoes elements of what other authors have described as 
the rise of the “(post-) regulatory state”,3 the growth of “collaborative 
governance”4 or the development of “regulatory capitalism”.5 The chapters in this 
volume highlight three important dimensions of this development: inter-
nationalisation, juridification and privatisation.6
Internationalisation: lawmaking and the European Union 
The first trend that Bovens et al. identify is the rapidly decreasing importance of 
the national legislator against the background of a globalizing economy.7 Over 
the past few decades, we have witnessed the growing importance of “Europe” 
with an increasing number of rules and regulations from Brussels. This 
development is also clearly illustrated in this volume. 
Mendelts describes how environmental law in both the Netherlands and Germany 
is influenced by the European Habitats Directive.  
Jans and Outhuijse demonstrate how access to justice in German administrative 
law is influenced by the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
                                                            
1  M. Bovens et al., De verplaatsing van de politiek: een agenda voor democratische 
vernieuwing. Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting 1995. 
2 See, e.g., J. van Erp & P. Mascini (eds.), Contextualizing regulatory governance
(special issue), Recht der Werkelijkheid 2014 (3). 
3  C. Scott, “Regulation in the age of governance: the rise of the post-regulatory state”, in: 
J. Jordana & D. Levi-Faur (eds.), The politics of regulation. Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elgar 2004, p. 145-174. 
4  C. Ansell & A. Gash, “Collaborative governance in theory and practice”, Journal of 
public administration research and theory 2008 (8), p. 543-572. 
5  D. Levi-Faur, “The regulatory state and regulatory capitalism: an institutional 
perspective”, in: D. Levi-Faur (ed.), Handbook on the politics of regulation.
Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar 2011, p. 662-672. 
6  In their report, Bovens et. al also identified three additional trends: regionalisation, 
bureaucratisation, and the rise of technology. These are also important trends in the 
Netherlands, but they are not discussed separately in this volume. 
7 See Bovens et al., op.cit., p. 14. 
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Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Affairs 
(Aarhus Convention). 
Más shows how environmental law and policy both in the Netherlands and in the 
UK is shaped by European regulation, such as the Waste Electrical and Electronic 
Equipment Directives (WEEE Directives). 
Juridification: lawmaking and the courts 
According to Bovens et al., a second trend is the growing importance of (national 
and international) courts in lawmaking.8 Both the growing emancipation of 
individual citizens and the fact that formal lawmaking is often a very complex and 
slow process can lead to a situation in which an increasing number of important 
social and political conflicts are no longer decided in Parliament but rather in a 
courtroom. Several chapters in this volume illustrate this process of juridification. 
Jans and Outhuijse analyse the response of the German legislator and courts in 
relation to their obligation under the Aarhus Convention to broaden access to 
justice for environmental organisations. In their first case study (on access to 
justice for environmental organisations), they examine how the German legislator 
created new rules in order to align German administrative procedural law with its 
international EU obligations. They refer to this process as “front-door” 
lawmaking. However, in their second case study, it was no longer the legislator 
but rather the highest German administrative court that made the final decision. 
According to Jans and Outhuijse, this case is a good example of “back-door” 
lawmaking, in which the court effectively acts as a “quasi-legislator”.  
Mendelts discusses the important role played by national courts in the 
interpretation of open norms in European Directives. Based on several cases 
regarding the levels of nitrogen deposition on so-called Nature 2000 sites, he 
shows that Dutch and German courts have developed two widely diverging 
interpretations of one of the key provisions of the EU Habitats Directive. 
Lubach looks at the importance of supranational dispute resolution and, in 
particular, the growing impact of arbitration. Following the German 
“Atomausstieg” (exit from nuclear energy), the energy company Vattenfall 
decided to sue Germany before the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID), which is connected to the World Bank. He argues 
that this procedure (as well as other forms of arbitration related to the TTIP-treaty) 
may ultimately lead to tensions between European and national regulations. 
De Ridder discusses the effects of juridification on the way in which public 
officials may contribute to administrative justice. In his view, the increasing role 
                                                            
8 See Bovens et al., op.cit., p. 19. 
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of the courts in administrative decision-making may also have some negative side-
effects. He argues that “if compliance and judge-resistance are the prime 
standards for the quality of a decision, the intrinsic motivation to come up with a 
just solution is accordingly reduced”. He refers to this as the “crowding out effect 
of juridification”. 
De Graaf and Marseille look at the way in which the mandatory objective 
procedure provided for by Dutch administrative law gradually became more 
juridified during the first decade following its implementation. Although the 
legislator intended the objection procedure to be flexible and informal (and, 
possibly, an alternative for administrative adjudication), in practice most 
members of the municipal external advisory committees were lawyers. As a result, 
many of the hearings of the municipal advisory committees started to resemble 
those of the administrative courts. Moreover, these committees primarily focused 
on issues of legality and gave hardly any attention to other aspects of the original 
administrative decision, such as effectiveness and reasonableness.  
Privatisation: lawmaking and civil society  
A third important development is the shift from public to private lawmaking (or a 
mix of these two). Corporations, NGOs and other private actors have become 
increasingly important in the regulation of public interests.9 In many areas, this 
has led to a shift from (public) government to (private) governance. Consequently, 
civil society is not just a passive “receiver” of rules and regulations adopted by a 
national legislator, but an active “co-producer” of public policy. Several chapters 
in this volume demonstrate what this development looks like in everyday practice. 
Winter and Klein Haarhuis explain that, in recent years, the character of 
lawmaking has changed rapidly. In the past, legislation used to be a “vertically 
structured process” which only involved government ministries, the Cabinet and 
Parliament. More recently, they observe “the emergence of countless forms of 
societal dialogue and stakeholder consultation”. For instance, several forms of 
social consultation (including internet consultation with several target groups) 
take place at the drafting stage of new legislation while, at the implementation 
stage, several (government and societal) organisations contribute in the form of 
implementation and enforcement checks. 
Bröring and Cherednychenko discuss several examples of principles-based 
regulation in the financial sector. Given the high degree of complexity and 
innovation involved in the financial services industry, legislation cannot achieve 
its regulatory objectives without open norms. In their chapter, they look at several 
examples of open norms in the Dutch legislation concerning the financial sector, 
including the duty to supply information that is accurate, clear and not misleading; 
                                                            
9 See Bovens et al., op.cit., p. 18. 
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the duty to lend responsibly; and the general duty of care. In all three examples, 
it is up to the financial services industry to fill in the details of these norms. 
Schwitters and Vonk analyse an important shift in the rationale of the welfare 
state. Historically, the focus was on a system of social rights and universal 
entitlements but, over the past decades, the focus has shifted to responsibilities 
and restrictive conditions. As part of this development, the role of the legislator is 
decreasing while the role of civil society and individual citizens (sometimes 
summarized as the “participation society”) is increasing.  
According to Tollenaar, social security is by definition a combination of public 
and private legal regulation. Yet, he argues, in the past two decades public 
regulation has retreated to make more room for private instruments. This is 
reflected, for instance, in the contracting out of social services and in the creation 
of a market that enhances competition between public and private providers. 
Westerman discusses the practice of goal-legislation (or principles-based 
regulation). Here, the legislator no longer issues detailed legislation that 
prescribes how citizens should act. Instead, the law merely indicates the goal to 
be achieved. Also, the law commissions other (public or private) parties to 
concretise this goal in more detailed rule-making. Westerman characterises this 
approach to legislation as a form of “outsourcing regulation”.  
Más focuses on lawmaking on a European level. In her chapter she describes how 
both the drafting and the implementation of the European Waste Electrical and 
Electronic Equipment Directives (WEEE Directives) include several 
consultations and working group meetings with important stakeholders. These 
Directives are not exclusively drafted by public officials, but (at least on paper) 
they are the result of intensive consultations with private companies, 
environmental organizations and consumers. 
3.  Lawmaking without legitimacy? 
Public trust is often seen as an important indicator of public legitimacy.10 The 
classic model of the Rechtsstaat assumes that, as long as the legislator acts in 
accordance with public law, this will automatically generate public trust in 
government. However, several authors in this volume question the legitimacy of 
public lawmaking. Their chapters describe, for example, “urgent problems of 
legitimacy” (Schwitters and Vonk), a “crisis of trust” in the financial markets 
(Bröring & Cherednychenko) and a “democratic deficit” in the EU (Zeegers). 
Recent survey data support these findings. Although the level of public trust in 
                                                            
10 See, e.g., J. Jackson and J.M. Gau, “Carving up concepts? Differentiating between trust 
and legitimacy in public attitudes towards legal authority”, in: E. Schockley et al. (Eds.),
Interdisciplinary perspectives on trust: towards theoretical and methodological 
integration. Heidelberg etc.: Springer 2016, p. 49-69.  
On Law Making and Public Trust
248 
 
the government and the courts in the Netherlands may still seem quite high from 
a comparative perspective, these surveys demonstrate that the (perceived) 
legitimacy of public institutions has become more contested. 
Public trust in government 
In the 1990s, public trust in government was still high in the Netherlands. At the 
turn of the century, however, public opinion surveys started to show a remarkable 
disruption of this trend.11 A sharp decline in public trust, sharper than in most 
other countries, started in 2001. In 1997, 66 per cent of the population reported 
trusting the national parliament. By 2004, that number had dropped to 45 per cent. 
In the same period, the percentage of the population that reported trusting the 
government fell from 68 to 38 percent. Finally, in 1998, two-thirds of the 
population thought that the Dutch government was doing a good job. However, 
by the end of 2004, this number had fallen to less than a third of the population. 
Yet, according to some commentators, the “Dutch drop” in public trust may be 
largely explained by temporary factors (such as strong fluctuations in the 
economy and dissatisfaction with the incumbent cabinet).12
Recent data from the Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) indicate 
that, at present, about 50 percent of the Dutch population have (some) trust in 
government and around 45 percent have (some) trust in Parliament.13 When asked 
to express their level of trust on a scale from 1-10, the overall score for 
government was 5.1 (4.7 for respondents with a lower education and 5.7 for those 
with a higher education).14 In general terms, there is wide support for the Dutch 
democratic system. However, researchers also emphasize that there is more 
support for the way in which the political system protects individual rights and 
freedoms than for the process of political decision-making and the responsiveness 
of the political system.15 This is also reflected in a recent study by the Dutch 
Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR). In a representative survey 
among some 1,300 people in the Netherlands, only a quarter of all respondents 
(25%) agreed that “Usually, the government listens closely to what citizens want”. 
By contrast, nearly two thirds (64%) of them said: “I don’t think that Members of 
                                                            
11 See, e.g., F. Hendriks, “Contextualizing the Dutch drop in political trust: connecting 
underlying factors”, International review of administrative sciences 2009 (3), p. 473-
492; T. van der Meer, “In what we trust? A multi-level study into trust in Parliament as 
an evaluation of state characteristics”, International review of administrative sciences
2010 (3), p. 517-536. 
12  M. Bovens & A. Wille, “Deciphering the Dutch drop: ten explanations for decreasing 
political trust in the Netherlands”, International review of administrative sciences 2008 
(2), p. 283-305. 
13  P. Dekker, P. van Houwelingen & T. van der Meer, Continue Onderzoek 
Burgerperspectieven 2015/3. The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 2015, p. 3. 
14  Dekker, Van Houwelingen & Van der Meer, op. cit., p. 35. 
15  P. Dekker & J. den Ridder, “Publieke opinie”, in: R. Bijl et al. (red.), De sociale staat 
van Nederland 2015. The Hague: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 2015, p. 73. 
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Parliament and government ministers care much about what people like me 
think.” Also, 71 percent of the respondents agreed that: “People like me have no 
influence whatsoever on what the government does”.16 Finally, there is growing 
public support for more direct forms of democracy. According to one study, 80 
percent of the Dutch population is in favor of a referendum and 70 percent 
supports a directly elected mayor.17 Based on these and other data, a recent report 
concludes that the current Dutch democratic system faces “serious and persistent 
problems of legitimacy”.18
Public trust in courts 
In general terms, the overall level of public trust in the courts seems fairly high. 
The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) has reviewed a series of 
available opinion survey datasets on trust in the justice system. This evidence 
suggests a decline in trust between 1981 and 1999. While both in 1981 (65%) and 
in 1990 (63%) nearly two thirds of the Dutch population expressed a (very) high 
level of trust in the justice system, the proportion had dropped to less than half 
(48%) of the population by 1999.19 Since the late 1990s, however, this downward 
trend seems to be halted. According to the Eurobarometer, between 1997 and 
2005 the level of trust in the Dutch legal system fluctuated between 51 and 64 
percent, with no clear trend.20
Recent data indicate that, at present, 60 percent of the Dutch population has 
(some) trust in the courts. However, at closer inspection, this figure primarily 
reflects the opinion of respondents with a higher education. Among people with a 
medium level of education, only 35 percent say they trust the courts while this 
proportion drops to only 24 percent among those with a lower education.21 Other 
studies also suggest that there is considerable public criticism aimed at the courts 
in the Netherlands. For example, there is a general feeling that some judges are 
out of touch with society. One study found that a sizeable proportion of 
respondents agreed with the following statements: “Judges do not try hard enough 
to explain their decisions to the common man” (82%), “Judges decide too often 
in a way unacceptable to the ordinary citizen” (61%), and “The Dutch judge lives 
in an ivory tower”(48%).22
                                                            
16  WRR, Vertrouwen in burgers (WRR rapport nr. 88). Amsterdam: Amsterdam 
University Press 2012, p. 235. 
17  F. Hendriks et al., Bewegende beelden van democratie (Legitimiteitsmonitor 
Democratisch Bestuur 2015). The Hague: Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en 
Koninkrijksrelaties 2016, p. 29/30. 
18  Hendriks et al., op. cit, p. 16. 
19  P. Dekker & T. van der Meer, Vertrouwen in de rechtspraak nader onderzocht. Den 
Haag: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau 2007, p. 12. 
20  Dekker & Van der Meer, op. cit., p. 14. 
21  Dekker & Den Ridder, op. cit., p. 71. 
22  H. Elffers & J. de Keijser, “Different perspectives, different gaps. Does the general 
public demand a more responsive judge?”, in: H. Kury (ed.), Fear of crime - punitivity. 
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Lawmaking and contested legitimacy 
Having legitimacy means that the regulated believe that the authorities “deserve” 
to rule and make decisions that influence their lives. The survey evidence 
suggests, however, that a considerable number of people in the Netherlands no 
longer share this belief. Although the available data do not allow us to specify the 
exact scope of this phenomenon, most studies suggest that the legitimacy of both 
the government and the courts in the Netherlands is no longer self-evident but has, 
instead, become structurally contested.23 Rather than automatically accepting the 
decisions and rules of public authorities as “right” or “proper”, the survey 
evidence indicates that the Dutch first need to be convinced by these authorities 
that they “deserve” to rule. People still accept the government and the courts as 
legal, but not always as fair or just, i.e. legitimate. This explains why people still 
express some level of trust in both the government and the courts while, at the 
same time, they are critical of these institutions.24
4.  Lessons from the Low Countries 
The chapters in this volume paint a lively, but also highly complex, picture of 
lawmaking in the Netherlands (and beyond). Based on these contributions, we can 
draw five general lessons on lawmaking and public trust. 
a.  Traditional lawmaking does not automatically generate public trust 
Trust is an important social lubricant that facilitates communication and 
relationships (Beaudin). However, several chapters in this book demonstrate that 
the conventional approach to lawmaking (with the state as the sole and central 
legislator) does not automatically generate public trust (Bröring and 
Cherednychenko; Schwitters and Vonk; De Ridder). Considered from a strictly 
legal perspective, this model of “traditional lawmaking” may still be the best 
guarantee for effective and legitimate laws (Jans and Outhuijse; Tollenaar; 
Westerman). In practice, however, it is increasingly difficult for the legislator to 
write good laws without the expertise and help of other stakeholders (Winter and 
Klein Haarhuis; Más). Moreover, public opinion surveys indicate that many 
people criticize the institutions of traditional lawmaking for their lack of 
responsiveness. 
                                                            
New developments in theory and research. Bochum: Universitätsverlag Brockmeyer 
2008, p. 457. 
23  H. Weyers & M. Hertogh, Legitimiteit betwist: een verkennend literatuuronderzoek 
naar de ervaren legitimiteit van het justitieoptreden. The Hague: WODC 2007. 
24 See M. Hertogh, “The curious case of Dutch legal culture: a reassessment of survey 
evidence”, in: D. Nelken (ed.), Using legal culture. London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 
Publishing 2012, p. 189-217. 
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b.  Modern lawmaking does not automatically generate public trust 
To increase both the efficacy and legitimacy of the traditional approach, several 
alternative forms of modern lawmaking have been introduced. The most 
important feature of this alternative approach is that the national legislator plays 
a less central role. However, this book illustrates that modern governance does 
not automatically generate public trust either.  
Some chapters clearly demonstrate that several forms of modern lawmaking can 
produce more legitimate and more effective laws than traditional forms of 
lawmaking. For example, in the financial sector, more principles-based regulation 
may contribute to an increase in public trust (Bröring and Cherednychenko). Also, 
on a European level, the introduction of the European Citizens’ Initiative has 
opened up the political debate and has stimulated grassroots activism (Zeegers).  
Similar positive findings are also reported in relation to adjudication and dispute 
resolution. For example, it has been suggested that mediation is an important tool 
for “trust repair” (Beaudin). Also, judges in Dutch administrative courts 
increasingly apply ideas from the “procedural justice” literature in efforts to create 
a procedure in which all parties feel that they are being heard and that their 
position is taken seriously (De Graaf and Marseille). 
However, other chapters also point to potential adverse effects of modern 
lawmaking. For example, it has been argued that principles-based regulation may 
also lead to a lack of democratic responsiveness (Westerman). Likewise, there is 
some evidence that, although in theory modern lawmaking provides for active 
consultations with all stakeholders, in practice highly organized corporations and 
their powerful lobbies may be heard far clearer than consumers (Más). Also, the 
transfer of more power to the market may eventually produce not less but more 
rules (Schwitters and Vonk). 
c.  Legal certainty is the linking pin between lawmaking and public trust 
Given the fact that neither a traditional nor a modern approach to lawmaking will 
automatically increase public trust, it is important to identify those individual 
elements that may increase or decrease public trust. Several chapters in this 
volume suggest that legal certainty can operate as an important linking pin 
between lawmaking and public trust. For example, it has been argued that the 
Dutch practice of tacit authorization may cause legal uncertainties and thus 
undermine public trust (Hoogstra). Also, the social security system in Germany is 
said to generate more public trust than the same system in the Netherlands because 
the German legal norms are more predictable than the Dutch norms (Tollenaar). 
Furthermore, divergent court interpretations of open EU norms by national courts 
could ultimately decrease the level of legal certainty (Mendelts).  
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This volume also suggests that contemporary governance requires a modern 
approach to legal certainty. In the traditional model, the legality principle implies 
that norms must be clear and foreseeable. However, in an era of globalization, this 
approach is no longer a guarantee for public trust. While public trust presupposes 
the existence of a public authority that acts in relation to its partners in a 
trustworthy way, defending the public interest sometimes also implies a certain 
level of flexibility and the possibility of radical policy change (Lubach). 
Moreover, detailed regulation can also become an obstacle for trust-based contact 
between the administration and the administered (De Ridder). Precise and detailed 
norms on paper do not always lead to more clarity and predictability in practice.
Instead, legal certainty is – in essence – a matter of good communication (with or 
without clear and foreseeable legal norms). As a result, lawmaking may increase 
the level of legal certainty (and hence the level of public trust) by improving co-
operation between the regulator and the regulated (Bröring and Cherednychenko). 
d.  Public trust is based on reciprocity 
Several contributions to this volume demonstrate that public trust is essentially a 
two-way street. Trust is based on mutual expectations and when the expectations 
that a person has towards an organization are not reached, this may be seen as a 
“psychological contract breach” (Beaudin). So if the system loses faith in the 
citizens, the citizens may equally lose faith in the system (Schwitters and Vonk). 
In other words, when people generally tend to reciprocate expectations and to 
respond in just the same way as they are treated, there is reason to believe that, as 
a result of growing distrust in the public, public trust will dwindle as well 
(Westerman). Consequently, restoring public trust in lawmaking not only requires 
a strong commitment from the general public but also from lawmakers 
themselves. 
e.  Public trust requires both normative and empirical legitimacy 
The final lesson drawn from this book is that public trust requires both 
“normative” and “empirical” legitimacy.25 The “normative” aspect of legitimacy 
refers to the legal theoretical requirements for laws and policies to be legitimate 
in relation to the fundamental characteristics of democratic constitutional states: 
rule of law, human rights and democracy. “Empirical” legitimacy refers to the 
perception of the legitimacy of laws and policies by different actors: members of 
the public, politicians, legal professionals, etc.  
Several authors in this book emphasize the importance of “normative” legitimacy 
to maintain or restore public trust. To maintain the credibility of the government, 
it is important to operate in accordance with the principles of legality, 
                                                            
25 See S. Snacken, “Legitimacy of penal policies: punishment between normative and 
empirical legitimacy”, in: A. Crawford & A. Hucklesby (eds.), Legitimacy and 
compliance in criminal justice. New York and London: Routledge 2013, p. 50-70. 
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transparency, legal certainty, inclusiveness and other central ideas of democracy 
and the rule of law (Hoogstra, Westerman, Jans and Outhuijse, Mendelts, Más). 
However, only a few authors analyse how the general public actually perceives 
the legitimacy of different laws and policies (Tollenaar, Zeegers, De Ridder). 
Although many authors simply assume that more “normative” legitimacy will 
automatically lead to more “empirical” legitimacy, most of them do not provide 
any empirical data to support this claim. As a result, many important questions 
still remain unanswered. For example, will an open and informed debate about 
the proposed alternatives for legislation really boost public trust in the option 
ultimately selected? (Winter and Klein Haarhuis) Are both the “Professional 
Treatment Model” and the “Moral Judgment Model” of administrative justice 
more likely to promote public trust in government than the “Bureaucratic 
Rationality Model”? (De Graaf and Marseille) To what extent is timely decision-
making crucial for the credibility of government? (Hoogstra) Will principles-
based legislation increase (Bröring and Cherednychenko) or decrease 
(Westerman) public trust? And will the “front-door” method of lawmaking lead 
to more public trust than the “back-door” method? (Jans and Outhuijse)  
5.  Conclusion: rethinking lawmaking and public trust 
Confucius allegedly told his disciple Tzu-kung that three things are needed for 
government: weapons, food and trust. If a ruler can’t hold on to all three, he should 
give up the weapons first and the food next. Trust should be safeguarded to the 
end: without trust there can be no government at all.26 Public lawmaking and 
public trust are strongly interconnected in the classic model of the Rechtsstaat.
However, the chapters in this book question two important assumptions of this 
model. First, this book illustrates the increasing role of the European Union, of 
the courts and of civil society in lawmaking. As a result, the national legislator is 
no longer the sole and central lawmaker. Second, this volume shows that public 
lawmaking does not always generate public trust. Both findings challenge us to 
rethink our conventional ideas about lawmaking and public trust.   
We may use the lessons from this book to help us set up an agenda for future 
research. Future studies may benefit from a more critical perspective. What are 
some of the strengths and weaknesses of both traditional and modern forms of 
lawmaking? And why do both forms of lawmaking not automatically generate 
public trust? Moreover, researchers should work towards a multidisciplinary
approach, which combines methods from both law and the social sciences. What 
are some of the most important developments in lawmaking on paper and in 
practice? And how will future lawmaking contribute to both the “normative” and 
the “empirical” legitimacy of public institutions?
                                                            
26 See O. O’Neill, A question of trust (The BBC Reith Lectures 2002). Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press 2002, p. 3. 
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